the critique of pure reason-及88嫗
梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈��梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈��梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何��
!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��
the regress through the conditions of existence�察�without admitting the
existence of a necessary being�察�but�察�on the other hand�察�I cannot
make a commencement from this being。
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
existing things�察�and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
thing as in itself necessary�察�the inevitable inference is that
necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves´
otherwise an internal contradiction would result�察�that consequently
neither of these principles are objective�察�but merely subjective
principles of reason´ the one requiring us to seek for a necessary
ground for everything that exists�察�that is�察�to be satisfied with no
other explanation than that which is complete a priori�察�the other
forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness��
that is�察�to regard no member of the empirical world as
unconditioned。 In this mode of viewing them�察�both principles�察�in their
purely heuristic and regulative character�察�and as concerning merely
the formal interest of reason�察�are quite consistent with each other。
The one says�此 �You must philosophize upon nature�察─�as if there existed
a necessary primal basis of all existing things�察�solely for the
purpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge�察�by
pursuing an idea of this character´ a foundation which is
arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate�察�while the other warns you to
consider no individual determination�察�concerning the existence of
things�察�as such an ultimate foundation�察�that is�察�as absolutely
necessary�察�but to keep the way always open for further progress in the
deduction�察�and to treat every determination as determined by some
other。 But if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally
necessary�察�it is impossible that anything which is empirically given
should be absolutely necessary。
It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary
as out of and beyond the world�察�inasmuch as it is useful only as a
principle of the highest possible unity in experience�察�and you
cannot discover any such necessary existence in the would�察�the
second rule requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as
themselves deduced。
The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
contingent�察�while matter was considered by them�察�in accordance with
the judgement of the common reason of mankind�察�as primal and
necessary。 But if they had regarded matter�察�not relatively´ as the
substratum of phenomena�察�but absolutely and in itself´ as an
independent existence�察�this idea of absolute necessity would have
immediately disappeared。 For there is nothing absolutely connecting
reason with such an existence�察�on the contrary�察�it can annihilate it
in thought�察�always and without self´contradiction。 But in thought
alone lay the idea of absolute necessity。 A regulative principle must��
therefore�察�have been at the foundation of this opinion。 In fact��
extension and impenetrability´ which together constitute our
conception of matter´ form the supreme empirical principle of the
unity of phenomena�察�and this principle�察�in so far as it is empirically
unconditioned�察�possesses the property of a regulative principle。
But�察�as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real
in it´ and consequently impenetrability´ is an effect�察�which must have
a cause�察�and is for this reason always derived�察�the notion of matter
cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being�察�in its
character of the principle of all derived unity。 For every one of
its real properties�察�being derived�察�must be only conditionally
necessary�察�and can therefore be annihilated in thought�察�and thus the
whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or suppressed。 If this
were not the case�察�we should have found in the world of phenomena
the highest ground or condition of unity´ which is impossible��
according to the second regulative principle。 It follows that
matter�察�and�察�in general�察�all that forms part of the world of sense��
cannot be a necessary primal being�察�nor even a principle of
empirical unity�察�but that this being or principle must have its
place assigned without the world。 And�察�in this way�察�we can proceed
in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their
existence from other phenomena�察�just as if there existed no
necessary being�察�and we can at the same time�察�strive without ceasing
towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction�察�just as if
such a being´ the supreme condition of all existences´ were
presupposed by the mind。
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal
of the Supreme Being�察�far from being an enouncement of the existence
of a being in itself necessary�察�is nothing more than a regulative
principle of reason�察�requiring us to regard all connection existing
between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all´sufficient
necessary cause�察�and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and
necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena。 We cannot�察�at the
same time�察�avoid regarding�察�by a transcendental subreptio�察�this formal
principle as constitutive�察�and hypostatizing this unity。 Precisely
similar is the case with our notion of space。 Space is the primal
condition of all forms�察�which are properly just so many different
limitations of it�察�and thus�察�although it is merely a principle of
sensibility�察�we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary
and self´subsistent thing´ as an object given a priori in itself。 In
the same way�察�it is quite natural that�察�as the systematic unity of
nature cannot be established as a principle for the empirical
employment of reason�察�unless it is based upon the idea of an ens
realissimum�察�as the supreme cause�察�we should regard this idea as a
real object�察�and this object�察�in its character of supreme condition��
as absolutely necessary�察�and that in this way a regulative should be
transformed into a constitutive principle。 This interchange becomes
evident when I regard this supreme being�察�which�察�relatively to the
world�察�was absolutely ��unconditionally�� necessary�察�as a thing per
se。 In this case�察�I find it impossible to represent this necessity
in or by any conception�察�and it exists merely in my own mind�察�as the
formal condition of thought�察�but not as a material and hypostatic
condition of existence。
SECTION VI。 Of the Impossibility of a Physico´Theological Proof。
If�察�then�察�neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an
existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the
existence of the Deity�察�we can make the attempt by the only other
mode´ that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience
of the phenomena of the present world�察�their constitution and
disposition�察�and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound
conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being。 This argument we shall
term the physico´theological argument。 If it is shown to be
insufficient�察�speculative reason cannot present us with any
satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our
transcendental idea。
It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the
preceding sections�察�that an answer to this question will be far from
being difficult or unconvincing。 For how can any experience be
adequate with an idea�拭�The very essence of an idea consists in the
fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate
with it。 The transcendental idea of a necessary and all´sufficient
being is so immeasurably great�察�so high above all that is empirical��
which is always conditioned�察�that we hope in vain to find materials in
the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception�察�and in
vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned�察�while
examples�察�nay�察�even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical
synthesis。
If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical
conditions�察�it must be a member of the empirical series�察�and�察�like the
lower members which it precedes�察�have its origin in some higher member
of the series。 If�察�on the other hand�察�we disengage it from the
chain�察�and cogitate it as an intelligible being�察�apart from the series
of natural causes´ how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates
the latter from the former�拭�All laws respecting the regress from
effects to causes�察�all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate
solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world��
and�察�apart from them�察�are without significance。
The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle
of order�察�variety�察�beauty�察�and conformity to ends�察�that whether we
pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one
direction�察�or into its illimitable divisions in the other�察�whether
we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations´
even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which
our weak minds can reach�察�we find that language in the presence of
wonders so inconceivable has lost its force�察�and number its power to
reckon�察�nay�察�even thought fails to conceive adequately�察�and our
conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power
of expression´ all the more eloquent that it is dumb。 Everywhere
around us we observe a chain of causes and effects�察�of means and ends��
of death and birth�察�and�察�as nothing has entered of itself into the
condition in which we find it�察�we are constantly referred to some
other thing�察�which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its
cause�察�and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of
nothingness�察�unless we admit that�察�besides this infinite chain of
contingencies�察�there exists something that is primal and
self´subsistent´ something which�察�as the cause of this phenomenal
world�察�secures its continuance and preservation。
This highest cause´ what magnitude shall we attribute to it�拭�Of
the content of the world we are ignorant�察�still less can we estimate
its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible。 But
this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind�察�what is
there to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection
as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible�拭�This we can
easily do�察�although only by the aid of the faint outline of an
abstract conception�察�by representing this being to ourselves as
containing in itself�察�as an individual substance�察�all possible
perfection´ a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason
which demands parsimony in principles�察�which is free from
self´contradiction�察�which even contributes to the extension of the
employment of reason in experience�察�by means of the guidance
afforded by this idea to order and system�察�and which in no respect
conflicts with any law of experience。
This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect。 It is
the oldest�察�the clearest�察�and that most in conformit