introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第3章

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an　opposite　course；　when　adjusting　beforehand　the　equilibrium　of　a

partial　balance　in　the　sphere　of　practical　judgement；　in　order　thereby

to　secure　the　decision　of　this　judgement；　according　to　the　due

weight　of　the　a　priori　principles　of　a　pure　practical　reason。



　　*This　holds　notwithstanding　the　fact　that　the　term　morals；〃　in　Latin

mores；　and　in　German　sitten；　signifies　originally　only　manners　or　mode

of　life。



　　Metaphysics　designates　any　system　of　knowledge　a　priori　that

consists　of　pure　conceptions。　Accordingly；　a　practical　philosophy

not　having　nature；　but　the　freedom　of　the　will　for　its　object；　will

presuppose　and　require　a　metaphysic　of　morals。　It　is　even　a　duty　to

have　such　a　metaphysic；　and　every　man　does；　indeed；　possess　it　in

himself；　although　commonly　but　in　an　obscure　way。　For　how　could　any

one　believe　that　he　has　a　source　of　universal　law　in　himself；

without　principles　a　priori？　And　just　as　in　a　metaphysics　of　nature

there　must　be　principles　regulating　the　application　of　the　universal

supreme　principles　of　nature　to　objects　of　experience；　so　there　cannot

but　be　such　principles　in　the　metaphysic　of　morals；　and　we　will

often　have　to　deal　objectively　with　the　particular　nature　of　man　as

known　only　by　experience；　in　order　to　show　in　it　the　consequences　of

these　universal　moral　principles。　But　this　mode　of　dealing　with

these　principles　in　their　particular　applications　will　in　no　way

detract　from　their　rational　purity；　or　throw　doubt　on　their　a　priori

origin。　In　other　words；　this　amounts　to　saying　that　a　metaphysic　of

morals　cannot　be　founded　on　anthropology　as　the　empirical　science　of

man；　but　may　be　applied　to　it。

　　The　counterpart　of　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　and　the　other　member　of

the　division　of　practical　philosophy；　would　be　a　moral　anthropology；

as　the　empirical　science　of　the　moral　nature　of　man。　This　science

would　contain　only　the　subjective　conditions　that　hinder　or　favor

the　realization　in　practice　of　the　universal　moral　laws　in　human

nature；　with　the　means　of　propagating；　spreading；　and　strengthening

the　moral　principles…　as　by　the　education　of　the　young　and　the

instruction　of　the　people…　and　all　other　such　doctrines　and　precepts

founded　upon　experience　and　indispensable　in　themselves；　although　they

must　neither　precede　the　metaphysical　investigation　of　the

principles　of　reason；　nor　be　mixed　up　with　it。　For；　by　doing　so；　there

would　be　a　great　danger　of　laying　down　false；　or　at　least　very

flexible　moral　laws；　which　would　hold　forth　as　unattainable　what　is

not　attached　only　because　the　law　has　not　been　comprehended　and

presented　in　its　purity；　in　which　also　its　strength　consists。　Or；

otherwise；　spurious　and　mixed　motives　might　be　adopted　instead　of　what

is　dutiful　and　good　in　itself；　and　these　would　furnish　no　certain

moral　principles　either　for　the　guidance　of　the　judgement　or　for　the

discipline　of　the　heart　in　the　practice　of　duty。　It　is　only　by　pure

reason；　therefore；　that　duty　can　and　must　be　prescribed。

　　The　higher　division　of　philosophy；　under　which　the　division　just

mentioned　stands；　is　into　theoretical　philosophy　and　practical

philosophy。　Practical　philosophy　is　just　moral　philosophy　in　its

widest　sense；　as　has　been　explained　elsewhere。*　All　that　is

practicable　and　possible；　according　to　natural　laws；　is　the　special

subject　of　the　activity　of　art；　and　its　precepts　and　rules　entirely

depend　on　the　theory　of　nature。　It　is　only　what　is　practicable

according　to　laws　of　freedom　that　can　have　principles　independent　of

theory；　for　there　is　no　theory　in　relation　to　what　passes　beyond　the

determinations　of　nature。　Philosophy　therefore　cannot　embrace　under

its　practical　division　a　technical　theory；　but　only　a　morally

practical　doctrine。　But　if　the　dexterity　of　the　will　in　acting

according　to　laws　of　freedom；　in　contradistinction　to　nature；　were

to　be　also　called　an　art；　it　would　necessarily　indicate　an　art　which

would　make　a　system　of　freedom　possible　like　the　system　of　nature。

This　would　truly　be　a　Divine　art；　if　we　were　in　a　position　by　means　of

it　to　realize　completely　what　reason　prescribes　to　us；　and　to　put

the　idea　into　practice。



　　*In　the　Critique　of　Judgement　（1790）。





　　　　　　　　　III。　THE　DIVISION　OF　A　METAPHYSIC　OF　MORALS。



　　All　legislation；　whether　relating　to　internal　or　external　action；

and　whether　prescribed　a　priori　by　mere　reason　or　laid　down　by　the

will　of　another；　involves　two　elements：　First；　a　law　which

represents　the　action　that　ought　to　happen　as　necessary　objectively；

thus　making　the　action　a　duty；　second；　a　motive　which　connects　the

principle　determining　the　will　to　this　action　with　the　mental

representation　of　the　law　subjectively；　so　that　the　law　makes　duty　the

motive　of　the　action。　By　the　first　element；　the　action　is

represented　as　a　duty；　in　accordance　with　the　mere　theoretical

knowledge　of　the　possibility　of　determining　the　activity　of　the　will

by　practical　rules。　By　the　second　element；　the　obligation　so　to　act　is

connected　in　the　subject　with　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　as

such。　All　legislation；　therefore；　may　be　differentiated　by　reference

to　its　motive…principle。*　The　legislation　which　makes　an　action　a

duty；　and　this　duty　at　the　same　time　a　motive；　is　ethical。　That

legislation　which　does　not　include　the　motive…principle　in　the　law；

and　consequently　admits　another　motive　than　the　idea　of　duty　itself；

is　juridical。　In　respect　of　the　latter；　it　is　evident　that　the　motives

distinct　from　the　idea　of　duty；　to　which　it　may　refer；　must　be　drawn

from　the　subjective　（pathological）　influences　of　inclination　and　of

aversion；　determining　the　voluntary　activity；　and　especially　from

the　latter；　because　it　is　a　legislation　which　has　to　be　compulsory；

and　not　merely　a　mode　of　attracting　or　persuading。　The　agreement　or

non…agreement　of　an　action　with　the　law；　without　reference　to　its

motive；　is　its　legality；　and　that　character　of　the　action　in　which　the

idea　of　duty　arising　from　the　law　at　the　same　time　forms　the　motive　of

the　action；　is　its　morality。



　　*This　ground　of　division　will　apply；　although　the　action　which　it

makes　a　duty　may　coincide　with　another　action　that　may　be　otherwise

looked　at　from　another　point　of　view。　For　instance；　actions　may　in　all

cases　be　classified　as　external。



　　Duties　specially　in　accord　with　a　juridical　legislation　can　only

be　external　duties。　For　this　mode　of　legislation　does　not　require　that

the　idea　of　the　duty；　which　is　internal；　shall　be　of　itself　the

determining　principle　of　the　act　of　will；　and　as　it　requires　a

motive　suitable　to　the　nature　of　its　laws；　it　can　only　connect　what　is

external　with　the　law。　Ethical　legislation；　on　the　other　hand；　makes

internal　actions　also　duties；　but　not　to　the　exclusion　of　the

external；　for　it　embraces　everything　which　is　of　the　nature　of　duty。

And　just　because　just　because　ethical　legislation　includes　within

its　law　the　internal　motive　of　the　action　as　contained　in　the　idea

of　duty；　it　involves　a　characteristic　which　cannot　at　all　enter　into

the　legislation　that　is　external。　Hence；　ethical　legislation　cannot　as

such　be　external；　not　even　when　proceeding　from　a　Divine　will；

although　it　may　receive　duties　which　rest　on　an　external　legislation

as　duties；　into　the　position　of　motives；　within　its　own　legislation。

　　From　what　has　been　said；　it　is　evident　that　all　duties；　merely

because　they　are　duties；　belong　to　ethics；　and　yet　the　legislation

upon　which　they　are　founded　is　not　on　that　account　in　all　cases

contained　in　ethics。　On　the　contrary；　the　law　of　many　of　them　lies

outside　of　ethics。　Thus　ethics　commands　that　I　must　fulfil　a　promise

entered　into　by　contract；　although　the　other　party　might　not　be　able

to　compel　me　to　do　so。　It　adopts　the　law　（pacta　sunt　servanda）　and　the

duty　corresponding　to　it；　from　jurisprudence　or　the　science　of

right；　by　which　they　are　established。　It　is　not　in　ethics；

therefore；　but　in　jurisprudence；　that　the　principle　of　the　legislation

lies；　that　〃promises　made　and　accepted　must　be　kept。〃　Accordingly；

ethics　specially　teaches　that　if　the　motive…principle　of　external

compulsion　which　juridical　legislation　connects　with　a　duty　is　even

let　go；　the　idea　of　duty　alone　is　sufficient　of　itself　as　a　motive。

For　were　it　not　so；　and　were　the　legislation　itself　not　juridical；　and

consequently　the　duty　arising　from　it　not　specially　a　duty　of　right　as

distinguished　from　a　duty　of　virtue；　then　fidelity　in　the

performance　of　acts；　to　which　the　individual　may　be　bound　by　the　terms

of　a　contract；　would　have　to　be　classified　with　acts　of　benevolence

and　the　obligation　that　underlies　them；　which　cannot　be　correct。　To

keep　one's　promise　is　not　properly　a　duty　of　virtue；　but　a　duty　of

right；　and　the　performance　of　it　can　be　enforced　by　external

compulsion。　But　to　keep　one's　promise；　even　when　no　compulsion　can

be　applied　to　enforce　it；　is；　at　the　same　time；　a　virtuous　action；　and

a　proof　of　virtue。　jurisprudence　as　the　science　of　right；　and　ethics

as　the　science　of　virtue；　are　therefore　distinguished　not　so　much　by

their　different　duties；　as　rather　by　the　difference　Of　the　legislation

which　connects　the　one　or　the　other　kind　of　motive　with　their　laws。

　　Ethical　legislation　is　that　which　cannot　be　external；　although　the

duties　it　prescribes　may　be　external　as　well　as　internal。　Juridical

legislation　is　that　which　may　also　be　external。　Thus　it　is　an　external

duty　to　keep　a　promise　entered　into　by　contract；　but　the　injunction　to

do　this　merely　because　it　is　a　duty；　without　regard　to　any　other

motive；　belongs　exclusively　to　the　internal　legislation。　It　does　not

belong　thus　to　the　ethical　sphere　as　being　a　particular　kind　of　duty

or　a　particular　mode　of　action　to　which　we　are　bound…　for　it　is　an

external　duty　in　ethics　as　well　as　in　jurisprudence…　but　it　is　because

the　legislation　in　the　case　referred　to　is　internal；　and　cannot　have

an　external　lawgiver；　that　the　obligation　is　reckoned　as　belonging

to　ethics。　For　the　same　reason；　the　duties　of　benevolence；　although

they　are　external　duties　as　obligations　to　external　actions；　are；　in

like　manner；　reckoned　as　belonging　to　ethics；　because　they　can　only　be

enjoined　by　legislation　that　is　internal。　Ethics　has　no　doubt　its

own　peculiar　duties…　such　as　those　towards　oneself…　but　it　bas　also

duties　in　common　with　jurisprudence；　only　not　under　the　same　mode　of

obligation。　In　short；　the　peculiarity　of　ethical　legislation　is　to

enjoin　the　performance　of　certain　actions　merely　because　they　are

duties；　and　to　make　the　principle　of　duty　itself…　whatever　be　its

source　or　occasion…　the　sole　sufficing　motive　of　the　activity　of　the

will。　Thus；　then；　there　are　many　ethical　duties　that　are　directly

such；　and　the　inner　legislation　also　makes　the　others…　all　and　each　of

them…　indirectly　ethical。

　　The　deduction　of　the　division　of　a　system　is　the　proof　of　its

completeness　as　well　as　of　its　continuity；