the critique of pure reason-第106章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



by　a　thorough　training　in　the　critical　investigation　of　pure　reason。

For；　in　order　to　bring　the　principles　of　this　critique　into　exercise

as　soon　as　possible；　and　to　demonstrate　their　perfect　even　in　the

presence　of　the　highest　degree　of　dialectical　illusion；　the　student

ought　to　examine　the　assertions　made　on　both　sides　of　speculative

questions　step　by　step；　and　to　test　them　by　these　principles。　It

cannot　be　a　difficult　task　for　him　to　show　the　fallacies　inherent　in

these　propositions；　and　thus　he　begins　early　to　feel　his　own　power

of　securing　himself　against　the　influence　of　such　sophistical

arguments；　which　must　finally　lose；　for　him；　all　their　illusory　power。

And；　although　the　same　blows　which　overturn　the　edifice　of　his

opponent　are　as　fatal　to　his　own　speculative　structures；　if　such　he

has　wished　to　rear；　he　need　not　feel　any　sorrow　in　regard　to　this

seeming　misfortune；　as　he　has　now　before　him　a　fair　prospect　into

the　practical　region　in　which　he　may　reasonably　hope　to　find　a　more

secure　foundation　for　a　rational　system。

　　There　is；　accordingly；　no　proper　polemic　in　the　sphere　of　pure

reason。　Both　parties　beat　the　air　and　fight　with　their　own　shadows；　as

they　pass　beyond　the　limits　of　nature；　and　can　find　no　tangible

point　of　attack…　no　firm　footing　for　their　dogmatical　conflict。

Fight　as　vigorously　as　they　may；　the　shadows　which　they　hew　down；

immediately　start　up　again；　like　the　heroes　in　Walhalla；　and　renew　the

bloodless　and　unceasing　contest。

　　But　neither　can　we　admit　that　there　is　any　proper　sceptical

employment　of　pure　reason；　such　as　might　be　based　upon　the　principle

of　neutrality　in　all　speculative　disputes。　To　excite　reason　against

itself；　to　place　weapons　in　the　hands　of　the　party　on　the　one　side

as　well　as　in　those　of　the　other；　and　to　remain　an　undisturbed　and

sarcastic　spectator　of　the　fierce　struggle　that　ensues；　seems；　from

the　dogmatical　point　of　view；　to　be　a　part　fitting　only　a　malevolent

disposition。　But；　when　the　sophist　evidences　an　invincible　obstinacy

and　blindness；　and　a　pride　which　no　criticism　can　moderate；　there　is

no　other　practicable　course　than　to　oppose　to　this　pride　and　obstinacy

similar　feelings　and　pretensions　on　the　other　side；　equally　well　or

ill　founded；　so　that　reason；　staggered　by　the　reflections　thus

forced　upon　it；　finds　it　necessary　to　moderate　its　confidence　in

such　pretensions　and　to　listen　to　the　advice　of　criticism。　But　we

cannot　stop　at　these　doubts；　much　less　regard　the　conviction　of　our

ignorance；　not　only　as　a　cure　for　the　conceit　natural　to　dogmatism；

but　as　the　settlement　of　the　disputes　in　which　reason　is　involved　with

itself。　On　the　contrary；　scepticism　is　merely　a　means　of　awakening

reason　from　its　dogmatic　dreams　and　exciting　it　to　a　more　careful

investigation　into　its　own　powers　and　pretensions。　But；　as

scepticism　appears　to　be　the　shortest　road　to　a　permanent　peace　in　the

domain　of　philosophy；　and　as　it　is　the　track　pursued　by　the　many　who

aim　at　giving　a　philosophical　colouring　to　their　contemptuous

dislike　of　all　inquiries　of　this　kind；　I　think　it　necessary　to　present

to　my　readers　this　mode　of　thought　in　its　true　light。



　　　　　Scepticism　not　a　Permanent　State　for　Human　Reason。



　　The　consciousness　of　ignorance…　unless　this　ignorance　is

recognized　to　be　absolutely　necessary　ought；　instead　of　forming　the

conclusion　of　my　inquiries；　to　be　the　strongest　motive　to　the

pursuit　of　them。　All　ignorance　is　either　ignorance　of　things　or　of　the

limits　of　knowledge。　If　my　ignorance　is　accidental　and　not

necessary；　it　must　incite　me；　in　the　first　case；　to　a　dogmatical

inquiry　regarding　the　objects　of　which　I　am　ignorant；　in　the　second；

to　a　critical　investigation　into　the　bounds　of　all　possible　knowledge。

But　that　my　ignorance　is　absolutely　necessary　and　unavoidable；　and

that　it　consequently　absolves　from　the　duty　of　all　further

investigation；　is　a　fact　which　cannot　be　made　out　upon　empirical

grounds…　from　observation…　but　upon　critical　grounds　alone；　that　is；

by　a　thoroughgoing　investigation　into　the　primary　sources　of

cognition。　It　follows　that　the　determination　of　the　bounds　of　reason

can　be　made　only　on　a　priori　grounds；　while　the　empirical　limitation

of　reason；　which　is　merely　an　indeterminate　cognition　of　an

ignorance　that　can　never　be　completely　removed；　can　take　place　only

a　posteriori。　In　other　words；　our　empirical　knowledge　is　limited　by

that　which　yet　remains　for　us　to　know。　The　former　cognition　of　our

ignorance；　which　is　possible　only　on　a　rational　basis；　is　a　science；

the　latter　is　merely　a　perception；　and　we　cannot　say　how　far　the

inferences　drawn　from　it　may　extend。　If　I　regard　the　earth；　as　it

really　appears　to　my　senses；　as　a　flat　surface；　I　am　ignorant　how

far　this　surface　extends。　But　experience　teaches　me　that；　how　far

soever　I　go；　I　always　see　before　me　a　space　in　which　I　can　proceed

farther；　and　thus　I　know　the　limits…　merely　visual…　of　my　actual

knowledge　of　the　earth；　although　I　am　ignorant　of　the　limits　of　the

earth　itself。　But　if　I　have　got　so　far　as　to　know　that　the　earth　is

a　sphere；　and　that　its　surface　is　spherical；　I　can　cognize　a　priori

and　determine　upon　principles；　from　my　knowledge　of　a　small　part　of

this　surface…　say　to　the　extent　of　a　degree…　the　diameter　and

circumference　of　the　earth；　and　although　I　am　ignorant　of　the

objects　which　this　surface　contains；　I　have　a　perfect　knowledge　of　its

limits　and　extent。

　　The　sum　of　all　the　possible　objects　of　our　cognition　seems　to　us

to　be　a　level　surface；　with　an　apparent　horizon…　that　which　forms

the　limit　of　its　extent；　and　which　has　been　termed　by　us　the　idea　of

unconditioned　totality。　To　reach　this　limit　by　empirical　means　is

impossible；　and　all　attempts　to　determine　it　a　priori　according　to　a

principle；　are　alike　in　vain。　But　all　the　questions　raised　by　pure

reason　relate　to　that　which　lies　beyond　this　horizon；　or；　at　least；　in

its　boundary　line。

　　The　celebrated　David　Hume　was　one　of　those　geographers　of　human

reason　who　believe　that　they　have　given　a　sufficient　answer　to　all

such　questions　by　declaring　them　to　lie　beyond　the　horizon　of　our

knowledge…　a　horizon　which；　however；　Hume　was　unable　to　determine。　His

attention　especially　was　directed　to　the　principle　of　causality；　and

he　remarked　with　perfect　justice　that　the　truth　of　this　principle；　and

even　the　objective　validity　of　the　conception　of　a　cause；　was　not

commonly　based　upon　clear　insight；　that　is；　upon　a　priori　cognition。

Hence　he　concluded　that　this　law　does　not　derive　its　authority　from

its　universality　and　necessity；　but　merely　from　its　general

applicability　in　the　course　of　experience；　and　a　kind　of　subjective

necessity　thence　arising；　which　he　termed　habit。　From　the　inability　of

reason　to　establish　this　principle　as　a　necessary　law　for　the

acquisition　of　all　experience；　he　inferred　the　nullity　of　all　the

attempts　of　reason　to　pass　the　region　of　the　empirical。

　　This　procedure　of　subjecting　the　facta　of　reason　to　examination；

and；　if　necessary；　to　disapproval；　may　be　termed　the　censura　of

reason。　This　censura　must　inevitably　lead　us　to　doubts　regarding　all

transcendent　employment　of　principles。　But　this　is　only　the　second

step　in　our　inquiry。　The　first　step　in　regard　to　the　subjects　of

pure　reason；　and　which　marks　the　infancy　of　that　faculty；　is　that　of

dogmatism。　The　second；　which　we　have　just　mentioned；　is　that　of

scepticism；　and　it　gives　evidence　that　our　judgement　has　been　improved

by　experience。　But　a　third　step　is　necessary…　indicative　of　the

maturity　and　manhood　of　the　judgement；　which　now　lays　a　firm

foundation　upon　universal　and　necessary　principles。　This　is　the　period

of　criticism；　in　which　we　do　not　examine　the　facta　of　reason；　but

reason　itself；　in　the　whole　extent　of　its　powers；　and　in　regard　to　its

capability　of　a　priori　cognition；　and　thus　we　determine　not　merely　the

empirical　and　ever…shifting　bounds　of　our　knowledge；　but　its　necessary

and　eternal　limits。　We　demonstrate　from　indubitable　principles；　not

merely　our　ignorance　in　respect　to　this　or　that　subject；　but　in　regard

to　all　possible　questions　of　a　certain　class。　Thus　scepticism　is　a

resting　place　for　reason；　in　which　it　may　reflect　on　its　dogmatical

wanderings　and　gain　some　knowledge　of　the　region　in　which　it　happens

to　be；　that　it　may　pursue　its　way　with　greater　certainty；　but　it

cannot　be　its　permanent　dwelling…place。　It　must　take　up　its　abode　only

in　the　region　of　complete　certitude；　whether　this　relates　to　the

cognition　of　objects　themselves；　or　to　the　limits　which　bound　all

our　cognition。

　　Reason　is　not　to　be　considered　as　an　indefinitely　extended　plane；　of

the　bounds　of　which　we　have　only　a　general　knowledge；　it　ought

rather　to　be　compared　to　a　sphere；　the　radius　of　which　may　be　found

from　the　curvature　of　its　surface…　that　is；　the　nature　of　a　priori

synthetical　propositions…　and；　consequently；　its　circumference　and

extent。　Beyond　the　sphere　of　experience　there　are　no　objects　which

it　can　cognize；　nay；　even　questions　regarding　such　supposititious

objects　relate　only　to　the　subjective　principles　of　a　complete

determination　of　the　relations　which　exist　between　the

understanding…conceptions　which　lie　within　this　sphere。

　　We　are　actually　in　possession　of　a　priori　synthetical　cognitions；　as

is　proved　by　the　existence　of　the　principles　of　the　understanding；

which　anticipate　experience。　If　any　one　cannot　comprehend　the

possibility　of　these　principles；　he　may　have　some　reason　to　doubt

whether　they　are　really　a　priori；　but　he　cannot　on　this　account

declare　them　to　be　impossible；　and　affirm　the　nullity　of　the　steps

which　reason　may　have　taken　under　their　guidance。　He　can　only　say：

If　we　perceived　their　origin　and　their　authenticity；　we　should　be　able

to　determine　the　extent　and　limits　of　reason；　but；　till　we　can　do

this；　all　propositions　regarding　the　latter　are　mere　random

assertions。　In　this　view；　the　doubt　respecting　all　dogmatical

philosophy；　which　proceeds　without　the　guidance　of　criticism；　is

well　grounded；　but　we　cannot　therefore　deny　to　reason　the　ability　to

construct　a　sound　philosophy；　when　the　way　has　been　prepared　by　a

thorough　critical　investigation。　All　the　conceptions　produced；　and　all

the　questions　raised；　by　pure　reason；　do　not　lie　in　the　sphere　of

experience；　but　in　that　of　reason　itself；　and　hence　they　must　be

solved；　and　shown　to　be　either　valid　or　inadmissible；　by　that　faculty。

We　have　no　right　to　decline　the　solution　of　such　problems；　on　the

ground　that　the　solution　can　be　discovered　only　from　the　nature　of

things；　and　under　pretence　of　the　limitation　of　human　faculties；　for

reason　is　the　sole　creator　of　all　these　ideas；　and　is　therefore

bound　either　to　establish　their　validity　or　to　expose　their　illusory

nature。

　　The　polemic　of　scepticism　is　properly　directed　against　the

dogmatist；　who　erects　a　system　of　philosophy　without　having　examined

the　fundamental　ob