the six enneads-第117章

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subordinates　of　their　own：　you　may；　for　example；　be　the　cause　of　the　operation　of　walking；　but　the　walking　is　not　subordinate　to　you　in　the　relation　of　species　to　genus；　and　if　walking　had　nothing　prior　to　it　as　its　genus；　but　had　posteriors；　then　it　would　be　a　＇primary＇　genus　and　rank　among　the　Existents。　　　　　Perhaps；　however；　it　must　be　utterly　denied　that　unity　is　even　the　cause　of　other　things；　they　should　be　considered　rather　as　its　parts　or　elements…　if　the　terms　may　be　allowed；…　their　totality　constituting　a　single　entity　which　our　thinking　divides。　All　unity　though　it　be；　it　goes　by　a　wonderful　power　out　into　everything；　it　appears　as　many　and　becomes　many　when　there　is　a　motion；　the　fecundity　of　its　nature　causes　the　One　to　be　no　longer　one；　and　we；　displaying　what　we　call　its　parts；　consider　them　each　as　a　unity　and　make　them　into　〃genera；〃　unaware　of　our　failure　to　see　the　whole　at　once。　We　display　it；　then；　in　parts；　though；　unable　to　restrain　their　natural　tendency　to　coalesce；　we　bring　these　parts　together　again；　resign　them　to　the　whole　and　allow　them　to　become　a　unity；　or　rather　to　be　a　unity。　　　　　All　this　will　become　clearer　in　the　light　of　further　consideration…　when；　that　is　to　say；　we　have　ascertained　the　number　of　the　genera；　for　thus　we　shall　also　discover　their　causes。　It　is　not　enough　to　deny；　we　must　advance　by　dint　of　thought　and　comprehension。　The　way　is　clear：　　　　　4。　If　we　had　to　ascertain　the　nature　of　body　and　the　place　it　holds　in　the　universe；　surely　we　should　take　some　sample　of　body；　say　stone；　and　examine　into　what　constituents　it　may　be　divided。　There　would　be　what　we　think　of　as　the　substrate　of　stone；　its　quantity…　in　this　case；　a　magnitude；　its　quality…　for　example；　the　colour　of　stone。　As　with　stone；　so　with　every　other　body：　we　should　see　that　in　this　thing；　body；　there　are　three　distinguishable　characteristics…　the　pseudo…substance；　the　quantity；　the　quality…　though　they　all　make　one　and　are　only　logically　trisected；　the　three　being　found　to　constitute　the　unit　thing；　body。　If　motion　were　equally　inherent　in　its　constitution；　we　should　include　this　as　well；　and　the　four　would　form　a　unity；　the　single　body　depending　upon　them　all　for　its　unity　and　characteristic　nature。　　　　　The　same　method　must　be　applied　in　examining　the　Intellectual　Substance　and　the　genera　and　first…principles　of　the　Intellectual　sphere。　　　　　But　we　must　begin　by　subtracting　what　is　peculiar　to　body；　its　coming…to…be；　its　sensible　nature；　its　magnitude…　that　is　to　say；　the　characteristics　which　produce　isolation　and　mutual　separation。　It　is　an　Intellectual　Being　we　have　to　consider；　an　Authentic　Existent；　possessed　of　a　unity　surpassing　that　of　any　sensible　thing。　　　　　Now　the　wonder　comes　how　a　unity　of　this　type　can　be　many　as　well　as　one。　In　the　case　of　body　it　was　easy　to　concede　unity…with…plurality；　the　one　body　is　divisible　to　infinity；　its　colour　is　a　different　thing　from　its　shape；　since　in　fact　they　are　separated。　But　if　we　take　Soul；　single；　continuous；　without　extension；　of　the　highest　simplicity…　as　the　first　effort　of　the　mind　makes　manifest…　how　can　we　expect　to　find　multiplicity　here　too？　We　believed　that　the　division　of　the　living　being　into　body　and　soul　was　final：　body　indeed　was　manifold；　composite；　diversified；　but　in　soul　we　imagined　we　had　found　a　simplex；　and　boldly　made　a　halt；　supposing　that　we　had　come　to　the　limit　of　our　course。　　　　　Let　us　examine　this　soul；　presented　to　us　from　the　Intellectual　realm　as　body　from　the　Sensible。　How　is　its　unity　a　plurality？　How　is　its　plurality　a　unity？　Clearly　its　unity　is　not　that　of　a　composite　formed　from　diverse　elements；　but　that　of　a　single　nature　comprising　a　plurality。　　　　　This　problem　attacked　and　solved；　the　truth　about　the　genera　comprised　in　Being　will　thereby；　as　we　asserted；　be　elucidated　also。　　　　　5。　A　first　point　demanding　consideration：　　　　　Bodies…　those；　for　example；　of　animals　and　plants…　are　each　a　multiplicity　founded　on　colour　and　shape　and　magnitude；　and　on　the　forms　and　arrangement　of　parts：　yet　all　these　elements　spring　from　a　unity。　Now　this　unity　must　be　either　Unity…Absolute　or　some　unity　less　thorough…going　and　complete；　but　necessarily　more　complete　than　that　which　emerges；　so　to　speak；　from　the　body　itself；　this　will　be　a　unity　having　more　claim　to　reality　than　the　unity　produced　from　it；　for　divergence　from　unity　involves　a　corresponding　divergence　from　Reality。　Since；　thus；　bodies　take　their　rise　from　unity；　but　not　〃unity〃　in　the　sense　of　the　complete　unity　or　Unity…Absolute…　for　this　could　never　yield　discrete　plurality…　it　remains　that　they　be　derived　from　a　unity　Pluralized。　But　the　creative　principle　＇in　bodies＇　is　Soul：　Soul　therefore　is　a　pluralized　unity。　　　　　We　then　ask　whether　the　plurality　here　consists　of　the　Reason…Principles　of　the　things　of　process。　Or　is　this　unity　not　something　different　from　the　mere　sum　of　these　Principles？　Certainly　Soul　itself　is　one　Reason…Principle；　the　chief　of　the　Reason…Principles；　and　these　are　its　Act　as　it　functions　in　accordance　with　its　essential　being；　this　essential　being；　on　the　other　hand；　is　the　potentiality　of　the　Reason…Principles。　This　is　the　mode　in　which　this　unity　is　a　plurality；　its　plurality　being　revealed　by　the　effect　it　has　upon　the　external。　　　　　But；　to　leave　the　region　of　its　effect；　suppose　we　take　it　at　the　higher　non…effecting　part　of　Soul；　is　not　plurality　of　powers　to　be　found　in　this　part　also？　The　existence　of　this　higher　part　will；　we　may　presume；　be　at　once　conceded。　　　　　But　is　this　existence　to　be　taken　as　identical　with　that　of　the　stone？　Surely　not。　Being　in　the　case　of　the　stone　is　not　Being　pure　and　simple；　but　stone…being：　so　here；　Soul's　being　denotes　not　merely　Being　but　Soul…being。　　　　　Is　then　that　〃being〃　distinct　from　what　else　goes　to　complete　the　essence　＇or　substance＇　of　Soul？　Is　it　to　be　identified　with　Bring　＇the　Absolute＇；　while　to　some　differentia　of　Being　is　ascribed　the　production　of　Soul？　No　doubt　Soul　is　in　a　sense　Being；　and　this　is　not　as　a　man　〃is〃　white；　but　from　the　fact　of　its　being　purely　an　essence：　in　other　words；　the　being　it　possesses　it　holds　from　no　source　external　to　its　own　essence。　　　　　6。　But　must　it　not　draw　on　some　source　external　to　its　essence；　if　it　is　to　be　conditioned；　not　only　by　Being；　but　by　being　an　entity　of　a　particular　character？　But　if　it　is　conditioned　by　a　particular　character；　and　this　character　is　external　to　its　essence；　its　essence　does　not　comprise　all　that　makes　it　Soul；　its　individuality　will　determine　it；　a　part　of　Soul　will　be　essence；　but　not　Soul　entire。　　　　　Furthermore；　what　being　will　it　have　when　we　separate　it　from　its　other　components？　The　being　of　a　stone？　No：　the　being　must　be　a　form　of　Being　appropriate　to　a　source；　so　to　speak；　and　a　first…principle；　or　rather　must　take　the　forms　appropriate　to　all　that　is　comprised　in　Soul's　being：　the　being　here　must；　that　is；　be　life；　and　the　life　and　the　being　must　be　one。　　　　　One；　in　the　sense　of　being　one　Reason…Principle？　No；　it　is　the　substrate　of　Soul　that　is　one；　though　one　in　such　a　way　as　to　be　also　two　or　more…　as　many　as　are　the　Primaries　which　constitute　Soul。　Either；　then；　it　is　life　as　well　as　Substance；　or　else　it　possesses　life。　　　　　But　if　life　is　a　thing　possessed；　the　essence　of　the　possessor　is　not　inextricably　bound　up　with　life。　If；　on　the　contrary；　this　is　not　possession；　the　two；　life　and　Substance；　must　be　a　unity。　　　　　Soul；　then；　is　one　and　many…　as　many　as　are　manifested　in　that　oneness…　one　in　its　nature；　many　in　those　other　things。　A　single　Existent；　it　makes　itself　many　by　what　we　may　call　its　motion：　it　is　one　entire；　but　by　its　striving；　so　to　speak；　to　contemplate　itself；　it　is　a　plurality；　for　we　may　imagine　that　it　cannot　bear　to　be　a　single　Existent；　when　it　has　the　power　to　be　all　that　it　in　fact　is。　The　cause　of　its　appearing　as　many　is　this　contemplation；　and　its　purpose　is　the　Act　of　the　Intellect；　if　it　were　manifested　as　a　bare　unity；　it　could　have　no　intellection；　since　in　that　simplicity　it　would　already　be　identical　with　the　object　of　its　thought。　　　　　7。　What；　then；　are　the　several　entities　observable　in　this　plurality？　　　　　We　have　found　Substance　＇Essence＇　and　life　simultaneously　present　in　Soul。　Now；　this　Substance　is　a　common　property　of　Soul；　but　life；　common　to　all　souls；　differs　in　that　it　is　a　property　of　Intellect　also。　　　　　Having　thus　introduced　Intellect　and　its　life　we　make　a　single　genus　of　what　is　common　to　all　life；　namely；　Motion。　Substance　and　the　Motion；　which　constitutes　the　highest　life；　we　must　consider　as　two　genera；　for　even　though　they　form　a　unity；　they　are　separable　to　thought　which　finds　their　unity　not　a　unity；　otherwise；　it　could　not　distinguish　them。　　　　　Observe　also　how　in　other　things　Motion　or　life　is　clearly　separated　from　Being…　a　separation　impossible；　doubtless；　in　True　Being；　but　possible　in　its　shadow　and　namesake。　In　the　portrait　of　a　man　much　is　left　out；　and　above　all　the　essential　thing；　life：　the　〃Being〃　of　sensible　things　just　such　a　shadow　of　True　Being；　an　abstraction　from　that　Being　complete　which　was　life　in　the　Archetype；　it　is　because　of　this　incompleteness　that　we　are　able　in　the　Sensible　world　to　separate　Being　from　life　and　life　from　Being。　　　　　Being；　then；　containing　many　species；　has　but　one　genus。　Motion；　however；　is　to　be　classed　as　neither　a　subordinate　nor　a　supplement　of　Being　but　as　its　concomitant；　for　we　have　not　found　Being　serving　as　substrate　to　Motion。　Motion　is　being　Act；　neither　is　separated　from　the　other　except　in　thought；　the　two　natures　are　one；　for　Being　is　inevitably　actual；　not　potential。　　　　　No　doubt　we　observe　Motion　and　Being　separately；　Motion　as　contained　in　Being　and　Being　as　involved　in　Motion；　and　in　the　individual　they　may　be　mutually　exclusive；　but　the　dualism　is　an　affirmation　of　our　thought　only；　and　that　thought　sees　either　form　as　a　duality　within　a　unity。　　　　　Now　Motion；　thus　manifested　in　conjunction　with　Being；　does　not　alter　Being's　nature…　unless　to　complete　its　essential　character…　and　it　does　retain　for　ever　its　own　peculiar　nature：　at　once；　then；　we　are　forced　to　introduce　Stability。　To　reject　Stability　would　be　more　unreasonable　than　to　reject　Motion；　for　Stability　is　associated　in　our　thought　and　conception　with　Being　even　more　than　with　Motion；　unalterable　condition；　unchanging　mode；　single　Reason…Principle…　these　are　characteristics　of　the　higher　sphere。　　　　　Stability；　then；　may　also　be　taken　as　a　single　genus。　Obviously　distinct　from　Motion　and　perhaps　even　its　contrary；　that　it　is　also　distinct　from　Being　may　be　shown　by　many　considerations。　We　may　especially　observe　that　if　Stability　were　identical　with　Being；　so　also　would　Motion　be；　with　equal　right。　Why　identity　in　the　case　of　Stability　and　not　in　that　of　Motion；　when　Motion　is　virtually　the　very　life　and　Act　both　of　Substance　and　of　Absolute　Being？　However；　on　the　very　same　principle　on　which　we　separated　Motion　from　Being　with　the　understanding　that　it　is　the　same　and　not　the　same…　that　they　are　two　and　yet　one…　we　also　separate　Stability　from　Being；　holding　it；　yet；　inseparable；　it　is　only　a　logical　separation　entailing　the　inclusion　among　the　Existents　of　this　other　genus。　To　identify　Stability　with　Being；　with　no　difference　between　them；　and　to　identify　Bei