the origins of contemporary france-5-第26章

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creators；　subject　to　their　daily　pressure；　he　at　last　becomes　as　they

are；　after　a　certain　period　they　have　shaped　him　in　their　image。　…

Thus　the　candidate…elect；　from　the　start　or　very　soon　after；　became　a

confederate　with　his　electors。　At　one　time；　and　this　occurred

frequently；　especially　in　the　towns；　he　had　been　elected　by　a　violent

sectarian　minority；　he　then　subordinated　general　interests　to　the

interests　of　a　clique。　At　another；　and　especially　in　the　rural

districts；　he　had　been　elected　by　an　ignorant　and　brutal　majority；

when　he　accordingly　subordinated　general　interests　to　those　of　a

village。　…　If　he　chanced　to　be　conscientious　and　somewhat　intelligent

and　was　anxious　to　do　his　duty；　he　could　not；　he　felt　himself　weak　and

was　felt　to　be　weak；＇5＇　both　authority　and　the　means　for　exercising　it

were　wanting　in　him。　He　had　not　the　force　which　a　power　above

communicates　to　its　delegates　below；　nobody　saw　behind　him　the

government　and　the　army；　his　only　resource　was　a　national…guard；　which

either　shirked　or　refused　to　do　its　duty；　and　which　often　did　not

exist　at　all。　…　On　the　contrary；　he　could　prevaricate；　pillage；　and

persecute　for　his　own　advantage　and　that　of　his　clique　with　impunity；

for　there　was　no　restraint　on　him　from　above；　the　Paris　Jacobins　would

not　be　disposed　to　alienate　the　Jacobins　of　the　province；　they　were

partisans　and　allies；　and　the　government　had　few　others；　it　was　bound

to　retain　them；　to　let　them　intrigue　and　embezzle　at　will。



Suppose　an　extensive　domain　of　which　the　steward　is　appointed；　not　by

the　absent　owner；　but　by　his　tenants；　debtors；　farmers；　and

dependents：　the　reader　may　imagine　whether　rents　will　be　paid　and

debts　collected；　whether　road…taxes　will　be　worked　out；　what　care　will

be　taken　of　the　property；　what　its　annual　income　will　be　to　the　owner；

how　abuses　of　commission　and　omission　will　be　multiplied　indefinitely；

how　great　the　disorder　will　be；　the　neglect；　the　waste；　the　fraud；　the

injustice；　and　the　license。　…　The　same　in　France；＇6＇　and　for　the　same

reason：



*　every　public　service　disorganized；　destroyed；　or　perverted；

*　no　justice；　no　police；

*　authorities　abstaining　from　prosecution；　magistrates　not　daring　to

　　condemn；　a　gendarmerie　which　receives　no　orders　or　which　stands　still；

*　rural　marauding　become　a　habit；

*　roving　bands　of　brigands　in　forty…five　departments；

*　mail　wagons　and　coaches　stopped　and　pillaged　even　up　to　the　environs

　　of　Paris；

*　highways　broken　up　and　rendered　impassable；

*　open　smuggling；　customs　yielding　nothing；　national　forests

　　devastated；　the　public　treasury　empty；＇7＇　its　revenues　intercepted

　　and　expended　before　being　deposited；　taxes　decreed　and　not　collected；

*　everywhere　arbitrary　assessments　of　real　and　personal　estate；　no

　　less　wicked　exemptions　than　overcharges；

*　in　many　places　no　list　prepared　for　tax　assessments；

*　communes　which　here　and　there；　under　pretext　of　defending　the

　　republic　against　neighboring　consumers；　exempt　themselves　from　both

　　tax　and　conscription；

*　conscripts　to　whom　their　mayor　gives　false　certificates　of　infirmity

　　and　marriage；　who　do　not　turn　out　when　ordered　out；　who　desert　by

　　hundreds　on　the　way　to　headquarters；　who　form　mobs　and　use　guns　in

　　defending　themselves　against　the　troops；…



such　were　the　fruits　of　the　system。



The　government　could　not　constrain　rural　majorities　with　the　officials

chosen　by　the　selfish　and　inept　rural　majorities。　Neither　could　it

repress　the　urban　minorities　with　agents　elected　by　the　same　partial

and　corrupt　urban　minorities。　Hands　are　necessary；　and　hands　as　firm

as　tenacious；　to　seize　conscripts　by　the　collar；　to　rummage　the

pockets　of　taxpayers；　and　the　State　did　not　have　such　hands。　They　were

required　right　away；　if　only　to　prepare　and　provide　for　urgent　needs。

If　the　western　departments　had　to　be　subdued　and　tranquilized；　relief

furnished　to　Massena　besieged　in　Genoa；　Mélas　prevented　from　invading

Provence；　Moreau's　army　transported　over　the　Rhine；　the　first　thing

was　to　restore　to　the　central　government　the　appointment　of　local

authorities。



V。　Reasons　for　centralization。



Reasons　for　placing　the　executive　central　power　in　one　hand。　…　Sieyès'

chimerical　combinations。　…　Bonaparte's　objections。



On　this　second　point；　the　evidence　was　scarcely　less。　…　And　clearly；

the　moment　the　local　powers　owed　their　appointment　to　the　central

powers；　it　is　plain　that　the　central　executive　power；　on　which　they

depend；　should　be　unique。　For；　this　great　team　of　functionaries；

driven　from　aloft；　could　not　have　aloft　several　distinct　drivers；

being　several　and　distinct；　the　drivers　would　each　pull　his　own　way；

while　the　horses；　pulling　in　opposite　directions；　would　do　nothing　but

prance。　In　this　respect　the　combinations　of　Sieyès　do　not　bear

examination。　A　mere　theorist　and　charged　with　preparing　the　plan　of　a

new　constitution；　he　had　reasoned　as　if　the　drivers　on　the　box　were

not　men；　but　robots：　perched　above　all；　a　grand…elector；　a　show

sovereign；　with　two　places　to　dispose　of　and　always　passive；　except　to

appoint　or　revoke　two　active　sovereigns；　the　two　governing　consuls。

One；　a　peace…consul；　appointing　all　civil　officers；　and　the　other　a

war…consul；　making　all　military　and　diplomatic　appointments；　each　with

his　own　ministers；　his　own　council　of　state；　his　own　court　of

judicature。　All　these　functionaries；　ministers；　consuls；　and　the

grand…elector　himself；　were　revocable　at　the　will　of　a　senate　which

from　day　to　day　could　absorb　them；　that　is　to　say；　make　them　senators

with　a　salary　of　30；000　francs　and　an　embroidered　dress…coat。＇8＇

Sieyès　evidently　had　not　taken　into　account　either　the　work　to　be　done

or　the　men　who　would　have　to　do　it；　while　Bonaparte；　who　was　doing　the

work　at　this　very　time；　who　understood　men　and　who　understood　himself；

at　once　put　his　finger　on　the　weak　spot　of　this　complex　mechanism；　so

badly　adjusted　and　so　frail。　Two　consuls；＇9＇　〃one　controlling　the

ministers　of　justice；　of　the　interior；　of　the　police；　of　the　treasury；

and　the　other　the　ministers　of　war；　of　the　navy；　and　of　foreign

affairs。〃　The　conflict　between　them　is　certain；　look　at　them　facing

each　other；　subject　to　contrary　influences　and　suggestions：　around　the

former　〃only　judges；　administrators；　financiers；　and　men　in　long

robes；〃　and　round　the　latter　〃only　epaulets　and　men　of　the　sword。〃

Certainly　〃one　will　need　money　and　recruits　for　his　army　which　the

other　will　not　grant。〃　…　And　it　is　not　your　grand…elector　who　will

make　them　agree。　〃If　he　conforms　strictly　to　the　functions　which　you

assign　to　him　he　will　be　the　mere　ghost；　the　fleshless　phantom　of　a

roi　fainéant。　Do　you　know　any　man　vile　enough　to　take　part　in　such

contrivances？　How　can　you　imagine　any　man　of　talent　or　at　all

honorable　contentedly　playing　the　part　of　a　hog　fattening　himself　on　a

few　millions？〃　…　And　all　the　more　because　if　he　wants　to　abandon　his

part　the　door　stands　open。　〃Were　I　the　grand…elector　I　would　say　to

the　war…consul　and　to　the　peace…consul　on　appointing　them；　If　you　put

in　a　minister　or　sign　a　bill　I　don't　like　I'll　put　you　out。〃　Thus　does

the　grand…elector　become　an　active；　absolute　monarch。



〃But；〃　you　may　say；　〃the　senate　in　its　turn　will　absorb　the　grand…

elector。〃　…　〃　The　remedy　is　worse　than　the　disease；　nobody；　according

to　this　plan；　has　any　guarantees；〃　and　each；　therefore；　will　try　to

secure　them　to　himself；　the　grand…elector　against　the　senate；　the

consuls　against　the　grand…elector；　and　the　senate　against　the　grand…

elector　and　consuls　combined；　each　uneasy；　alarmed；　threatened；

threatening；　and　usurping　to　protect　himself；　these　are　the　wheels

which　work　the　wrong　way；　in　a　machine　constantly　getting　out　of

order；　stopping；　and　finally　breaking　down　entirely。



Thereupon；　and　as　Bonaparte；　moreover；　was　already　master；　all　the

executive　powers　were　reduced　to　one；　and　this　power　was　vested　in

him。＇10＇　In　reality；　〃to　humor　republican　opinion〃＇11＇　they　gave　him

two　associates　with　the　same　title　as　his　own；　but　they　were　appointed

only　for　show；　simply　as　consulting；　inferior；　and　docile　registrars；

with　no　rights　save　that　of　signing　their　names　after　his　and　putting

their　signatures　to　the　procès　verbal　declaring　his　orders；　he　alone

commanded；　〃he　alone　had　the　say；　he　alone　appointed　to　all　offices；〃

so　that　they　were　already　subjects　as　he　alone　was　already　the

sovereign。



VI。　Irreconcilable　divisions。



Difficulty　of　organizing　a　legislative　power。　…　Fraudulent　and　violent

elections　for　ten　years。　…　Spirit　and　diffusion　of　hatred　against　the

men　and　dogmas　of　the　Revolution。　…　Probable　composition　of　a　freely

elected　Assembly。　…　Its　two　irreconcilable　divisions。　…　Sentiments　of

the　army。　…　Proximity　and　probable　meaning　of　a　new　coup　d'état。



It　remained　to　frame　a　legislative　power　as　a　counterpoise　to　this

executive　power；　so　concentrated　and　so　strong。　…　In　organized　and

tolerably　sound　communities　this　point　is　reached　through　an　elective

parliament　which　represents　the　public　will；　it　represents　this

because　it　is　a　copy；　a　faithful　reduction　of　that　will　on　a　small

scale；　it　is　so　organized　as　to　present　a　loyal　and　proportionate

expression　of　diverse　controlling　opinions。　In　this　case；　the

electoral　selection　has　worked　well；　one　superior　right；　that　of

election；　has　been　respected；　or；　in　other　words；　the　passions　excited

have　not　proved　too　strong；　which　is　owing　to　the　most　important

interests　not　having　proved　too　divergent。　…　Unfortunately；　in　France；

rent　asunder　and　discordant；　all　the　most　important　interests　were　in

sharp　antagonism；　the　passions　brought　into　play；　consequently；　were

furious；　no　right　was　respected；　and　least　of　all　that　of　election；

hence　the　electoral　test　worked　badly；　and　no　elected　parliament　was

or　could　be　a　veritable　expression　of　the　public　will。　Since　1791；　the

elections；　violated　and　deserted；　had　brought　intruders　only　to　the

legislative　benches；　under　the　name　of　mandatories。　These　were　endured

for　lack　of　better；　but　nobody　had　any　confidence　in　them；　and　nobody

showed　them　any　deference。　People　knew　how　they　had　been　elected　and

how　little　their　title　was　worth。　Through　inertness；　fear；　or　disgust；

the　great　majority　of　electors　had　not　voted；　while　the　voters　at　the

polls　fought　among　themselves；　the　strongest　or　least　scrupulous

expelling　or　constraining　the　rest。　During　the　last　three　years　of　the

Directory　the　electoral　assembly　was　often　divided；　each　faction

elected　its　own　deputy　and　protested　against　the　election　of　the

other。　The　government　then　chose　between　the　two　candidates　elected；

arbitrarily　and　always　with　barefaced　partiality；　and　again；　if　but

one　candidate　was　elected；　and　that　one　an　adversary；　his　election　was

invalidated。　In　sum；　for　nine　years；　the　legislative　body；　imposed　on

the　nation　by　a　faction；　was　scarcely　more　legi