the critique of pure reason-第107章

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　　The　polemic　of　scepticism　is　properly　directed　against　the

dogmatist；　who　erects　a　system　of　philosophy　without　having　examined

the　fundamental　objective　principles　on　which　it　is　based；　for　the

purpose　of　evidencing　the　futility　of　his　designs；　and　thus　bringing

him　to　a　knowledge　of　his　own　powers。　But；　in　itself；　scepticism

does　not　give　us　any　certain　information　in　regard　to　the　bounds　of

our　knowledge。　All　unsuccessful　dogmatical　attempts　of　reason　are

facia；　which　it　is　always　useful　to　submit　to　the　censure　of　the

sceptic。　But　this　cannot　help　us　to　any　decision　regarding　the

expectations　which　reason　cherishes　of　better　success　in　future

endeavours；　the　investigations　of　scepticism　cannot；　therefore；　settle

the　dispute　regarding　the　rights　and　powers　of　human　reason。

　　Hume　is　perhaps　the　ablest　and　most　ingenious　of　all　sceptical

philosophers；　and　his　writings　have；　undoubtedly；　exerted　the　most

powerful　influence　in　awakening　reason　to　a　thorough　investigation

into　its　own　powers。　It　will；　therefore；　well　repay　our　labours　to

consider　for　a　little　the　course　of　reasoning　which　he　followed　and

the　errors　into　which　he　strayed；　although　setting　out　on　the　path

of　truth　and　certitude。

　　Hume　was　probably　aware；　although　he　never　clearly　developed　the

notion；　that　we　proceed　in　judgements　of　a　certain　class　beyond　our

conception　if　the　object。　I　have　termed　this　kind　of　judgement

synthetical。　As　regard　the　manner　in　which　I　pass　beyond　my　conception

by　the　aid　of　experience；　no　doubts　can　be　entertained。　Experience

is　itself　a　synthesis　of　perceptions；　and　it　employs　perceptions　to

increment　the　conception；　which　I　obtain　by　means　of　another

perception。　But　we　feel　persuaded　that　we　are　able　to　proceed　beyond　a

conception；　and　to　extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　We　attempt　this　in

two　ways…　either；　through　the　pure　understanding；　in　relation　to

that　which　may　become　an　object　of　experience；　or；　through　pure

reason；　in　relation　to　such　properties　of　things；　or　of　the

existence　of　things；　as　can　never　be　presented　in　any　experience。　This

sceptical　philosopher　did　not　distinguish　these　two　kinds　of

judgements；　as　he　ought　to　have　done；　but　regarded　this　augmentation

of　conceptions；　and；　if　we　may　so　express　ourselves；　the　spontaneous

generation　of　understanding　and　reason；　independently　of　the

impregnation　of　experience；　as　altogether　impossible。　The　so…called

a　priori　principles　of　these　faculties　he　consequently　held　to　be

invalid　and　imaginary；　and　regarded　them　as　nothing　but　subjective

habits　of　thought　originating　in　experience；　and　therefore　purely

empirical　and　contingent　rules；　to　which　we　attribute　a　spurious

necessity　and　universality。　In　support　of　this　strange　assertion；　he

referred　us　to　the　generally　acknowledged　principle　of　the　relation

between　cause　and　effect。　No　faculty　of　the　mind　can　conduct　us　from

the　conception　of　a　thing　to　the　existence　of　something　else；　and

hence　he　believed　he　could　infer　that；　without　experience；　we

possess　no　source　from　which　we　can　augment　a　conception；　and　no

ground　sufficient　to　justify　us　in　framing　a　judgement　that　is　to

extend　our　cognition　a　priori。　That　the　light　of　the　sun；　which　shines

upon　a　piece　of　wax；　at　the　same　time　melts　it；　while　it　hardens　clay；

no　power　of　the　understanding　could　infer　from　the　conceptions　which

we　previously　possessed　of　these　substances；　much　less　is　there　any

a　priori　law　that　could　conduct　us　to　such　a　conclusion；　which

experience　alone　can　certify。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　seen　in　our

discussion　of　transcendental　logic；　that；　although　we　can　never

proceed　immediately　beyond　the　content　of　the　conception　which　is

given　us；　we　can　always　cognize　completely　a　priori…　in　relation；

however；　to　a　third　term；　namely；　possible　experience…　the　law　of

its　connection　with　other　things。　For　example；　if　I　observe　that　a

piece　of　wax　melts；　I　can　cognize　a　priori　that　there　must　have　been

something　（the　sun's　heat）　preceding；　which　this　law；　although；

without　the　aid　of　experience；　I　could　not　cognize　a　priori　and　in　a

determinate　manner　either　the　cause　from　the　effect；　or　the　effect

from　the　cause。　Hume　was；　therefore；　wrong　in　inferring；　from　the

contingency　of　the　determination　according　to　law；　the　contingency

of　the　law　itself；　and　the　passing　beyond　the　conception　of　a　thing　to

possible　experience　（which　is　an　a　priori　proceeding；　constituting　the

objective　reality　of　the　conception）；　he　confounded　with　our　synthesis

of　objects　in　actual　experience；　which　is　always；　of　course；

empirical。　Thus；　too；　he　regarded　the　principle　of　affinity；　which　has

its　seat　in　the　understanding　and　indicates　a　necessary　connection；　as

a　mere　rule　of　association；　lying　in　the　imitative　faculty　of

imagination；　which　can　present　only　contingent；　and　not　objective

connections。

　　The　sceptical　errors　of　this　remarkably　acute　thinker　arose

principally　from　a　defect；　which　was　common　to　him　with　the

dogmatists；　namely；　that　he　had　never　made　a　systematic　review　of

all　the　different　kinds　of　a　priori　synthesis　performed　by　the

understanding。　Had　he　done　so；　he　would　have　found；　to　take　one

example　among　many；　that　the　principle　of　permanence　was　of　this

character；　and　that　it；　as　well　as　the　principle　of　causality；

anticipates　experience。　In　this　way　he　might　have　been　able　to

describe　the　determinate　limits　of　the　a　priori　operations　of

understanding　and　reason。　But　he　merely　declared　the　understanding

to　be　limited；　instead　of　showing　what　its　limits　were；　he　created　a

general　mistrust　in　the　power　of　our　faculties；　without　giving　us

any　determinate　knowledge　of　the　bounds　of　our　necessary　and

unavoidable　ignorance；　he　examined　and　condemned　some　of　the

principles　of　the　understanding；　without　investigating　all　its

powers　with　the　completeness　necessary　to　criticism。　He　denies；　with

truth；　certain　powers　to　the　understanding；　but　he　goes　further；　and

declares　it　to　be　utterly　inadequate　to　the　a　priori　extension　of

knowledge；　although　he　has　not　fully　examined　all　the　powers　which

reside　in　the　faculty；　and　thus　the　fate　which　always　overtakes

scepticism　meets　him　too。　That　is　to　say；　his　own　declarations　are

doubted；　for　his　objections　were　based　upon　facta；　which　are

contingent；　and　not　upon　principles；　which　can　alone　demonstrate　the

necessary　invalidity　of　all　dogmatical　assertions。

　　As　Hume　makes　no　distinction　between　the　well…grounded　claims　of　the

understanding　and　the　dialectical　pretensions　of　reason；　against

which；　however；　his　attacks　are　mainly　directed；　reason　does　not

feel　itself　shut　out　from　all　attempts　at　the　extension　of　a　priori

cognition；　and　hence　it　refuses；　in　spite　of　a　few　checks　in　this　or

that　quarter；　to　relinquish　such　efforts。　For　one　naturally　arms

oneself　to　resist　an　attack；　and　becomes　more　obstinate　in　the　resolve

to　establish　the　claims　he　has　advanced。　But　a　complete　review　of

the　powers　of　reason；　and　the　conviction　thence　arising　that　we　are　in

possession　of　a　limited　field　of　action；　while　we　must　admit　the

vanity　of　higher　claims；　puts　an　end　to　all　doubt　and　dispute；　and

induces　reason　to　rest　satisfied　with　the　undisturbed　possession　of

its　limited　domain。

　　To　the　uncritical　dogmatist；　who　has　not　surveyed　the　sphere　of

his　understanding；　nor　determined；　in　accordance　with　principles；

the　limits　of　possible　cognition；　who；　consequently；　is　ignorant　of

his　own　powers；　and　believes　he　will　discover　them　by　the　attempts

he　makes　in　the　field　of　cognition；　these　attacks　of　scepticism　are

not　only　dangerous；　but　destructive。　For　if　there　is　one　proposition

in　his　chain　of　reasoning　which　be　he　cannot　prove；　or　the　fallacy

in　which　be　cannot　evolve　in　accordance　with　a　principle；　suspicion

falls　on　all　his　statements；　however　plausible　they　may　appear。

　　And　thus　scepticism；　the　bane　of　dogmatical　philosophy；　conducts

us　to　a　sound　investigation　into　the　understanding　and　the　reason。

When　we　are　thus　far　advanced；　we　need　fear　no　further

attacks；　for　the　limits　of　our　domain　are　clearly　marked　out；　and　we

can　make　no　claims　nor　become　involved　in　any　disputes　regarding　the

region　that　lies　beyond　these　limits。　Thus　the　sceptical　procedure

in　philosophy　does　not　present　any　solution　of　the　problems　of　reason；

but　it　forms　an　excellent　exercise　for　its　powers；　awakening　its

circumspection；　and　indicating　the　means　whereby　it　may　most　fully

establish　its　claims　to　its　legitimate　possessions。



　　　　SECTION　III。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　Hypothesis。



　　This　critique　of　reason　has　now　taught　us　that　all　its　efforts　to

extend　the　bounds　of　knowledge；　by　means　of　pure　speculation；　are

utterly　fruitless。　So　much　the　wider　field；　it　may　appear；　lies　open

to　hypothesis；　as；　where　we　cannot　know　with　certainty；　we　are　at

liberty　to　make　guesses　and　to　form　suppositions。

　　Imagination　may　be　allowed；　under　the　strict　surveillance　of　reason；

to　invent　suppositions；　but；　these　must　be　based　on　something　that

is　perfectly　certain…　and　that　is　the　possibility　of　the　object。　If　we

are　well　assured　upon　this　point；　it　is　allowable　to　have　recourse

to　supposition　in　regard　to　the　reality　of　the　object；　but　this

supposition　must；　unless　it　is　utterly　groundless；　be　connected；　as

its　ground　of　explanation；　with　that　which　is　really　given　and

absolutely　certain。　Such　a　supposition　is　termed　a　hypothesis。

　　It　is　beyond　our　power　to　form　the　least　conception　a　priori　of

the　possibility　of　dynamical　connection　in　phenomena；　and　the　category

of　the　pure　understanding　will　not　enable　us　to　ex。　cogitate　any

such　connection；　but　merely　helps　us　to　understand　it；　when　we　meet

with　it　in　experience。　For　this　reason　we　cannot；　in　accordance　with

the　categories；　imagine　or　invent　any　object　or　any　property　of　an

object　not　given；　or　that　may　not　be　given　in　experience；　and　employ

it　in　a　hypothesis；　otherwise；　we　should　be　basing　our　chain　of

reasoning　upon　mere　chimerical　fancies；　and　not　upon　conceptions　of

things。　Thus；　we　have　no　right　to　assume　the　existence　of　new

powers；　not　existing　in　nature…　for　example；　an　understanding　with　a

non…sensuous　intuition；　a　force　of　attraction　without　contact；　or　some

new　kind　of　substances　occupying　space；　and　yet　without　the　property

of　impenetrability…　and；　consequently；　we　cannot　assume　that　there

is　any　other　kind　of　community　among　substances　than　that　observable

in　experience；　any　kind　of　presence　than　that　in　space；　or　any　kind　of

duration　than　that　in　time。　In　one　word；　the　conditions　of　possible

experience　are　for　reason　the　only　conditions　of　the　possibility　of

things；　reason　cannot　venture　to　form；　independently　of　these

conditions；　any　conceptions　of　things；　because　such　conceptions；

although　not　self…contradictory；　are　without　object　and　without

application。

　　The　conceptions　of　reason　are；　as　we　have　already　shown；　m