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梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈��梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈��梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何��
!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��





the preface to Pt。 IV。���察�one and the same action being sometimes good�察�



sometimes bad�察�wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad�察�or arises 



from some evil emotion�察�we may be led by reason ��IV��xix。��。 Q。E。D。 







Note。´ An example will put this point in a clearer light。 The action of 



striking�察�in so far as it is considered physically�察�and in so far as we 



merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm�察�clenches his fist�察�and 



moves his whole arm violently downwards�察�is a virtue or excellence which 



is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body。 If�察�then�察�a man�察�



moved by anger or hatred�察�is led to clench his fist or to move his arm�察�



this result takes place ��as we showed in Pt。II。���察�because one and the 



same action can be associated with various mental images of things�察�



therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same 



action by confused ideas�察�or by clear and distinct ideas。 Hence it is 



evident that every desire which springs from emotion�察�wherein the mind is 



passive�察�would become useless�察�if men could be guided by reason。 Let us 



now see why desire which arises from emotion�察�wherein the mind is passive�察�



is called by us blind。















Prop。 LX。 Desire arising from a pleasure 



or pain�察�that is not attributable�察�to 



the whole body�察�but only to one or certain 



parts thereof�察�is without utility in 



respect to a man as a whole。







Proof。´ Let it be assumed�察�for instance�察�that A�察�a part of a body�察�is so 



strengthened by some external cause�察�that it prevails over the remaining 



parts ��IV��vi。��。 This part will not endeavour to do away with its own 



powers�察�in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office�察�



for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing 



away with its own powers�察�which ��III��vi。�� is absurd。 The said part�察�and�察�



consequently�察�the mind also�察�will endeavour to preserve its condition。 



Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no 



utility in reference to a man as a whole。 If it be assumed�察�on the other 



hand�察�that the part�察�A�察�be checked so that the remaining parts prevail�察�



it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no 



utility in respect to a man as a whole。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ As pleasure is generally ��IV��xliv。Note�� attributed to one part 



of the body�察�we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking 



into consideration our health as a whole�此�to which it may be added�察�that 



the desires which have most hold over us ��IV��ix。�� take account of the 



present and not of the future。















Prop。 LXI。 Desire which springs from 



reason cannot be excessive。







Proof。´ Desire ��Def。 of the Emotions��i。�� considered absolutely is the 



actual essence of man�察�in so far as it is conceived as in any way 



determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself。 



Hence desire�察�which arises from reason�察�that is ��III��iii。���察�which is 



engendered in us in so far as we act�察�is the actual essence or nature of 



man�察�in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are 



adequately conceived through man's essence only ��III��Def。ii。��。 Now�察�if 



such desire could be excessive�察�human nature considered in itself alone 



would be able to exceed itself�察�or would be able to do more than it can�察�



a manifest contradiction。 Therefore�察�such desire cannot be excessive。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 LXII。 In so far as the mind conceives 



a thing under the dictates of reason�察�it is 



affected equally�察�whether the idea be of a 



thing future�察�past�察�or present。







Proof。´ Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason�察�it 



conceives under the form of eternity or necessity ��II��xliv。Coroll。ii。���察�



and is therefore affected with the same certitude ��II��xliii。&Note��。  



Wherefore�察�whether the thing be present�察�past�察�or future�察�the mind 



conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same 



certitude�察�and whether the idea be of something present�察�past�察�or future�察�



it will in all cases be equally true ��II��xli。���察�that is�察�it will always 



possess the same properties of an adequate idea ��II��Def。iv。���察�therefore�察�in 



so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason�察�it is 



affected in the same manner�察�whether the idea be of a thing future�察�past�察�



or present。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things�察�



and could determine by reason their periods of existence�察�we should 



contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present�察�and 



the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it 



conceived as future�察�consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser 



good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future�察�and 



would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of 



evil in the future�察�as we shall presently show。 However�察�we can have but 



a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things ��II��xxxi。�� and the 



periods of their existence ��II��xliv。Note�� we can only determine by 



imagination�察�which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the 



present。 Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is 



merely abstract or general�察�and the judgment which we pass on the order 



of things and the connection of causes�察�with a view to determining what 



is good or bad for us in the�察�present�察�is rather imaginary than real。  



Therefore it is nothing wonderful�察�if the desire arising from such 



knowledge of good and evil�察�in so far as it looks on into the future�察�be 



more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the 



present time。 ��Cf。 IV��xvi。��















Prop。 LXIII。 He who is led by fear�察�



and does good in order to escape evil�察�



is not led by reason。







Proof。´ All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active�察�



or in other words to reason�察�are emotions of pleasure and desire ��III��lix。���察�



therefore�察�he who is led by fear�察�and does good in order to escape evil�察�



is not led by reason。







Note。´ Superstitions persons�察�who know better how to rail at vice than 



how to teach virtue�察�and who strive not to guide men by reason�察�but so 



to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue�察�



have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves�察�wherefore 



it is nothing wonderful�察�if they be generally troublesome and odious to 



their fellow´men。







Corollary。´ Under desire which springs from reason�察�we seek good directly�察�



and shun evil indirectly。







Proof。´ Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable 



emotion�察�wherein the mind is not passive ��III��lix。���察�in other words�察�from 



a pleasure which cannot be excessive ��IV��lxi。���察�and not from pain�察�



wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good�察�not of evil 



��IV��viii。���察�hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and 



only by implication shun evil。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a 



healthy man。 The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally 



shrinks from�察�but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food�察�and thus 



gets a better enjoyment out of life�察�than if he were in fear of death�察�



and desired directly to avoid it。 So a judge�察�who condemns a criminal 



to death�察�not from hatred or anger but from love of the public 



well´being�察�is guided solely by reason。















Prop。 LXIV。 The knowledge of evil is 



an inadequate knowledge。







Proof。´ The knowledge of evil ��IV��viii。�� is pain�察�in so far as we are 



conscious thereof。 Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 



��Def。 of the Emotions��iii。�� and therefore cannot be understood through 



man's nature ��III��vi。��& II��vii。���察�therefore it is a passive state 



��III。Def。ii。�� which ��III��iii。�� depends on inadequate ideas�察�consequently 



the knowledge thereof ��II��xxix。���察�namely�察�the knowledge of evil�察�is 



inadequate。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ Hence it follows that�察�if the human mind possessed only 



adequate ideas�察�it would form no conception of evil。















Prop。 LXV。 Under the guidance of reason we 



should pursue the greater of two goods and 



the lesser of two evils。







Proof。´ A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in 



reality an evil�察�for we apply the terms good and bad to things�察�in so 



far as we compare them one with another ��see preface to this Part���察�



therefore�察�evil is in reality a lesser good�察�hence under the guidance of 



reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ We may�察�under the guidance of reason�察�pursue the lesser evil 



as though it were the greater good�察�and we may shun the lesser good�察�



which would be the cause of the greater evil。 For the evil�察�which is 



here called the lesser�察�is really good�察�and the lesser good is really 



evil�察�wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 LXVI。 We may�察�under the guidance of 



reason�察�seek a greater good in the future 



in preference to a lesser good in the 



present�察�and we may seek a lesser evil in 



the present in preference to a greater evil 



in the future。 



;Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro。; ��Van Vloten��。  Bruder reads�此 �Malum praesens minus�察�quod



causa est faturi alicujus mali。; The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint�察�and is



corrected by the Dutch translator into ;majoris boni。; ��Pollock�察�p。 268�察�note。��







Proof。´ If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future�察�



it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards 



what is present ��IV��lxii。���察�wherefore�察�looking merely to reason�察�as in 



this proposition we are assumed to do�察�there is no difference�察�whether 



the greater good or evil be assumed as present�察�or assumed as future�察�



hence ��IV��lxv。�� we may seek a greater good in the future in preference 



to a lesser good in the present�察�&c。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ We may�察�under the guidance of reason�察�seek a lesser evil in 



the present�察�because it is the cause of a greater good in the future�察�



and we may shun a lesser good in the present�察�because it is the cause 



of a greater evil in the future。 This Corollary is related to the 



foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV��lxv。 is related to the 



said IV��lxv。







Note。´ If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out 



concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop。 xviii。�察�



we shall readily see the difference between a man�察�who is led solely by 



emotion or opinion�察�and a man�察�who

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