introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第4章

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　　The　deduction　of　the　division　of　a　system　is　the　proof　of　its

completeness　as　well　as　of　its　continuity；　so　that　there　may　be　a

logical　transition　from　the　general　conception　divided　to　the

members　of　the　division；　and　through　the　whole　series　of　the

subdivisions　without　any　break　or　leap　in　the　arrangement　（divisio　per

saltum）。　Such　a　division　is　one　of　the　most　difficult　conditions　for

the　architect　of　a　system　to　fulfil。　There　is　even　some　doubt　as　to

what　is　the　highest　conception　that　is　primarily　divided　into　right

and　wrong　（aut　fas　aut　nefas）。　It　is　assuredly　the　conception　of　the

activity　of　the　free…will　in　general。　In　like　manner；　the　expounders

of　ontology　start　from　something　and　nothing；　without　perceiving

that　these　are　already　members　of　a　division　for　which　the　highest

divided　conception　is　awanting；　and　which　can　be　no　other　than　that　of

thing　in　general。





　　　　　IV。　GENERAL　PRELIMINARY　CONCEPTIONS　DEFINED　AND　EXPLAINED。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Philosophia　practica　universalis）。



　　The　conception　of　freedom　is　a　conception　of　pure　reason。　It　is

therefore　transcendent　in　so　far　as　regards　theoretical　philosophy；

for　it　is　a　conception　for　which　no　corresponding　instance　or

example　can　be　found　or　supplied　in　any　possible　experience。

Accordingly　freedom　is　not　presented　as　an　object　of　any　theoretical

knowledge　that　is　possible　for　us。　It　is　in　no　respect　a　constitutive；

but　only　a　regulative　conception；　and　it　can　be　accepted　by　the

speculative　reason　as　at　most　a　merely　negative　principle。　In　the

practical　sphere　of　reason；　however；　the　reality　of　freedom　may　be

demonstrated　by　certain　practical　principles　which；　as　laws；　prove　a

causality　of　the　pure　reason　in　the　process　of　determining　the

activity　of　the　will　that　is　independent　of　all　empirical　and　sensible

conditions。　And　thus　there　is　established　the　fact　of　a　pure　will

existing　in　us　as　the　source　of　all　moral　conceptions　and　laws。

　　On　this　positive　conception　of　freedom　in　the　practical　relation

certain　unconditional　practical　laws　are　founded；　and　they　specially

constitute　moral　laws。　In　relation　to　us　as　human　beings；　with　an

activity　of　will　modified　by　sensible　influences　so　as　not　to　be

conformable　to　the　pure　will；　but　as　often　contrary　to　it；　these

laws　appear　as　imperatives　commanding　or　prohibiting　certain

actions；　and　as　such　they　are　categorical　or　unconditional

imperatives。　Their　categorical　and　unconditional　character

distinguishes　them　from　the　technical　imperatives　which　express　the

prescriptions　of　art；　and　which　always　command　only　conditionally。

According　to　these　categorical　imperatives；　certain　actions　are

allowed　or　disallowed　as　being　morally　possible　or　impossible；　and

certain　of　them　or　their　opposites　are　morally　necessary　and

obligatory。　Hence；　in　reference　to　such　actions；　there　arises　the

conception　of　a　duty　whose　observance　or　transgression　is

accompanied　with　a　pleasure　or　pain　of　a　peculiar　kind；　known　as　moral

feeling。　We　do　not；　however；　take　the　moral　feelings　or　sentiments

into　account　in　considering　the　practical　laws　of　reason。　For　they

do　not　form　the　foundation　or　principle　of　practical　laws　of　reason；

but　only　the　subjective　effects　that　arise　in　the　mind　on　the　occasion

of　our　voluntary　activity　being　determined　by　these　laws。　And　while

they　neither　add　to　nor　take　from　the　objective　validity　or

influence　of　the　moral　laws　in　the　judgement　of　reason；　such

sentiments　may　vary　according　to　the　differences　of　the　individuals

who　experience　them。

　　The　following　conceptions　are　common　to　jurisprudence　and　ethics

as　the　two　main　divisions　of　the　metaphysic　of　morals。

　　Obligation　is　the　necessity　of　a　free　action　when　viewed　in　relation

to　a　categorical　imperative　of　reason。　An　imperative　is　a　practical

rule　by　which　an　action；　otherwise　contingent　in　itself；　is　made

necessary。　It　is　distinguished　from　a　practical　law　in　that　such　a

law；　while　likewise　representing　the　action　as　necessary；　does　not

consider　whether　it　is　internally　necessary　as　involved　in　the

nature　of　the　agent…　say　as　a　holy　being…　or　is　contingent　to　him；

as　in　the　case　of　man　as　we　find　him；　for　where　the　first　condition

holds　good；　there　is　in　fact　no　imperative。　Hence　an　imperative　is　a

rule　which　not　only　represents　but　makes　a　subjectively　contingent

action　necessary；　and　it；　accordingly；　represents　the　subject　as　being

（morally）　necessitated　to　act　in　accordance　with　this　rule。　A

categorical　or　unconditional　imperative　is　one　which　does　not

represent　the　action　in　any　way　immediately　through　the　conception

of　an　end　that　is　to　be　attained　by　it；　but　it　presents　the　action

to　the　mind　as　objectively　necessary　by　the　mere　representation　of　its

form　as　an　action；　and　thus　makes　it　necessary。　Such　imperatives

cannot　be　put　forward　by　any　other　practical　science　than　that　which

prescribes　obligations；　and　it　is　only　the　science　of　morals　that　does

this。　All　other　imperatives　are　technical；　and　they　are　altogether

conditional。　The　ground　of　the　possibility　of　categorical

imperatives　lies　in　the　fact　that　they　refer　to　no　determination　of

the　activity　of　the　will　by　which　a　purpose　might　be　assigned　to　it；

but　solely　to　its　freedom。

　　Every　action　is　allowed　（licitum）　which　is　not　contrary　to

obligation；　and　this　freedom　not　being　limited　by　an　opposing

imperative；　constitutes　a　moral　right　as　a　warrant　or　title　of

action　（facultas　moralis）。　From　this　it　is　at　once　evident　what

actions　are　disallowed　or　illicit　（illicita）。

　　Duty　is　the　designation　of　any　action　to　which　anyone　is　bound　by　an

obligation。　It　is　therefore　the　subject…matter　of　all　obligation。　Duty

as　regards　the　action　concerned　may　be　one　and　the　same；　and　yet　we

may　be　bound　to　it　in　various　ways。

　　The　categorical　imperative；　as　expressing　an　obligation　in　respect

to　certain　actions；　is　a　morally　practical　law。　But　because　obligation

involves　not　merely　practical　necessity　expressed　in　a　law　as　such；

but　also　actual　necessitation；　the　categorical　imperative　is　a　law

either　of　command　or　prohibition；　according　as　the　doing　or　not

doing　of　an　action　is　represented　as　a　duty。　An　action　which　is

neither　commanded　nor　forbidden　is　merely　allowed；　because　there　is　no

law　restricting　freedom；　nor　any　duty　in　respect　of　it。　Such　an　action

is　said　to　be　morally　indifferent　（indifferens；　adiaphoron；　res

merae　facultatis）。　It　may　be　asked　whether　there　are　such　morally

indifferent　actions；　and　if　there　are；　whether　in　addition　to　the

preceptive　and　prohibitive　law　（lex　praeceptiva　et　prohibitiva；　lex

mandati　et　vetiti）；　there　is　also　required　a　permissive　law　（lex

permissiva）；　in　order　that　one　may　be　free　in　such　relations　to　act；

or　to　forbear　from　acting；　at　his　pleasure？　If　it　were　so；　the　moral

right　in　question　would　not；　in　all　cases；　refer　to　actions　that　are

indifferent　in　themselves　（adiaphora）；　for　no　special　law　would　be

required　to　establish　such　a　right；　considered　according　to　moral

laws。

　　An　action　is　called　an　act…　or　moral　deed…　in　so　far　as　it　is

subject　to　laws　of　obligation；　and　consequently　in　so　far　as　the

subject　of　it　is　regarded　with　reference　to　the　freedom　of　his

choice　in　the　exercise　of　his　will。　The　agent…　as　the　actor　or　doer　of

the　deed…　is　regarded　as；　through　the　act；　the　author　of　its　effect；

and　this　effect；　along　with　the　action　itself；　may　be　imputed　to

him；　if　be　previously　knew　the　law　in　virtue　of　which　an　obligation

rested　upon　him。

　　A　person　is　a　subject　who　is　capable　of　having　his　actions　imputed

to　him。　Moral　personality　is；　therefore；　nothing　but　the　freedom　of

a　rational　being　under　moral　laws；　and　it　is　to　be　distinguished

from　psychological　freedom　as　the　mere　faculty　by　which　we　become

conscious　of　ourselves　in　different　states　of　the　identity　of　our

existence。　Hence　it　follows　that　a　person　is　properly　subject　to　no

other　laws　than　those　he　lays　down　for　himself；　either　alone　or　in

conjunction　with　others。

　　A　thing　is　what　is　incapable　of　being　the　subject　of　imputation。

Every　object　of　the　free　activity　of　the　will；　which　is　itself　void　of

freedom；　is　therefore　called　a　thing　（res　corporealis）。

　　Right　or　wrong　applies；　as　a　general　quality；　to　an　act　（rectum

aut　minus　rectum）；　in　so　far　as　it　is　in　accordance　with　duty　or

contrary　to　duty　（factum　licitum　aut　illicitum）；　no　matter　what　may　be

the　subject　or　origin　of　the　duty　itself。　An　act　that　is　contrary　to

duty　is　called　a　transgression　（reatus）。

　　An　unintentional　transgression　of　a　duty；　which　is；　nevertheless；

imputable　to　a　person；　is　called　a　mere　fault　（culpa）。　An

intentional　transgression…　that　is；　an　act　accompanied　with　the

consciousness　that　it　is　a　transgression…　constitutes　a　crime　（dolus）。

　　Whatever　is　juridically　in　accordance　with　external　laws　is　said

to　be　just　（jus；　instum）；　and　whatever　is　not　juridically　in

accordance　with　external　laws　is　unjust　（unjustum）。

　　A　collision　of　duties　or　obligations　（collisio　officiorum　s。

obligationum）　would　be　the　result　of　such　a　relation　between　them　that

the　one　would　annul　the　other；　in　whole　or　in　part。　Duty　and

obligation；　however；　are　conceptions　which　express　the　objective

practical　necessity　of　certain　actions；　and　two　opposite　rules

cannot　be　objective　and　necessary　at　the　same　time；　for　if　it　is　a

duty　to　act　according　to　one　of　them；　it　is　not　only　no　duty　to　act

according　to　an　opposite　rule；　but　to　do　so　would　even　be　contrary

to　duty。　Hence　a　collision　of　duties　and　obligations　is　entirely

inconceivable　（obligationes　non　colliduntur）。　There　may；　however；　be

two　grounds　of　obligation　（rationes　obligandi）；　connected　with　an

individual　under　a　rule　prescribed　for　himself；　and　yet　neither　the

one　nor　the　other　may　be　sufficient　to　constitute　an　actual　obligation

（rationes　obligandi　non　obligantes）；　and　in　that　case　the　one　of

them　is　not　a　duty。　If　two　such　grounds　of　obligation　are　actually

in　collision　with　each　other；　practical　philosophy　does　not　say　that

the　stronger　obligation　is　to　keep　the　upper　hand　（fortior　obligatio

vincit）；　but　that　the　stronger　ground　of　obligation　is　to　maintain　its

place　（fortior　obligandi　ratio　vincit）。

　　Obligatory　Laws　for　which　an　external　legislation　is　possible　are

called　generally　external　laws。　Those　external　laws；　the

obligatoriness　of　which　can　be　recognised　by　reason　a　priori　even

without　an　external　legislation；　are　called　natural　laws。　Those

laws；　again；　which　are　not　obligatory　without　actual　external

legislation；　are　called　positive　laws。　An　external　legislation；

containing　pure　natural　laws；　is　therefore　conceivable；　but　in　that

case　a　previous　natural　law　must　be　presupposed　to　establish　the

authority　of　the　lawgiver　by　the　right　to　subject　others　to　obligation

through　his　own　act　of　will。

　　The　principle　which　makes　a　certain　action　a　duty　is　a　practical

law。　The　rule　of　the　agent