the six enneads-第148章

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d　words　can　carry　the　matter；　we　need　overwhelming　persuasion。　　　　　It　must　be　borne　in　mind　that　all　intellection　rises　in　some　principle　and　takes　cognisance　of　an　object。　But　a　distinction　is　to　be　made：　　　　　There　is　the　intellection　that　remains　within　its　place　of　origin；　it　has　that　source　as　substratum　but　becomes　a　sort　of　addition　to　it　in　that　it　is　an　activity　of　that　source　perfecting　the　potentiality　there；　not　by　producing　anything　but　as　being　a　completing　power　to　the　principle　in　which　it　inheres。　There　is　also　the　intellection　inbound　with　Being…　Being's　very　author…　and　this　could　not　remain　confined　to　the　source　since　there　it　could　produce　nothing；　it　is　a　power　to　production；　it　produces　therefore　of　its　own　motion　and　its　act　is　Real…Being　and　there　it　has　its　dwelling。　In　this　mode　the　intellection　is　identical　with　Being；　even　in　its　self…intellection　no　distinction　is　made　save　the　logical　distinction　of　thinker　and　thought　with；　as　we　have　often　observed；　the　implication　of　plurality。　　　　　This　is　a　first　activity　and　the　substance　it　produces　is　Essential　Being；　it　is　an　image；　but　of　an　original　so　great　that　the　very　copy　stands　a　reality。　If　instead　of　moving　outward　it　remained　with　the　First；　it　would　be　no　more　than　some　appurtenance　of　that　First；　not　a　self…standing　existent。　　　　　At　the　earliest　activity　and　earliest　intellection；　it　can　be　preceded　by　no　act　or　intellection：　if　we　pass　beyond　this　being　and　this　intellection　we　come　not　to　more　being　and　more　intellection　but　to　what　overpasses　both；　to　the　wonderful　which　has　neither；　asking　nothing　of　these　products　and　standing　its　unaccompanied　self。　　　　　That　all…transcending　cannot　have　had　an　activity　by　which　to　produce　this　activity…　acting　before　act　existed…　or　have　had　thought　in　order　to　produce　thinking…　applying　thought　before　thought　exists…　all　intellection；　even　of　the　Good；　is　beneath　it。　　　　　In　sum；　this　intellection　of　the　Good　is　impossible：　I　do　not　mean　that　it　is　impossible　to　have　intellection　of　the　Good…　we　may　admit　the　possibility　but　there　can　be　no　intellection　by　The　Good　itself；　for　this　would　be　to　include　the　inferior　with　the　Good。　　　　　If　intellection　is　the　lower；　then　it　will　be　bound　up　with　Being；　if　intellection　is　the　higher；　its　object　is　lower。　Intellection；　then；　does　not　exist　in　the　Good；　as　a　lesser；　taking　its　worth　through　that　Good；　it　must　stand　apart　from　it；　leaving　the　Good　unsoiled　by　it　as　by　all　else。　Immune　from　intellection　the　Good　remains　incontaminably　what　it　is；　not　impeded　by　the　presence　of　the　intellectual　act　which　would　annul　its　purity　and　unity。　　　　　Anyone　making　the　Good　at　once　Thinker　and　Thought　identifies　it　with　Being　and　with　the　Intellection　vested　in　Being　so　that　it　must　perform　that　act　of　intellection：　at　once　it　becomes　necessary　to　find　another　principle；　one　superior　to　that　Good：　for　either　this　act；　this　intellection；　is　a　completing　power　of　some　such　principle；　serving　as　its　ground；　or　it　points；　by　that　duality；　to　a　prior　principle　having　intellection　as　a　characteristic。　It　is　because　there　is　something　before　it　that　it　has　an　object　of　intellection；　even　in　its　self…intellection；　it　may　be　said　to　know　its　content　by　its　vision　of　that　prior。　　　　　What　has　no　prior　and　no　external　accompaniment　could　have　no　intellection；　either　of　itself　or　of　anything　else。　What　could　it　aim　at；　what　desire？　To　essay　its　power　of　knowing？　But　this　would　make　the　power　something　outside　itself；　there　would　be；　I　mean；　the　power　it　grasped　and　the　power　by　which　it　grasped：　if　there　is　but　the　one　power；　what　is　there　to　grasp　at？　　　　　41。　Intellection　seems　to　have　been　given　as　an　aid　to　the　diviner　but　weaker　beings；　an　eye　to　the　blind。　But　the　eye　itself　need　not　see　Being　since　it　is　itself　the　light；　what　must　take　the　light　through　the　eye　needs　the　light　because　of　its　darkness。　If；　then；　intellection　is　the　light　and　light　does　not　need　the　light；　surely　that　brilliance　（The　First）　which　does　not　need　light　can　have　no　need　of　intellection；　will　not　add　this　to　its　nature。　　　　　What　could　it　do　with　intellection？　What　could　even　intellection　need　and　add　to　itself　for　the　purpose　of　its　act？　It　has　no　self…awareness；　there　is　no　need。　It　is　no　duality　but；　rather；　a　manifold；　consisting　of　itself；　its　intellective　act；　distinct　from　itself；　and　the　inevitable　third；　the　object　of　intellection。　No　doubt　since　knower；　knowing；　and　known；　are　identical；　all　merges　into　a　unity：　but　the　distinction　has　existed　and；　once　more；　such　a　unity　cannot　be　the　First；　we　must　put　away　all　otherness　from　the　Supreme　which　can　need　no　such　support；　anything　we　add　is　so　much　lessening　of　what　lacks　nothing。　　　　　To　us　intellection　is　a　boon　since　the　soul　needs　it；　to　the　Intellectual…Principle　it　is　appropriate　as　being　one　thing　with　the　very　essence　of　the　principle　constituted　by　the　intellectual　Act　so　that　principle　and　act　coincide　in　a　continuous　self…consciousness　carrying　the　assurance　of　identity；　of　the　unity　of　the　two。　But　pure　unity　must　be　independent；　in　need　of　no　such　assurance。　　　　　〃Know　yourself〃　is　a　precept　for　those　who；　being　manifold；　have　the　task　of　appraising　themselves　so　as　to　become　aware　of　the　number　and　nature　of　their　constituents；　some　or　all　of　which　they　ignore　as　they　ignore　their　very　principle　and　their　manner　of　being。　The　First　on　the　contrary　if　it　have　content　must　exist　in　a　way　too　great　to　have　any　knowledge；　intellection；　perception　of　it。　To　itself　it　is　nothing；　accepting　nothing；　self…sufficing；　it　is　not　even　a　good　to　itself：　to　others　it　is　good　for　they　have　need　of　it；　but　it　could　not　lack　itself：　it　would　be　absurd　to　suppose　The　Good　standing　in　need　of　goodness。　　　　　It　does　not　see　itself：　seeing　aims　at　acquisition：　all　this　it　abandons　to　the　subsequent：　in　fact　nothing　found　elsewhere　can　be　There；　even　Being　cannot　be　There。　Nor　therefore　has　it　intellection　which　is　a　thing　of　the　lower　sphere　where　the　first　intellection；　the　only　true；　is　identical　with　Being。　Reason；　perception；　intelligence；　none　of　these　can　have　place　in　that　Principle　in　which　no　presence　can　be　affirmed。　　　　　42。　Faced　by　the　difficulty　of　placing　these　powers；　you　must　in　reason　allocate　to　the　secondaries　what　you　count　august：　secondaries　must　not　be　foisted　upon　the　First；　or　tertiaries　upon　the　secondaries。　Secondaries　are　to　be　ranged　under　the　First；　tertiaries　under　the　secondaries：　this　is　giving　everything　its　place；　the　later　dependent　on　their　priors；　those　priors　free。　　　　　This　is　included　in　that　true　saying　〃About　the　King　of　All；　all　has　being　and　in　view　of　Him　all　is〃：　we　are　to　understand　from　the　attribution　of　all　things　to　Him；　and　from；　the　words　〃in　view　of　Him〃　that　He　is　their　cause　and　they　reach　to　Him　as　to　something　differing　from　them　all　and　containing　nothing　that　they　contain：　for　certainly　His　very　nature　requires　that　nothing　of　the　later　be　in　Him。　　　　　Thus；　Intellectual…Principle；　finding　place　in　the　universe；　cannot　have　place　in　Him。　Where　we　read　that　He　is　the　cause　of　all　beauty　we　are　clearly　to　understand　that　beauty　depends　upon　the　Forms；　He　being　set　above　all　that　is　beautiful　here。　The　Forms　are　in　that　passage　secondaries；　their　sequels　being　attached　to　them　as　dependent　thirds：　it　is　clear　thus　that　by　〃the　products　of　the　thirds〃　is　meant　this　world；　dependent　upon　soul。　　　　　Soul　dependent　upon　Intellectual…Principle　and　Intellectual…Principle　upon　the　Good；　all　is　linked　to　the　Supreme　by　intermediaries；　some　close；　some　nearing　those　of　the　closer　attachment；　while　the　order　of　sense　stands　remotest；　dependent　upon　soul。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　EIGHTH　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　FREE…WILL　AND　THE　WILL　OF　THE　ONE。

　　　　1。　Can　there　be　question　as　to　whether　the　gods　have　voluntary　action？　Or　are　we　to　take　it　that；　while　we　may　well　enquire　in　the　case　of　men　with　their　combination　of　powerlessness　and　hesitating　power；　the　gods　must　be　declared　omnipotent；　not　merely　some　things　but　all　lying　at　their　nod？　Or　is　power　entire；　freedom　of　action　in　all　things；　to　be　reserved　to　one　alone；　of　the　rest　some　being　powerful；　others　powerless；　others　again　a　blend　of　power　and　impotence？　　　　　All　this　must　come　to　the　test：　we　must　dare　it　even　of　the　Firsts　and　of　the　All…Transcendent　and；　if　we　find　omnipotence　possible；　work　out　how　far　freedom　extends。　The　very　notion　of　power　must　be　scrutinized　lest　in　this　ascription　we　be　really　making　power　identical　with　Essential　Act；　and　even　with　Act　not　yet　achieved。　　　　　But　for　the　moment　we　may　pass　over　these　questions　to　deal　with　the　traditional　problem　of　freedom　of　action　in　ourselves。　　　　　To　begin　with；　what　must　be　intended　when　we　assert　that　something　is　in　our　power；　what　is　the　conception　here？　　　　　To　establish　this　will　help　to　show　whether　we　are　to　ascribe　freedom　to　the　gods　and　still　more　to　God；　or　to　refuse　it；　or　again；　while　asserting　it；　to　question　still；　in　regard　both　to　the　higher　and　lower…　the　mode　of　its　presence。　　　　　What　then　do　we　mean　when　we　speak　of　freedom　in　ourselves　and　why　do　we　question　it？　　　　　My　own　reading　is　that；　moving　as　we　do　amid　adverse　fortunes；　compulsions；　violent　assaults　of　passion　crushing　the　soul；　feeling　ourselves　mastered　by　these　experiences；　playing　slave　to　them；　going　where　they　lead；　we　have　been　brought　by　all　this　to　doubt　whether　we　are　anything　at　all　and　dispose　of　ourselves　in　any　particular。　　　　　This　would　indicate　that　we　think　of　our　free　act　as　one　which　we　execute　of　our　own　choice；　in　no　servitude　to　chance　or　necessity　or　overmastering　passion；　nothing　thwarting　our　will；　the　voluntary　is　conceived　as　an　event　amenable　to　will　and　occurring　or　not　as　our　will　dictates。　Everything　will　be　voluntary　that　is　produced　under　no　compulsion　and　with　knowledge；　our　free　act　is　what　we　are　masters　to　perform。　　　　　Differing　conceptually；　the　two　conditions　will　often　coincide　but　sometimes　will　clash。　Thus　a　man　would　be　master　to　kill；　but　the　act　will　not　be　voluntary　if　in　the　victim　he　had　failed　to　recognise　his　own　father。　Perhaps　however　that　ignorance　is　not　compatible　with　real　freedom：　for　the　knowledge　necessary　to　a　voluntary　act　cannot　be　limited　to　certain　particulars　but　must　cover　the　entire　field。　Why；　for　example；　should　killing　be　involuntary　in　the　failure　to　recognise　a　father　and　not　so　in　the　failure　to　recognise　the　wickedness　of　murder？　If　because　the　killer　ought　to　have　learned；　still　ignorance　of　the　duty　of　learning　and　the　cause　of　that　ignorance　remain　alike　involuntary。　　　　　2。　A　cardinal　question　is　where　we　are　to　place　the　freedom　of　action　ascribed　to　us。　　　　　It　must　be　founded　in　impulse　or　in　some　appetite；　as　when　we　act　or　omit　in　lust　or　rage　or　upon　some　calculation　of　advantage　accompanied　by　desire。　　　　　But　if　rage　or　desire　implied　freedom　we　must　allow　freedom　to　animals；　infants；　maniacs；　the　distraught；　the　victims　of　malpractice　producing　incontrollable　delusions。　And　if　freedom　turns　on　calculation　with　desire；　does　this　include　faulty　calculation？　Sound　calculation；　no　doubt；　and　sound　desire；　but　then　comes　the　question　whether　the　appetite　stirs　the　calculation　or　the　calculation　the　appetite。　　　　　Where　the　appetites　are　dictated　by