history of philosophy-第57章

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matter　of　choice　（qualemcunque）；　also　as　subordinate；　and　things　indifferent　and　evils　often　as
means。　Evil　is；　however；　an　object　of　His　will　only　as　the　condition　of　something　otherwise
necessary　（rei　alioqui　debit？）；　which　without　it　could　not　exist；　in　which　sense　Christ　said　it　must
needs　be　that　offences　come。”（24）

In　a　general　sense　we　are　satisfied　with　the　answer：　“In　accordance　with　the　wisdom　of　God　we
must　accept　it　as　a　fact　that　the　laws　of　nature　are　the　best　possible；”　but　this　answer　does　not
suffice　for　a　definite　question。　What　one　wishes　to　know　is　the　goodness　of　this　or　that　particular
law；　and　to　that　no　answer　is　given。　If；　for　example；　it　is　said　that　“The　law　of　falling　bodies；　in
which　the　relation　of　time　and　space　is　the　square；　is　the　best　possible；”　one　might　employ；　as　far
as　mathematics　are　concerned；　any　other　power　whatever。　When　Leibnitz　answers：　“God　made　it
so；”　this　is　no　answer　at　all。　We　wish　to　know　the　definite　reason　of　this　law；　such　general
determinations　sound　pious；　but　are　not　satisfying。

He　goes　on　to　say　that　the　sufficient　reason　has　reference　to　the　representation　of　the　monads。　The
principles　of　things　are　monads；　of　which　each　is　for　itself；　without　having　influence　on　the　others。　If
now　the　Monad　of　monads；　God；　is　the　absolute　substance；　and　individual　monads　are　created
through　His　will；　their　substantiality　comes　to　an　end。　There　is　therefore　a　contradiction　present；
which　remains　unsolved　in　itself　—　that　is　between　the　one　substantial　monad　and　the　many
monads　for　which　independence　is　claimed；　because　their　essence　consists　in　their　standing　in　no
relation　to　one　another。　Yet　at　the　same　time；　in　order　to　show　the　harmony　that　exists　in　the
world；　Leibnitz　understands　the　relation　of　monads　to　monads　more　generally　as　the　unity　of
contrasted　existences；　namely　of　soul　and　body。　This　unity　he　represents　as　a　relation　without
difference；　and　notionless；　i。e。　as　a　pre…established　harmony。（25）　Leibnitz　uses　here　the　illustration
of　two　clocks；　which　are　set　to　the　same　hour；　and　keep　the　same　time；（26）　in　the　same　way　the
movement　of　the　kingdom　of　thought　goes　on；　determined　in　accordance　with　ends；　and　the
movement　onward　of　the　corporeal　kingdom　which　corresponds　with　it；　proceeds　according　to　a
general　casual　connection。（27）　The　case　is　the　same　as　with　Spinoza；　that　these　two　sides　of　the
universe　have　no　connection　with　each　other；　the　one　does　not　influence　the　other；　but　both　are
entirely　indifferent　to　one　another；　it　is　really　the　differentiating　relation　of　the　Notion　that　is　lacking。
In　abstract　thought　that　is　without　Notion；　that　determination　now　receives　the　form　of　simplicity；
of　implicitude；　of　indifference　with　regard　to　what　is　other；　of　a　self…reflection　that　has　no
movement：　in　this　way　red　in　the　abstract　is　in　a　position　of　indifference　as　regards　blue；　&c。　Here；
as　before；　Leibnitz　forsakes　his　principle　of　individuation；　it　has　only　the　sense　of　being　exclusively
one；　and　of　not　reaching　to　and　including　what　is　other；　or　it　is　only　a　unity　of　the　popular
conception；　not　the　Notion　of　unity。　The　soul　has　thus　a　series　of　conceptions　and　ideas　which　are
developed　from　within　it；　and　this　series　is　from　the　very　first　placed　within　the　soul　at　its　creation；
i。e。；　the　soul　is　in　all　immediacy　this　implicit　determination；　determination　is；　however；　not　implicit；
but　the　reflected　unfolding　of　this　determination　in　the　ordinary　conception　is　its　outward　existence。
Parallel　with　this　series　of　differentiated　conceptions；　there　now　runs　a　series　of　motions　of　the
body；　or　of　what　is　external　to　the　soul。（28）　Both　are　essential　moments　of　reality；　they　are
mutually　indifferent；　but　they　have　also　an　essential　relation　of　difference。

Since　now　every　monad；　as　shut　up　within　itself；　has　no　influence　upon　the　body　and　its
movements；　and　yet　the　infinite　multitude　of　their　atoms　correspond　with　one　another；　Leibnitz
places　this　harmony　in　God；　a　better　definition　of　the　relation　and　the　activity　of　the　Monad　of
monads　is　therefore　that　it　is　what　pre…establishes　harmony　in　the　changes　of　the　monads。（29）　God
is　the　sufficient　reason；　the　cause　of　this　correspondence；　He　has　so　arranged　the　multitude　of
atoms　that　the　original　changes　which　are　developed　within　one　monad　correspond　with　the
changes　of　the　others。　The　pre…established　harmony　is　to　be　thought　of　somewhat　in　this　style；
when　a　dog　gets　a　beating；　the　pain　develops　itself　in　him；　in　like　fashion　the　beating　develops　itself
in　itself；　and　so　does　the　person　who　administers　the　beating；　their　determinations　all　correspond
with　one　another；　and　that　not　by　means　of　their　objective　connection；　since　each　is
independent。（30）　The　principle　of　the　harmony　among　the　monads　does　not　consequently　belong
to　them；　but　it　is　in　God；　who　for　that　very　reason　is　the　Monad　of　monads；　their　absolute　unity。
We　saw　from　the　beginning　how　Leibnitz　arrived　at　this　conception。　Each　monad　is　really
possessed　of　the　power　of　representation；　and　is　as　such　a　representation　of　the　universe；
therefore　implicitly　the　totality　of　the　whole　world。　But　at　the　same　time　this　representation　is　not　in
consciousness；　the　naked　monad　is　implicitly　the　universe；　and　difference　is　the　development　of　this
totality　in　it。（31）　What　develops　itself　therein　is　at　the　same　time　in　harmony　with　all　other
developments；　all　is　one　harmony。　“In　the　universe　all　things　are　closely　knit　together；　they　are　in
one　piece；　like　an　ocean：　the　slightest　movement　transmits　its　influence　far　and　wide　all
around。”（32）　From　a　single　grain　of　sand；　Leibnitz　holds；　the　whole　universe　might　be
comprehended　in　its　entire　development　if　we　only　knew　the　sand　grain　thoroughly。　There　is　not
really　much　in　all　this；　though　it　sounds　very　fine；　for　the　rest　of　the　universe　is　considerably　more
than　a　grain　of　sand；　well　though　we　knew　it；　and　considerably　different　therefrom。　To　say　that　its
essence　is　the　universe　is　mere　empty　talk：　for　the　fact　is　that　the　universe　as　essence　is　not　the
universe。　To　the　sand　grain　much　must　be　added　which　is　not　present；　and　since　thought　adds
more　than　all　the　grains　of　sand　that　exist；　the　universe　and　its　development　may　in　this　way
certainly　be　comprehended。　Thus　according　to　Leibnitz　every　monad　has　or　is　the　representation
of　the　entire　universe；　which　is　the　same　as　saying　that　it　is　really　representation　in　general；　but　at
the　same　time　it　is　a　determinate　representation；　by　means　of　which　it　comes　to　be　this　particular
monad；　therefore　it　is　representation　according　to　its　particular　situation　and　circumstances。（33）

The　representations　of　the　monad　in　itself；　which　constitute　its　universe；　develop　themselves　from
themselves；　as　the　spiritual　element　in　it；　according　to　the　laws　of　their　own　activity　and　desire；　just
as　the　movements　of　their　outer　world　do　according　to　laws　of　bodies；　hence　liberty　is　nothing
other　than　this　spontaneity　of　immanent　development；　but　as　in　consciousness。　The　magnetic
needle；　on　the　contrary；　has　only　spontaneity　without　consciousness；　and　consequently　without
freedom。　For；　says　Leibnitz；　the　nature　of　the　magnetic　needle　is　to　turn　to　the　north；　if　it　had
consciousness　it　would　imagine　that　this　was　its　self…determination；　it　would　thus　have　the　will　to
move　round　in　accordance　with　its　nature。（34）　But　it　is　clear　that　in　the　course　of　conscious
representations　there　is　involved　no　necessary　connection；　but　contingency　and　want　of　sequence
are　to　be　found；　the　reason　of　this　according　to　Leibnitz　（Oper。　T。　II。　P。　I。　p。　75）　being　“because
the　nature　of　a　created　substance　implies　that　it　changes　incessantly　according　to　a　certain　order；
which　order　guides　it　spontaneously　（spontanément）　in　all　the　circumstances　which　befall　it；　so　that
one　who　sees　all　things　recognizes　in　the　present　condition　of　substance　the　past　also　and　the
future。　The　law　of　order；　which　determines　the　individuality　of　the　particular　substance；　has　an
exact　reference　to　what　takes　place　in　every　other　substance　and　in　the　whole　universe。”　The
meaning　of　this　is　that　the　monad　is　not　a　thing　apart；　or　that　there　are　two　views　of　it；　the　one
making　it　out　as　spontaneously　generating　its　representations；　so　far　as　form　is　concerned；　and　the
other　making　it　out　to　be　a　moment　of　the　whole　of　necessity；　Spinoza　would　call　this　regarding　it
from　both　sides。　An　organic　whole；　a　human　being；　is　thus　for　instance　the　assertion　of　his　aim
from　out　of　himself：　at　the　same　time　the　being　directed　on　something　else　is　involved　in　his　Notion。
He　represents　this　and　that　to　himself；　he　wills　this　and　that；　his　activity　employs　itself　and　brings
about　changes。　His　inward　determination　thus　becomes　corporeal　determination；　and　then　change
going　beyond　himself；　he　appears　as　cause；　influencing　other　monads。　But　this　Being…for…another　is
only　an　appearance。　For　the　other；　i。e。；　the　actual；　in　so　far　as　the　monad　determines　it　or　makes　it
negative；　is　the　passive　element　which　the　monad　has　in　itself：　all　moments　are　indeed　contained
therein；　and　for　that　very　reason　it　has　no　need　of　other　monads；　but　only　of　the　laws　of　the
monads　in　itself。　But　if　the　Being…for…another　is　mere　appearance；　the　same　may　be　said　of
Being…for…self；　for　this　has　significance　only　in　reference　to　Being…for…another。

The　important　point　in　Leibnitz's　philosophy　is　this　intellectuality　of　representation　which　Leibnitz；
however；　did　not　succeed　in　carrying　out；　and　for　the　same　reason　this　intellectuality　is　at　the　same
time　infinite　multiplicity；　which　has　remained　absolutely　independent；　because　this　intellectuality　has
not　been　able　to　obtain　mastery　over　the　One。　The　separation　in　the　Notion；　which　proceeds　as
far　as　release　from　itself；　or　appearance　in　distinct　independence；　Leibnitz　did　not　succeed　in
bringing　together　into　unity。　The　harmony　of　these　two　moments；　the　course　of　mental
representations　and　the　course　of　things　external；　appearing　mutually　as　cause　and　effect；　is　not
brought　by　Leibnitz　into　relation　in　and　for　themselves；　he　therefore　lets　them　fall　asunder；　although
each　is　passive　as　regards　the　other。　He　moreover　considers　both　of　them　in　one　unity；　to　be　sure；
but　their　activity　is　at　the　same　time　not　for　themselves。　Every　forward　advance　becomes　therefore
incomprehensible　when　taken　by　itself；　because　the　course　of　the　representation　as　through　aims　in
itself；　requires　this　moment　of　Other…Being　or　of　passivity；　and　again　the　connection　of　cause　and
effect　requires　the　universal：　each　however　lacks　this　its　other　moment。　The　unity　which　according
to　Leibnitz　is　to　be　brought　about　by　the　pre…established　harmony；　namely　that　the　determination
of　the　will　of　man　and　the　outward　change　harmonize；　is　therefore　brought　about　by　means　of
another；　if　not　indeed　from　without；　for　this　other　is　God。　Before　God　the　monads　are　not　to　be
independent；　but　ideal　and　absorbed　in　Him。

At　this　point　the　demand　would　come　in　that　in　God　Himself　there　should　be　comprehended　the
required　unity　of　that　which　before　fell　asunder；　and　God　has　the　special　privilege　of　having　laid　on
Him　the　burden　of　what　cannot　be　comprehended。　The　w