phenomenology of mind-第98章

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or　as　cancelled　and　transcended。　This　becomes　consciously　explicit　in　the　last　phase　of　the　moral
attitude　or　point　of　view。　Consciousness；　we　there　saw；　places　pure　duty　in　another　form　of　being
than　its　own　consciousness；　i。e。　it　regards　pure　duty　partly　as　something　ideally　presented；　partly
as　what　does　not　by　itself　hold　good　—　indeed；　the　non…moral　is　rather　what　is　held　to　be　perfect。
In　the　same　way　it　affirms　itself　to　be　that　whose　actuality；　not　being　in　conformity　with　duty；　is
transcended；　and；　qua　transcended；　or　in　the　idea　of　the　Absolute　＇God's　view＇；　no　longer
contradicts　morality。

For　the　moral　consciousness　itself；　however；　its　moral　attitude　does　not　mean　that　consciousness
therein　develops　its　own　proper　notion　and　makes　this　its　object。　It　has　no　consciousness　of　this
opposition　either　as　regards　the　form　or　the　content　thereof；　the　elements　composing　this
opposition　it　does　not　relate　and　compare　with　one　another；　but　goes　forward　on　its　own　course
of　development；　without　being　the　connecting　principle　of　those　moments。　For　it　is　only　aware　of
the　essence　pure　and　simple；　i。e。　the　object　so　far　as　this　is　duty；　so　far　as　this　is　an　abstract　object
of　its　pure　consciousness　—　in　other　words；　it　is　only　aware　of　this　object　as　pure　knowledge　or　as
itself。　Its　procedure　is　thus　merely　that　of　thinking；　not　conceiving；　is　by　way　of　thoughts　not
notions。　Consequently　it　does　not　yet　find　the　object　of　its　actual　consciousness　transparently　clear
to　itself；　it　is　not　the　absolute　notion；　which　alone　grasps　otherness　as　such；　its　absolute　opposite；
as　its　very　self。　Its　own　reality；　as　well　as　all　objective　reality；　no　doubt　is　held　to　be　something
unessential；　but　its　freedom　is　that　of　pure　thought；　in　opposition　to　which；　therefore；　nature　has
likewise　arisen　as　something　equally　free。　Because　both　are　found　in　like　manner　within　it…both　the
freedom　which　belongs　to　＇external＇　being　and　the　inclusion　of　this　existence　within　consciousness
—　its　object　comes　to　be　an　existing　object；　which　is　at　the　same　time　merely　a　thought…product。　In
the　last　phase　of　its　attitude　or　point　of　view；　the　content　is　essentially　so　affirmed　that　its　being　has
the　character　of　something　presented；　and　this　union　of　being　and　thinking　is　expressed　as　what　in
fact　it　is；　viz。…Imagining　（Vorstellen）。

When　we　look　at　the　moral　view　of　the　world　and　see　that　this　objective　condition　is　nothing　else
than　the　very　principle　or　notion　of　moral　self…consciousness　which　it　makes　objective　to　itself；
there　arises　through　this　consciousness　concerning　the　form　of　its　origin　another　mode　of　exhibiting
this　view　of　the　world。

The　first　stage；　which　forms　the　starting…point；　is　the　actual　moral　self…consciousness；　or　is　the　fact
that　there　is　such　a　self…consciousness　at　all。　For　the　notion　establishes　moral　self…consciousness　in
the　form　that；　for　it；　all　reality　in　general　has　essential　being　only　so　far　as　such　reality　is　in
conformity　with　duty；　and　that　notion　establishes　this　essential　element　as　knowledge；　i。e。　in
immediate　unity　with　the　actual　self。　This　unity　is　thus　itself　actual；　is　a　moral　actual　consciousness。
The　latter；　now；　qua　consciousness；　pictures　its　content　to　itself　as　an　object；　viz。　as　the　final
purpose　of　the　world；　as　the　harmony　of　morality　with　all　reality。　Since；　however；　it　pictures　this
unity　as　object　and　is　not　yet　the　complete　notion；　which　has　mastery　over　the　object　as　such；　this
unity　is　taken　to　be　something　negative　of　self…consciousness；　i。e。　the　unity　falls　outside　it；　as
something　beyond　its　actual　reality；　but　at　the　same　time　of　such　a　nature　as　to　be　also　existent；
though　merely　thought　of。

This　self…consciousness；　which；　qua　self…consciousness；　is　something　other　than　the　object；　thus
finds　itself　left　with　the　want　of　harmony　between　the　consciousness　of　duty　and　actual　reality；　and
indeed　its　own　reality。　The　proposition　consequently　now　runs　thus：　〃there　is　no　morally　complete
actual　self…consciousness〃；　and；　since　what　is　moral　only　is　at　all　so　far　as　it　is　complete；　—　for　duty
is　the　pure　unadulterated　ultimate　element　（Ansich）；　and　morality　consists　merely　in　conformity　to
this　pure　principle　—　the　second　proposition　runs：　〃there　is　no　actual　existence　which　is　moral〃。

Since；　however；　in　the　third　place；　it　is　a　self；　it　is　inherently　the　unity　of　duty　and　actual　reality。　This
unity　thus　becomes　its　object；　as　completed　morality　—　but　as　something　beyond　its　actual　reality；
and　yet　a　〃beyond〃　which　still　ought　to　be　real。

In　this　final　goal　or　aim　of　the　synthetic　unity　of　the　two　first　propositions；　the　self…conscious
actuality；　as　well　as　duty；　is　only　affirmed　as　a　transcended　or　superseded　moment。　For　neither　of
them　is　alone；　neither　is　isolated；　on　the　contrary；　these　factors；　whose　essential　characteristic　lies
in　being　free　from　one　another；　are　thus　each　in　that　unity　no　longer　free　from　the　other；　each　is
transcended。　Hence；　as　regards　content；　they　become；　as　such；　object；　each　of　them　holds　good
for　the　other；　and；　as　regards　form；　they　become　object　in　suchwise　that　this　reciprocal
interchange　is；　at　the　same　time；　merely　pictured　—　a　mere　idea。　Or；　again；　the　actually　non…moral；
because　it　is；　at　the　same　time；　pure　thought　and　elevated　above　its　own　actual　reality；　is　in　idea
still　moral；　and　is　taken　to　be　entirely　valid。　In　this　way　the　first　proposition；　that　there　is　a　moral
self…consciousness；　is　reinstated；　but　bound　up　with　the　second　that　there　is　none；　that　is　to　say；
there　is　one；　but　merely　in　idea。　In　other　words；　there　is　indeed　none；　but　it　is　all　the　same　allowed
by　some　other　consciousness　to　pass　for　one。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　i。e。　there　is　not　the　opposition　of　an　object　to　subject　which　consciousness　requires。　




b
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Dissemblance　（1）

IN　the　moral　attitude　of　experience　we　see；　on　one　side；　consciousness　itself　produce　its　object　in
a　conscious　way。　We　find　that　neither　does　it　pick　up　the　object　as　something　external；　nor　does
the　object　come　before　it　in　an　unconscious　manner。　Rather；　consciousness　throughout　proceeds
on　an　explicit　ground；　and　from　this　establishes　the　objective　reality。　It　thus　knows　this　objective
reality　to　be　itself；　for　it　is　aware　of　itself　as　the　active　agent　producing　this　object。　It　seems；　in
consequence；　to　attain　here　its　peace　and　satisfaction；　for　this　can　only　be　found　where　it　does　not
need　to　go　any　more　beyond　its　object；　because　this　object　no　longer　goes　beyond　it。　On　the
other　side；　however；　it　really　puts　the　object　away　outside　itself；　as　something　beyond　itself。　But
this　latter　self…contained　entity　is　at　the　same　time　put　there　as　something　that　is　not；　free　from
self…consciousness；　but　really　there　on　behalf　of　and　by　means　of　it。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）　The　Contradictions　in　the　Moral　View　of　the　World

The　moral　attitude　is；　therefore；　in　fact　nothing　else　than　the　developed　expression　of　this
fundamental　contradiction　in　its　various　aspects。　It　isto　use　a　Kantian　phrase　which　is　here　most
appropriated　〃perfect　nest〃　of　thoughtless　contradictions。（2）　Consciousness；　in　developing　this
situation；　proceeds　by　fixing　definitely　one　moment；　passing　thence　immediately　over　to　another
and　doing　away　with　the　first。　But；　as　soon　as　it　has　now　set　up　this　second　moment；　it　also　〃shifts〃
（verstellt）　this　again；　and　really　makes　the　opposite　the　essential　element。　At　the　same　time；　it　is
conscious　of　its　contradiction　and　of　its　shuffling；　for　it　passes　from　one　moment；　immediately　in　its
relation　to　this　very　moment；　right　over　to　the　opposite。　Because　a　moment　has　for　it　no　reality　at
all；　it　affirms　that　very　moment　as　real：　or；　what　comes　to　the　same　thing；　in　order　to　assert　one
moment　as　per　se　existent；　it　asserts　the　opposite　as　the　per　se；　existent。　It　thereby　confesses　that；
as　a　matter　of　fact；　it　is　in　earnest　about　neither　of　them。　The　various　moments　of　this　vertiginous
fraudulent　process　we　must　look　at　more　closely。

Let　us；　to　begin　with；　agree　to　accept　the　assumption　that　there　is　an　actual　moral　consciousness；
because　the　assumption　is　made　directly　and　not　with　reference　to　something　preceding；　and　let　us
turn　to　the　harmony　of　morality　and　naturethe　first　postulate。　It　is　to　be　immanent；　not　explicitly
for　actual　conscious　life；　not　really　present；　the　present　is　rather　simply　the　contradiction　between
the　two。　In　the　present；　morality　is　taken　to　be　something　at　hand；　and　actual　reality　to　be　so
situated　or　〃placed〃　that　it　is　not　in　harmony　with　morality。　The　concrete　moral　consciousness；
however；　is　an　active　one；　that　is　precisely　what　constitutes　the　actuality　of　its　morality。　In　the　very
process　of　acting；　however；　that　〃Place〃　or　semblance　is　immediately　〃displaced〃；　is　dissembled；
for　action　is　nothing　else　than　the　actualization　of　the　inner　moral　purpose；　nothing　but　the
production　of　an　actuality　constituted　and　determined　by　the　purpose；　in　other　words；　the
production　of　the　harmony　of　moral　purpose　and　reality　itself。　At　the　same　time　the　performance　of
the　action　is　a　conscious　fact；　it　is　the　〃presence〃　of　this　unity　of　reality　and　purpose；　and　because
in　the　completed　act　consciousness　realizes　itself　as　a　given　individual　consciousness；　or　sees
existence　returned　into　itselfand　in　this　consists　the　nature　of　enjoymentthere　is；　eo　ipso；
contained　in　the　realization　of　moral　purpose　also　that　form　of　its　realization　which　is　called
enjoyment　and　happiness。

Action　thus；　as　a　fact；　fulfils　directly　what　it　was　assorted　could　not　take　place　at　all；　fulfils　what
was　to　be　merely　a　postulate；　was　to　lie　merely　〃beyond〃。　Consciousness；　therefore；　expresses
through　its　deed　that　it　is　not　in　earnest　in　making　the　postulate；　since　the　meaning　of　acting　is　really
that　it　makes　a　present　fact　of　what　was　not　to　be　in　the　present。　And；　since　the　harmony　is
postulated　for　the　sake　of　the　actionfor　what　is　to　become　actual　through　action　must　be　implicit；
otherwise　the　actuality　would　not　be　possiblethe　connexion　of　action　with　the　postulate　is　so
constituted　that；　for　the　sake　of　the　action；　i。e。　for　the　sake　of　the　actual　harmony　of　purpose
and　reality；　this　harmony　is　put　forward　as　not　actual；　as　far　away；　as　〃beyond〃。

In　that　action　takes　place；　the　want　of　adaptation　between　purpose　and　reality　is　thus　not　taken
seriously　at　all。　Action　itself；　on　the　other　hand；　does　seem　to　be　taken　seriously。　But；　as　a　matter
of　fact；　the　actual　deed　done　is　only　the　action　of　an　individual　consciousness；　and　so　is　itself
merely　something　individual；　and　the　result　contingent。　The　end　of　reason；　however；　being　the
all…comprehensive　universal　end；　is　nothing　short　of　the　entire　worlda　final　purpose　which　goes
far　beyond　the　content　of　this　individual　act；　and　therefore　is　to　be　placed　altogether　beyond
anything　actually　done。　Because　the　universal　best　ought　to　be　carried　out；　nothing　good　is　done。
In　point　of　fact；　however；　the　nothingness　of　actual　action　and　the　reality　of　the　entire　purpose
alone；　which　are　here　upheldthese　are　on　all　hands　again　〃shifted〃　or　dissembled。　The　moral　act
is　not　something　contingent　and　restricted