phenomenology of mind-第99章

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is　not　something　contingent　and　restricted；　its　essential　nature　lies　in　pure　duty。　This　pure　duty
constitutes　the　sole　entire　purpose；　and　the　act；　whatever　may　be　the　limitation　of　the　content；
being　the　actualization　of　that　purpose；　is　the　accomplishment　of　the　entire　absolute　purpose。　Or；　if
again　we　take　the　reality　in　the　sense　of　nature；　which　has　laws　of　its　own　and　stands　over　against
pure　duty；　and　take　it　in　such　a　way　that　duty　cannot　realize　its　law　within　nature；　then；　since　duty
as　such　is　the　essential　element；　we　are；　when　acting；　not　in　fact　concerned　about　the
accomplishment　of　pure　duty　which　is　the　whole　purpose；　for　the　accomplishment　would　then
rather　have　as　its　end　not　pure　duty；　but　the　opposite；　viz。　reality。　But　there　is　again　a　〃shifting〃
from　the　position　that　it　is　not　reality　with　which　we　have　to　do。　For　by　the　very　notion　of　moral
action；　pure　duty　is　essentially　an　active　consciousness。　Action　thus　ought　certainly　to　take　place；
absolute　duty　ought　to　be　expressed　in　the　whole　of　nature；　and　〃moral　law〃　to　become　〃natural
law〃。

If；　then；　we　allow　this　highest　good　to　stand　for　the　essentially　real；　consciousness　is　altogether　not
in　earnest　with　morality。　For；　in　this　highest　good；　nature　has　not　a　different　law　from　what　morality
has。　Moral　action　itself；　in　consequence；　drops；　for　action　takes　place　only　under　the　assumption
of　a　negative　element　which　is　to　be　cancelled　by　means　of　the　act。　But　if　nature　conforms　to　the
moral　law；　then　assuredly　this　moral　law　would　be　violated　by　acting；　by　cancelling　what　already
exists。

On　that　mode　of　interpretation；　then；　there　has　been　admitted　as　the　essential　situation　one　which
renders　moral　action　superfluous　and　in　which　moral　action　does　not　take　place　at　all。　Hence　the
postulate　of　the　harmony　between　morality　and　realitya　harmony　posited　by　the　very　notion　of
moral　action；　which　means　bringing　the　two　into　agreementfinds　on　this　view；　too；　an　expression
which　takes　the　form：〃because　moral　action　is　the　absolute　purpose；　the　absolute　purpose
isthat　moral　action　do　not　take　place　at　all〃。

If　we　put　these　moments　together；　through　which　consciousness　has　moved　in　presenting　its　ideas
of　its　moral　life；　we　see　that　it　cancels　each　one　again　in　its　opposite。　It　starts　from　the　position
that；　for　it；　morality　and　reality　do　not　make　a　harmony；　but　it　is　not　in　earnest　with　that；　for　in　the
moral　act　it　is　conscious　of　the　presence　of　this　harmony。　But　neither　is　it　in　earnest　with　this
action；　since　the　action　is　something　individual；　for　it　has　such　a　high　purpose；　the　highest　good。
This；　however；　is　once　more　merely　a　dissemblance　of　the　actual　fact；　for　thereby　all　action　and　all
morality　would　fall　to　the　ground。　In　other　words；　it　is　not　strictly　in　earnest　with　moral　action；　on
the　contrary；　it　really　feels　that；　what　is　most　to　be　wished　for；　the　absolutely　desirable；　is　that　the
highest　good　were　carried　out　and　moral　action　superfluous。

From　this　result　consciousness　must　go　on　still　further　in　its　contradictory　process；　and　must　of
necessity　again　dissemble　the　abolition　of　moral　action。　Morality　is　the　inherently　essential
（Ansich）；　in　order　that　it　may　have　place；　the　final　end　of　the　world　cannot　be　carried　out；　rather；
the　moral　consciousness　must　exist　for　itself；　and　must　find　lying　before　it　a　nature　opposing　it。　But
it　must　per　se；　be　completed。　This　leads　to　the　second　postulate　of　the　harmony　of　itself　and
sensibility；　the　〃nature〃　immediately　within　it。　Moral　self…consciousness　sets　up　its　purpose　as　pure
purpose；　as　independent　of　inclinations　and　impulses；　so　that　this　bare　purpose　has　abolished
within　itself　the　ends　of　sensibility。　But　this　cancelling　of　the　element　of　sense　is　no　sooner　set　up
than　it　is　again　dissembled。　The　moral　consciousness　acts；　it　brings　its　purpose　into　reality；　and
self…conscious　sensibility；　which　should　be　done　away　with；　is　precisely　the　mediating　element
between　pure　consciousness　and　realityis　the　instrument　used　by　the　former　for　the　realization　of
itself；　or　is　the　organ；　and　what　is　called　impulse；　inclinations。　It　is　thus　not　really　in　earnest　in
cancelling　inclinations　and　impulses；　for　these　are　just　self…consciousness　making　itself　actual。
Moreover；　they　ought　not　to　be　suppressed；　but　merely　to　be　in　conformity　with　reason。　They　are；
too；　in　conformity　with　it；　for　moral　action　is　nothing　else　than　self…realizing
consciousnessconsciousness　taking　on　the　form　of　an　impulse；　i。e。　it　is　immediately　the　realized
actually　present　harmony　of　impulse　and　morality。　But；　in　point　of　fact；　impulse　is　not　only　this
empty　conscious　form；　which　might　possibly　have　within　itself　a　spring　of　action　other　than　the
impulse　in　question；　and　be　driven　on　by　that。　For　sensibility　is　a　kind　of　nature；　which　contains
within　itself　its　own　laws　and　springs　of　action：　consequently；　morality　cannot　seriously　mean　to　be
the　inciting　motive　（Triebfeder）　for　impulses　（Triebe）；　the　angle　of　inclination　for　inclinations。　For；
since　these　latter　have　their　own　fixed　character　and　peculiar　content；　the　consciousness；　to　which
they　were　to　conform；　would　rather　be　in　conformity　with　thema　conformity　which　moral
self…consciousness　declines　to　adopt。　The　harmony　between　the　two　is　thus　merely　implicit　and
postulated。

In　moral　action　the　realized　or　present　harmony　of　morality　and　sensibility　was　set　up　just　now；
and　is　now　again　〃displaced〃。　The　harmony　is　in　a　misty　distance　beyond　consciousness；　where
nothing　can　any　more　be　accurately　distinguished　or　grasped；　for；　to　grasp　this　unity；　which　we
have　just　tried　to　do；　has　proved　impossible。

In　this　merely　immanent　or　implicit　harmony；　however；　consciousness　gives　up　itself　altogether。
This　immanent　state　is　its　moral　completion；　where　the　struggle　of　morality　and　sensibility　has
ceased；　and　the　latter　is　in　conformity　to　the　former　in　a　way　which　cannot　be　made　out。　On　that
account　this　completion　is　again　merely　a　dissemblance　of　the　actual　case；　for　in　point　of　fact
morality　would　be　really　giving　up　itself　in　that　completion；　because　it　is　only　consciousness　of　the
absolute　purpose　qua　pure　purpose；　i。e。　in　opposition　to　all　other　purposes。　Morality　is　both　the
activity　of　this　pure　purpose；　and　at　the　same　time　the　consciousness　of　rising　above　sensibility；　of
being　mixed　up　with　sensibility　and　of　opposing　and　struggling　with　it。　That　this　moral　completion　is
not　taken　seriously　is　directly　expressed　by　consciousness　itself　in　the　fact　that　it　shifts　this
completion　away　into　infinity；　i。e。　asserts　that　the　completion　is　never　completed。

Thus　it　is　really　only　the　middle　state　of　being　incomplete　that　is　admitted　to　have　any　value：　a　state
nevertheless　which　at　least　is　supposed　to　be　one　of　progress　towards　completion。　Yet　it　cannot
be　so；　for　advancing　in　morality　would　really　mean　approaching　its　disappearance。　For　the　goal
would　be　the　nothingness　above　mentioned；　the　abolition　of　morality　and　consciousness　itself：　but
to　come　ever　nearer　and　nearer　to　nothing　means　to　decrease。　Besides；　〃advancing〃　would；　in
general；　in　the　same　way　as　〃decreasing；〃　assume　distinctions　of　quantity　in　morality：　but　these　are
quite　inadmissible　in　such　a　sphere。　In　morality　as　the　consciousness　which　takes　the　ethical　end　to
be　pure　duty；　we　cannot　think　at　all　of　difference；　least　of　all　of　the　superficial　difference　of
quantity：　there　is　only　one　virtue；　only　one　pure　duty；　only　one　morality。

Since；　then；　it　is　not　moral　completion　that　is　taken　seriously；　but　rather　the　middle　state；　i。e。　as　just
explained；　the　condition　of　no　morality；　we　thus　come　by　another　way　back　to　the　content　of　the
first　postulate。　For　we　cannot　perceive　how　happiness　is　to　be　demanded　for　this　moral
consciousness　on　the　ground　of　its　worthiness　to　be　happy。　It　is　well　aware　of　its　not　being
complete；　and　cannot；　therefore；　in　point　of　fact；　demand　happiness　as　a　desert；　as　something　of
which　it　is　worthy。　It　can　ask　happiness　to　be　given　merely　as　an　act　of　free　grace；　i。e。　it　can　only
ask　for　happiness　as　such　and　as　a　substantive　element　by　itself；　it　cannot　expect　it　except　as　the
result　of　chance　and　caprice；　not　because　there　is　any　absolute　reason　of　the　above　sort。　The
condition　of　non…morality　herein　expresses　just　what　it　isthat　it　is　concerned；　not　about　morality；
but　about　happiness　alone；　without　reference　to　morality。

By　this　second　aspect　of　the　moral　point　of　view；　the　assertion　of　the　first　aspect；　wherein
disharmony　between　morality　and　happiness　is　presupposed；　is　also　cancelled。　One　may　pretend
to　have　found　by　experience　that　in　the　actual　present　the　man　who　is　moral　often　fares　badly；
while　the　man　who　is　not；　often　comes　off　happily。　Yet　the　middle　state　of　incomplete　morality；　the
condition　which　has　proved　to　be　the　essential　one；　shows　clearly　that　this　perception　that　morality
fares　badly；　this　supposed　experience　of　it；　is　merely　a　dissemblance　of　the　real　facts　of　the　case。
For；　since　morality　is　not　completed；　i。e。　since　morality　in　point　of　fact　is　not；　what　can　there　be　in
the　〃experience〃　that　morality　fares　badly？

Since；　at　the　same　time；　it　has　turned　out　that　the　point　at　issue　concerns　happiness　alone；　it　is
manifest　that；　in　making　the　criticism；　〃the　man　without　morality　comes　off　well；〃　there　was　no
intention　to　convey　thereby　that　there　is　something　wrong　in　such　a　case。。　The　designation　of　an
individual　as　one　devoid　of　morality　necessarily　falls　to　the　ground；　when　morality　in　general　is
incomplete；　such　a　characterization　rests；　indeed；　on　pure　caprice。　Hence　the　sense　and　content　of
that　judgment　of　experience　is　simply　this；　that　happiness　as　such　should　not　have　fallen　to　some
who　have　got　it；　i。e。　the　judgment　is　an　expression　of　envy；　which　covers　itself　up　in　the　cloak　of
morality。　The　reason；　however；　why　we　think　good　luck；　as　we　call　it；　should　fall　to　the　lot　of
others　is　good　friendship；　which　ungrudgingly　grants　and　wishes　them；　and　wishes　itself　too；　this
favour；　this　accident　of　good　fortune。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（2）　The　Resolution　of　Morality　into　its　Opposite

Morality；　then；　in　the　moral　consciousness；　is　not　completed。　This　is　what　is　now　established。　But
its　essence　consists　in　being　only　what　is　complete；　and　so　pure　morality：　incomplete　morality　is；
therefore；　impure　in　other　words；　is　Immorality。　Morality　itself　thus　exists　in　another　being　than　the
actual　concrete　consciousness。　This　other　is　a　holy　moral　legislator。

Morality　which　is　not　completed　in　consciousness　the　morality　which　is　the　reason　for　making
those　postulates；　means；　in　the　first　instance；　that　morality；　when　it　is　set　up　as　actual　in
consciousness；　stands　in　relation　to　something　else；　to　an　existence；　and　thus　itself　acquires
otherness　or　distinction；　whence　arises　a　manifold　plurality　of　moral　commands。　The　moral
self…consciousness　at　the　same　time；　however；　looks　on　these　many　duties　as　unessential；　for　it　is
concerned　with　merely　the　one　pure　duty；　and　this　plurality　of　duties；　so　far　as　they　are　determinate
duties；　has　no　true　reality　for　self…consciousness。　They　can　thus　have　their　real　truth　only　in　another
consciousness；　and　are　（what