the critique of pure reason-第54章

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meant　by　it　something　which　is　never　derived　from　the　senses；　but

which　far　transcends　even　the　conceptions　of　the　understanding　（with

which　Aristotle　occupied　himself）；　inasmuch　as　in　experience　nothing

perfectly　corresponding　to　them　could　be　found。　Ideas　are；　according

to　him；　archetypes　of　things　themselves；　and　not　merely　keys　to

possible　experiences；　like　the　categories。　In　his　view　they　flow

from　the　highest　reason；　by　which　they　have　been　imparted　to　human

reason；　which；　however；　exists　no　longer　in　its　original　state；　but　is

obliged　with　great　labour　to　recall　by　reminiscence…　which　is　called

philosophy…　the　old　but　now　sadly　obscured　ideas。　I　will　not　here

enter　upon　any　literary　investigation　of　the　sense　which　this

sublime　philosopher　attached　to　this　expression。　I　shall　content

myself　with　remarking　that　it　is　nothing　unusual；　in　common

conversation　as　well　as　in　written　works；　by　comparing　the　thoughts

which　an　author　has　delivered　upon　a　subject；　to　understand　him　better

than　he　understood　himself　inasmuch　as　he　may　not　have　sufficiently

determined　his　conception；　and　thus　have　sometimes　spoken；　nay　even

thought；　in　opposition　to　his　own　opinions。

　　Plato　perceived　very　clearly　that　our　faculty　of　cognition　has　the

feeling　of　a　much　higher　vocation　than　that　of　merely　spelling　out

phenomena　according　to　synthetical　unity；　for　the　purpose　of　being

able　to　read　them　as　experience；　and　that　our　reason　naturally

raises　itself　to　cognitions　far　too　elevated　to　admit　of　the

possibility　of　an　object　given　by　experience　corresponding　to　them…

cognitions　which　are　nevertheless　real；　and　are　not　mere　phantoms　of

the　brain。

　　This　philosopher　found　his　ideas　especially　in　all　that　is

practical；*　that　is；　which　rests　upon　freedom；　which　in　its　turn　ranks

under　cognitions　that　are　the　peculiar　product　of　reason。　He　who　would

derive　from　experience　the　conceptions　of　virtue；　who　would　make　（as

many　have　really　done）　that；　which　at　best　can　but　serve　as　an

imperfectly　illustrative　example；　a　model　for　or　the　formation　of　a

perfectly　adequate　idea　on　the　subject；　would　in　fact　transform　virtue

into　a　nonentity　changeable　according　to　time　and　circumstance　and

utterly　incapable　of　being　employed　as　a　rule。　On　the　contrary；

every　one　is　conscious　that；　when　any　one　is　held　up　to　him　as　a　model

of　virtue；　he　compares　this　so…called　model　with　the　true　original

which　he　possesses　in　his　own　mind　and　values　him　according　to　this

standard。　But　this　standard　is　the　idea　of　virtue；　in　relation　to

which　all　possible　objects　of　experience　are　indeed　serviceable　as

examples…　proofs　of　the　practicability　in　a　certain　degree　of　that

which　the　conception　of　virtue　demands…　but　certainly　not　as

archetypes。　That　the　actions　of　man　will　never　be　in　perfect

accordance　with　all　the　requirements　of　the　pure　ideas　of　reason；　does

not　prove　the　thought　to　be　chimerical。　For　only　through　this　idea　are

all　judgements　as　to　moral　merit　or　demerit　possible；　it

consequently　lies　at　the　foundation　of　every　approach　to　moral

perfection；　however　far　removed　from　it　the　obstacles　in　human　nature…

indeterminable　as　to　degree…　may　keep　us。



　　*He　certainly　extended　the　application　of　his　conception　to

speculative　cognitions　also；　provided　they　were　given　pure　and

completely　a　priori；　nay；　even　to　mathematics；　although　this　science

cannot　possess　an　object　otherwhere　than　in　Possible　experience。　I

cannot　follow　him　in　this；　and　as　little　can　I　follow　him　in　his

mystical　deduction　of　these　ideas；　or　in　his　hypostatization　of

them；　although；　in　truth；　the　elevated　and　exaggerated　language

which　he　employed　in　describing　them　is　quite　capable　of　an

interpretation　more　subdued　and　more　in　accordance　with　fact　and　the

nature　of　things。



　　The　Platonic　Republic　has　become　proverbial　as　an　example…　and　a

striking　one…　of　imaginary　perfection；　such　as　can　exist　only　in　the

brain　of　the　idle　thinker；　and　Brucker　ridicules　the　philosopher　for

maintaining　that　a　prince　can　never　govern　well；　unless　he　is

participant　in　the　ideas。　But　we　should　do　better　to　follow　up　this

thought　and；　where　this　admirable　thinker　leaves　us　without

assistance；　employ　new　efforts　to　place　it　in　clearer　light；　rather

than　carelessly　fling　it　aside　as　useless；　under　the　very　miserable

and　pernicious　pretext　of　impracticability。　A　constitution　of　the

greatest　possible　human　freedom　according　to　laws；　by　which　the

liberty　of　every　individual　can　consist　with　the　liberty　of　every

other　（not　of　the　greatest　possible　happiness；　for　this　follows

necessarily　from　the　former）；　is；　to　say　the　least；　a　necessary

idea；　which　must　be　placed　at　the　foundation　not　only　of　the　first

plan　of　the　constitution　of　a　state；　but　of　all　its　laws。　And；　in

this；　it　not　necessary　at　the　outset　to　take　account　of　the

obstacles　which　lie　in　our　way…　obstacles　which　perhaps　do　not

necessarily　arise　from　the　character　of　human　nature；　but　rather

from　the　previous　neglect　of　true　ideas　in　legislation。　For　there　is

nothing　more　pernicious　and　more　unworthy　of　a　philosopher；　than　the

vulgar　appeal　to　a　so…called　adverse　experience；　which　indeed　would

not　have　existed；　if　those　institutions　had　been　established　at　the

proper　time　and　in　accordance　with　ideas；　while；　instead　of　this；

conceptions；　crude　for　the　very　reason　that　they　have　been　drawn

from　experience；　have　marred　and　frustrated　all　our　better　views　and

intentions。　The　more　legislation　and　government　are　in　harmony　with

this　idea；　the　more　rare　do　punishments　become　and　thus　it　is　quite

reasonable　to　maintain；　as　Plato　did；　that　in　a　perfect　state　no

punishments　at　all　would　be　necessary。　Now　although　a　perfect　state

may　never　exist；　the　idea　is　not　on　that　account　the　less　just；

which　holds　up　this　maximum　as　the　archetype　or　standard　of　a

constitution；　in　order　to　bring　legislative　government　always　nearer

and　nearer　to　the　greatest　possible　perfection。　For　at　what　precise

degree　human　nature　must　stop　in　its　progress；　and　how　wide　must　be

the　chasm　which　must　necessarily　exist　between　the　idea　and　its

realization；　are　problems　which　no　one　can　or　ought　to　determine…

and　for　this　reason；　that　it　is　the　destination　of　freedom　to　overstep

all　assigned　limits　between　itself　and　the　idea。

　　But　not　only　in　that　wherein　human　reason　is　a　real　causal　agent　and

where　ideas　are　operative　causes　（of　actions　and　their　objects）；

that　is　to　say；　in　the　region　of　ethics；　but　also　in　regard　to

nature　herself；　Plato　saw　clear　proofs　of　an　origin　from　ideas。　A

plant；　and　animal；　the　regular　order　of　nature…　probably　also　the

disposition　of　the　whole　universe…　give　manifest　evidence　that　they

are　possible　only　by　means　of　and　according　to　ideas；　that；　indeed；　no

one　creature；　under　the　individual　conditions　of　its　existence；

perfectly　harmonizes　with　the　idea　of　the　most　perfect　of　its　kind…

just　as　little　as　man　with　the　idea　of　humanity；　which　nevertheless　he

bears　in　his　soul　as　the　archetypal　standard　of　his　actions；　that；

notwithstanding；　these　ideas　are　in　the　highest　sense　individually；

unchangeably；　and　completely　determined；　and　are　the　original　causes

of　things；　and　that　the　totality　of　connected　objects　in　the

universe　is　alone　fully　adequate　to　that　idea。　Setting　aside　the

exaggerations　of　expression　in　the　writings　of　this　philosopher；　the

mental　power　exhibited　in　this　ascent　from　the　ectypal　mode　of

regarding　the　physical　world　to　the　architectonic　connection　thereof

according　to　ends；　that　is；　ideas；　is　an　effort　which　deserves

imitation　and　claims　respect。　But　as　regards　the　principles　of　ethics；

of　legislation；　and　of　religion；　spheres　in　which　ideas　alone　render

experience　possible；　although　they　never　attain　to　full　expression

therein；　he　has　vindicated　for　himself　a　position　of　peculiar　merit；

which　is　not　appreciated　only　because　it　is　judged　by　the　very

empirical　rules；　the　validity　of　which　as　principles　is　destroyed　by

ideas。　For　as　regards　nature；　experience　presents　us　with　rules　and　is

the　source　of　truth；　but　in　relation　to　ethical　laws　experience　is　the

parent　of　illusion；　and　it　is　in　the　highest　degree　reprehensible　to

limit　or　to　deduce　the　laws　which　dictate　what　I　ought　to　do；　from

what　is　done。

　　We　must；　however；　omit　the　consideration　of　these　important

subjects；　the　development　of　which　is　in　reality　the　peculiar　duty　and

dignity　of　philosophy；　and　confine　ourselves　for　the　present　to　the

more　humble　but　not　less　useful　task　of　preparing　a　firm　foundation

for　those　majestic　edifices　of　moral　science。　For　this　foundation

has　been　hitherto　insecure　from　the　many　subterranean　passages　which

reason　in　its　confident　but　vain　search　for　treasures　has　made　in

all　directions。　Our　present　duty　is　to　make　ourselves　perfectly

acquainted　with　the　transcendental　use　made　of　pure　reason；　its

principles　and　ideas；　that　we　may　be　able　properly　to　determine　and

value　its　influence　and　real　worth。　But　before　bringing　these

introductory　remarks　to　a　close；　I　beg　those　who　really　have

philosophy　at　heart…　and　their　number　is　but　small…　if　they　shall　find

themselves　convinced　by　the　considerations　following　as　well　as　by

those　above；　to　exert　themselves　to　preserve　to　the　expression　idea

its　original　signification；　and　to　take　care　that　it　be　not　lost　among

those　other　expressions　by　which　all　sorts　of　representations　are

loosely　designated…　that　the　interests　of　science　may　not　thereby

suffer。　We　are　in　no　want　of　words　to　denominate　adequately　every　mode

of　representation；　without　the　necessity　of　encroaching　upon　terms

which　are　proper　to　others。　The　following　is　a　graduated　list　of　them。

The　genus　is　representation　in　general　（representation。　Under　it

stands　representation　with　consciousness　（perceptio）。　A　perception

which　relates　solely　to　the　subject　as　a　modification　of　its　state；　is

a　sensation　（sensatio）；　an　objective　perception　is　a　cognition

（cognitio）。　A　cognition　is　either　an　intuition　or　a　conception

（intuitus　vel　conceptus）。　The　former　has　an　immediate　relation　to

the　object　and　is　singular　and　individual；　the　latter　has　but　a

mediate　relation；　by　means　of　a　characteristic　mark　which　may　be

common　to　several　things。　A　conception　is　either　empirical　or　pure。

A　pure　conception；　in　so　far　as　it　has　its　origin　in　the　understanding

alone；　and　is　not　the　conception　of　a　pure　sensuous　image；　is　called

notio。　A　conception　formed　from　notions；　which　transcends　the

possibility　of　experience；　is　an　idea；　or　a　conception　of　reason。　To

one　who　has　accustomed　himself　to　these　distinctions；　it　must　be　quite

intolerable　to　hear　the　representation　of　the　colour　red　called　an

idea。　It　ought　not　even　to　be　called　a　notion　or　conception　of

understanding。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　Of　Transcendental　Ideas。



　　Transcendental　analytic　showed　us　how　the　mere　logical　form　of　our

cognitio