phenomenology of mind-第3章
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Translator's comments： In this section we have the second form in which rational experience
is realized。 In 〃observation〃 mind is directly aware of itself as in conscious unity with its
object： it makes no effort of its own to realize this unity： it finds the unity by looking on；
so to say。 But it may have the same experience by creating through its own effort an
object constituted and determined solely by its self。 Here it does not find the unity of itself
and its object； it makes the object at one with itself by moulding the character and content
of the object after its own nature。 As contrasted with observation； which may be called the
operation of 〃theoretical〃 reason； this new way of having a rational experience may be
called the operation of 〃practical〃 reason。 In the first we have reason in the form of
knowledge and science； in the second； reason in the sense of rational action and practice。
It is this second way of establishing the experience of reason which is analysed in the
following sections。 The immediately succeeding section describes the experience in its
general features。 We have here the sphere of conscious purpose and the foundation of
moral and social life。
a。 Pleasure and Necessity
Translator's comments： The succeeding three sections discuss the procedure of one…sided
subjective individualism — the attempt to realize the individual and yet not transcend the
particular individuality。 The first thought of self…consciousness when it seeks to realize or
objectify itself as a mere individual is to make the objective element return directly to itself
and bring a sense of increase of its own individual being or private Pleasure。 This is all its
interest in the practical realization of its purposes。 But the realization of purposes is an
expression of the life of reason； and reason means universality and systematic connexion
of the content realized。 Hence to seek solely private satisfaction or pleasure by a process
which is inherently universal is a contradiction in terms。 This contradiction the individual
discovers in the shape of a sharp and painful contrast between its private feeling of
individuation on the one hand and a network of universal connexion on the other…the
contrast between 〃pleasure〃 and 〃necessity〃。 Both fall within the individual's experience as
a rational agent； and hence this necessity is his own necessity as much as the pleasure is
his own pleasure。 In the opposition between these factors there is no question as to which
must triumph； and which must surrender。
This is the type of experience analysed in the following section。 It is an experience that
constantly recurs in the life…history of most if not all human beings at one stage or another
in their development。 The analysis contained in this section is indirectly a searching
criticism of Hedonism in all its forms。
b。 The law of the heart； and the frenzy of self…conceit
Translator's comments： The following section is an analysis of the mood of moral
Sentimentalism。 It is a mood of all times and appears in many forms； but about Hegel's
time it became prominent in the Romantic school and was frankly adopted as a practical
attitude by certain of its representatives。 Perhaps one of the most remarkable historic
examples of sentimentalism was Rousseau； to whom so much in the romantic movement
may be traced。 In the literature of Hegel's time； and indeed in all literature； no more
perfect type of sentimentalism can be found than Goethe's Werther。 With such instances as
these in our minds the succeeding analysis requires neither explanation nor comment。
c。 Virtue and the course of the world
C。 Individuality
a。 Self…contained individuals associated as a community of animals
and the deception thence arising： the real fact
Translator's comments： The title of this section sounds unfamiliar； but the purpose of the
analysis is plain； and the argument is essential as a stage in the unfolding of what rational
self…contained individuality implies。 It also； with the immediately succeeding sections；
prepares the way for the constructive interpretation of organized society。 Indeed； without
individuals constituted as rational self…conscious units； each self…contained； a free
self…conscious community could not exist。 They form the component separate cells of the
〃organism〃 of a society； the elements out of which the compact structure of a society is
made。 In the first instance and as an abstract aspect of associated life； they can be
regarded； and for certain purposes are in fact regarded； as merely distinct and detached
units living together。 Each functions as an individuality； endowed with certain powers and
capacities for self…expression； pursuing his ends for his own interest； spontaneously
putting forth his energies without being clearly aware of or concerned with any universal
result which his essentially universal nature must bring about。 In realizing his individuality
he goes out of himself in one sense； in another sense he does not。 By expressing himself
he carries out some 〃end〃 in which he has an 〃interest〃； he〃does〃something： he does a
deed or a 〃work〃； which qua mere action is nothing more than a mode of purposed
self…expression； and is not； as such； either good or bad （at this stage）。 What he does
appears as external to himself； but is his own all the while； something which he has
formed and in which he specifically is interested。 Such a result at once objective； framed by
himself and reflecting his interest； is 〃fact〃 as distinct from 〃thing〃 （which is an object of
perception at the level of consciousness； not of self…consciousness）。 But by the nature of
the case he can distinguish within this fact what is the real 〃intent〃 （die Sache Selbst） he
has in mind from the merely objective character of the fact （Sache）； he can； if we may put
it so； distinguish the 〃fact of the matter〃 from mere 〃matter of fact〃。 But other individuals
with whom he is associated and who are similarly constituted； carry on the same process of
separate self…expression。 Each is 〃honest〃 and 〃honourable〃 in so doing： each is
concerned with his own 〃real intent〃 and his own 〃fact〃。 By this association they necessarily
are interrelated and intercommunicate。 But communication on such a basis leads to
misconception； transference of intent； and 〃deception〃 of each other as well as of
themselves。 Work； deeds； facts have a universal character as well as a particular nature： in
the former aspect they cannot be one's own； in the latter aspect they cannot be another's：
yet both aspects are inseparable。 Intercommunication between these individuals thus
inevitably leads to contradiction。 It implies a common universal nature between the
individuals： but such universality at this stage is implicit not explicit。 The contradiction
inherent at this level between the elements in the situation created by individuals merely
coexisting together without a conscious common purpose controlling and guiding all； points
the way and compels an advance to another stage in the evolution of rational individuality。
When self…conscious individuals are regarded as merely 〃together〃； as coexisting without
consciously controlling common purposes； they resemble a community or herd of animals。
Hence the title of the Section。
It is not an accidental but an essential aspect of the life of society； it is indeed the
indispensable basis of community which is in one respect like a community of ants； the
system of activity of its component individuals； though each may and does fulfil his
purpose as his own private interest。
This aspect of social existence can be over…emphasized and may be regarded at times as
the sole nature of society。 The result can only lead to confusion。 Such a conception of
society may perhaps be said to be found where； as in certain economic conceptions of
society； society is viewed as a herd of self…interested units each pursuing his own individual
ends。 It is also seen in certain historical forms of national polity which recur from time to
time。
（1） The Notion of Individuality as Real
（2） Actual Fact and Individuality
（3） Mutual Deception and Spiritual Substance
b。 Reason as lawgiver
Translator's comments： The next step in the development of individuality is to bring out the
universal conditions of its co…existence with other individualities。 This it can do because it
is complete in itself； and is essentially self…conscious reason。 These conditions are many；
because of the diversity of its own content and of the relations in which it stands； and are
yet the conditions of individuality which is one and single。 Hence their plurality never
implies a separation； the conditions limit each other's operation and their precise
operation must be determined。
These； then； are the two stages in determining the general conditions or laws of
co…existence of individuality： （1） the enunciation of different laws by and for rational
individuality； （2） the relation of these laws inter se； and to the single principle from which
they all proceed。 Both stages owe their existence to the activity of reason。 Reason
promulgates laws； and criticizes； tests the validity of； the laws。
Hence the two following sections。
c。 Reason as test of laws
（BB）。 Spirit
VI。 Spirit
Translator's comments： In the preceding section there is analysed the attempt on the part
of individuality to operate as its own legislator and judge of laws holding for individuals。
Individuality may claim the privilege of enunciating laws universal in character but having
their source and inspiration solely in the single individual。 Such laws can at best only be
regulative and cannot be constitutive of the substance of individuality； for the substance of
individuality necessarily involves other individuals within it。 In short individuality is itself
only realized as a part of a concrete whole of individuals： its life is drawn from common life
in and with
