the critique of pure reason-第95章

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　　Of　the　Ultimate　End　of　the　Natural　Dialectic　of　Human　Reason。



　　The　ideas　of　pure　reason　cannot　be；　of　themselves　and　in　their　own

nature；　dialectical；　it　is　from　their　misemployment　alone　that

fallacies　and　illusions　arise。　For　they　originate　in　the　nature　of

reason　itself；　and　it　is　impossible　that　this　supreme　tribunal　for　all

the　rights　and　claims　of　speculation　should　be　itself　undeserving　of

confidence　and　promotive　of　error。　It　is　to　be　expected；　therefore；

that　these　ideas　have　a　genuine　and　legitimate　aim。　It　is　true；　the

mob　of　sophists　raise　against　reason　the　cry　of　inconsistency　and

contradiction；　and　affect　to　despise　the　government　of　that　faculty；

because　they　cannot　understand　its　constitution；　while　it　is　to　its

beneficial　influences　alone　that　they　owe　the　position　and　the

intelligence　which　enable　them　to　criticize　and　to　blame　its

procedure。

　　We　cannot　employ　an　a　priori　conception　with　certainty；　until　we

have　made　a　transcendental　deduction　therefore。　The　ideas　of　pure

reason　do　not　admit　of　the　same　kind　of　deduction　as　the　categories。

But　if　they　are　to　possess　the　least　objective　validity；　and　to

represent　anything　but　mere　creations　of　thought　（entia　rationis

ratiocinantis）；　a　deduction　of　them　must　be　possible。　This　deduction

will　complete　the　critical　task　imposed　upon　pure　reason；　and　it　is　to

this　part　Of　our　labours　that　we　now　proceed。

　　There　is　a　great　difference　between　a　thing's　being　presented　to　the

mind　as　an　object　in　an　absolute　sense；　or　merely　as　an　ideal

object。　In　the　former　case　I　employ　my　conceptions　to　determine　the

object；　in　the　latter　case　nothing　is　present　to　the　mind　but　a　mere

schema；　which　does　not　relate　directly　to　an　object；　not　even　in　a

hypothetical　sense；　but　which　is　useful　only　for　the　purpose　of

representing　other　objects　to　the　mind；　in　a　mediate　and　indirect

manner；　by　means　of　their　relation　to　the　idea　in　the　intellect。

Thus　I　say　the　conception　of　a　supreme　intelligence　is　a　mere　idea；

that　is　to　say；　its　objective　reality　does　not　consist　in　the　fact

that　it　has　an　immediate　relation　to　an　object　（for　in　this　sense　we

have　no　means　of　establishing　its　objective　validity）；　it　is　merely

a　schema　constructed　according　to　the　necessary　conditions　of　the

unity　of　reason…　the　schema　of　a　thing　in　general；　which　is　useful

towards　the　production　of　the　highest　degree　of　systematic　unity　in

the　empirical　exercise　of　reason；　in　which　we　deduce　this　or　that

object　of　experience　from　the　imaginary　object　of　this　idea；　as　the

ground　or　cause　of　the　said　object　of　experience。　In　this　way；　the

idea　is　properly　a　heuristic；　and　not　an　ostensive；　conception；　it

does　not　give　us　any　information　respecting　the　constitution　of　an

object；　it　merely　indicates　how；　under　the　guidance　of　the　idea；　we

ought　to　investigate　the　constitution　and　the　relations　of　objects

in　the　world　of　experience。　Now；　if　it　can　be　shown　that　the　three

kinds　of　transcendental　ideas　（psychological；　cosmological；　and

theological）；　although　not　relating　directly　to　any　object　nor

determining　it；　do　nevertheless；　on　the　supposition　of　the　existence

of　an　ideal　object；　produce　systematic　unity　in　the　laws　of　the

empirical　employment　of　the　reason；　and　extend　our　empirical

cognition；　without　ever　being　inconsistent　or　in　opposition　with　it…

it　must　be　a　necessary　maxim　of　reason　to　regulate　its　procedure

according　to　these　ideas。　And　this　forms　the　transcendental

deduction　of　all　speculative　ideas；　not　as　constitutive　principles

of　the　extension　of　our　cognition　beyond　the　limits　of　our　experience；

but　as　regulative　principles　of　the　systematic　unity　of　empirical

cognition；　which　is　by　the　aid　of　these　ideas　arranged　and　emended

within　its　own　proper　limits；　to　an　extent　unattainable　by　the

operation　of　the　principles　of　the　understanding　alone。

　　I　shall　make　this　plainer。　Guided　by　the　principles　involved　in

these　ideas；　we　must；　in　the　first　place；　so　connect　all　the

phenomena；　actions；　and　feelings　of　the　mind；　as　if　it　were　a　simple

substance；　which；　endowed　with　personal　identity；　possesses　a

permanent　existence　（in　this　life　at　least）；　while　its　states；　among

which　those　of　the　body　are　to　be　included　as　external　conditions；　are

in　continual　change。　Secondly；　in　cosmology；　we　must　investigate　the

conditions　of　all　natural　phenomena；　internal　as　well　as　external；

as　if　they　belonged　to　a　chain　infinite　and　without　any　prime　or

supreme　member；　while　we　do　not；　on　this　account；　deny　the　existence

of　intelligible　grounds　of　these　phenomena；　although　we　never　employ

them　to　explain　phenomena；　for　the　simple　reason　that　they　are　not

objects　of　our　cognition。　Thirdly；　in　the　sphere　of　theology；　we

must　regard　the　whole　system　of　possible　experience　as　forming　an

absolute；　but　dependent　and　sensuously…conditioned　unity；　and　at　the

same　time　as　based　upon　a　sole；　supreme；　and　all…sufficient　ground

existing　apart　from　the　world　itself…　a　ground　which　is　a

self…subsistent；　primeval　and　creative　reason；　in　relation　to　which　we

so　employ　our　reason　in　the　field　of　experience；　as　if　all　objects

drew　their　origin　from　that　archetype　of　all　reason。　In　other　words；

we　ought　not　to　deduce　the　internal　phenomena　of　the　mind　from　a

simple　thinking　substance；　but　deduce　them　from　each　other　under　the

guidance　of　the　regulative　idea　of　a　simple　being；　we　ought　not　to

deduce　the　phenomena；　order；　and　unity　of　the　universe　from　a

supreme　intelligence；　but　merely　draw　from　this　idea　of　a　supremely

wise　cause　the　rules　which　must　guide　reason　in　its　connection　of

causes　and　effects。

　　Now　there　is　nothing　to　hinder　us　from　admitting　these　ideas　to

possess　an　objective　and　hyperbolic　existence；　except　the　cosmological

ideas；　which　lead　reason　into　an　antinomy：　the　psychological　and

theological　ideas　are　not　antinomial。　They　contain　no　contradiction；

and　how；　then；　can　any　one　dispute　their　objective　reality；　since　he

who　denies　it　knows　as　little　about　their　possibility　as　we　who

affirm？　And　yet；　when　we　wish　to　admit　the　existence　of　a　thing；　it　is

not　sufficient　to　convince　ourselves　that　there　is　no　positive

obstacle　in　the　way；　for　it　cannot　be　allowable　to　regard　mere

creations　of　thought；　which　transcend；　though　they　do　not

contradict；　all　our　conceptions；　as　real　and　determinate　objects；

solely　upon　the　authority　of　a　speculative　reason　striving　to

compass　its　own　aims。　They　cannot；　therefore；　be　admitted　to　be　real

in　themselves；　they　can　only　possess　a　comparative　reality…　that　of

a　schema　of　the　regulative　principle　of　the　systematic　unity　of　all

cognition。　They　are　to　be　regarded　not　as　actual　things；　but　as　in

some　measure　analogous　to　them。　We　abstract　from　the　object　of　the

idea　all　the　conditions　which　limit　the　exercise　of　our　understanding；

but　which；　on　the　other　hand；　are　the　sole　conditions　of　our

possessing　a　determinate　conception　of　any　given　thing。　And　thus　we

cogitate　a　something；　of　the　real　nature　of　which　we　have　not　the

least　conception；　but　which　we　represent　to　ourselves　as　standing　in　a

relation　to　the　whole　system　of　phenomena；　analogous　to　that　in

which　phenomena　stand　to　each　other。

　　By　admitting　these　ideal　beings；　we　do　not　really　extend　our

cognitions　beyond　the　objects　of　possible　experience；　we　extend　merely

the　empirical　unity　of　our　experience；　by　the　aid　of　systematic　unity；

the　schema　of　which　is　furnished　by　the　idea；　which　is　therefore

valid…　not　as　a　constitutive；　but　as　a　regulative　principle。　For

although　we　posit　a　thing　corresponding　to　the　idea…　a　something；　an

actual　existence…　we　do　not　on　that　account　aim　at　the　extension　of

our　cognition　by　means　of　transcendent　conceptions。　This　existence

is　purely　ideal；　and　not　objective；　it　is　the　mere　expression　of　the

systematic　unity　which　is　to　be　the　guide　of　reason　in　the　field　of

experience。　There　are　no　attempts　made　at　deciding　what　the　ground

of　this　unity　may　be；　or　what　the　real　nature　of　this　imaginary　being。

　　Thus　the　transcendental　and　only　determinate　conception　of　God；

which　is　presented　to　us　by　speculative　reason；　is　in　the　strictest

sense　deistic。　In　other　words；　reason　does　not　assure　us　of　the

objective　validity　of　the　conception；　it　merely　gives　us　the　idea　of

something；　on　which　the　supreme　and　necessary　unity　of　all

experience　is　based。　This　something　we　cannot；　following　the　analogy

of　a　real　substance；　cogitate　otherwise　than　as　the　cause　of　all

things　operating　in　accordance　with　rational　laws；　if　we　regard　it

as　an　individual　object；　although　we　should　rest　contented　with　the

idea　alone　as　a　regulative　principle　of　reason；　and　make　no　attempt　at

completing　the　sum　of　the　conditions　imposed　by　thought。　This

attempt　is；　indeed；　inconsistent　with　the　grand　aim　of　complete

systematic　unity　in　the　sphere　of　cognition…　a　unity　to　which　no

bounds　are　set　by　reason。

　　Hence　it　happens　that；　admitting　a　divine　being；　I　can　have　no

conception　of　the　internal　possibility　of　its　perfection；　or　of　the

necessity　of　its　existence。　The　only　advantage　of　this　admission　is

that　it　enables　me　to　answer　all　other　questions　relating　to　the

contingent；　and　to　give　reason　the　most　complete　satisfaction　as

regards　the　unity　which　it　aims　at　attaining　in　the　world　of

experience。　But　I　cannot　satisfy　reason　with　regard　to　this　hypothesis

itself；　and　this　proves　that　it　is　not　its　intelligence　and　insight

into　the　subject；　but　its　speculative　interest　alone　which　induces

it　to　proceed　from　a　point　lying　far　beyond　the　sphere　of　our

cognition；　for　the　purpose　of　being　able　to　consider　all　objects　as

parts　of　a　systematic　whole。

　　Here　a　distinction　presents　itself；　in　regard　to　the　way　in　which　we

may　cogitate　a　presupposition…　a　distinction　which　is　somewhat　subtle；

but　of　great　importance　in　transcendental　philosophy。　I　may　have

sufficient　grounds　to　admit　something；　or　the　existence　of

something；　in　a　relative　point　of　view　（suppositio　relativa）；

without　being　justified　in　admitting　it　in　an　absolute　sense

（suppositio　absoluta）。　This　distinction　is　undoubtedly　requisite；　in

the　case　of　a　regulative　principle；　the　necessity　of　which　we

recognize；　though　we　are　ignorant　of　the　source　and　cause　of　that

necessity；　and　which　we　assume　to　be　based　upon　some　ultimate

ground；　for　the　purpose　of　being　able　to　cogitate　the　universality

of　the　principle　in　a　more　determinate　way。　For　example；　I　cogitate

the　existence　of　a　being　corresponding　to　a　pure　transcendental

idea。　But　I　cannot　admit　that　this　being　exists　absolutely　and　in

itself；　because　all　of　the　conceptions　by　which　I　can　cogitate　an

object　in　a　determinate　manner　fall　short　of　assuring　me　of　its

existence；　nay；　the　conditions　of　the　objective　validity　of　my

conceptions　are　excluded　by　the　idea…　by　the　very　fact　of　its　being　an

idea。　The　conceptions　of　reality；　substance；　causality；　nay；　even　t