the ethics(part iv)-及10嫗
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!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��
the preface to Pt。 IV。���察�one and the same action being sometimes good�察�
sometimes bad�察�wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad�察�or arises
from some evil emotion�察�we may be led by reason ��IV��xix。��。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ An example will put this point in a clearer light。 The action of
striking�察�in so far as it is considered physically�察�and in so far as we
merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm�察�clenches his fist�察�and
moves his whole arm violently downwards�察�is a virtue or excellence which
is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body。 If�察�then�察�a man�察�
moved by anger or hatred�察�is led to clench his fist or to move his arm�察�
this result takes place ��as we showed in Pt。II。���察�because one and the
same action can be associated with various mental images of things�察�
therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same
action by confused ideas�察�or by clear and distinct ideas。 Hence it is
evident that every desire which springs from emotion�察�wherein the mind is
passive�察�would become useless�察�if men could be guided by reason。 Let us
now see why desire which arises from emotion�察�wherein the mind is passive�察�
is called by us blind。
Prop。 LX。 Desire arising from a pleasure
or pain�察�that is not attributable�察�to
the whole body�察�but only to one or certain
parts thereof�察�is without utility in
respect to a man as a whole。
Proof。´ Let it be assumed�察�for instance�察�that A�察�a part of a body�察�is so
strengthened by some external cause�察�that it prevails over the remaining
parts ��IV��vi。��。 This part will not endeavour to do away with its own
powers�察�in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office�察�
for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing
away with its own powers�察�which ��III��vi。�� is absurd。 The said part�察�and�察�
consequently�察�the mind also�察�will endeavour to preserve its condition。
Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no
utility in reference to a man as a whole。 If it be assumed�察�on the other
hand�察�that the part�察�A�察�be checked so that the remaining parts prevail�察�
it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no
utility in respect to a man as a whole。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ As pleasure is generally ��IV��xliv。Note�� attributed to one part
of the body�察�we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking
into consideration our health as a whole�此�to which it may be added�察�that
the desires which have most hold over us ��IV��ix。�� take account of the
present and not of the future。
Prop。 LXI。 Desire which springs from
reason cannot be excessive。
Proof。´ Desire ��Def。 of the Emotions��i。�� considered absolutely is the
actual essence of man�察�in so far as it is conceived as in any way
determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself。
Hence desire�察�which arises from reason�察�that is ��III��iii。���察�which is
engendered in us in so far as we act�察�is the actual essence or nature of
man�察�in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
adequately conceived through man's essence only ��III��Def。ii。��。 Now�察�if
such desire could be excessive�察�human nature considered in itself alone
would be able to exceed itself�察�or would be able to do more than it can�察�
a manifest contradiction。 Therefore�察�such desire cannot be excessive。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 LXII。 In so far as the mind conceives
a thing under the dictates of reason�察�it is
affected equally�察�whether the idea be of a
thing future�察�past�察�or present。
Proof。´ Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason�察�it
conceives under the form of eternity or necessity ��II��xliv。Coroll。ii。���察�
and is therefore affected with the same certitude ��II��xliii。&Note��。
Wherefore�察�whether the thing be present�察�past�察�or future�察�the mind
conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same
certitude�察�and whether the idea be of something present�察�past�察�or future�察�
it will in all cases be equally true ��II��xli。���察�that is�察�it will always
possess the same properties of an adequate idea ��II��Def。iv。���察�therefore�察�in
so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason�察�it is
affected in the same manner�察�whether the idea be of a thing future�察�past�察�
or present。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things�察�
and could determine by reason their periods of existence�察�we should
contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present�察�and
the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it
conceived as future�察�consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser
good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future�察�and
would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of
evil in the future�察�as we shall presently show。 However�察�we can have but
a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things ��II��xxxi。�� and the
periods of their existence ��II��xliv。Note�� we can only determine by
imagination�察�which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the
present。 Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is
merely abstract or general�察�and the judgment which we pass on the order
of things and the connection of causes�察�with a view to determining what
is good or bad for us in the�察�present�察�is rather imaginary than real。
Therefore it is nothing wonderful�察�if the desire arising from such
knowledge of good and evil�察�in so far as it looks on into the future�察�be
more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the
present time。 ��Cf。 IV��xvi。��
Prop。 LXIII。 He who is led by fear�察�
and does good in order to escape evil�察�
is not led by reason。
Proof。´ All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active�察�
or in other words to reason�察�are emotions of pleasure and desire ��III��lix。���察�
therefore�察�he who is led by fear�察�and does good in order to escape evil�察�
is not led by reason。
Note。´ Superstitions persons�察�who know better how to rail at vice than
how to teach virtue�察�and who strive not to guide men by reason�察�but so
to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue�察�
have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves�察�wherefore
it is nothing wonderful�察�if they be generally troublesome and odious to
their fellow´men。
Corollary。´ Under desire which springs from reason�察�we seek good directly�察�
and shun evil indirectly。
Proof。´ Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable
emotion�察�wherein the mind is not passive ��III��lix。���察�in other words�察�from
a pleasure which cannot be excessive ��IV��lxi。���察�and not from pain�察�
wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good�察�not of evil
��IV��viii。���察�hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and
only by implication shun evil。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a
healthy man。 The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally
shrinks from�察�but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food�察�and thus
gets a better enjoyment out of life�察�than if he were in fear of death�察�
and desired directly to avoid it。 So a judge�察�who condemns a criminal
to death�察�not from hatred or anger but from love of the public
well´being�察�is guided solely by reason。
Prop。 LXIV。 The knowledge of evil is
an inadequate knowledge。
Proof。´ The knowledge of evil ��IV��viii。�� is pain�察�in so far as we are
conscious thereof。 Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection
��Def。 of the Emotions��iii。�� and therefore cannot be understood through
man's nature ��III��vi。��& II��vii。���察�therefore it is a passive state
��III。Def。ii。�� which ��III��iii。�� depends on inadequate ideas�察�consequently
the knowledge thereof ��II��xxix。���察�namely�察�the knowledge of evil�察�is
inadequate。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ Hence it follows that�察�if the human mind possessed only
adequate ideas�察�it would form no conception of evil。
Prop。 LXV。 Under the guidance of reason we
should pursue the greater of two goods and
the lesser of two evils。
Proof。´ A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in
reality an evil�察�for we apply the terms good and bad to things�察�in so
far as we compare them one with another ��see preface to this Part���察�
therefore�察�evil is in reality a lesser good�察�hence under the guidance of
reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ We may�察�under the guidance of reason�察�pursue the lesser evil
as though it were the greater good�察�and we may shun the lesser good�察�
which would be the cause of the greater evil。 For the evil�察�which is
here called the lesser�察�is really good�察�and the lesser good is really
evil�察�wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 LXVI。 We may�察�under the guidance of
reason�察�seek a greater good in the future
in preference to a lesser good in the
present�察�and we may seek a lesser evil in
the present in preference to a greater evil
in the future。
;Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro。; ��Van Vloten��。 Bruder reads�此 �Malum praesens minus�察�quod
causa est faturi alicujus mali。; The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint�察�and is
corrected by the Dutch translator into ;majoris boni。; ��Pollock�察�p。 268�察�note。��
Proof。´ If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future�察�
it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards
what is present ��IV��lxii。���察�wherefore�察�looking merely to reason�察�as in
this proposition we are assumed to do�察�there is no difference�察�whether
the greater good or evil be assumed as present�察�or assumed as future�察�
hence ��IV��lxv。�� we may seek a greater good in the future in preference
to a lesser good in the present�察�&c。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ We may�察�under the guidance of reason�察�seek a lesser evil in
the present�察�because it is the cause of a greater good in the future�察�
and we may shun a lesser good in the present�察�because it is the cause
of a greater evil in the future。 This Corollary is related to the
foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV��lxv。 is related to the
said IV��lxv。
Note。´ If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out
concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop。 xviii。�察�
we shall readily see the difference between a man�察�who is led solely by
emotion or opinion�察�and a man�察�who