science of logic-第40章

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and　causae　finalis；　between　merely　efficient　and　final　causes；　relates　to　this　distinction；　and　this
distinction；　taken　in　a　concrete　form；　is　also　made　the　criterion　for　deciding　whether　the　absolute
essence　of　the　world　is　to　be　conceived　as　blind　natural　mechanism　or　as　an　intelligence　that
determines　itself　in　accordance　with　ends。　The　antinomy　between　fatalism；　along　with
determinism　and　freedom；　is　likewise　concerned　with　the　opposition　of　mechanism　and
teleology；　for　the　free　is　the　Notion　in　its　Existence。

Earlier　metaphysics　has　treated　these　concepts　as　it　has　treated　others；　it　has　for　one　thing
presupposed　a　certain　conception　of　the　world　and　laboured　to　show　that　one　or　the　other
concept　fitted　it；　while　the　opposite　one　was　defective　because　it　failed　to　explain　that　conception；
and　again；　while　doing　this；　it　has　not　examined　the　concept　of　mechanical　cause　and　of　end；　to　see
which　possesses　truth　in　and　for　itself。　When　this　has　been　established　independently；　the
objective　world　may　present　us　with　mechanical　and　final　causes；　but　their　existence　is　not　the
standard　of　truth：　on　the　contrary；　truth　is　the　criterion　that　decides　which　of　these　existences　is
the　true　one。　just　as　the　subjective　understanding　also　exhibits　errors　in　itself；　so　the　objective
world　also　exhibits　aspects　and　stages　of　truth　that　by　themselves　are　still　one…sided；　incomplete
and　only　relationships　in　the　sphere　of　Appearance。　If　mechanism　and　purposiveness　stand
opposed　to　one　another；　they　cannot　for　that　very　reason　be　taken　as　indifferent　concepts；　each
of　which　is　correct　on　its　own　account；　possessing　as　much　validity　as　the　other；　the　only　question
being　where　one　or　the　other　may　be　applied。　This　equal　validity　of　both　rests　merely　on　the　fact
that　they　are；　that　is　to　say；　that　we　have　them　both。　But　since　they　are　opposed；　the　necessary
preliminary　question　is；　which　of　the　two　is　the　true　one；　and　the　higher　and　real　question　is；
whether　their　truth　is　not　a　third　concept；　or　whether　one　of　them　is　the　truth　of　the　other。
But　the　relation　of　end　has　proved　to　be　the　truth　of　mechanism　—　what　exhibited　itself　as
chemism　is　included　with　mechanism　in　so　far　as　end　is　the　Notion　in　free　Existence；　and　to　end
stands　opposed　in　general　the　unfreedom　of　the　Notion；　its　submergence　in　externality；　both　of
them；　therefore；　mechanism　and　chemism；　are　included　under　natural　necessity；　for　in　the　former
the　Notion　does　not　exist　in　the　object。　Since　the　object　as　mechanical　does　not　contain
self…determination；　while　in　chemism　the　Notion　either　has　a　one…sided　Existence　in　a　state　of
tension；　or；　in　emerging　as　the　unity　that　disjoins　the　neutral　object　into　tensed　extremes；　is　external
to　itself　in　so　far　as　it　sublates　this　disjunction。　

The　more　the　teleological　principle　was　linked　with　the　concept　of　an　extramundane　intelligence
and　to　that　extent　was　favoured　by　piety；　the　more　it　seemed　to　depart　from　the　true　investigation
of　nature；　which　aims　at　cognising　the　properties　of　nature　not　as　extraneous；　but　as　immanent
determinatenesses　and　accepts　only　such　cognition　as　a　valid　comprehension。　As　end　is　the
Notion　itself　in　its　Existence；　it　may　seem　strange　that　the　cognition　of　objects　from　their　Notion
appears　rather　as　an　unjustified　trespass　into　a　heterogeneous　element；　whereas　mechanism；　for
which　the　determinateness　of　an　object　is　a　determinateness　posited　in　it　externally　and　by　another
object；　is　held　to　be　a　more　immanent　point　of　view　than　teleology。　Of　course　mechanism；　at
least　the　ordinary　unfree　mechanism；　and　also　chemism。；　must　be　regarded　as　an　immanent
principle　in　so　far　as　the　external　determinant　is　itself　again　just　such　another　object；　externally
determined　and　indifferent　to　such　determining；　or；　in　the　case　of　chemism；　the　other　object　is　one
likewise　chemically　determined；　in　general；　an　essential　moment　of　the　totality　always　lies　in
something　outside　it。　These　principles　therefore　remain　confined　within　the　same　natural　form　of
finitude；　yet　though　they　do　not　seek　to　go　beyond　the　finite　and　lead　only　to　finite　causes　in　their
explanation　of　phenomena；　which　themselves　demand　a　further　progress；　at　the　same　time　they
expand　themselves；　partly　into　a　formal　totality　in　the　concept　of　force；　cause；　and　similar
determinations　of　reflection　which　are　supposed　to　denote　a　primariness；　and　partly　also　through
the　abstract　universality　of　a　sum　total　of　forces；　a　whole　of　reciprocal　causes。　Mechanism
shows　itself　to　be　a　striving　for　totality　in　the　fact　that　it　seeks　to　grasp　nature　by　itself　as　a　whole
that　for　its　Notion　does　not　require　any　other…a　totality　that　is　not　found　in　end　and　the
extra…mundane　intelligence　associated　with　it。

Now　purposiveness　shows　itself　in　the　first　instance　as　a　higher　being　in　general；　as　an
intelligence　that　externally　determines　the　multiplicity　of　objects　by　a　unity　that　exists　in　and　for
itself；　so　that　the　indifferent　determinatenesses　of　the　objects　become　essential　through　this
relation。　In　mechanism　they　become　so　through　the　mere　form　of　necessity；　their　content　being
indifferent；　for　they　are　supposed　to　remain　external；　and　it　is　only　understanding　as　such　that　is
supposed　to　find　satisfaction　in　cognising　its　own　connective　principle；　abstract　identity。　In
teleology；　on　the　contrary；　the　content　becomes　important；　for　teleology　presupposes　a　Notion；
something　absolutely　determined　and　therefore　self…determining；　and　so　has　made　a　distinction
between　the　relation　of　the　differences　and　their　reciprocal　determinedness；　that　is　the　form；　and
the　unity　that　is　reflected　into　itself；　a　unity　that　is　determined　in　and　for　itself　and　therefore
a　content。　But　when　the　content　is　otherwise　a　finite　and　insignificant　one；　it　contradicts　what　it　is
supposed　to　be；　for　end；　according　to　its　form；　is　a　totality　infinite　within　itself…especially　when
the　activity　that　operates　in　accordance　with　ends　is　assumed　to　be　an　absolute　will　and
intelligence。　The　reason　why　teleology　has　incurred　so　much　the　reproach　of　triviality　is　that　the
ends　that　it　exhibited　are　more　important　or　more　trivial；　as　the　case　may　be；　and　it　was　inevitable
that　the　end　relation　of　objects　should　so　often　appear　trifling；　since　it　appears　to　be　so　external
and　therefore　contingent。　Mechanism；　on　the　contrary；　leaves　to　the　determinatenesses　of　objects；
as　regards　their　import；　their　contingent　status；　to　which　the　object　is　indifferent；　and　these
determinatenesses　are　not　supposed　to　have；　either　for　the　objects　or　for　the　subjective
intelligence；　any　higher　validity。　This　principle；　therefore；　in　its　context　of　external　necessity　gives
the　consciousness　of　infinite　freedom　as　compared　with　teleology；　which　sets　up　for　something
absolute　what　is　trivial　and　even　contemptible　in　its　content；　in　which　the　more　universal　thought
can　only　find　itself　infinitely　cramped　and　even　feel　disgusted。

The　formal　disadvantage　from　which　this　teleology　immediately　suffers　is　that　it　only　goes　as　far　as
external　purpositeness。　The　Notion　being　thus　posited　as　something　formal；　then　for　such
teleology　the　content　is　also　something　that　for　the　Notion　is　given　externally　in　the　manifoldness　of
the　objective　world…in　those　very　determinatenesses　which　are　also　the　content　of　mechanism；　but
appearing　there　as　something　external　and　contingent。　On　account　of　this　community　of　content；　it
is　solely　the　form　of　purposiveness　by　itself　that　constitutes　what　is　essential　in　this　teleology。　In
this　respect；　without　as　yet　attending　to　the　difference　of　outer　and　inner　purposiveness；　the
end…relation　in　general　has　proved　itself　to　be　in　and　for　itself　the　truth　of　mechanism。　Teleology
possesses　in　general　the　higher　principle；　the　Notion　in　its　Existence；　which　is　in　and　for　itself　the
infinite　and　absolute…a　principle　of　freedom　that　in　the　utter　certainty　of　its　self…determination　is
absolutely　liberated　from　the　external　determining　of　mechanism。

One　of　Kant's　great　services　to　philosophy　consists　in　the　distinction　he　has　made　between　relative
or　external；　and　internal　purposiveness；　in　the　latter　he　has　opened　up　the　Notion　of　life；　the
Idea；　and　by　so　doing　has　done　positively　for　philosophy　what　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　did
but　imperfectly；　equivocally；　and　only　negatively；　namely；　raised　it　above　the　determinations　of
reflection　and　the　relative　world　of　metaphysics。　It　has　been　remarked　that　the　opposition　of
teleology　and　mechanism　is　in　the　first　instance　the　more　general　opposition　of　freedom　and
necessity。　Kant　has　exhibited　the　opposition　in　this　form　among　the　antinomies　of　reason；　namely；
as　the　third　conflict　of　the　transcendental　ideas。　His　exposition；　which　was　referred　to　earlier；　I
cite　quite　briefly；　as　the　gist　of　it　is　so　simple　as　to　require　no　detailed　analysis；　and　the　peculiar
features　of　the　Kantian　antinomies　have　been　elucidated　in　more　detail　elsewhere。
The　thesis　of　the　antinomy　here　to　be　considered　runs　thus：　Causality　according　to　natural　laws　is
not　the　sole　causality　from　which　the　phenomena　of　the　world　can　one　and　all　be　derived。　For　their
explanation　a　causality　through　freedom　must　be　assumed　as　well。
The　antithesis　is：　There　is　no　freedom；　but　everything　in　the　world　happens　solely　according　to
natural　laws。
As　in　the　case　of　the　other　antinomies；　the　proof　first　sets　to　work　apagogically；　the　opposite　of
each　thesis　being　assumed；　secondly　and　conversely　in　order　to　show　the　contradictory　nature　of
this　assumption；　its　opposite；　which　is　accordingly　the　proposition　to　be　proved；　is　assumed　and
presupposed　as　valid。　The　whole　roundabout　method　of　proof　could　therefore　be　spared；　the
proof　consists　in　nothing　but　the　assertorical　affirmation　of　the　two　opposed　propositions。
Thus　in　order　to　prove　the　thesis　we　have　first　to　assume　that　there　is　no　other　causality　than　that
according　to　natural　laws；　that　is；　according　to　the　necessity　of　mechanism　in　general；　including
chemism。　This　proposition　w　e　find　to　be　selfcontradictory；　because　we　take　natural　law　to　consist
just　in　this；　that　nothing　happens　without　a　cause　sufficiently　determined　a　priori；　which　cause
therefore　must　contain　an　absolute　spontaneity　within　itself；　that　is；　the　assumption　opposed　to　the
thesis　is　contradictory　because　it　contradicts　the　thesis。
In　order　to　prove　the　antithesis；　we　are　to　postulate　that　there　exists　a　freedom；　as　a　particular
kind　of　causality；　that　absolutely　initiates　a　state　of　things　and　therefore　also　a　series　of
consequences　of　that　state。　But　now；　since　such　a　beginning　presupposes　a　state　that　has　no
causal　connection　whatever　with　its　predecessor；　it　contradicts　the　law　of　causality　which　alone
makes　unity　of　experience；　and　experience　at　all；　possible；　in　other　words　the　assumption　of
freedom；　which　is　opposed　to　the　antithesis；　cannot　be　made　because　it　contradicts　the　antithesis。

What　is　essentially　the　same　antinomy　recurs　in　the　Critique　of　Teleological　judgment　as　the
opposition　between　the　assertion　that　all　production　of　material　things　takes　place　according
to　merely　mechanical　laws　and　the　assertion　that　some　cases　of　production　of　material　things
accordin