utilitarianism-第14章

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The　same　powerful　motives　which　command　the　observance　of　these　primary　moralities；　enjoin　the　punishment　of　those　who　violate　them；　and　as　the　impulses　of　self…defence；　of　defence　of　others；　and　of　vengeance；　are　all　called　forth　against　such　persons；　retribution；　or　evil　for　evil；　becomes　closely　connected　with　the　sentiment　of　justice；　and　is　universally　included　in　the　idea。　Good　for　good　is　also　one　of　the　dictates　of　justice；　and　this；　though　its　social　utility　is　evident；　and　though　it　carries　with　it　a　natural　human　feeling；　has　not　at　first　sight　that　obvious　connection　with　hurt　or　injury；　which；　existing　in　the　most　elementary　cases　of　just　and　unjust；　is　the　source　of　the　characteristic　intensity　of　the　sentiment。　But　the　connection；　though　less　obvious；　is　not　less　real。　He　who　accepts　benefits；　and　denies　a　return　of　them　when　needed；　inflicts　a　real　hurt；　by　disappointing　one　of　the　most　natural　and　reasonable　of　expectations；　and　one　which　he　must　at　least　tacitly　have　encouraged；　otherwise　the　benefits　would　seldom　have　been　conferred。　The　important　rank；　among　human　evils　and　wrongs；　of　the　disappointment　of　expectation；　is　shown　in　the　fact　that　it　constitutes　the　principal　criminality　of　two　such　highly　immoral　acts　as　a　breach　of　friendship　and　a　breach　of　promise。　Few　hurts　which　human　beings　can　sustain　are　greater；　and　none　wound　more；　than　when　that　on　which　they　habitually　and　with　full　assurance　relied；　fails　them　in　the　hour　of　need；　and　few　wrongs　are　greater　than　this　mere　withholding　of　good；　none　excite　more　resentment；　either　in　the　person　suffering；　or　in　a　sympathising　spectator。　The　principle；　therefore；　of　giving　to　each　what　they　deserve；　that　is；　good　for　good　as　well　as　evil　for　evil；　is　not　only　included　within　the　idea　of　justice　as　we　have　defined　it；　but　is　a　proper　object　of　that　intensity　of　sentiment；　which　places　the　just；　in　human　estimation；　above　the　simply　Expedient。　　　Most　of　the　maxims　of　justice　current　in　the　world；　and　commonly　appealed　to　in　its　transactions；　are　simply　instrumental　to　carrying　into　effect　the　principles　of　justice　which　we　have　now　spoken　of。　That　a　person　is　only　responsible　for　what　he　has　done　voluntarily；　or　could　voluntarily　have　avoided；　that　it　is　unjust　to　condemn　any　person　unheard；　that　the　punishment　ought　to　be　proportioned　to　the　offence；　and　the　like；　are　maxims　intended　to　prevent　the　just　principle　of　evil　for　evil　from　being　perverted　to　the　infliction　of　evil　without　that　justification。　The　greater　part　of　these　common　maxims　have　come　into　use　from　the　practice　of　courts　of　justice；　which　have　been　naturally　led　to　a　more　complete　recognition　and　elaboration　than　was　likely　to　suggest　itself　to　others；　of　the　rules　necessary　to　enable　them　to　fulfil　their　double　function；　of　inflicting　punishment　when　due；　and　of　awarding　to　each　person　his　right。　　　That　first　of　judicial　virtues；　impartiality；　is　an　obligation　of　justice；　partly　for　the　reason　last　mentioned；　as　being　a　necessary　condition　of　the　fulfilment　of　the　other　obligations　of　justice。　But　this　is　not　the　only　source　of　the　exalted　rank；　among　human　obligations；　of　those　maxims　of　equality　and　impartiality；　which；　both　in　popular　estimation　and　in　that　of　the　most　enlightened；　are　included　among　the　precepts　of　justice。　In　one　point　of　view；　they　may　be　considered　as　corollaries　from　the　principles　already　laid　down。　If　it　is　a　duty　to　do　to　each　according　to　his　deserts；　returning　good　for　good　as　well　as　repressing　evil　by　evil；　it　necessarily　follows　that　we　should　treat　all　equally　well　（when　no　higher　duty　forbids）　who　have　deserved　equally　well　of　us；　and　that　society　should　treat　all　equally　well　who　have　deserved　equally　well　of　it；　that　is；　who　have　deserved　equally　well　absolutely。　This　is　the　highest　abstract　standard　of　social　and　distributive　justice；　towards　which　all　institutions；　and　the　efforts　of　all　virtuous　citizens；　should　be　made　in　the　utmost　possible　degree　to　converge。　　　But　this　great　moral　duty　rests　upon　a　still　deeper　foundation；　being　a　direct　emanation　from　the　first　principle　of　morals；　and　not　a　mere　logical　corollary　from　secondary　or　derivative　doctrines。　It　is　involved　in　the　very　meaning　of　Utility；　or　the　Greatest　Happiness　Principle。　That　principle　is　a　mere　form　of　words　without　rational　signification；　unless　one　person's　happiness；　supposed　equal　in　degree　（with　the　proper　allowance　made　for　kind）；　is　counted　for　exactly　as　much　as　another's。　Those　conditions　being　supplied；　Bentham's　dictum；　〃everybody　to　count　for　one；　nobody　for　more　than　one；〃　might　be　written　under　the　principle　of　utility　as　an　explanatory　commentary。*　The　equal　claim　of　everybody　to　happiness　in　the　estimation　of　the　moralist　and　the　legislator；　involves　an　equal　claim　to　all　the　means　of　happiness；　except　in　so　far　as　the　inevitable　conditions　of　human　life；　and　the　general　interest；　in　which　that　of　every　individual　is　included；　set　limits　to　the　maxim；　and　those　limits　ought　to　be　strictly　construed。　As　every　other　maxim　of　justice；　so　this　is　by　no　means　applied　or　held　applicable　universally；　on　the　contrary；　as　I　have　already　remarked；　it　bends　to　every　person's　ideas　of　social　expediency。　But　in　whatever　case　it　is　deemed　applicable　at　all；　it　is　held　to　be　the　dictate　of　justice。　All　persons　are　deemed　to　have　a　right　to　equality　of　treatment；　except　when　some　recognised　social　expediency　requires　the　reverse。　And　hence　all　social　inequalities　which　have　ceased　to　be　considered　expedient；　assume　the　character　not　of　simple　inexpediency；　but　of　injustice；　and　appear　so　tyrannical；　that　people　are　apt　to　wonder　how　they　ever　could　have。　been　tolerated；　forgetful　that　they　themselves　perhaps　tolerate　other　inequalities　under　an　equally　mistaken　notion　of　expediency；　the　correction　of　which　would　make　that　which　they　approve　seem　quite　as　monstrous　as　what　they　have　at　last　learnt　to　condemn。　The　entire　history　of　social　improvement　has　been　a　series　of　transitions；　by　which　one　custom　or　institution　after　another；　from　being　a　supposed　primary　necessity　of　social　existence；　has　passed　into　the　rank　of　a　universally　stigmatised　injustice　and　tyranny。　So　it　has　been　with　the　distinctions　of　slaves　and　freemen；　nobles　and　serfs；　patricians　and　plebeians；　and　so　it　will　be；　and　in　part　already　is；　with　the　aristocracies　of　colour；　race；　and　sex。

　　*　This　implication；　in　the　first　principle　of　the　utilitarian　scheme；　of　perfect　impartiality　between　persons；　is　regarded　by　Mr。　Herbert　Spencer　（in　his　Social　Statics）　as　a　disproof　of　the　pretensions　of　utility　to　be　a　sufficient　guide　to　right；　since　（he　says）　the　principle　of　utility　presupposes　the　anterior　principle；　that　everybody　has　an　equal　right　to　happiness。　It　may　be　more　correctly　described　as　supposing　that　equal　amounts　of　happiness　are　equally　desirable；　whether　felt　by　the　same　or　by　different　persons。　This；　however；　is　not　a　pre…supposition；　not　a　premise　needful　to　support　the　principle　of　utility；　but　the　very　principle　itself；　for　what　is　the　principle　of　utility；　if　it　be　not　that　〃happiness〃　and　〃desirable〃　are　synonymous　terms？　If　there　is　any　anterior　principle　implied；　it　can　be　no　other　than　this；　that　the　truths　of　arithmetic　are　applicable　to　the　valuation　of　happiness；　as　of　all　other　measurable　quantities。　　　＇Mr。　Herbert　Spencer；　in　a　private　communication　on　the　subject　of　the　preceding　Note；　objects　to　being　considered　an　opponent　of　utilitarianism；　and　states　that　he　regards　happiness　as　the　ultimate　end　of　morality；　but　deems　that　end　only　partially　attainable　by　empirical　generalisations　from　the　observed　results　of　conduct；　and　completely　attainable　only　by　deducing；　from　the　laws　of　life　and　the　conditions　of　existence；　what　kinds　of　action　necessarily　tend　to　produce　happiness；　and　what　kinds　to　produce　unhappiness。　What　the　exception　of　the　word　〃necessarily；〃　I　have　no　dissent　to　express　from　this　doctrine；　and　（omitting　that　word）　I　am　not　aware　that　any　modern　advocate　of　utilitarianism　is　of　a　different　opinion。　Bentham；　certainly；　to　whom　in　the　Social　Statics　Mr。　Spencer　particularly　referred；　is；　least　of　all　writers；　chargeable　with　unwillingness　to　deduce　the　effect　of　actions　on　happiness　from　the　laws　of　human　nature　and　the　universal　conditions　of　human　life。　The　common　charge　against　him　is　of　relying　too　exclusively　upon　such　deductions；　and　declining　altogether　to　be　bound　by　the　generalisations　from　specific　experience　which　Mr。　Spencer　thinks　that　utilitarians　generally　confine　themselves　to。　My　own　opinion　（and；　as　I　collect；　Mr。　Spencer's）　is；　that　in　ethics；　as　in　all　other　branches　of　scientific　study；　the　consilience　of　the　results　of　both　these　processes；　each　corroborating　and　verifying　the　other；　is　requisite　to　give　to　any　general　proposition　the　kind　degree　of　evidence　which　constitutes　scientific　proof。＇

　　It　appears　from　what　has　been　said；　that　justice　is　a　name　for　certain　moral　requirements；　which；　regarded　collectively；　stand　higher　in　the　scale　of　social　utility；　and　are　therefore　of　more　paramount　obligation；　than　any　others；　though　particular　cases　may　occur　in　which　some　other　social　duty　is　so　important；　as　to　overrule　any　one　of　the　general　maxims　of　justice。　Thus；　to　save　a　life；　it　may　not　only　be　allowable；　but　a　duty；　to　steal；　or　take　by　force；　the　necessary　food　or　medicine；　or　to　kidnap；　and　compel　to　officiate；　the　only　qualified　medical　practitioner。　In　such　cases；　as　we　do　not　call　anything　justice　which　is　not　a　virtue；　we　usually　say；　not　that　justice　must　give　way　to　some　other　moral　principle；　but　that　what　is　just　in　ordinary　cases　is；　by　reason　of　that　other　principle；　not　just　in　the　particular　case。　By　this　useful　accommodation　of　language；　the　character　of　indefeasibility　attributed　to　justice　is　kept　up；　and　we　are　saved　from　the　necessity　of　maintaining　that　there　can　be　laudable　injustice。　　　The　considerations　which　have　now　been　adduced　resolve；　I　conceive；　the　only　real　difficulty　in　the　utilitarian　theory　of　morals。　It　has　always　been　evident　that　all　cases　of　justice　are　also　cases　of　expediency：　the　difference　is　in　the　peculiar　sentiment　which　attaches　to　the　former；　as　contradistinguished　from　the　latter。　If　this　characteristic　sentiment　has　been　sufficiently　accounted　for；　if　there　is　no　necessity　to　assume　for　it　any　peculiarity　of　origin；　if　it　is　simply　the　natural　feeling　of　resentment；　moralised　by　being　made　coextensive　with　the　demands　of　social　good；　and　if　this　feeling　not　only　does　but　ought　to　exist　in　all　the　classes　of　cases　to　which　the　idea　of　justice　corresponds；　that　idea　no　longer　presents　itself　as　a　stumbling…block　to　the　utilitarian　ethics。　　　Justice　remains　the　appropriate　name　for　certain　social　utilities　which　are　vastly　more　important；　and　therefore　more　absolute　and　imperative；　than　any　others　are　as　a　class　（though　not　more　so　than　others　may　be　in　particular　cases）；　and　which；　therefore；　ought　to　be；　as　well　as　naturally　are；　guarded　by　a　sentiment　not　only　different　in　degree；　but　also　in　kind；　distinguished　from　the　milder　feeling　which　attaches　to　the　mere　idea　of　promoting　human　pleasure　or　convenience；　at　once　by　the　more　definite　nature　of　its　commands；　and　by　the　sterner　character　of　its