phenomenology of mind-第97章

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to
it；　the　absolute　unity　of　sensibility　with　it；　to　be　the　essential　fact。　Both　of　these；　pure　thought　and
sensibility；　are　essentially　and　inherently　one　consciousness；　and　pure　thought　is　just　that　for　which
and　in　which　this　pure　unity　exists；　but　for　it　qua　consciousness　the　opposition　between　itself　and
its　impulses　holds。　In　this　conflict　between　reason　and　sensibility；　the　essential　thing　for　reason　is
that　the　conflict　should　be　resolved；　and　that　the　unity　of　both　should　come　out　as　a　result：　not　the
original　unity　which　consisted　in　both　the　opposites　being　in　one　individual；　but　a　unity　which　arises
out　of　the　known　opposition　of　the　two。　So　attained；　such　a　unity　is　then　actual　morality；　for　in　it　is
contained　the　opposition　through　which　the　self　is　a　consciousness；　or　first　becomes　concrete　and
in　actual　fact　self；　and　at　the　same　time　universal。　In　other　words；　we　find　there　expressed　that
process　of　mediation　which；　as　we　see；　is　essential　to　morality。

Since；　of　the　two　factors　in　opposition；　sensibility　is　otherness　out　and　out；　is　the　negative；　while；
on　the　other　hand；　pure　thought　of　duty　is　the　ultimate　essence　which　cannot　possibly　be
surrendered　in　any　respect；　it　seems　as　if　the　unity　produced　can　be　brought　about　only　by　doing
away　with　sensibility。　But　since　sensibility　is　itself　a　moment　of　this　process　of　producing　the　unity；
is　the　moment　of　actuality；　we　have；　in　the　first　instance；　to　be　content　to　express　the　unity　in　this
form　—　sensibility　should　be　in　conformity　with　morality。

This　unity　is　likewise　a　postulated　existence；　it　is　not　there　as　a　fact；　for　what　is　there　is
consciousness；　or　the　opposition　of　sensibility　and　pure　consciousness。　All　the　same；　the　unity　is
not　a　something　per　se　like　the　first　postulate；　in　which　free　external　nature　constitutes　an　aspect
and　the　harmony　of　nature　with　moral　consciousness　in　consequence　falls　outside　the　latter。
Rather；　nature　is　here　that　which　lies　within　consciousness；　and　we　have　here　to　deal　with　morality
（Moralit？t）　as　such；　with　a　harmony　which　is　the　active　self's　very　own。　Consciousness　has；
therefore；　of　itself　to　bring　about　this　harmonious　unity；　and　〃to　be　always　making　progress　in
morality〃。　The　completion　of　this　result；　however；　has　to　be　pushed　away　into　the　remote　infinite；
because　if　it　actually　entered　the　life　of　consciousness　as　an　actual　fact；　the　moral　consciousness
would　be　done　away　with。　For　morality　is　only　moral　consciousness　qua　negative　force；　sensibility
has　merely　a　negative　significance　for　the　consciousness　of　pure　duty；　it　is　something　merely　〃not　in
conformity　with〃　duty。　By　attaining　that　harmony；　however；　morality　qua　consciousness；　i。e。　its
actuality；　passes　away；　just　as　in　the　moral　consciousness　or　actuality　its　harmony　vanishes。　The
completion　is；　therefore；　not　to　be　reached　as　an　actual　fact；　it　is　to　be　thought　of　merely　as　an
absolute　task　or　problem；　i。e。　one　which　remains　a　problem　pure　and　simple。　Nevertheless；　its
content　has　to　be　thought　as　something　which　unquestionably　has　to　be；　and　must　not　remain　a
problem：　whether　we　imagine　the　moral　consciousness　quite　cancelled　in　the　attainment　of　this
goal；　or　riot。　Which　of　these　exactly　is　the　case；　can　no　longer　be　clearly　distinguished　in　the　dim
distance　of　infinitude；　to　which　the　attainment　of　the　end　has　to　be　postponed；　just　because　we
cannot　decide　the　point。　We　shall　be；　strictly　speaking；　bound　to　say　that　a　definite　idea　on　the
matter　ought　to　be　of　no　interest　and　ought　not　to　be　sought　for；　because　this　leads　to
contradictions　—　the　contradiction　involved　in　an　undertaking　that　at　once　ought　to　remain　an
undertaking　and　yet　ought　to　be　carried　out；　and　the　conttradiction　involved　in　the　morality　which
is　to　be　no　longer　consciousness；　i。e。　no　longer　actual。　By　adopting　the　view；　however；　that
morality　when　completed　would　contain　a　contradiction；　the　sacredness　of　moral　truth　would　be
seriously　affected；　and　the　unconditional　duty　would　appear　something　unreal。

The　first　postulate　was　the　harmony　of　morality　and　objective　nature…the　final　purpose　of　the
world：　the　other　was　the　harmony　of　morality　and　will　in　its　sensuous　form；　in　the　form　if　impulse；
etc。…the　final　purpose　of　self…consciousness　as　such。　The　former　is　the　harmony　in　the　form　of
implicit　immanent　existence；　the　latter；　the　harmony　in　the　form　of　explicit　self…existence。　That；
however；　which　connects　these　two　extreme　final　purposes　which　are　thought；　and　operates　as
their　mediating　ground；　is　the　process　of　concrete　action　itself。　They　are　harmonies　whose
moments　have　not　yet　become　definitely　objective　in　their　abstract　distinctiveness　from　each　other：
this　takes　place　in　concrete　actuality；　in　which　the　aspects　appear　in　consciousness　proper；　each　as
the　other　of　the　other。　The　postulates　arising　by　this　means　contain　harmonies　which　are　now　both
immanent　and　self…existent；　whereas　formerly　they　were　postulated　merely　separately；　the　one
being　the　immanent　harmony；　the　other　self…existent。

The　moral　consciousness；　qua　simple　knowledge　and　willing　of　pure　duty；　is　brought；　by　the
process　of　acting；　into　relation　with　an　object　opposed　to　that　abstract　simplicity；　into　relation　with
the　manifold　actuality　which　various　cases　present；　and　thereby　assumes　a　moral　attitude　varied
and　manifold　in　character。　Hence　arise；　on　the　side　of　content；　the　plurality　of　laws　generally；　and；
on　the　side　of　form；　the　contradictory　powers　of　intelligent　knowing　consciousness　and　of　a　being
devoid　of　consciousness。

To　begin　with；　as　regards　the　plurality　of　duties；　it　is　merely　the　aspect　of　pure　or　bare　duty　in　them
which　the　moral　consciousness　in　general　recognizes　as　having　validity：　the　many　duties　qua　many
are　determinate　and；　therefore；　are　not；　as　such；　anything　sacred　for　the　moral　consciousness。　At
the　same　time；　however；　being　necessary；　in　virtue　of　the　notion　of　action　which　implicates　a
manifold　actuality；　and　hence　manifold　types　of　moral　attitude；　those　many　duties　must　be　looked
on　as　having　a　substantial　existence　and　value。　Furthermore；　since　they　can　only　exist　in　a　moral
consciousness；　they　exist　at　the　same　time　in　another　consciousness　than　that　for　which　only　pure
duty　qua　pure　duty　is　sacred　and　substantial。

It　is　thus　postulated　that　there　is　another　consciousness　which　renders　them　sacred；　or　which
knows　them　as　duties　and　wills　them　so。　The　first　maintains　pure　duty　indifferent　towards　all
specific　content；　and　duty　consists　merely　in　being　thus　indifferent　towards　it。　The　other；　however；
contains　the　equally　essential　relation　to　the　process　of　action；　and　the　necessity；　therefore；　of
determinate　content：　since　duties　for　this　other　mean　determinate　duties；　the　content　is　thus；　for　it；
just　as　essential　as　the　form　in　virtue　of　which　the　content　is　a　duty　at　all。　This　consciousness　is；
consequently；　such　that　in　it　the　universal　and　the　particular　are；　through　and　through；　one；　its
essential　principle　is　thus　the　same　as　that　of　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness。　For　this
opposition　between　morality　and　happiness　expresses　in　like　manner　the　separation　of　the
self…identical　moral　consciousness　from　that　actuality　which；　qua　manifold　existence；　opposes　and
conflicts　with　the　simple　nature　of　duty。　While；　however；　the　first　postulate　expresses　merely　the
objective　existential　harmony　between　morality　and　nature；　because　nature　is　therein　the　negative
of　self…consciousness；　is　the　moment　of　existence；　this　inherent　harmony；　on　the　other　hand　is　now
affirmed　essentially　as　a　type　of　consciousness。　For　existence　now　appears　as　the　content　of　duty；
as　that　in　the　determinate　duty　which　gives　it　specific　determinateness。　The　immanent　harmony　is
thus　the　unity　of　elements　which；　qua　simple　ultimate　elements；　are　essentially　thought…created；　and
hence　cannot　exist　except　in　a　consciousness。　This　latter　becomes　now　a　master　and　ruler　of　the
world；　who　brings　about　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness；　and　at　the　same　time　sanctifies
duties　in　their　Multiplicity。　To　sanctify　these　duties　means　this　much；　that　the　consciousness　of　pure
duty　cannot　straight…way　and　directly　accept　the　determinate　or　specific　duty　as　sacred；　but
because　a　specific　duty；　owing　to　the　nature　of　concrete　action　which　is　something　specific　and
definite；　is　likewise　necessary；　its　necessity　falls　outside　that　consciousness　and　holds　inside
another　consciousness；　which　thus　mediates　or　connects　determinate　and　pure　duty；　and　is　the
reason　why　that　specific　duty　also　has　validity。

　　　　　　　　　　（2）　The　Divine　Lawgiver　and　the　Imperfect　Moral　Consciousness

In　the　concrete　act；　however；　consciousness　proceeds　to　work　as　this　particular　self；　as
completely　individual：　it　directs　its　activity　on　actual　reality　as　such；　and　takes　this　as　its　purpose；
for　it　wants　to　perform　something　definite。　〃Duty　in　general〃　thus　falls　outside　it　and　within　another
being；　which　is　a　consciousness　and　the　sacred　lawgiver　of　pure　duty。　The　consciousness　which
acts；　just　because　it　acts；　accepts　the　other　consciousness；　that　of　pure　duty；　and　admits　its　validity
immediately；　this　pure　duty　is　thus　a　content　of　another　consciousness；　and　is　only　indirectly　or　in　a
mediate　way　sacred　for　the　active　consciousness；　viz。　in　virtue　of　this　other　consciousness。

Because　it　is　established　in　this　manner　that　the　validity；　the　bindingness；　of　duty　as　something
wholly　and　absolutely　sacred；　falls　outside　the　actual　consciousness；　this　latter　thereby　stands
altogether　on　one　side　as　the　incomplete　moral　consciousness。　Just　as；　in　regard　to　its　knowledge；
it　is　aware　of　itself　as　that　whose　knowledge　and　conviction　are　incomplete　and　contingent；　in　the
same　way；　as　regards　its　willing；　it　feels　itself　to　be　that　whose　purposes　are　affected　with
sensibility。　On　account　of　its　〃unworthiness〃；　therefore；　it　cannot　look　on　happiness　as　something
necessary；　but　as　a　something　contingent；　and　can　only　expect　happiness　as　the　result　of　〃grace〃。

But　though　its　actuality　is　incomplete；　duty　is　still；　so　far　as　its　pure　will　and　knowledge　are
concerned；　held　to　be　the　essential　truth。　In　principle；　therefore；　so　far　as　the　notion　is　opposed　to
actual　reality；　in　other　words；　in　thought；　it　is　perfect。　The　absolute　Being　＇God＇　is；　however；　just
this　object　of　thought；　and　is　something　postulated　beyond　the　actual。　It　is　therefore　the　thought　in
which　the　morally　imperfect　knowledge　and　will　are　held　to　be　perfect；　and　the　Absolute；　since　it
takes　this　imperfection　to　have　full　weight；　distributes　happiness　according　to　〃worthiness〃；　i。e。
according　to　the　〃merit〃　ascribed　to　the　imperfect　consciousness。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（3）　The　Moral　World　as　a　Presented　Idea

This　completes　the　meaning　of　the　moral　attitude。　For　in　the　conception　of　moral
self…consciousness　the　two　aspects；　pure　duty　and　actual　reality；　are　affirmed　of　a　single　unity；　and
thereby　the　one；　like　the　other；　is　put　forward；　not　as　something　self…complete；　but　as　a　moment；
or　as　cancelled　and　transcended。　This　becomes　consciously　explicit　in　the　last　phase　of　the　moral
attitude　or　point　of　view。　Consciousness；　we　there　saw；　places　pure　duty　in　another　fo