the six enneads-第116章

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Intellect？　But　Intellect　is　merely　a　state　of　Matter；　and　even　the　〃state〃　is　an　empty　qualification。　We　are　left　after　all　with　Matter　alone　competent　to　make　these　assertions；　to　fathom　these　problems。　And　if　its　assertions　were　intelligent；　we　must　wonder　how　it　thinks　and　performs　the　functions　of　Soul　without　possessing　either　Intellect　or　Soul。　If；　then；　it　were　to　make　foolish　assertions；　affirming　itself　to　be　what　it　is　not　and　cannot　be；　to　what　should　we　ascribe　this　folly？　Doubtless　to　Matter；　if　it　was　in　truth　Matter　that　spoke。　But　Matter　does　not　speak；　anyone　who　says　that　it　does　proclaims　the　predominance　of　Matter　in　himself；　he　may　have　a　soul；　but　he　is　utterly　devoid　of　Intellect；　and　lives　in　ignorance　of　himself　and　of　the　faculty　alone　capable　of　uttering　the　truth　in　these　things。　　　　　30。　With　regard　to　States：　　　　　It　may　seem　strange　that　States　should　be　set　up　as　a　third　class…　or　whatever　class　it　is…　since　all　States　are　referable　to　Matter。　We　shall　be　told　that　there　is　a　difference　among　States；　and　that　a　State　as　in　Matter　has　definite　characteristics　distinguishing　it　from　all　other　States　and　further　that；　whereas　Qualities　are　States　of　Matter；　States　properly　so…called　belong　to　Qualities。　But　if　Qualities　are　nothing　but　States　of　Matter；　States　＇in　the　strict　sense　of　the　term＇　are　ultimately　reducible　to　Matter；　and　under　Matter　they　must　be　classed。　　　　　Further；　how　can　States　constitute　a　single　genus；　when　there　is　such　manifold　diversity　among　them？　How　can　we　group　together　three　yards　long〃　and　〃white〃…　Quantity　and　Quality　respectively？　Or　again　Time　and　Place？　How　can　〃yesterday；〃　〃last　year；〃　〃in　the　Lyceum；〃　〃in　the　Academy；〃　be　States　at　all？　How　can　Time　be　in　any　sense　a　State？　Neither　is　Time　a　State　nor　the　events　in　Time；　neither　the　objects　in　Space　nor　Space　itself。　　　　　And　how　can　Action　be　a　State？　One　acting　is　not　in　a　state　of　being　but　in　a　state　of　Action；　or　rather　in　Action　simply：　no　state　is　involved。　Similarly；　what　is　predicated　of　the　patient　is　not　a　state　of　being　but　a　state　of　Passion；　or　strictly；　Passion　unqualified　by　state。　　　　　But　it　would　seem　that　State　was　the　right　category　at　least　for　cases　of　Situation　and　Possession：　yet　Possession　does　not　imply　possession　of　some　particular　state；　but　is　Possession　absolute。　　　　　As　for　the　Relative　State；　if　the　theory　does　not　include　it　in　the　same　genus　as　the　other　States；　another　question　arises：　we　must　enquire　whether　any　actuality　is　attributed　to　this　particular　type　of　relation；　for　to　many　types　actuality　is　denied。　　　　　It　is；　moreover；　absurd　that　an　entity　which　depends　upon　the　prior　existence　of　other　entities　should　be　classed　in　the　same　genus　with　those　priors：　one　and　two　must；　clearly；　exist；　before　half　and　double　can。　　　　　The　various　speculations　on　the　subject　of　the　Existents　and　the　principles　of　the　Existents；　whether　they　have　entailed　an　infinite　or　a　finite　number；　bodily　or　bodiless；　or　even　supposed　the　Composite　to　be　the　Authentic　Existent；　may　well　be　considered　separately　with　the　help　of　the　criticisms　made　by　the　ancients　upon　them。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　THE　KINDS　OF　BEING　（2）。

　　　　1。　We　have　examined　the　proposed　〃ten　genera〃：　we　have　discussed　also　the　theory　which　gathers　the　total　of　things　into　one　genus　and　to　this　subordinates　what　may　be　thought　of　as　its　four　species。　The　next　step　is；　naturally；　to　expound　our　own　views　and　to　try　to　show　the　agreement　of　our　conclusions　with　those　of　Plato。　　　　　Now　if　we　were　obliged　to　consider　Being　as　a　unity；　the　following　questions　would　be　unnecessary：　　　　　Is　there　one　genus　embracing　everything；　or　are　there　genera　which　cannot　be　subsumed　under　such　a　unity？　Are　there　first…principles？　Are　first…principles　to　be　identified　with　genera；　or　genera　with　first…principles？　Or　is　it　perhaps　rather　the　case　that　while　not　all　genera　are　first…principles；　all　first…principles　are　at　the　same　time　genera？　Or　is　the　converse　true？　Or　again；　do　both　classes　overlap；　some　principles　being　also　genera；　and　some　genera　also　principles？　And　do　both　the　sets　of　categories　we　have　been　examining　imply　that　only　some　principles　are　genera　and　some　genera　principles？　or　does　one　of　them　presuppose　that　all　that　belongs　to　the　class　of　genera　belongs　also　to　the　class　of　principles？　　　　　Since；　however；　we　affirm　that　Being　is　not　a　unity…　the　reason　for　this　affirmation　is　stated　by　Plato　and　others…　these　questions　become　imperative；　once　we　are　satisfied　as　to　the　number　of　genera　to　be　posited　and　the　grounds　for　our　choice。　　　　　The　subject　of　our　enquiry；　then；　is　the　Existent　or　Existents；　and　it　presents　immediately　two　problems　demanding　separate　analysis：　　　　　What　do　we　mean　by　the　Existent？　This　is　naturally　the　first　question　to　be　examined。　　　　　What　is　that　which；　often　taken　for　Being　＇for　the　Existent＇；　is　in　our　view　Becoming　and　never　really　Being？　Note　however　that　these　concepts　are　not　to　be　taken　as　distinguished　from　each　other　in　the　sense　of　belonging　to　a　genus；　Something；　divided　into　Being　and　Becoming；　and　we　must　not　suppose　that　Plato　took　this　view。　It　would　be　absurd　to　assign　Being　to　the　same　genus　as　non…Being：　this　would　be　to　make　one　genus　of　Socrates　and　his　portrait。　The　division　here　＇between　what　has　Being　and　what　is　in　Becoming＇　means　a　definite　marking…off；　a　setting　asunder；　leading　to　the　assertion　that　what　takes　the　appearance　of　Being　is　not　Being　and　implying　that　the　nature　of　True　Being　has　been　quite　misapprehended。　Being；　we　are　taught；　must　have　the　attribute　of　eternity；　must　be　so　constituted　as　never　to　belie　its　own　nature。　　　　　This；　then；　is　the　Being　of　which　we　shall　treat；　and　in　our　investigation　we　shall　assume　that　it　is　not　a　unity：　subsequently　we　ask　leave　to　say　something　on　the　nature　of　Becoming　and　on　what　it　is　that　comes　to　be；　that　is；　on　the　nature　of　the　world　of　Sense。　　　　　2。　In　asserting　that　Being　is　not　a　unity；　we　do　not　mean　to　imply　a　definite　number　of　existences；　the　number　may　well　be　infinite：　we　mean　simply　that　it　is　many　as　well　as　one；　that　it　is；　so　to　speak；　a　diversified　unity；　a　plurality　in　unity。　　　　　It　follows　that　either　the　unity　so　regarded　is　a　unity　of　genus　under　which　the　Existents；　involving　as　they　do　plurality　as　well　as　unity；　stand　as　species；　or　that　while　there　are　more　genera　than　one；　yet　all　are　subordinate　to　a　unity；　or　there　may　be　more　genera　than　one；　though　no　one　genus　is　subordinate　to　any　other；　but　all　with　their　own　subordinates…　whether　these　be　lesser　genera；　or　species　with　individuals　for　their　subordinates…　all　are　elements　in　one　entity；　and　from　their　totality　the　Intellectual　realm…　that　which　we　know　as　Being…　derives　its　constitution。　　　　　If　this　last　is　the　truth；　we　have　here　not　merely　genera；　but　genera　which　are　at　the　same　time　principles　of　Being。　They　are　genera　because　they　have　subordinates…　other　genera；　and　successively　species　and　individuals；　they　are　also　principles；　since　from　this　plurality　Being　takes　its　rise；　constituted　in　its　entirety　from　these　its　elements。　　　　　Suppose；　however；　a　greater　number　of　origins　which　by　their　mere　totality　comprised；　without　possessing　any　subordinates；　the　whole　of　Being；　these　would　be　first…principles　but　not　genera：　it　would　be　as　if　one　constructed　the　sensible　world　from　the　four　elements…　fire　and　the　others；　these　elements　would　be　first　principles；　but　they　would　not　be　genera；　unless　the　term　〃genus〃　is　to　be　used　equivocally。　　　　　But　does　this　assertion　of　certain　genera　which　are　at　the　same　time　first…principles　imply　that　by　combining　the　genera；　each　with　its　subordinates；　we　find　the　whole　of　Being　in　the　resultant　combination？　But　then；　taken　separately；　their　existence　will　not　be　actual　but　only　potential；　and　they　will　not　be　found　in　isolation。　　　　　Suppose；　on　the　other　hand；　we　ignore　the　genera　and　combine　the　particulars：　what　then　becomes　of　the　ignored　genera？　They　will；　surely；　exist　in　the　purity　of　their　own　isolation；　and　the　mixtures　will　not　destroy　them。　The　question　of　how　this　result　is　achieved　may　be　postponed。　　　　　For　the　moment　we　take　it　as　agreed　that　there　are　genera　as　distinct　from　principles　of　Being　and　that；　on　another　plane；　principles　＇elements＇　are　opposed　to　compounds。　We　are　thus　obliged　to　show　in　what　relation　we　speak　of　genera　and　why　we　distinguish　them　instead　of　summing　them　under　a　unity；　for　otherwise　we　imply　that　their　coalescence　into　a　unity　is　fortuitous；　whereas　it　would　be　more　plausible　to　dispense　with　their　separate　existence。　　　　　If　all　the　genera　could　be　species　of　Being；　all　individuals　without　exception　being　immediately　subordinate　to　these　species；　then　such　a　unification　becomes　feasible。　But　that　supposition　bespeaks　annihilation　for　the　genera：　the　species　will　no　longer　be　species；　plurality　will　no　longer　be　subordinated　to　unity；　everything　must　be　the　unity；　unless　there　exist　some　thing　or　things　outside　the　unity。　The　One　never　becomes　many…　as　the　existence　of　species　demands…　unless　there　is　something　distinct　from　it：　it　cannot　of　itself　assume　plurality；　unless　we　are　to　think　of　it　as　being　broken　into　pieces　like　some　extended　body：　but　even　so；　the　force　which　breaks　it　up　must　be　distinct　from　it：　if　it　is　itself　to　effect　the　breaking　up…　or　whatever　form　the　division　may　take…　then　it　is　itself　previously　divided。　　　　　For　these　and　many　other　reasons　we　must　abstain　from　positing　a　single　genus；　and　especially　because　neither　Being　nor　Substance　can　be　the　predicate　of　any　given　thing。　If　we　do　predicate　Being；　it　is　only　as　an　accidental　attribute；　just　as　when　we　predicate　whiteness　of　a　substance；　we　are　not　predicating　the　Absolute　Whiteness。　　　　　3。　We　assert；　then；　a　plurality　of　Existents；　but　a　plurality　not　fortuitous　and　therefore　a　plurality　deriving　from　a　unity。　　　　　But　even　admitting　this　derivation　from　a　unity…　a　unity　however　not　predicated　of　them　in　respect　of　their　essential　being…　there　is；　surely；　no　reason　why　each　of　these　Existents；　distinct　in　character　from　every　other；　should　not　in　itself　stand　as　a　separate　genus。　　　　　Is；　then；　this　unity　external　to　the　genera　thus　produced；　this　unity　which　is　their　source　though　it　cannot　be　predicated　of　them　in　respect　of　their　essence？　it　is　indeed　external；　the　One　is　beyond；　it　cannot；　therefore；　be　included　among　the　genera：　it　is　the　＇transcendent＇　source；　while　they　stand　side　by　side　as　genera。　Yet　surely　the　one　must　somehow　be　included　＇among　the　genera＇？　No：　it　is　the　Existents　we　are　investigating；　not　that　which　is　beyond　Existence。　　　　　We　pass　on；　then；　to　consider　that　which　is　included；　and　find　to　our　surprise　the　cause　included　with　the　things　it　causes：　it　is　surely　strange　that　causes　and　effects　should　be　brought　into　the　same　genus。　　　　　But　if　the　cause　is　included　with　its　effects　only　in　the　sense　in　which　a　genus　is　included　with　its　subordinates；　the　subordinates　being　of　a　different　order；　so　that　it　cannot　be　predicated　of　them　whether　as　their　genus　or　in　any　other　relation；　these　subordinates　are　obviously　themselves　genera　with　subordinates　of　their　own：　you　may；　for　example；　be　the　cause　of　the　operation　of　walking；　but　the　w