phenomenology of mind-第42章

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reality；　of　being　both　itself　and　its　object。　

Its　first　declaration　is　merely　this　abstract；　empty　phrase　that　everything　is　its　own。　For　the
certainty　of　being　all　reality　is　to　begin　with　the　pure　category。　Reason　knowing　itself　in　this　sense
in　its　object　is　what　finds　expression　in　abstract　empty　idealism；　（6）　it　merely　takes　reason　as
reason　appears　at　first；　and　by　its　pointing　out　that　in　all　being　there　is　this　bare　consciousness　of　a
〃mine〃；　and　by　expressing　things　as　sensations　or　ideas；　it　fancies　it　has　shown　that　abstract　mine〃
of　consciousness　to　be　complete　reality。　It　is　bound；　therefore；　to　be　at　the　same　time　absolute
Empiricism；　because；　for　the　filling　of　this　empty　〃mine〃　；　i。e。　for　the　element　of　distinction　and　all
the　further　development　and　embodiment　of　it；　its　reason　needs　an　impact　（Anstoss）　operating
from　without；　in　which　lies　the　fons　et　origo　of　the　multiplicity　of　sensations　or　ideas。　This　kind　of
idealism　is　thus　just　such　a　self…contradictory　equivocation　as　scepticism；　only；　while　the　latter
expresses　itself　negatively；　the　f　ormer　does　so　in　a　positive　way。　But　it　fails　just　as　completely　as
scepticism　to　link　up　its　contradictory　statements　about　pure　consciousness　being　all　reality；　while
all　the　time　the　alien　impact；　or　sense…impressions　and　ideas；　are　equally　reality。　It　oscillates　hither
and　thither　from　one　to　the　other　and　tumbles　into　the　false；　or　the　sensuous；　infinite。　（7）　Since
reason　is　all　reality　in　the　sense　of　the　abstract　〃mine〃；　and　the　〃other〃　is　an　externality　indifferent　to
it；　there　is　here　affirmed　just　that　sort　of　knowledge　of　an　〃other〃　on　the　part　of　reason；　which　we
met　with　before　in　the　form　of　〃intending〃　or　meaning〃　（Meinen）；　（8）　〃perceiving〃；　and
〃understanding〃；　which　grasps　what　is　〃meant〃　and　what　is　〃perceived〃。　Such　a　kind　of　knowledge
is　at　the　same　time　asserted　by　the　very　principle　of　this　idealism　itself　not　to　be　true　knowledge；
for　only　the　unity　of　apperception　is　the　real　truth　of　knowledge。　Pure　reason　as　conceived　by　this
idealism；　if　it　is　to　get　at　this　〃other〃　which　is　essential　to　it；　i。e。　really　is　per　se；　but　which　it　does
not　possess　in　itself　—　is　thus　thrown　back　on　that　knowledge　which　is　not　a　knowledge　of　the　real
truth。　It　thus　condemns　itself　knowingly　and　voluntarily　to　being　an　untrue　kind　of　knowledge；　and
cannot　get　away　from　〃meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　which　for　it　have　no　truth　at　all。　It　falls　into　a
direct　contradiction；　it　asserts　that　the　real　has　a　twofold　nature；　consists　of　elements　in　sheer
opposition；　is　the　unity　of　apperception　and　a　〃thing〃　as　well；　whether　a　thing　is　called　an　alien
impact；　or　an　empirical　entity；　or　sensibility；　or　the　〃thing　in　itself〃；　it　remains　in　principle　precisely
the　same；　viz。　something　external　and　foreign　to　that　unity。　

This　idealism　falls　into　such　a　contradiction　because　it　asserts　the　abstract　notion　of　reason　to　be
the　truth。　Consequently　reality　comes　directly　before　it　just　as　much　in　a　form　which　is　not　strictly
the　reality　of　reason　at　all；　whereas　reason　all　the　while　is　intended　to　be　all　reality。　Reason
remains；　in　this　case；　a　restless　search；　which　in　its　very　process　of　seeking　declares　that　it　is　utterly
impossible　to　have　the　satisfaction　of　finding。　But　actual　concrete　reason　is　not　so　inconsequent　as
this。　Being　at　first　merely　the　certainty　that　it　is　all　reality；　it　is　in　this　notion　well　aware　that　qua
certainty　qua　ego　it　is　not　yet　in　truth　all　reality；　and　thus　reason　is　driven　on　to　raise　its　formal
certainty　into　actual　truth；　and　give　concrete　filling　to　the　empty　〃mine〃。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　Cp。　Hegel's　Hist。　Of　Philos。；　pt。　2；　§　3；　Introd。　And　C：　pt。　3；　Introd。　Philos。　Of　Hist。；　pt。　4；　§
3；　c。　3　ad　fin。　

2。　Cp。　Naturphilos。；　W。W。；　vii。　1。　§　246；　Logik；　W。W。；　v。　

3。　Cp。　Fichte；　Grundlage　d。　Gesam。　Wissenschaftslehre。　

4。　V。　sup。　P。　154　ff。　

5。　This　refers　to　Kant's　〃discovery〃　of　his　〃table　of　categories〃。　

6。　Fichte；　Berkeley。　

7。　Cp。　Wiss。　D。　Logik；　Pt。　I；　p。　253　ff。　

8。　V。　sup。　P。　154　ff。　




A
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Observation　as　a　Process　of　Reason

THIS　consciousness；　which　takes　being　to　mean　what　is　its　own；　now　seems；　indeed；　to　adopt
once　again　the　attitude　of　〃meaning〃　（1）　and　〃perceiving〃；　but　not　in　the　sense　that　it　is　certain　of
what　is　a　mere　〃other〃　；　but　in　the　sense　that　it　is　certain　of　this　〃other〃　being　itself。　Formerly；
consciousness　merely　happened　to　perceive　various　elements　in　the　〃thing〃；　and　had　a　certain
experience　in　so　doing。　But　here　it　itself　settles　the　observations　to　be　made　and　the　experience　to
be　had。　〃Meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　which　formerly　were　superseded　so　far　as　we　were
concerned　（für　uns）；　are　now　superseded　by　consciousness　in　its　own　behalf　（für　es）。　Reason
sets　out　to　know　the　truth；　to　find　in　the　form　of　a　notion　what；　for　〃meaning〃　and　〃perceiving〃；　is　a
〃thing〃；　i。e。　it　seeks　in　thinghood　to　have　merely　the　consciousness　of　its　own　self。　Reason　has；
therefore；　now　a　universal　interest　in　the　world；　because　it　is　certain　of　its　presence　in　the　world；　or
is　certain　that　the　actual　present　is　rational。　It　seeks　its　〃other〃；　while　knowing　that　it　there
possesses　nothing　else　but　itself：　it　seeks　merely　its　own　infinitude。　

While；　at　first；　merely　surmising　that　it　is　in　the　world　of　reality；　or　knowing　this　only　in　a　general
way　to　be　its　own；　it　goes　forward　on　this　understanding　and　appropriates　everywhere　and　at　all
points　its　own　assured　possession。　It　plants　the　symbol　of　its　sovereignty　on　the　heights　and　in　the
depths　of　reality。　But　this　superficial　〃mine〃　is　not　its　final　and　supreme　interest。　The　joy　of　universal
appropriation　finds　still　in　its　property　the　alien　other　which　abstract　reason　does　not　contain　within
itself。　Reason　has　the　presentiment　of　being　a　deeper　reality　than　pure　ego　is；　and　must　demand
that　difference；　the　manifold　diversity　of　being；　should　itself　become　its　very　own；　that　the　ego
should　look　at　and　see　itself　as　concrete　reality；　and　find　itself　present　in　objectively　embodied
form　and　in　the　shape　of　a　〃thing〃。　But　if　reason　probes　and　gropes　through　the　inmost　recesses　of
the　life　of　things；　and　opens　their　every　vein　so　that　reason　itself　may　gush　out　of　them；　then　it　will
not　achieve　this　desired　result；　it　must；　for　its　purpose；　have　first　brought　about　in　itself　its　own
completion　in　order　to　be　able　after　that　to　experience　what　its　completion　means。　

Consciousness　〃observes〃；　i。e。　reason　wants　to　find　and　to　have　itself　in　the　form　of　existent
object；　to　be；　in　concrete　sensuously…present　form。　The　consciousness　thus　observing　fancies
（meint）；　and；　indeed；　says　that　it　wants　to　discover　not　itself；　but；　on　the　contrary；　the　inner　being
of　things　qua　things。　That　this　consciousness　〃means〃　this　and　says　so；　lies　in　the　fact　that　it　is
reason；　but　reason　as　such　is　for　it　not　as　yet　object。　

If　it　were　to　know　reason　to　be　equally　and　at　once　the　essence　of　things　and　of　itself；　and　knew
that　reason　can　only　be　actually　present　in　consciousness　in　the　form　and　shape　peculiarly
appropriate　to　reason；　then　it　would　descend　into　the　depths　of　its　own　being；　and　seek　reason
there　rather　than　in　things。　If　it　had　found　reason　there；　it　would　again　turn　from　that　and　be
directed　upon　concrete　reality；　in　order　to　see　therein　its　own　sensuous　expression；　but　would；　at
the　same　time；　take　that　sensuous　form　to　be　essentially　a　notion。　

Reason；　as　it　immediately　appears　in　the　form　of　conscious　certainty　of　being　all　reality；　takes　its
reality　in　the　sense　of　immediacy　of　being；　and　also　takes　the　unity　of　ego　with　this　objective
existence　in　the　sense　of　an　immediate　unity；　a　unity　in　which　it　（reason）　has　not　yet　separated　and
then　again　united　the　moment　of　being　and　ego；　or；　in　other　words；　a　unity　which　reason　has　not
yet　come　to　understand。　It；　therefore；　when　appearing　as　conscious　observation；　turns　to　things
with　the　idea　that　it　is　really　taking　them　as　sensuous　things　opposed　to　the　ego。　But　its　actual
procedure　contradicts　this　idea；　for　it　knows　things；　it　transforms　their　sensuous　character　into
conceptions；　i。e。　just　into　a　kind　of　being　which　at　the　same　time　is　ego；　it　transforms　thought　into
an　existent　thought；　or　being　into　a　thought…constituted　being；　and；　in　fact；　asserts　that　things　have
truth　merely　as　conceptions。　In　this　process；　it　is　only　what　the　things　are　that　consciousness　in
observation　becomes　aware　of；　we；　however　＇who　are　tracing　the　nature　of　this　experience＇；
become　aware　of　what　conscious　observation　itself　is。　The　outcome　of　its　process；　however；　will
be　that　this　consciousness　becomes　aware　of　being　for　itself　what　it　is　in　itself　＇i。e。　becomes　aware
of　being　to　itself　what；　in　the　meantime；　it　is　to　us＇。　

We　have　to　consider　the　operation　of　this　observational　phase　of　reason　in　all　the　various　moments
of　its　activity。　It　takes　up　this　attitude　towards　Nature；　Mind；　and　finally　towards　the　relation　of
both　in　the　form　of　sense…existence；　and　in　all　these　it　seeks　to　find　itself　as　a　definitely　existing
concrete　actuality。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　v。　p。　154　ff。　




a　（1）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Observation　of　Nature

WHEN　the　unreflective　consciousness　speaks　of　observation　and　experience　as　being　the　fountain
of　truth；　the　phrase　may　possibly　sound　as　if　the　whole　business　were　a　matter　of　tasting；　smelling；
feeling；　hearing；　and　seeing。　It　forgets；　in　its　zeal　for　tasting；　smelling；　etc。；　to　say　that；　in　point　of
fact；　it　has　really　and　rationally　determined　for　itself　already　the　object　thus　sensuously
apprehended；　and　this　determination　of　the　object　is　at　least　as　important　for　it　as　that
apprehension。　It　will　also　as　readily　admit　that　its　whole　concern　is　not　simply　a　matter　of
perceiving；　and　will　not　allow；　e。g；。　the　perception　that　this　penknife　lies　beside　this　snuff…box　to
pass　for　an　〃observation〃。　What　is　perceived　should；　at　least；　have　the　significance　of　a　universal；
and　not　of　a　sensuous　particular　〃this〃。　

The　universal；　here　regarded；　is；　only　in　the　first　instance；　what　remains　identical　with　itself；　its
movement　is　merely　the　uniform　recurrence　of　the　same　operation。　The　consciousness；　which　thus
far　finds　in　the　object　merely　universality　or　the　abstract　〃mine〃；　must　take　upon　itself　the
movement　peculiar　to　the　object；　and；　since　it　is　not　yet　at　the　stage　of　understanding　that　object；　it
must；　at　least；　be　the　recollection　of　it；　a　recollection　which　expresses　in　a　universal　way　what；　in
actual　fact；　is　merely　present　in　a　particular　form。　This　superficial　way　of　educing　from　particularity；
and　the　equally　superficial　form　of　universality　into　which　the　sense　element　is　merely　taken　up；
without　the　sense　element　having　in　itself　become　a　universalthis　description　of　things　is　not　as　yet
a　process　effected　in　the　object　itself。　The　process　really　takes　place　solely　in　the　function　of
describing。　The　object　as　it　is　described　has　consequently　lost　interest；　when　one　object　is　being
described　another　must　be　taken　in　hand　and　ever　sought；　so　as　not　to　put　a　stop　to　the　process　of
description。　If　it　is　no　longer　easy　to　find　new　a