phenomenology of mind-第43章

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described　another　must　be　taken　in　hand　and　ever　sought；　so　as　not　to　put　a　stop　to　the　process　of
description。　If　it　is　no　longer　easy　to　find　new　and　whole　things；　then　there　is　nothing　for　it　but　to
turn　back　upon　those　already　found；　in　order　to　divide　them　still　further；　break　them　up　into
component　parts　and　look　out　for　any　new　aspects　of　thinghood　that　still　remain　in　them。　There
can　never　be　an　end　to　the　material　at　the　disposal　of　this　restlessly　active　instinct。　To　find　a　new
genus　of　distinctive　significance；　or　even　to　discover　a　new　planet；　which　although　an　individual
entity　yet　possesses　the　nature　of　a　universal；　can　only　fall　to　the　lot　of　those　who　are　lucky
enough。　But　the　boundary　line　of　what；　like　elephant；　oak；　gold；　is　markedly　distinctive；　the　line　of
demarcation　of　what　is　genus　and　species　passes　through　many　stages　into　the　endless
particularization　of　the　chaos　of　plants　and　animals；　kinds　of　rocks；　or　of　metals；　forms　of　earth；
etc。；　etc。；　that　only　force　and　craft　can　bring　to　light。　In　this　realm　where　universality　means
indeterminateness；　where　particularity　now　approximates　to　singleness；　and　again　at　this　point　and
that　even　descends　to　it　entirely；　there　is　offered　an　inexhaustible　supply　of　material　for　observation
and　description　to　deal　with。　Here；　where　a　boundless　field　is　opened　up；　at　the　boundary　line　of
the　universal　it　can　have　found　not　an　immeasurable　wealth；　but　instead；　merely　the　limitations　of
nature　and　of　its　own　operation。　It　can　no　longer　know　whether　what　seems　to　have　being　per　se
is　not　a　chance　accident。　What　bears　the　impress　of　a　confused　or　immature　feeble　structure；
barely　evolving　from　the　stage　of　elementary　indeterminateness；　cannot　claim　even　to　be
described。　

While　this　seeking　and　describing　seem　to　be　concerned　merely　with　things；　we　see　that　in　point　of
fact　it　does　not　continue　in　the　form　of　sense…perception。　Rather；　what　enables　things　to　be　known
is　more　important　for　description　than　the　range　of　sense　properties　still　left　over；　qualities　which；
of　course；　the　thing　itself　cannot　do　without；　but　which　consciousness　dispenses　with。　Through　this
distinction　into　what　is　essential　and　what　is　unessential；　the　notion　rises　out　of　the　dispersion　of
sensibility；　and　knowledge　thereby　makes　it　clear　that　it　has　to　do　at　least　quite　as　essentially　with
its　own　self　as　with　things。　This　twofold　essentiality　produces　a　certain　hesitation　as　to　whether
what　is　essential　and　necessary　for　knowledge　is　also　so　in　the　case　of　the　things。　On　the　one　hand；
the　qualifying　〃marks〃　have　merely　to　serve　the　purpose　of　knowledge　in　distinguishing　things　inter
se；　on　the　other　hand；　however；　it　is　not　the　unessential　quality　of　things　that　has　to　be　known；　but
that　feature　in　virtue　of　which　they　themselves　break　away　from　the　general　continuity　of　being　as　a
whole；　separate　themselves　from　others　and　stand　by　themselves。　The　distinguishing　〃marks〃　must
not　only　have　an　essential　relation　to　knowledge　but　also　be　the　essential　characteristics　of　the
things；　and　the　system　of　marks　devised　must　conform　to　the　system　of　nature　itself；　and　merely
express　this　system。　This　follows　necessarily　from　the　very　principle　and　meaning　of　reason；　and
the　instinct　of　reasonfor　it　operates　in　this　process　of　observation　merely　as　an　instincthas　also
in　its　systems　attained　this　unity；　a　unity　where　its　objects　are　so　constituted　that　they　carry　their
own　essential　reality　with　them；　involve　an　existence　on　their　own　account；　and　are　not　simply　an
incident　of　a　given　particular　time；　or　a　particular　place。　The　distinguishing　marks　of　animals；　for
example；　are　taken　from　their　claws　and　teeth；　for；　in　point　of　fact；　not　only　does　knowledge
distinguish　thus　one　animal　from　another；　but　each　animal　itself　separates　itself　off　thereby；　it
preserves　itself　independently　by　means　of　these　weapons；　and　keeps　itself　detached　from　the
universal　nature。　A　plant；　on　the　other　hand；　never　gets　the　length　of　existing　for　itself；　it　touches
merely　the　boundary　line　of　individuality。　This　line　is　where　plants　show　the　semblance　of
diremption　and　separation　by　the　possession　of　different　sex…characters；　this　furnishes；　therefore；
the　principle　for　distinguishing　plants　inter　se。　What；　however；　stands　on　a　still　lower　level　cannot
of　itself　any　longer　distinguish　itself　from　another；　it　gets　lost　when　the　contrast　comes　into　play。
Quiescent　being　and　being　in　a　relation　come　into　conflict　with　one　another；　a　〃thing〃　in　the　latter
case　is　something　different　from　a　〃thing〃　in　the　former　state；　whereas　the　〃individuum〃　consists　in
preserving　itself　in　relation　to　another。　What；　however；　is　incapable　of　this　and　becomes　in
chemical　fashion　something　other　than　it　is　empirically；　confuses　knowledge　and　gives　rise　to　the
same　doubt　as　to　whether　knowledge　is　to　hold　to　the　one　side　or　the　other；　since　the　thing　has
itself　no　self…consistency；　and　these　two　sides　fall　apart　within　it。　

In　those　systems　where　the　elements　involve　general　self…sameness；　this　character　connotes　at
once　the　self…sameness　of　knowledge　and　of　things　themselves　as　well。　But　this　expansion　of　these
self…identical　characteristics；　each　of　which　describes　undisturbed　the　entire　circuit　of　its　course
and　gets　full　scope　to　do　as　it　likes；　necessarily　leads　as　readily　to　its　very　opposite；　leads　to　the
confusion　of　these　characteristics。　For　the　qualifying　mark；　the　general　characteristic　is　the　unity　of
opposite　factors；　viz。　of　what　is　determinate；　and　of　what　is　per　se　universal。　It　must；　therefore；
break　asunder　into　this　opposition。　If；　now；　on　one　side　the　characteristic　overmasters　the
universality　in　which　its　essence　lies；　on　the　other　side；　again；　this　universality　equally　keeps　that
characteristic　under　control；　forces　the　latter　on　to　its　boundary　line；　and　there　mingles　together　its
distinctions　and　its　essential　constituents。　Observation　which　kept　them　apart　in　orderly　fashion；
and　thought　it　had　hold　there　of　something　stable　and　fixed；　finds　the　principles　overlapping　and
dominating　one　another；　sees　confusions　formed　and　transitions　made　from　one　to　another；　here　it
finds　united　what　it　took　at　first　to　be　absolutely　separated；　and　there　separated　what　it　considered
connected。　Hence；　when　observation　thus　holds　by　the　unbroken　self…sameness　of　being；　it　has
here；　just　in　the　most　general　determinations　given…e。g。　in　the　case　of　the　essential　marks　of　an
animal　or　a　plant…to　see　itself　tormented　with　instances；　which　rob　it　of　every　determination；　silence
the　universality　it　reached；　and　reduce　it　again　to　unreflective　observation　and　description。　

Observation；　which　confines　itself　in　this　way　to　what　is　simple；　or　restricts　the　sensuously
dispersed　elements　by　the　universal；　thus　finds　its　principle　confused　by　its　object；　because　what　is
determined　must　by　its　very　nature　get　lost　in　its　opposite。　Reason；　therefore；　must　pass　from　that
inert　characteristic　which　had　the　semblance　of　stability；　and　go　on　to　observe　it　as　it　really　is　in
truth；　viz。　as　relating　itself　to　its　opposite。　What　are　called　essential　marks　are　passive
characteristics；　which；　when　expressed　and　apprehended　as　simple；　do　not　bring　out　what
constitutes　their　real　naturewhich　is　to　be　vanishing　moments　of　its　process　of　withdrawing　and
betaking　itself　into　itself。　Since　the　instinct　of　reason　now　arrives　at　the　point　of　looking　for　the
characteristic　in　the　light　of　its　true　naturethat　of　essentially　passing　over　into　its　opposite　and　not
existing　apart　by　itself　and　for　its　own　sakeit　seeks　after　the　Law　and　the　notion　of　law。　It　seeks
for　them；　moreover；　as　existing　reality；　but　this　feature　of　concrete　reality　will　in　point　of　fact
disappear　before　reason；　and　the　aspects　of　the　law　will　become　for　it　mere　moments　or
abstractions；　so　that　the　law　comes　to　light　in　the　nature　of　the　notion；　which　has　destroyed　within
itself　the　indifferent　subsistence　of　sensuous　reality。　

To　the　consciousness　observing；　the　truth　of　the　law　is　given　in　〃experience〃；　in　the　way　that　sense
existence　is　object　for　consciousness；　the　truth　is　not　given　in　and　itself。　If；　however；　the　law　does
not　have　its　truth　for　in　the　notion；　it　is　something　contingent；　not　a　necessity；　in　fact；　not　a　law。　But
its　being　essentially　in　the　form　of　a　notion　does　not　merely　not　contradict　its　being　present　for
observation　to　deal　with；　but　really　gives　it　on　that　account　necessary　existence；　and　makes　it　an
object　for　observation。　The　universal　in　the　sense　of　a　rational　universality　is　also　universal　in　the
sense　implied　in　the　above　notion：　its　being　is　for　consciousness；　it　presents　itself　there　as　the　real；
the　objective　present；　the　notion　sets　itself　forth　in　the　form　of　thinghood　and　sensuous　existence。
But　it　does　not；　on　that　account；　lose　its　nature　and　fall　into　the　condition　of　immovable　subsisting
passivity；　or　mere　adventitious　（gleichgültig）　succession。　What　is　universally　valid　is　also
universally　effective：　what　ought　to　be；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　is　too；　and　what　merely　should　be；　and
is　not；　has　no　real　truth。　The　instinct　of　reason　is　entirely　within　its　rights　when　it　stands　firm　on　this
point；　and　refuses　to　be　led　astray　by　entia　intellectus　which　merely　ought　to　be　and；　qua　ought；
should　be　allowed　to　have　truth　even　though　they　are　to　be　met　with　nowhere　in　experience；　and
declines　to　be　turned　aside　by　the　hypothetical　suggestions　and　all　the　other　impalpable　unrealities
designed　in　the　interest　of　an　everlasting　〃ought　to　be〃　which　never　is。　（1）　For　reason　is　just　this
certainty　of　having　reality；　and　what　consciousness　is　not　aware　of　as　a　real　self　（Selbstwesen）；　i。e。
what　does　not　appear；　is　nothing　for　consciousness　at　all。　

The　true　nature　of　law；　viz。：　that　it　essentially　is　reality；　no　doubt　again　assumes　for　consciousness
which　remains　at　the　level　of　observation；　the　form　of　an　opposite　over　against　the　notion　and　the
inherently　universal；　in　other　words；　this　consciousness　does　not　take　such　an　object　as　its　law　to
be　a　reality　of　reason；　it　thinks　it　has　got　there　something　external　and　foreign。　But　it　contradicts　its
own　idea　by　actually　and　in　fact　not　taking　its　universality　to　mean　that　all　individual　things　of　sense
must　have　given　evidence　of　the　law　to　enable　the　truth　of　the　law　to　be　asserted。　The　assertion
that　stones；　when　raised　from　the　ground　and　lot　go；　fall；　does　not　at　all　require　us　to　make　the
experiment　with　all　stones。　It　means　most　likely　that　this　experiment　must　have　been　tried　at　least
with　a　good　many；　and　from　that　we　can　by　analogy　draw　an　inference　about　the　rest　with　the
greatest　probability　or　with　perfect　right。　Yet　analogy　not　only　gives　no　perfect　right；　but；　on
account　of　its　nature；　contradicts　itself　so　often　that　the　inference　to　be　drawn　from　analogy　itself
rather　is　that　analogy　does　not　permit　an　inference　to　be　drawn。　Probability；　which　is　what　analogy
would　come　to；　loses；　when　face　to　face　with　truth；　every　distinction　of　less　and　greater；　be　the
probability　as　great　as　it　may　it　is　nothing　as　against　truth。　The　instinct　of　reason；　however；　takes；
as　a　matter　of　fact；　laws　of　that　sort　for　truth。