utilitarianism-第13章

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　not　compelled　to　take　into　consideration　any　other　maxims　of　justice　than　the　one　he　has　selected；　but　as　soon　as　their　several　maxims　are　brought　face　to　face；　each　disputant　seems　to　have　exactly　as　much　to　say　for　himself　as　the　others。　No　one　of　them　can　carry　out　his　own　notion　of　justice　without　trampling　upon　another　equally　binding。　　　These　are　difficulties；　they　have　always　been　felt　to　be　such；　and　many　devices　have　been　invented　to　turn　rather　than　to　overcome　them。　As　a　refuge　from　the　last　of　the　three；　men　imagined　what　they　called　the　freedom　of　the　will；　fancying　that　they　could　not　justify　punishing　a　man　whose　will　is　in　a　thoroughly　hateful　state；　unless　it　be　supposed　to　have　come　into　that　state　through　no　influence　of　anterior　circumstances。　To　escape　from　the　other　difficulties；　a　favourite　contrivance　has　been　the　fiction　of　a　contract；　whereby　at　some　unknown　period　all　the　members　of　society　engaged　to　obey　the　laws；　and　consented　to　be　punished　for　any　disobedience　to　them；　thereby　giving　to　their　legislators　the　right；　which　it　is　assumed　they　would　not　otherwise　have　had；　of　punishing　them；　either　for　their　own　good　or　for　that　of　society。　This　happy　thought　was　considered　to　get　rid　of　the　whole　difficulty；　and　to　legitimate　the　infliction　of　punishment；　in　virtue　of　another　received　maxim　of　justice；　Volenti　non　fit　injuria；　that　is　not　unjust　which　is　done　with　the　consent　of　the　person　who　is　supposed　to　be　hurt　by　it。　I　need　hardly　remark；　that　even　if　the　consent　were　not　a　mere　fiction；　this　maxim　is　not　superior　in　authority　to　the　others　which　it　is　brought　in　to　supersede。　It　is；　on　the　contrary；　an　instructive　specimen　of　the　loose　and　irregular　manner　in　which　supposed　principles　of　justice　grow　up。　This　particular　one　evidently　came　into　use　as　a　help　to　the　coarse　exigencies　of　courts　of　law；　which　are　sometimes　obliged　to　be　content　with　very　uncertain　presumptions；　on　account　of　the　greater　evils　which　would　often　arise　from　any　attempt　on　their　part　to　cut　finer。　But　even　courts　of　law　are　not　able　to　adhere　consistently　to　the　maxim；　for　they　allow　voluntary　engagements　to　be　set　aside　on　the　ground　of　fraud；　and　sometimes　on　that　of　mere　mistake　or　misinformation。　　　Again；　when　the　legitimacy　of　inflicting　punishment　is　admitted；　how　many　conflicting　conceptions　of　justice　come　to　light　in　discussing　the　proper　apportionment　of　punishments　to　offences。　No　rule　on　the　subject　recommends　itself　so　strongly　to　the　primitive　and　spontaneous　sentiment　of　justice；　as　the　bex　talionis；　an　eye　for　an　eye　and　a　tooth　for　a　tooth。　Though　this　principle　of　the　Jewish　and　of　the　Mahometan　law　has　been　generally　abandoned　in　Europe　as　a　practical　maxim；　there　is；　I　suspect；　in　most　minds；　a　secret　hankering　after　it；　and　when　retribution　accidentally　falls　on　an　offender　in　that　precise　shape；　the　general　feeling　of　satisfaction　evinced　bears　witness　how　natural　is　the　sentiment　to　which　this　repayment　in　kind　is　acceptable。　With　many；　the　test　of　justice　in　penal　infliction　is　that　the　punishment　should　be　proportioned　to　the　offence；　meaning　that　it　should　be　exactly　measured　by　the　moral　guilt　of　the　culprit　（whatever　be　their　standard　for　measuring　moral　guilt）：　the　consideration；　what　amount　of　punishment　is　necessary　to　deter　from　the　offence；　having　nothing　to　do　with　the　question　of　justice；　in　their　estimation：　while　there　are　others　to　whom　that　consideration　is　all　in　all；　who　maintain　that　it　is　not　just；　at　least　for　man；　to　inflict　on　a　fellow　creature；　whatever　may　be　his　offences；　any　amount　of　suffering　beyond　the　least　that　will　suffice　to　prevent　him　from　repeating；　and　others　from　imitating；　his　misconduct。　　　To　take　another　example　from　a　subject　already　once　referred　to。　In　a　co…operative　industrial　association；　is　it　just　or　not　that　talent　or　skill　should　give　a　title　to　superior　remuneration？　On　the　negative　side　of　the　question　it　is　argued；　that　whoever　does　the　best　he　can；　deserves　equally　well；　and　ought　not　in　justice　to　be　put　in　a　position　of　inferiority　for　no　fault　of　his　own；　that　superior　abilities　have　already　advantages　more　than　enough；　in　the　admiration　they　excite；　the　personal　influence　they　command；　and　the　internal　sources　of　satisfaction　attending　them；　without　adding　to　these　a　superior　share　of　the　world's　goods；　and　that　society　is　bound　in　justice　rather　to　make　compensation　to　the　less　favoured；　for　this　unmerited　inequality　of　advantages；　than　to　aggravate　it。　On　the　contrary　side　it　is　contended；　that　society　receives　more　from　the　more　efficient　labourer；　that　his　services　being　more　useful；　society　owes　him　a　larger　return　for　them；　that　a　greater　share　of　the　joint　result　is　actually　his　work；　and　not　to　allow　his　claim　to　it　is　a　kind　of　robbery；　that　if　he　is　only　to　receive　as　much　as　others；　he　can　only　be　justly　required　to　produce　as　much；　and　to　give　a　smaller　amount　of　time　and　exertion；　proportioned　to　his　superior　efficiency。　Who　shall　decide　between　these　appeals　to　conflicting　principles　of　justice？　justice　has　in　this　case　two　sides　to　it；　which　it　is　impossible　to　bring　into　harmony；　and　the　two　disputants　have　chosen　opposite　sides；　the　one　looks　to　what　it　is　just　that　the　individual　should　receive；　the　other　to　what　it　is　just　that　the　community　should　give。　Each；　from　his　own　point　of　view；　is　unanswerable；　and　any　choice　between　them；　on　grounds　of　justice；　must　be　perfectly　arbitrary。　Social　utility　alone　can　decide　the　preference。　　　How　many；　again；　and　how　irreconcilable；　are　the　standards　of　justice　to　which　reference　is　made　in　discussing　the　repartition　of　taxation。　One　opinion　is；　that　payment　to　the　State　should　be　in　numerical　proportion　to　pecuniary　means。　Others　think　that　justice　dictates　what　they　term　graduated　taxation；　taking　a　higher　percentage　from　those　who　have　more　to　spare。　In　point　of　natural　justice　a　strong　case　might　be　made　for　disregarding　means　altogether；　and　taking　the　same　absolute　sum　（whenever　it　could　be　got）　from　every　one：　as　the　subscribers　to　a　mess；　or　to　a　club；　all　pay　the　same　sum　for　the　same　privileges；　whether　they　can　all　equally　afford　it　or　not。　Since　the　protection　（it　might　be　said）　of　law　and　government　is　afforded　to；　and　is　equally　required　by　all；　there　is　no　injustice　in　making　all　buy　it　at　the　same　price。　It　is　reckoned　justice；　not　injustice；　that　a　dealer　should　charge　to　all　customers　the　same　price　for　the　same　article；　not　a　price　varying　according　to　their　means　of　payment。　This　doctrine；　as　applied　to　taxation；　finds　no　advocates；　because　it　conflicts　so　strongly　with　man's　feelings　of　humanity　and　of　social　expediency；　but　the　principle　of　justice　which　it　invokes　is　as　true　and　as　binding　as　those　which　can　be　appealed　to　against　it。　Accordingly　it　exerts　a　tacit　influence　on　the　line　of　defence　employed　for　other　modes　of　assessing　taxation。　People　feel　obliged　to　argue　that　the　State　does　more　for　the　rich　than　for　the　poor；　as　a　justification　for　its　taking　more　from　them：　though　this　is　in　reality　not　true；　for　the　rich　would　be　far　better　able　to　protect　themselves；　in　the　absence　of　law　or　government；　than　the　poor；　and　indeed　would　probably　be　successful　in　converting　the　poor　into　their　slaves。　Others；　again；　so　far　defer　to　the　same　conception　of　justice；　as　to　maintain　that　all　should　pay　an　equal　capitation　tax　for　the　protection　of　their　persons　（these　being　of　equal　value　to　all）；　and　an　unequal　tax　for　the　protection　of　their　property；　which　is　unequal。　To　this　others　reply；　that　the　all　of　one　man　is　as　valuable　to　him　as　the　all　of　another。　From　these　confusions　there　is　no　other　mode　of　extrication　than　the　utilitarian。

　　Is；　then　the　difference　between　the　just　and　the　Expedient　a　merely　imaginary　distinction？　Have　mankind　been　under　a　delusion　in　thinking　that　justice　is　a　more　sacred　thing　than　policy；　and　that　the　latter　ought　only　to　be　listened　to　after　the　former　has　been　satisfied？　By　no　means。　The　exposition　we　have　given　of　the　nature　and　origin　of　the　sentiment；　recognises　a　real　distinction；　and　no　one　of　those　who　profess　the　most　sublime　contempt　for　the　consequences　of　actions　as　an　element　in　their　morality；　attaches　more　importance　to　the　distinction　than　I　do。　While　I　dispute　the　pretensions　of　any　theory　which　sets　up　an　imaginary　standard　of　justice　not　grounded　on　utility；　I　account　the　justice　which　is　grounded　on　utility　to　be　the　chief　part；　and　incomparably　the　most　sacred　and　binding　part；　of　all　morality。　justice　is　a　name　for　certain　classes　of　moral　rules；　which　concern　the　essentials　of　human　well…being　more　nearly；　and　are　therefore　of　more　absolute　obligation；　than　any　other　rules　for　the　guidance　of　life；　and　the　notion　which　we　have　found　to　be　of　the　essence　of　the　idea　of　justice；　that　of　a　right　residing　in　an　individual　implies　and　testifies　to　this　more　binding　obligation。　　　The　moral　rules　which　forbid　mankind　to　hurt　one　another　（in　which　we　must　never　forget　to　include　wrongful　interference　with　each　other's　freedom）　are　more　vital　to　human　well…being　than　any　maxims；　however　important；　which　only　point　out　the　best　mode　of　managing　some　department　of　human　affairs。　They　have　also　the　peculiarity；　that　they　are　the　main　element　in　determining　the　whole　of　the　social　feelings　of　mankind。　It　is　their　observance　which　alone　preserves　peace　among　human　beings：　if　obedience　to　them　were　not　the　rule；　and　disobedience　the　exception；　every　one　would　see　in　every　one　else　an　enemy；　against　whom　he　must　be　perpetually　guarding　himself。　What　is　hardly　less　important；　these　are　the　precepts　which　mankind　have　the　strongest　and　the　most　direct　inducements　for　impressing　upon　one　another。　By　merely　giving　to　each　other　prudential　instruction　or　exhortation；　they　may　gain；　or　think　they　gain；　nothing：　in　inculcating　on　each　other　the　duty　of　positive　beneficence　they　have　an　unmistakable　interest；　but　far　less　in　degree：　a　person　may　possibly　not　need　the　benefits　of　others；　but　he　always　needs　that　they　should　not　do　him　hurt。　Thus　the　moralities　which　protect　every　individual　from　being　harmed　by　others；　either　directly　or　by　being　hindered　in　his　freedom　of　pursuing　his　own　good；　are　at　once　those　which　he　himself　has　most　at　heart；　and　those　which　he　has　the　strongest　interest　in　publishing　and　enforcing　by　word　and　deed。　It　is　by　a　person's　observance　of　these　that　his　fitness　to　exist　as　one　of　the　fellowship　of　human　beings　is　tested　and　decided；　for　on　that　depends　his　being　a　nuisance　or　not　to　those　with　whom　he　is　in　contact。　Now　it　is　these　moralities　primarily　which　compose　the　obligations　of　justice。　The　most　marked　cases　of　injustice；　and　those　which　give　the　tone　to　the　feeling　of　repugnance　which　characterises　the　sentiment；　are　acts　of　wrongful　aggression；　or　wrongful　exercise　of　power　over　some　one；　the　next　are　those　which　consist　in　wrongfully　withholding　from　him　something　which　is　his　due；　in　both　cases；　inflicting　on　him　a　positive　hurt；　either　in　the　form　of　direct　suffering；　or　of　the　privation　of　some　good　which　he　had　reasonable　ground；　either　of　a　physical　or　of　a　social　kind；　for　counting　upon。　　　The　same　powerful　motives　which　command　the　observance　of　these　primary　moralities；　enjoin　the　punis