history of philosophy-第74章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


derived　from　the　original。　Here；　then；　we　have　no　more　to　do　with　derivation；　although　this
derivation　of　opposition　from　the　first　proposition　was　all　the　same　demanded。　Inasmuch　as　I　posit
another　in　opposition　to　the　ego；　I　posit　myself　as　not　posited；　this　non…ego　is　the　object　generally；
i。e。　that　which　is　opposed　to　me。　This　other　is　the　negative　of　the　ego；　thus　when　Fichte　called　it
the　non…ego　he　was　expressing　himself　in　a　very　happy；　suitable；　and　consistent　manner。　There　has
been　a　good　deal　of　ridicule　cast　on　the　ego　and　non…ego；　the　expression　is　new；　and　therefore　to
us　Germans　it　seems　strange　at　first。　But　the　French　say　Moi　and　Non…moi；　without　finding
anything　laughable　in　it。　In　this　principle　the　positing　belongs；　however；　to　the　ego；　but　because　the
non…ego　is　independent　of　the　ego；　we　have　two　sides；　and　self…consciousness　relates　itself　to
another。　This　second　proposition　thus　signifies　that　I　posit　myself　as　limited；　as　non…ego；　but
non…ego　is　something　quite　new　to　be　added。　On　the　one　side　we　thus　have　before　us　a　field　which
is　merely　appropriated　from　the　ego；　and　in　this　way　we　have　before　us　the　non…ego　as　our　object。

To　these　is　added　yet　a　third　proposition；　in　which　I　now　make　this　division　into　ego　and　non…ego：
it　is　the　synthetic　principle；　the　proposition　of　ground；　which　in　content　is　unconditioned；　just　as　in
the　second　was　the　case　in　regard　to　form。　This　third　proposition　is　the　determination　of　the　first
two　through　one　another；　in　such　a　way　that　the　ego　limits　the　non…ego。　“In　and　through　the　ego
both　the　ego　and　the　non…ego　are　posited　as　capable　of　being　mutually　limited　by　means　of　one
another；　i。e。　in　such　a　way　that　the　reality　of　the　one　abrogates　the　reality　of　the　other。”　In
limitation　both　are　negated；　but　“only　in　part”　；　only　thus　are　synthesis　and　deduction　possible。　I
posit　the　non…ego；　which　is　for　me；　in　myself；　in　my　identity　with　myself；　thus　I　take　it　from　its
non…identity；　its　not…being…I；　that　is　to　say　I　limit　it。　This　limitation　of　the　non…ego　Fichte　expresses
thus：　“I　place　in　opposition　to　the　ego；”　and　indeed　“to　the　divisible　ego；　a　divisible　non…ego。”
The　non…ego　I　destroy　as　a　complete　sphere；　which　it　was　according　to　the　second　principle；　and
posit　it　as　divisible；　I　likewise　posit　the　ego　as　divisible　in　so　far　as　the　non…ego　is　present　in　it。　The
whole　sphere　which　I　have　before　me　is　supposed　indeed　to　be　the　ego；　but　in　it　I　have　not　one
but　two。　The　proposition　of　ground　is　thus　the　relation　of　reality　and　negation；　i。e。　it　is　limitation；　it
contains　the　ego　limited　by　the　non…ego；　and　the　non…ego　limited　by　the　ego。（14）　Of　this　synthesis
there　is　nothing；　properly　speaking；　contained　in　the　two　earlier　propositions。　Even　this　first
presentation　of　the　three　principles　does　away　with　the　immanence　of　real　knowledge。　Thus　the
presentation　is　here　also　subject　to　an　opposite　from　the　first；　as　it　is　with　Kant；　even　if　these　are
two　acts　of　the　ego　merely；　and　we　remain　entirely　in　the　ego。

Now　that　limitation　may　take　place　for　me　in　two　different　ways：　at　one　time　the　one　is　passive；　at
another　time　the　other　is　so。　In　this　limitation　the　ego　may　posit　the　non…ego　as　limiting　and　itself　as
limited；　in　such　a　way　that　the　ego　posits　itself　as　requiring　to　have　an　object；　I　know　myself　indeed
as　ego；　but　determined　by　the　non…ego；　non…ego　is　here　active　and　ego　passive。　Or；　on　the　other
hand；　the　ego；　as　abrogating　other…being；　is　that　which　limits；　and　non…ego　is　the　limited。　I　know
myself　then　as　clearly　determining　the　non…ego；　as　the　absolute　cause　of　the　non…ego　as　such；　for　I
can　think。　The　first　is　the　proposition　of　the　theoretic　reason；　of　intelligence：　the　second　the
proposition　of　practical　reason；　of　will。（15）　The　will　is　this；　that　I　am　conscious　of　myself　as　limiting
the　object；　thus　I　make　myself　exercise　activity　upon　the　object　and　maintain　myself。　The　theoretic
proposition　is　that　the　object　is　before　me　and　it　determines　me。　The　ego　is；　since　I　perceive；　a
content；　and　I　have　this　content　in　me；　which　is　thus　outside　of　me。　This　is　on　the　whole　the　same
thing　as　we　meet　with　in　the　experience　of　Kant：　it　comes　to　the　same　thing　whether　it　is　by　matter
or　the　non…ego　that　the　ego　is　here　determined。

b。　In　the　theoretic　consciousness　the　ego；　although　the　assertive　generally；　finds　itself　limited　by　the
non…ego。　But　it　is　identical　with　itself；　hence　its　infinite　activity　ever　sets　itself　to　abrogate　the
non…ego　and　to　bring　forth　itself。　Now　the　different　methods　whereby　the　ego　sets　forth　itself　are
the　different　methods　of　its　activity；　these　we　have　to　understand　in　their　necessity。　But　since
philosophic　knowledge　is　the　consideration　of　consciousness　itself　（supra；　p。　483）；　I　can　only
know　knowledge；　the　act　of　the　ego。　Fichte　thus　appeals　to　consciousness；　postulates　ego　and
non…ego　in　their　abstraction；　and　since　philosophic　knowledge　is　the　consciousness　of
consciousness；　it　is　not　sufficient　that　I　should　find　its　determinations　in　consciousness；　for　I
produce　them　with　consciousness。　Common　consciousness；　indeed；　likewise　brings　forth　all　the
determinations　of　the　ordinary　conception　and　of　thought；　but　without　—　on　the　theoretic　side　at
least　—　having　any　knowledge　of　it；　for　it　is　the　fact　of　being　limited　alone　that　is　present　to　it。　Thus；
when　I　see　a　large　square　object；　such　as　a　wall；　my　ordinary　consciousness　accepts　these
determinations　as　they　are　given　to　it；　the　object　is。　In　so　doing　I　do　not　think　of　seeing；　but　of　the
object；　seeing；　however；　is　my　activity；　the　determinations　of　my　faculty　of　sensation　are　thus
posited　through　me。（16）　The　ego　as　theoretic　is；　indeed；　aware　in　philosophic　consciousness　that　it
is　the　ego　which　posits；　but　here　it　posits　that　the　non…ego　posits　somewhat　in　me。　The　ego　thus
posits　itself　as　that　which　is　limited　by　the　non…ego。　I　make　this　limitation　mine；　thus　is　it　for　me　in
me；　this　passivity　of　the　ego　is　itself　the　activity　of　the　ego。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　all　reality　which
appears　in　the　object　for　the　ego　is　a　determination　of　the　ego；（17）　just　as　the　categories　and　other
determinations　were　in　Kant's　case。　Thus　it　is　here　more　especially　that　we　should　expect　Fichte　to
demonstrate　the　return　of　other…Being　into　absolute　consciousness。　However；　because　after　all　the
other…Being　was　regarded　as　unconditioned；　as　implicit；　this　return　does　not　come　to　pass。　The
ego　determines　the　'other；'　indeed；　but　this　unity　is　an　altogether　finite　unity；　non…ego　has　thus
immediately　escaped　from　determination　once　more　and　gone　forth　from　this　unity。　What　we　find
is　merely　an　alternation　between　self…consciousness　and　the　consciousness　of　another；　and　the
constant　progression　of　this　alternation；　which　never　reaches　any　end。（18）

The　development　of　theoretic　reason　is　the　following…out　of　the　manifold　relationships　between　the
ego　and　non…ego；　the　forms　of　this　limitation　which　Fichte　now　goes　through　are　the　determinations
of　the　object。　These　particular　thought…determinations　he　calls　categories；　and　he　seeks　to
demonstrate　them　in　their　necessity；　from　the　time　of　Aristotle　onwards　no　one　had　thought　of　so
doing。　The　first　of　these　forms　is　the　determination　of　reciprocity；　which　we　already　met　with　in　the
third　proposition：　“By　the　determination　of　the　reality　or　negation　of　the　ego；　the　negation　or　reality
of　the　non…ego　is　equally　determined；”　the　two　in　one　is　reciprocal　action。　In　the　second　place；
“Causality　is　the　same　degree　of　activity　in　the　one　as　of　passivity　in　the　other。”　In　so　far　as
something　is　considered　as　the　reality　of　the　non…ego；　the　ego　is　considered　as　passive；　and；　on　the
other　hand；　in　so　far　as　'I'　am　real；　the　object　is　passive；　this　relation；　that　the　passivity　of　the
object　is　my　activity　or　reality；　and　the　opposite；　is　the　conception　of　Causality。　“As　many　parts　of
negation　as　the　ego　posits　in　itself；　so　many　parts　of　reality　it　posits　in　the　non…ego；　it　therefore
posits　itself　as　self…determining　in　so　far　as　it　is　determined；　and　as　suffering　determination　in　so　far
as　it　determines　itself。　In　so　far；”　in　the　third　place；　“as　the　ego　is　regarded　as　embracing　the
whole　absolutely　determined　realm　of　all　reality；　it　is　substance；　on　the　other　hand　when　it　is
posited　in　a　not　absolutely　determined　sphere　of　this　realm；　in　so　far　there　is　an　accidence　in　the
ego。”　（19）　That　is　the　first　rational　attempt　that　has　ever　been　made　to　deduce　the　categories；　this
progress　from　one　determination　to　another　is；　however；　only　an　analysis　from　the　standpoint　of
consciousness；　and　is　not　in　and　for　itself。

The　ego　is　so　far　the　ideal　ground　of　all　conceptions　of　the　object；　all　determination　of　this　object　is
a　determination　of　the　ego。　But　in　order　that　it　may　be　object；　it　must　be　placed　in　opposition　to
the　ego；　i。e。　the　determinations　set　forth　through　the　ego　are　another；　the　non…ego；　this　placing　of
the　object　in　opposition　is　the　real　ground　of　conceptions。　The　ego　is；　however；　likewise　the　real
ground　of　the　object；　for　it　is　likewise　a　determination　of　the　ego　that　the　non…ego　as　object　is　set
in　opposition　to　the　ego。　Both；　the　real　ground　and　the　ideal　ground　of　the　conception；　are　thus
one　and　the　same。（20）　Regarding　the　ego　as　ideal　principle　and　the　non…ego　as　real　principle；
Krug　has　likewise　talked　a　great　deal　of　nonsense。　Regarded　from　the　one　point　of　view；　the　ego
is　active　and　the　non…ego　purely　passive；　while　from　the　other　side　the　ego　is　passive　and　the
object　active　and　operative。　But　since　the　ego　in　the　non…philosophic　consciousness　does　not　have
the　consciousness　of　its　activity　in　the　conception　of　the　object；　it　represents　to　itself　its　own
activity　as　foreign；　i。e。　as　belonging　to　the　non…ego。

We　here　see　the　opposition　adopting　various　forms：　ego；　non…ego；　positing；　setting　in　opposition；
two　sorts　of　activity　of　the　ego；　&c。　The　fact　that　I　represent　is　undoubtedly　my　activity；　but　the
matter　of　main　importance　is　the　content　of　the　positing　and　its　necessary　connection　through　itself。
If　one　occupies　oneself　only　with　this　content；　that　form　of　subjectivity　which　is　dominant　with
Fichte；　and　which　remains　in　his　opposition；　disappears。　As　the　ego　is　affirmative　and　determining；
there　now　is　in　this　determination　a　negative　likewise　present；　I　find　myself　determined　and　at　the
same　time　the　ego　is　like　itself；　infinite；　i。e。　identical　with　itself。　This　is　a　contradiction　which　Fichte
indeed　endeavours　to　reconcile；　but　in　spite　of　it　all　he　leaves　the　false　basis　of　dualism
undisturbed。　The　ultimate；　beyond　which　Fichte　does　not　get；　is　only　an　'ought；'　which　does　not
solve　the　contradiction；　for　while　the　ego　should　be　absolutely　at　home　with　itself；　i。e。　free；　it
should　at　the　same　time　be　associated　with　another。　To　Fichte　the　demand　for　the　solution　of　this
contradiction　thus　adopts　the　attitude　of　being　a　demanded　solution　only；　of　signifying　that　I　ever
have　to　destroy　the　barriers；　that　I　ever　have　to　reach　beyond　the　limitation　into　utter　infinitude；
and　that　I　ever　find　a　new　limit；　a　continual　alternation　takes　place　between　negation　and
affirmation；　an　identity　with　self　which　again　falls　into　neg