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etite stirs the calculation or the calculation the appetite。 Where the appetites are dictated by the very nature they are the desires of the conjoint of soul and body and then soul lies under physical compulsions�此�if they spring in the soul as an independent�察�then much that we take to be voluntary is in reality outside of our free act。 Further�察�every emotion is preceded by some meagre reasoning�察�how then can a compelling imagination�察�an appetite drawing us where it will�察�be supposed to leave us masters in the ensuing act�拭�Need�察�inexorably craving satisfaction�察�is not free in face of that to which it is forced�此�and how at all can a thing have efficiency of its own when it rises from an extern�察�has an extern for very principle�察�thence taking its Being as it stands�拭�It lives by that extern�察�lives as it has been moulded�此�if this be freedom�察�there is freedom in even the soulless�察�fire acts in accordance with its characteristic being。 We may be reminded that the Living Form and the soul know what they do。 But�察�if this is knowledge by perception�察�it does not help towards the freedom of the act�察�perception gives awareness�察�not mastery�此�if true knowing is meant�察�either this is the knowing of something happening´ once more awareness´ with the motive´ force still to seek�察�or the reasoning and knowledge have acted to quell the appetite�察�then we have to ask to what this repression is to be referred and where it has taken place。 If it is that the mental process sets up an opposing desire we must assure ourselves how�察�if it merely stills the appetite with no further efficiency and this is our freedom�察�then freedom does not depend upon act but is a thing of the mind´ and in truth all that has to do with act�察�the very most reasonable�察�is still of mixed value and cannot carry freedom。 3。 All this calls for examination�察�the enquiry must bring us close to the solution as regards the gods。 We have traced self´disposal to will�察�will to reasoning and�察�next step�察�to right reasoning�察�perhaps to right reasoning we must add knowledge�察�for however sound opinion and act may be they do not yield true freedom when the adoption of the right course is the result of hazard or of some presentment from the fancy with no knowledge of the foundations of that rightness。 Taking it that the presentment of fancy is not a matter of our will and choice�察�how can we think those acting at its dictation to be free agents�拭�Fancy strictly�察�in our use�察�takes it rise from conditions of the body�察�lack of food and drink sets up presentments�察�and so does the meeting of these needs�察�similarly with seminal abundance and other humours of the body。 We refuse to range under the principle of freedom those whose conduct is directed by such fancy�此�the baser sort�察�therefore�察�mainly so guided�察�cannot be credited with self´disposal or voluntary act。 Self´disposal�察�to us�察�belongs to those who�察�through the activities of the Intellectual´Principle�察�live above the states of the body。 The spring of freedom is the activity of Intellectual´Principle�察�the highest in our being�察�the proposals emanating thence are freedom�察�such desires as are formed in the exercise of the Intellectual act cannot be classed as involuntary�察�the gods�察�therefore�察�that live in this state�察�living by Intellectual´Principle and by desire conformed to it�察�possess freedom。 4。 It will be asked how act rising from desire can be voluntary�察�since desire pulls outward and implies need�察�to desire is still to be drawn�察�even though towards the good。 Intellectual´Principle itself comes under the doubt�察�having a certain nature and acting by that nature can it be said to have freedom and self´disposal´ in an act which it cannot leave unenacted�拭�It may be asked�察�also�察�whether freedom may strictly be affirmed of such beings as are not engaged in action。 However that may be�察�where there is such act there is compulsion from without�察�since�察�failing motive�察�act will not be performed。 These higher beings�察�too�察�obey their own nature�察�where then is their freedom�拭 �But�察�on the other hand�察�can there be talk of constraint where there is no compulsion to obey an extern�察�and how can any movement towards a good be counted compulsion�拭�Effort is free once it is towards a fully recognised good�察�the involuntary is�察�precisely�察�motion away from a good and towards the enforced�察�towards something not recognised as a good�察�servitude lies in being powerless to move towards one's good�察�being debarred from the preferred path in a menial obedience。 Hence the shame of slavedom is incurred not when one is held from the hurtful but when the personal good must be yielded in favour of another's。 Further�察�this objected obedience to the characteristic nature would imply a duality�察�master and mastered�察�but an undivided Principle�察�a simplex Activity�察�where there can be no difference of potentiality and act�察�must be free�察�there can be no thought of ;action according to the nature�察─�in the sense of any distinction between the being and its efficiency�察�there where being and act are identical。 Where act is performed neither because of another nor at another's will�察�there surely is freedom。 Freedom may of course be an inappropriate term�此�there is something greater here�此�it is self´disposal in the sense�察�only�察�that there is no disposal by the extern�察�no outside master over the act。 In a principle�察�act and essence must be free。 No doubt Intellectual´Principle itself is to be referred to a yet higher�察�but this higher is not extern to it�察�Intellectual´Principle is within the Good�察�possessing its own good in virtue of that indwelling�察�much more will it possess freedom and self´disposal which are sought only for the sake of the good。 Acting towards the good�察�it must all the more possess self´disposal for by that Act it is directed towards the Principle from which it proceeds�察�and this its act is self´centred and must entail its very greatest good。 5。 Are we�察�however�察�to make freedom and self´disposal exclusive to Intellectual´Principle as engaged in its characteristic Act�察�Intellectual´Principle unassociated�察�or do they belong also to soul acting under that guidance and performing act of virtue�拭 �If freedom is to be allowed to soul in its Act�察�it certainly cannot be allowed in regard to issue�察�for we are not master of events�此�if in regard to fine conduct and all inspired by Intellectual´Principle�察�that may very well be freedom�察�but is the freedom ours�拭 �Because there is war�察�we perform some brave feat�察�how is that our free act since had there been no war it could not have been performed�拭�So in all cases of fine conduct�察�there is always some impinging event leading out our quality to show itself in this or that act。 And suppose virtue itself given the choice whether to find occasion for its exercise´ war evoking courage�察�wrong�察�so that it may establish justice and good order�察�poverty that it may show independence´ or to remain inactive�察�everything going well�察�it would choose the peace of inaction�察�nothing calling for its intervention�察�just as a physician like Hippocrates would prefer no one to stand in need of his skill。 If thus virtue whose manifestation requires action becomes inevitably a collaborator under compulsion�察�how can it have untrammelled self´disposal�拭 �Should we�察�perhaps�察�distinguish between compulsion in the act and freedom in the preceding will and reasoning�拭 �But in setting freedom in those preceding functions�察�we imply that virtue has a freedom and self´disposal apart from all act�察�then we must state what is the reality of the self´disposal attributed to virtue as state or disposition。 Are we to put it that virtue comes in to restore the disordered soul�察�taming passions and appetites�拭�In what sense�察�at that�察�can we hold our goodness to be our own free act�察�our fine conduct to be uncompelled�拭�In that we will and adopt�察�in that this entry of virtue prepares freedom and self´disposal�察�ending our slavery to the masters we have been obeying。 If then virtue is�察�as it were�察�a second Intellectual´Principle�察�and heightens the soul to Intellectual quality�察�then�察�once more�察�our freedom is found to lie not in act but in Intellectual´Principle immune from act。 6。 How then did we come to place freedom in the will when we made out free action to be that produced´ or as we also indicated�察�suppressed´ at the dictate of will�拭 �If what we have been saying is true and our former statement is consistent with it�察�the case must stand thus�此 �Virtue and Intellectual´Principle are sovereign and must be held the sole foundation of our self´disposal and freedom�察�both then are free�察�Intellectual´Principle is self´confined�此�Virtue�察�in its government of the soul which it seeks to lift into goodness�察�would wish to be free�察�in so far as it does so it is free and confers freedom�察�but inevitably experiences and actions are forced upon it by its governance�此�these it has not planned for�察�yet when they do arise it will watch still for its sovereignty calling these also to judgement。 Virtue does not follow upon occurrences as a saver of the emperilled�察�at its discretion it sacrifices a man�察�it may decree the jettison of life�察�means�察�children�察�country even�察�it looks to its own high aim and not to the safeguarding of anything lower。 Thus our freedom of act�察�our self´disposal�察�must be referred not to the doing�察�not to the external thing done but to the inner activity�察�to the Intellection�察�to virtue's own vision。 So understood�察�virtue is a mode of Intellectual´Principle�察�a mode not involving any of the emotions or passions controlled by its reasonings�察�since such experiences�察�amenable to morality and discipline�察�touch closely´ we read´ on body。 This makes it all the more evident that the unembodied is the free�察�to this our self´disposal is to be referred�察�herein lies our will which remains free and self´disposing in spite of any orders which it may necessarily utter to meet the external。 All then that issues from will and is the effect of will is our free action�察�and in the highest degree all that lies outside of the corporeal is purely within the scope of will�察�all that will adopts and brings�察�unimpeded�察�into existence。 The contemplating Intellect�察�the first or highest�察�has self´disposal to the point that its operation is utterly independent�察�it turns wholly upon itself�察�its very action is itself�察�at rest in its good it is without need�察�complete�察�and may be said to live to its will�察�there the will is intellection�此�it is called will because it expresses the Intellectual´Principle in the willing´phase and�察�besides�察�what we know as will imitates this operation taking place within the Intellectual´Principle。 Will strives towards the good which the act of Intellectual´Principle realizes。 Thus that principle holds what will seeks�察�that good whose attainment makes will identical with Intellection。 But if self´disposal is founded thus on the will aiming at the good�察�how can it possibly be denied to that principle permanently possessing the good�察�sole object of the aim�拭 �Any one scrupulous about setting self´disposal so high may find some loftier word。 7。 Soul becomes free when it moves�察�through Intellectual´Principle�察�towards The Good�察�what it does in that spirit is its free act�察�Intellectual´Principle is free in its own right。 That principle o