democracy in america-1-第52章

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means　of　maintaining　its　influence　than　upon　the　means　of　improving　its　condition。

When；　on　the　contrary；　the　people　is　invested　with　the　supreme　authority；　the　perpetual　sense　of　their　own　miseries　impels　the　rulers　of　society　to　seek　for　perpetual　ameliorations。　　A　thousand　different　objects　are　subjected　to　improvement；　the　most　trivial　details　are　sought　out　as　susceptible　of　amendment；　and　those　changes　which　are　accompanied　with　considerable　expense　are　more　especially　advocated；　since　the　object　is　to　render　the　condition　of　the　poor　more　tolerable；　who　cannot　pay　for　themselves。　

Moreover；　all　democratic　communities　are　agitated　by　an　ill…　defined　excitement　and　by　a　kind　of　feverish　impatience；　that　engender　a　multitude　of　innovations；　almost　all　of　which　are　attended　with　expense。

In　monarchies　and　aristocracies　the　natural　taste　which　the　rulers　have　for　power　and　for　renown　is　stimulated　by　the　promptings　of　ambition；　and　they　are　frequently　incited　by　these　temptations　to　very　costly　undertakings。　In　democracies；　where　the　rulers　labor　under　privations；　they　can　only　be　courted　by　such　means　as　improve　their　well…being；　and　these　improvements　cannot　take　place　without　a　sacrifice　of　money。　　When　a　people　begins　to　reflect　upon　its　situation；　it　discovers　a　multitude　of　wants　to　which　it　had　not　before　been　subject；　and　to　satisfy　these　exigencies　recourse　must　be　had　to　the　coffers　of　the　State。　　Hence　it　arises　that　the　public　charges　increase　in　proportion　as　civilization　spreads；　and　that　imposts　are　augmented　as　knowledge　pervades　the　community。

The　last　cause　which　frequently　renders　a　democratic　government　dearer　than　any　other　is；　that　a　democracy　does　not　always　succeed　in　moderating　its　expenditure；　because　it　does　not　understand　the　art　of　being　economical。　　As　the　designs　which　it　entertains　are　frequently　changed；　and　the　agents　of　those　designs　are　still　more　frequently　removed；　its　undertakings　are　often　ill　conducted　or　left　unfinished：　in　the　former　case　the　State　spends　sums　out　of　all　proportion　to　the　end　which　it　proposes　to　accomplish；　in　the　second；　the　expense　itself　is　unprofitable。　*f　

＇Footnote　f：　The　gross　receipts　of　the　Treasury　of　the　United　States　in　1832　were　about　28；000；000；　in　1870　they　had　risen　to　411；000；000。　　The　gross　expenditure　in　1832　was　30；000；000；　in　1870；　309；000；000。＇

Tendencies　Of　The　American　Democracy　As　Regards　The　Salaries　Of　Public　Officers

In　the　democracies　those　who　establish　high　salaries　have　no　chance　of　profiting　by　them　…　Tendency　of　the　American　democracy　to　increase　the　salaries　of　subordinate　officers　and　to　lower　those　of　the　more　important　functionaries　…　Reason　of　this　…　Comparative　statement　of　the　salaries　of　public　officers　in　the　United　States　and　in　France。

There　is　a　powerful　reason　which　usually　induces　democracies　to　economize　upon　the　salaries　of　public　officers。　　As　the　number　of　citizens　who　dispense　the　remuneration　is　extremely　large　in　democratic　countries；　so　the　number　of　persons　who　can　hope　to　be　benefited　by　the　receipt　of　it　is　comparatively　small。　　In　aristocratic　countries；　on　the　contrary；　the　individuals　who　fix　high　salaries　have　almost　always　a　vague　hope　of　profiting　by　them。　　These　appointments　may　be　looked　upon　as　a　capital　which　they　create　for　their　own　use；　or　at　least　as　a　resource　for　their　children。

It　must；　however；　be　allowed　that　a　democratic　State　is　most　parsimonious　towards　its　principal　agents。　　In　America　the　secondary　officers　are　much　better　paid；　and　the　dignitaries　of　the　administration　much　worse；　than　they　are　elsewhere。

These　opposite　effects　result　from　the　same　cause；　the　people　fixes　the　salaries　of　the　public　officers　in　both　cases；　and　the　scale　of　remuneration　is　determined　by　the　consideration　of　its　own　wants。　　It　is　held　to　be　fair　that　the　servants　of　the　public　should　be　placed　in　the　same　easy　circumstances　as　the　public　itself；　*g　but　when　the　question　turns　upon　the　salaries　of　the　great　officers　of　State；　this　rule　fails；　and　chance　alone　can　guide　the　popular　decision。　　The　poor　have　no　adequate　conception　of　the　wants　which　the　higher　classes　of　society　may　feel。　　The　sum　which　is　scanty　to　the　rich　appears　enormous　to　the　poor　man　whose　wants　do　not　extend　beyond　the　necessaries　of　life；　and　in　his　estimation　the　Governor　of　a　State；　with　his　twelve　or　fifteen　hundred　dollars　a　year；　is　a　very　fortunate　and　enviable　being。　*h　If　you　undertake　to　convince　him　that　the　representative　of　a　great　people　ought　to　be　able　to　maintain　some　show　of　splendor　in　the　eyes　of　foreign　nations；　he　will　perhaps　assent　to　your　meaning；　but　when　he　reflects　on　his　own　humble　dwelling；　and　on　the　hard…　earned　produce　of　his　wearisome　toil；　he　remembers　all　that　he　could　do　with　a　salary　which　you　say　is　insufficient；　and　he　is　startled　or　almost　frightened　at　the　sight　of　such　uncommon　wealth。　　Besides；　the　secondary　public　officer　is　almost　on　a　level　with　the　people；　whilst　the　others　are　raised　above　it。　　The　former　may　therefore　excite　his　interest；　but　the　latter　begins　to　arouse　his　envy。

＇Footnote　g：　The　easy　circumstances　in　which　secondary　functionaries　are　placed　in　the　United　States　result　also　from　another　cause；　which　is　independent　of　the　general　tendencies　of　democracy；　every　kind　of　private　business　is　very　lucrative；　and　the　State　would　not　be　served　at　all　if　it　did　not　pay　its　servants。　　The　country　is　in　the　position　of　a　commercial　undertaking；　which　is　obliged　to　sustain　an　expensive　competition；　notwithstanding　its　tastes　for　economy。＇

＇Footnote　h：　The　State　of　Ohio；　which　contains　a　million　of　inhabitants；　gives　its　Governor　a　salary　of　only　1；200　a　year。＇　

This　is　very　clearly　seen　in　the　United　States；　where　the　salaries　seem　to　decrease　as　the　authority　of　those　who　receive　them　augments　*i

＇Footnote　i：　To　render　this　assertion　perfectly　evident；　it　will　suffice　to　examine　the　scale　of　salaries　of　the　agents　of　the　Federal　Government。　　I　have　added　the　salaries　attached　to　the　corresponding　officers　in　France　under　the　constitutional　monarchy　to　complete　the　comparison。

　　　　United　States　　　　　Treasury　Department　Messenger　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　　700　Clerk　with　lowest　salary　。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　1；000　Clerk　with　highest　salary　。。。。。。。。。。。。　　1；600　Chief　Clerk　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　2；000　Secretary　of　State　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　　6；000　The　President　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　25；000

France　Ministere　des　Finances　Hussier　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。　1；500　fr。　Clerk　with　lowest　salary；　　1；000　to　1；800　fr。　Clerk　with　highest　salary　　3；200　to　8；600　fr。　Secretaire…general　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。20；000　fr。　The　Minister　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。80；000　fr。　The　King　。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。12；000；000　fr。

I　have　perhaps　done　wrong　in　selecting　France　as　my　standard　of　comparison。　　In　France　the　democratic　tendencies　of　the　nation　exercise　an　ever…increasing　influence　upon　the　Government；　and　the　Chambers　show　a　disposition　to　raise　the　low　salaries　and　to　lower　the　principal　ones。　　Thus；　the　Minister　of　Finance；　who　received　160；000　fr。　under　the　Empire；　receives　80；000　fr。　in　1835：　the　Directeurs…generaux　of　Finance；　who　then　received　50；000　fr。　now　receive　only　20；000　fr。　　＇This　comparison　is　based　on　the　state　of　things　existing　in　France　and　the　United　States　in　1831。　　It　has　since　materially　altered　in　both　countries；　but　not　so　much　as　to　impugn　the　truth　of　the　author's　observation。＇＇

Under　the　rule　of　an　aristocracy　it　frequently　happens；　on　the　contrary；　that　whilst　the　high　officers　are　receiving　munificent　salaries；　the　inferior　ones　have　not　more　than　enough　to　procure　the　necessaries　of　life。　　The　reason　of　this　fact　is　easily　discoverable　from　causes　very　analogous　to　those　to　which　I　have　just　alluded。　　If　a　democracy　is　unable　to　conceive　the　pleasures　of　the　rich　or　to　witness　them　without　envy；　an　aristocracy　is　slow　to　understand；　or；　to　speak　more　correctly；　is　unacquainted　with；　the　privations　of　the　poor。　　The　poor　man　is　not　（if　we　use　the　term　aright）　the　fellow　of　the　rich　one；　but　he　is　a　being　of　another　species。　　An　aristocracy　is　therefore　apt　to　care　but　little　for　the　fate　of　its　subordinate　agents；　and　their　salaries　are　only　raised　when　they　refuse　to　perform　their　service　for　too　scanty　a　remuneration。

It　is　the　parsimonious　conduct　of　democracy　towards　its　principal　officers　which　has　countenanced　a　supposition　of　far　more　economical　propensities　than　any　which　it　really　possesses。　　It　is　true　that　it　scarcely　allows　the　means　of　honorable　subsistence　to　the　individuals　who　conduct　its　affairs；　but　enormous　sums　are　lavished　to　meet　the　exigencies　or　to　facilitate　the　enjoyments　of　the　people。　*j　The　money　raised　by　taxation　may　be　better　employed；　but　it　is　not　saved。　　In　general；　democracy　gives　largely　to　the　community；　and　very　sparingly　to　those　who　govern　it。　　The　reverse　is　the　case　in　aristocratic　countries；　where　the　money　of　the　State　is　expended　to　the　profit　of　the　persons　who　are　at　the　head　of　affairs。

＇Footnote　j：　See　the　American　budgets　for　the　cost　of　indigent　citizens　and　gratuitous　instruction。　　In　1831　250；000　were　spent　in　the　State　of　New　York　for　the　maintenance　of　the　poor；　and　at　least　1；000；000　were　devoted　to　gratuitous　instruction。　　（William's　〃New　York　Annual　Register；〃　1832；　pp。　205　and　243。）　The　State　of　New　York　contained　only　1；900；000　inhabitants　in　the　year　1830；　which　is　not　more　than　double　the　amount　of　population　in　the　Department　du　Nord　in　France。＇

Difficulty　of　Distinguishing　The　Causes　Which　Contribute　To　The　Economy　Of　The　American　Government

We　are　liable　to　frequent　errors　in　the　research　of　those　facts　which　exercise　a　serious　influence　upon　the　fate　of　mankind；　since　nothing　is　more　difficult　than　to　appreciate　their　real　value。　　One　people　is　naturally　inconsistent　and　enthusiastic；　another　is　sober　and　calculating；　and　these　characteristics　originate　in　their　physical　constitution　or　in　remote　causes　with　which　we　are　unacquainted。

These　are　nations　which　are　fond　of　parade　and　the　bustle　of　festivity；　and　which　do　not　regret　the　costly　gaieties　of　an　hour。　　Others；　on　the　contrary；　are　attached　to　more　retiring　pleasures；　and　seem　almost　ashamed　of　appearing　to　be　pleased。　　In　some　countries　the　highest　value　is　set　upon　the　beauty　of　public　edifices；　in　others　the　productions　of　art　are　treated　with　indifference；　and　everything　which　is　unproductive　is　looked　down　upon　with　contempt。　　In　some　renown；　in　others　money；　is　the　ruling　passion。

Independently　of　the　laws；　all　these　causes　concur　to　exercise　a　very　powerful　influence　upon　the　conduct　of　the　finances　of　the　State。　　If　the　Americans　never　spend　the　money　of　the　people　in　galas；　it　is　not　only　because　the　imposition　of　taxes　is　under　the　control　of　the　people；　but　because　the　people　takes　no　delight　in　public　rejoicings。　　If　they　repudiate　all　ornament　from　their　architecture；　and　set　no　store　on　any　but　the　more　practical　and　homely　advantages；　it　is　not　only　because　they　live　under　democratic　institutions；　but　because　they　are　a　commercial　nation。　　The　habits　of　private　life　are　continued　in　public；　and　we　ought　carefully　to　distinguish　that　economy　which　depends　upon　their　institutions　from