the critique of pure reason-第53章

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subordinate　faculty；　whose　duty　it　is　to　give　a　certain　form　to

given　cognitions…　a　form　which　is　called　logical；　and　through　which

the　cognitions　of　the　understanding　are　subordinated　to　each　other；

and　lower　rules　to　higher　（those；　to　wit；　whose　condition　comprises　in

its　sphere　the　condition　of　the　others）；　in　so　far　as　this　can　be　done

by　comparison？　This　is　the　question　which　we　have　at　present　to

answer。　Manifold　variety　of　rules　and　unity　of　principles　is　a

requirement　of　reason；　for　the　purpose　of　bringing　the　understanding

into　complete　accordance　with　itself；　just　as　understanding　subjects

the　manifold　content　of　intuition　to　conceptions；　and　thereby

introduces　connection　into　it。　But　this　principle　prescribes　no　law　to

objects；　and　does　not　contain　any　ground　of　the　possibility　of

cognizing　or　of　determining　them　as　such；　but　is　merely　a　subjective

law　for　the　proper　arrangement　of　the　content　of　the　understanding。

The　purpose　of　this　law　is；　by　a　comparison　of　the　conceptions　of

the　understanding；　to　reduce　them　to　the　smallest　possible　number；

although；　at　the　same　time；　it　does　not　justify　us　in　demanding　from

objects　themselves　such　a　uniformity　as　might　contribute　to　the

convenience　and　the　enlargement　of　the　sphere　of　the　understanding；　or

in　expecting　that　it　will　itself　thus　receive　from　them　objective

validity。　In　one　word；　the　question　is：　〃does　reason　in　itself；　that

is；　does　pure　reason　contain　a　priori　synthetical　principles　and

rules；　and　what　are　those　principles？〃

　　The　formal　and　logical　procedure　of　reason　in　syllogisms　gives　us

sufficient　information　in　regard　to　the　ground　on　which　the

transcendental　principle　of　reason　in　its　pure　synthetical　cognition

will　rest。

　　1。　Reason；　as　observed　in　the　syllogistic　process；　is　not　applicable

to　intuitions；　for　the　purpose　of　subjecting　them　to　rules…　for　this

is　the　province　of　the　understanding　with　its　categories…　but　to

conceptions　and　judgements。　If　pure　reason　does　apply　to　objects　and

the　intuition　of　them；　it　does　so　not　immediately；　but　mediately…

through　the　understanding　and　its　judgements；　which　have　a　direct

relation　to　the　senses　and　their　intuition；　for　the　purpose　of

determining　their　objects。　The　unity　of　reason　is　therefore　not　the

unity　of　a　possible　experience；　but　is　essentially　different　from　this

unity；　which　is　that　of　the　understanding。　That　everything　which

happens　has　a　cause；　is　not　a　principle　cognized　and　prescribed　by

reason。　This　principle　makes　the　unity　of　experience　possible　and

borrows　nothing　from　reason；　which；　without　a　reference　to　possible

experience；　could　never　have　produced　by　means　of　mere　conceptions　any

such　synthetical　unity。

　　2。　Reason；　in　its　logical　use；　endeavours　to　discover　the　general

condition　of　its　judgement　（the　conclusion）；　and　a　syllogism　is　itself

nothing　but　a　judgement　by　means　of　the　subsumption　of　its　condition

under　a　general　rule　（the　major）。　Now　as　this　rule　may　itself　be

subjected　to　the　same　process　of　reason；　and　thus　the　condition　of　the

condition　be　sought　（by　means　of　a　prosyllogism）　as　long　as　the

process　can　be　continued；　it　is　very　manifest　that　the　peculiar

principle　of　reason　in　its　logical　use　is　to　find　for　the

conditioned　cognition　of　the　understanding　the　unconditioned　whereby

the　unity　of　the　former　is　completed。

　　But　this　logical　maxim　cannot　be　a　principle　of　pure　reason；

unless　we　admit　that；　if　the　conditioned　is　given；　the　whole　series　of

conditions　subordinated　to　one　another…　a　series　which　is　consequently

itself　unconditioned…　is　also　given；　that　is；　contained　in　the

object　and　its　connection。

　　But　this　principle　of　pure　reason　is　evidently　synthetical；　for；

analytically；　the　conditioned　certainly　relates　to　some　condition；　but

not　to　the　unconditioned。　From　this　principle　also　there　must

originate　different　synthetical　propositions；　of　which　the　pure

understanding　is　perfectly　ignorant；　for　it　has　to　do　only　with

objects　of　a　possible　experience；　the　cognition　and　synthesis　of　which

is　always　conditioned。　The　unconditioned；　if　it　does　really　exist；

must　be　especially　considered　in　regard　to　the　determinations　which

distinguish　it　from　whatever　is　conditioned；　and　will　thus　afford　us

material　for　many　a　priori　synthetical　propositions。

　　The　principles　resulting　from　this　highest　principle　of　pure

reason　will；　however；　be　transcendent　in　relation　to　phenomena；　that

is　to　say；　it　will　be　impossible　to　make　any　adequate　empirical　use　of

this　principle。　It　is　therefore　completely　different　from　all

principles　of　the　understanding；　the　use　made　of　which　is　entirely

immanent；　their　object　and　purpose　being　merely　the　possibility　of

experience。　Now　our　duty　in　the　transcendental　dialectic　is　as

follows。　To　discover　whether　the　principle　that　the　series　of

conditions　（in　the　synthesis　of　phenomena；　or　of　thought　in　general）

extends　to　the　unconditioned　is　objectively　true；　or　not；　what

consequences　result　therefrom　affecting　the　empirical　use　of　the

understanding；　or　rather　whether　there　exists　any　such　objectively

valid　proposition　of　reason；　and　whether　it　is　not；　on　the　contrary；　a

merely　logical　precept　which　directs　us　to　ascend　perpetually　to　still

higher　conditions；　to　approach　completeness　in　the　series　of　them；　and

thus　to　introduce　into　our　cognition　the　highest　possible　unity　of

reason。　We　must　ascertain；　I　say；　whether　this　requirement　of　reason

has　not　been　regarded；　by　a　misunderstanding；　as　a　transcendental

principle　of　pure　reason；　which　postulates　a　thorough　completeness

in　the　series　of　conditions　in　objects　themselves。　We　must　show；

moreover；　the　misconceptions　and　illusions　that　intrude　into

syllogisms；　the　major　proposition　of　which　pure　reason　has　supplied…　a

proposition　which　has　perhaps　more　of　the　character　of　a　petitio

than　of　a　postulatum…　and　that　proceed　from　experience　upwards　to

its　conditions。　The　solution　of　these　problems　is　our　task　in

transcendental　dialectic；　which　we　are　about　to　expose　even　at　its

source；　that　lies　deep　in　human　reason。　We　shall　divide　it　into　two

parts；　the　first　of　which　will　treat　of　the　transcendent　conceptions

of　pure　reason；　the　second　of　transcendent　and　dialectical　syllogisms。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　I。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　OF　THE　CONCEPTIONS　OF　PURE　REASON。



　　The　conceptions　of　pure　reason…　we　do　not　here　speak　of　the

possibility　of　them…　are　not　obtained　by　reflection；　but　by

inference　or　conclusion。　The　conceptions　of　understanding　are　also

cogitated　a　priori　antecedently　to　experience；　and　render　it　possible；

but　they　contain　nothing　but　the　unity　of　reflection　upon　phenomena；

in　so　far　as　these　must　necessarily　belong　to　a　possible　empirical

consciousness。　Through　them　alone　are　cognition　and　the

determination　of　an　object　possible。　It　is　from　them；　accordingly；

that　we　receive　material　for　reasoning；　and　antecedently　to　them　we

possess　no　a　priori　conceptions　of　objects　from　which　they　might　be

deduced；　On　the　other　hand；　the　sole　basis　of　their　objective

reality　consists　in　the　necessity　imposed　on　them；　as　containing　the

intellectual　form　of　all　experience；　of　restricting　their

application　and　influence　to　the　sphere　of　experience。

　　But　the　term；　conception　of　reason；　or　rational　conception；　itself

indicates　that　it　does　not　confine　itself　within　the　limits　of

experience；　because　its　object…matter　is　a　cognition；　of　which　every

empirical　cognition　is　but　a　part…　nay；　the　whole　of　possible

experience　may　be　itself　but　a　part　of　it…　a　cognition　to　which　no

actual　experience　ever　fully　attains；　although　it　does　always

pertain　to　it。　The　aim　of　rational　conceptions　is　the　comprehension；

as　that　of　the　conceptions　of　understanding　is　the　understanding　of

perceptions。　If　they　contain　the　unconditioned；　they　relate　to　that　to

which　all　experience　is　subordinate；　but　which　is　never　itself　an

object　of　experience…　that　towards　which　reason　tends　in　all　its

conclusions　from　experience；　and　by　the　standard　of　which　it　estimates

the　degree　of　their　empirical　use；　but　which　is　never　itself　an

element　in　an　empirical　synthesis。　If；　notwithstanding；　such

conceptions　possess　objective　validity；　they　may　be　called　conceptus

ratiocinati　（conceptions　legitimately　concluded）；　in　cases　where

they　do　not；　they　have　been　admitted　on　account　of　having　the

appearance　of　being　correctly　concluded；　and　may　be　called　conceptus

ratiocinantes　（sophistical　conceptions）。　But　as　this　can　only　be

sufficiently　demonstrated　in　that　part　of　our　treatise　which　relates

to　the　dialectical　conclusions　of　reason；　we　shall　omit　any

consideration　of　it　in　this　place。　As　we　called　the　pure　conceptions

of　the　understanding　categories；　we　shall　also　distinguish　those　of

pure　reason　by　a　new　name　and　call　them　transcendental　ideas。　These

terms；　however；　we　must　in　the　first　place　explain　and　justify。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I　…　Of　Ideas　in　General。



　　Despite　the　great　wealth　of　words　which　European　languages

possess；　the　thinker　finds　himself　often　at　a　loss　for　an　expression

exactly　suited　to　his　conception；　for　want　of　which　he　is　unable　to

make　himself　intelligible　either　to　others　or　to　himself。　To　coin

new　words　is　a　pretension　to　legislation　in　language　which　is　seldom

successful；　and；　before　recourse　is　taken　to　so　desperate　an

expedient；　it　is　advisable　to　examine　the　dead　and　learned

languages；　with　the　hope　and　the　probability　that　we　may　there　meet

with　some　adequate　expression　of　the　notion　we　have　in　our　minds。　In

this　case；　even　if　the　original　meaning　of　the　word　has　become

somewhat　uncertain；　from　carelessness　or　want　of　caution　on　the　part

of　the　authors　of　it；　it　is　always　better　to　adhere　to　and　confirm　its

proper　meaning…　even　although　it　may　be　doubtful　whether　it　was

formerly　used　in　exactly　this　sense…　than　to　make　our　labour　vain　by

want　of　sufficient　care　to　render　ourselves　intelligible。

　　For　this　reason；　when　it　happens　that　there　exists　only　a　single

word　to　express　a　certain　conception；　and　this　word；　in　its　usual

acceptation；　is　thoroughly　adequate　to　the　conception；　the　accurate

distinction　of　which　from　related　conceptions　is　of　great

importance；　we　ought　not　to　employ　the　expression　improvidently；　or；

for　the　sake　of　variety　and　elegance　of　style；　use　it　as　a　synonym　for

other　cognate　words。　It　is　our　duty；　on　the　contrary；　carefully　to

preserve　its　peculiar　signification；　as　otherwise　it　easily　happens

that　when　the　attention　of　the　reader　is　no　longer　particularly

attracted　to　the　expression；　and　it　is　lost　amid　the　multitude　of

other　words　of　very　different　import；　the　thought　which　it　conveyed；

and　which　it　alone　conveyed；　is　lost　with　it。

　　Plato　employed　the　expression　idea　in　a　way　that　plainly　showed　he

meant　by　it　something　which　is　never　derived　from　the　senses；　but

which　far　transcends　even　the　conceptions　of　t