history of philosophy-第75章

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affirmation；　an　identity　with　self　which　again　falls　into　negation；　and　from　this　negation　is　ever　again
restored。　To　speak　of　the　bounds　of　human　reason　is；　however；　an　unmeaning　form　of　words。
That　the　reason　of　the　subject　is　limited　is　comprehensible　from　the　nature　of　the　case；　but　when
we　speak　of　Thought；　infinitude　is　none　other　than　one's　own　relation　to　self；　and　not　to　one's　limit；
and　the　place　in　which　man　is　infinite　is　Thought。　Infinitude　may　then　be　likewise　very　abstract；　and
in　this　way　it　is　also　once　more　finite；　but　true　infinitude　remains　in　itself。

Fichte　further　deduces　the　ordinary　conception　thus：　the　fact　that　the　ego　in　going　forth　at　once
finds　its　activity　checked　by　a　limitation；　and　returns　once　more　into　itself；　brings　about　two
opposite　tendencies　in　me；　between　which　I　waver；　and　which　I　try　to　unite　in　the　faculty　of
imagination。　In　order　that　a　fixed　determination　may　exist　between　the　two；　I　have　to　make　the
limit　a　permanent　one；　and　we　have　that　in　the　understanding。　All　further　determinations　of　the
object　are；　as　categories　of　the　understanding；　modes　of　synthesis；　but　each　synthesis　is　a　new
contradiction。　New　mediations　are　thus　once　more　necessary；　and　these　are　new　determinations。
Thus　Fichte　says：　I　can　always　continue　to　determine　the　non…ego；　to　make　it　my　conception；　i。e。
to　take　from　it　its　negation　as　regards　me。　I　have　to　deal　with　my　activity　alone；　but　there　is　always
an　externality　therein　present　which　still　remains；　and　which　is　not　explained　by　my　activity。　This
Beyond　which　alone　remains　to　the　undetermined　ego　Fichte　calls　the　infinite　check　upon　the　ego；
with　which　it　ever　has　to　deal；　and　beyond　which　it　cannot　get；　thus　the　activity　which　proceeds
into　infinitude　finds　itself　checked　and　driven　back　by　this　repulsive　force；　and　then　it　reacts　upon
itself。　“The　ego　in　its　self…determination　has　been　considered　both　as　determining　and　determined；
if　we　reflect　on　the　fact　that　the　absolutely　determined　determining　power　must　be　an　absolutely
indeterminate；　and　further；　that　ego　and　non…ego　are　absolutely　opposed　to　one　another；　in　the　one
case　ego　is　the　indeterminate　and　in　the　other　case　non…ego。”　（21）

Inasmuch　as　the　ego　here　makes　the　object　its　conception　and　negates　it；　this　philosophy　is
Idealism；　in　which　philosophy　all　the　determinations　of　the　object　are　ideal。　Everything　determinate
which　the　ego　possesses　it　has　through　its　own　positing；　I　even　make　a　coat　or　a　boot　because　I
put　them　on。　There　remains　only　the　empty　repulsive　force；　and　that　is　the　Kantian　Thing…in…itself；
beyond　which　even　Fichte　cannot　get；　even　though　the　theoretic　reason　continues　its　determination
into　infinitude。　“The　ego　as　intelligence”　ever　“remains　dependent　on　an　undetermined　non…ego；　it
is　only　through　this　that　it　is　intelligence。”　（22）　The　theoretic　side　is　thus　dependent。　In　it　we　have
not　therefore　to　deal　with　the　truth　in　and　for　itself　but　with　a　contingent；　because　ego　is　limited；　not
absolute；　as　its　Notion　demands：　intelligence　is　not　here　considered　as　spirit　which　is　free。　This　is
Fichte's　standpoint　as　regards　the　theoretic　side。

c。　Practical　reason　comes　next；　the　point　of　view　from　which　it　starts　is　that　“The　ego　posits　itself
as　determining　the　non…ego。”　Now　the　contradiction　has　thus　to　be　solved　of　ego　being　at　home
with　itself；　since　it　determines　its　Beyond。　The　ego　is　thus　infinite　activity；　and；　as　ego=ego；　the
absolute　ego；　it　is　undoubtedly　abstract。　But　in　order　to　have　a　determination；　a　non…ego　must
exist；　ego　is　thus　activity；　causality；　the　positing　of　the　non…ego。　But　as　with　Kant　sensuousness　and
reason　remain　opposed；　the　same　contradiction　is　present　here；　only　in　a　more　abstract　form；　and
not　in　the　rude　empiricism　of　Kant。　Fichte　here　turns　and　twists　in　all　sorts　of　ways；　or　he　gives　the
opposition　many　different　forms；　the　crudest　form　is　that　ego　is　posited　as　causality；　for　in　it
another　is　necessitated　on　which　it　exercises　its　activity。　“The　absolute　ego　has　accordingly　to　be”
now　“the　cause　of　the　non…ego；　i。e。　only　of　that　in　the　non…ego　which　remains　when　we　abstract
from　all　demonstrable　forms　of　representation　or　conception　—　of　that　to　which　is　ascribed　the
check　given　to　the　infinitely　operative　activity　of　the　ego；　for　the　fact　that　the　intelligent　ego　is；　in
accordance　with　the　necessary　laws　of　the　conception；　the　cause　of　the　particular　determinations
of　that　which　is　conceived　as　such；　is　demonstrated　in　the　theoretic　science　of　knowledge。”　（23）
The　limits　of　intelligence　must　be　broken　through；　the　ego　must　alone　be　active；　the　other　side；　the
infinite　repulsion；　must　be　removed；　in　order　that　the　ego　may　be　liberated。

“According　to　our　hypothesis　the　ego　must　now　posit　a　non…ego　absolutely；　and　without　any
ground；　i。e。　absolutely　and　without　any　ground　it　must　limit　or　in　part　not　posit　itself。”　This；
indeed；　it　already　does　as　intelligent。　“It　must　therefore　have　the　ground　of　not　positing　itself”
only　“in　itself。”　The　ego　is；　however；　just　the　ego；　it　posits　itself；　“it　must”　therefore　“have　the
principle　of　positing　itself　within　it；　and　also　the　principle　of　not　positing　itself。　Hence　the　ego　in　its
essence　would　be　contradictory　and　self…repellent；　there　would　be　in　it　a　twofold　or　contradictory
principle；　which　assumption　contradicts　itself；　for　in　that　case　there　would　be　no　principle　within　it。
The　ego　would”　consequently　“not　exist；　for　it　would　abrogate　itself。　All　contradictions　are
reconciled　through　the　further　determination　of　contradictory　propositions。　The　ego　must　be
posited　in　one　sense　as　infinite；　and　in　another　as　finite。　Were　it　to　be　posited　as　infinite　and　finite　in
one　and　the　same　sense；　the　contradiction　would　be　insoluble；　the　ego　would　not　be　one　but　two。
In　so　far　as　the　ego　posits　itself　as　infinite；　its　activity　is　directed　upon　itself　and　on　nothing　else　but
itself。　In　so　far　as　the　ego　posits　limits；　and　itself　in　these　limits；　its　activity　is　not　exercised　directly
on　itself；　but　on　a　non…ego　which　has　to　be　placed　in　opposition；”　upon　another　and　again　upon
another；　and　so　on　into　infinitude；　that　is　the　object；　and　the　activity　of　the　ego　“is　objective
activity。”　（24）　In　this　way　Fichte　in　the　practical　sphere　also　remains　at　opposition；　only　this
opposition　now　has　the　form　of　two　tendencies　in　the　ego；　both　of　which　are　said　to　be　one　and
the　same　activity　of　the　ego。　I　am　called　upon　to　proceed　to　determine　the　other　in　relation　to
which　I　am　negative；　the　non…ego；　in　accordance　with　my　freedom　it　has　indeed　all　determinations
through　the　activity　of　the　ego；　but　beyond　my　determination　the　same　non…ego　ever　continues　to
appear。　The　ego　clearly　posits　an　object；　a　point　of　limitation；　but　where　the　limitation　is；　is
undetermined。　I　may　transfer　the　sphere　of　my　determination；　and　extend　it　to　an　infinite　degree；
but　there　always　remains　a　pure　Beyond；　and　the　non…ego　has　no　positive　self…existent
determination。

The　last　point　in　respect　of　the　practical　sphere　is　hence　this；　that　the　activity　of　the　ego　is　a
yearning　or　striving（25）　—　like　the　Kantian　“ought”　；　Fichte　treats　this　with　great　prolixity。　The
Fichtian　philosophy　consequently　has　the　same　standpoint　as　the　Kantian；　the　ultimate　is　always
subjectivity；　as　existent　in　and　for　itself。　Yearning；　according　to　Fichte；　is　divine；　in　yearning　I　have
not　forgotten　myself；　I　have　not　forgotten　that　I　possess　a　superiority　in　myself；　and　therefore　it　is　a
condition　of　happiness　and　satisfaction。　This　infinite　yearning　and　desire　has　then　been　regarded　as
what　is　highest　and　most　excellent　in　the　Beautiful；　and　in　religious　feelings　likewise；　and　with　it　is
connected　the　irony　of　which　we　have　spoken　before　（Vol。　I。　pp。　400；　401）。　In　this　return　the　ego
is　merely　an　effort；　on　its　side　it　is　fixed；　and　it　cannot　realize　its　endeavours。　Striving　is　thus　an
imperfect　or　implicitly　limited　action。　The　ultimate　result　is　consequently　a　“circle”　which　cannot
be　broken　through；　so　that　“the　finite　spirit　must　necessarily　posit　an　absolute　outside　itself　（a
thing…in…itself）；　and　yet　on　the　other　hand　it　must　recognize　that　this　same　is　only　there　for　it　（a
necessary　noumenon）。”　（26）　To　put　it　otherwise；　we　see　the　ego　absolutely　determined　in
opposition　only；　we　see　it　only　as　consciousness　and　self…consciousness　which　does　not　got
beyond　this；　and　which　does　not　reach　so　far　as　to　Spirit。　The　ego　is　the　absolute　Notion　in　so　far
as　it　does　not　yet　reach　the　unity　of　thought；　or　in　this　simplicity　does　not　reach　difference；　and　in
motion　does　not　have　rest；　that　is　to　say；　in　so　far　as　positing；　or　the　pure　activity　of　the　ego；　and
setting　in　opposition；　are　not　by　it　comprehended　as　the　same。　Or　the　ego　does　not　comprehend
the　infinite　repulsion；　the　non…ego；　self…consciousness　determines　the　non…ego；　but　does　not　know
how　to　make　this　Beyond　its　own。

The　deficiency　in　the　Fichtian　philosophy　is　thus　firstly　that　the　ego　retains　the　significance　of　the
individual；　actual　self…consciousness；　as　opposed　to　that　which　is　universal　or　absolute；　or　to　the
spirit　in　which　it　is　itself　a　moment　merely；　for　the　individual　self…consciousness　simply　signifies
standing　apart　as　far　as　another　is　concerned。　Hence；　if　the　ego　was　ever　called　absolute
existence；　the　most　terrible　offence　was　given；　because　really　the　ego　only　came　before　us　as
signifying　the　individual　subject　as　opposed　to　the　universal。

In　the　second　place；　Fichte　does　not　attain　to　the　idea　of　Reason　as　the　perfected；　real　unity　of
subject　and　object；　or　of　ego　and　non…ego；　it　is　only；　as　with　Kant；　represented　as　the　thought　of　a
union　in　a　belief　or　faith；　and　with　this　Fichte　likewise　concludes　（Grundlage　der　gesammten
Wissenschaftslehre；　p。　301）。　This　he　worked　out　in　his　popular　writings。　For　because　the　ego　is
fixed　in　its　opposition　to　the　non…ego；　and　is　only　as　being　opposed；　it　becomes　lost　in　that　unity。
The　attainment　of　this　aim　is　hence　sent　further　and　further　back　into　the　false；　sensuous　infinitude：
it　is　a　progression　implying　just　the　same　contradiction　as　that　found　in　Kant；　and　having　no　present
actuality　in　itself；　for　the　ego　has　all　actuality　in　its　opposition　only。　The　Fichtian　philosophy
recognizes　the　finite　spirit　alone；　and　not　the　infinite；　it　does　not　recognize　spirit　as　universal
thought；　as　the　Kantian　philosophy　does　not　recognize　the　not…true；　or　it　is　formal。　The　knowledge
of　absolute　unity　is　apprehended　as　faith　in　a　moral　disposition　of　the　world；　an　absolute
hypothesis　in　accordance　with　which　we　have　the　belief　that　every　moral　action　that　we　perform
will　have　a　good　result。（27）　As　in　Kant's　case；　this　Idea　belongs　to　universal　thought。　“In　a　word；
when　anything　is　apprehended　it　ceases　to　be　God；　and　every　conception　of　God　that　is　set　up　is
necessarily　that　of　a　false　God。　Religion　is　a　practical　faith　in　the　moral　government　of　the　world；
faith　in　a　supersensuous　world　belongs；　according　to　our　philosophy；　to　the　immediate　verities。”
（28）　Fichte　thus　concludes　with　the　highest　Idea；　with　the　union　of　freedom　and　nature；　but　a　union
of　such　a　nature　that；　immediately　regarded；　it　is　not　known；　t