the commonwealth of oceana-第2章

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e　little　or　no　land；　as　Holland　and　Genoa；　the　balance　of　treasure　may　be　equal　to　that　of　land　in　the　cases　mentioned。　　　　　But　Leviathan；　though　he　seems　to　skew　at　antiquity；　following　his　furious　master　Carneades；　has　caught　hold　of　the　public　sword；　to　which　he　reduces　all　manner　and　matter　of　government；　as；　where　he　affirms　this　opinion　（that　any　monarch　receives　his　power　by　covenant；　that　is　to　say；　upon　conditions）〃　to　proceed　from　the　not　understanding　this　easy　truth；　that　covenants　being　but　words　and　breath；　have　no　power　to　oblige；　contain；　constrain；　or　protect　any　man；　but　what　they　have　from　the　public　sword。〃　But　as　he　said　of　the　law；　that　without　this　sword　it　is　but　paper；　so　he　might　have　thought　of　this　sword；　that　without　a　hand　it　is　but　cold　iron。　The　hand　which　holds　this　sword　is　the　militia　of　a　nation；　and　the　militia　of　a　nation　is　either　an　army　in　the　field；　or　ready　for　the　field　upon　occasion。　But　an　army　is　a　beast　that　has　a　great　belly；　and　must　be　fed：　wherefore　this　will　come　to　what　pastures　you　have；　and　what　pastures　you　have　will　come　to　the　balance　of　property；　without　which　the　public　sword　is　but　a　name　or　mere　spitfrog。　Wherefore；　to　set　that　which　Leviathan　says　of　arms　and　of　contracts　a　little　straighter；　he　that　can　graze　this　beast　with　the　great　belly；　as　the　Turk　does　his　Timariots；　may　well　deride　him　that　imagines　he　received　his　power　by　covenant；　or　is　obliged　to　any　such　toy。　It　being　in　this　case　only　that　covenants　are　but　words　and　breath。　But　if　the　property　of　the　nobility；　stocked　with　their　tenants　and　retainers；　be　the　pasture　of　that　beast；　the　ox　knows　his　master's　crib；　and　it　is　impossible　for　a　king　in　such　a　constitution　to　reign　otherwise　than　by　covenant；　or　if　he　break　it；　it　is　words　that　come　to　blows。　　　　　〃But；〃　says　he；　〃when　an　assembly　of　men　is　made　sovereign；　then　no　man　imagines　any　such　covenant　to　have　part　in　the　institution。〃　But　what　was　that　by　Publicola　of　appeal　to　the　people；　or　that　whereby　the　people　had　their　tribunes？　〃Fie；〃　says　he；　〃nobody　is　so　dull　as　to　say　that　the　people　of　Rome　made　a　covenant　with　the　Romans；　to　hold　the　sovereignty　on　such　or　such　conditions；　which；　not　performed；　the　Romans　might　depose　the　Roman　people。〃　In　which　there　be　several　remarkable　things；　for　he　holds　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome　to　have　consisted　of　one　assembly；　whereas　it　consisted　of　the　Senate　and　the　people；　that　they　were　not　upon　covenant；　whereas　every　law　enacted　by　them　was　a　covenant　between　them；　that　the　one　assembly　was　made　sovereign；　whereas　the　people；　who　only　were　sovereign；　were　such　from　the　beginning；　as　appears　by　the　ancient　style　of　their　covenants　or　laws　　〃The　Senate　has　resolved；　the　people　have　decreed；〃　that　a　council　being　made　sovereign；　cannot　be　made　such　upon　conditions；　whereas　the　Decemvirs　being　a　council　that　was　made　sovereign；　was　made　such　upon　conditions；　that　all　conditions　or　covenants　making　a　sovereign　being　made；　are　void；　whence　it　must　follow　that；　the　Decemviri　being　made；　were　ever　after　the　lawful　government　of　Rome；　and　that　it　was　unlawful　for　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome　to　depose　the　Decemvirs；　as　also　that　Cicero；　if　he　wrote　otherwise　out　of　his　commonwealth；　did　not　write　out　of　nature。　But　to　come　to　others　that　see　more　of　this　balance。　　　　　You　have　Aristotle　full　of　it　in　divers　places；　especially　where　he　says；　that　〃immoderate　wealth；　as　where　one　man　or　the　few　have　greater　possessions　than　the　equality　or　the　frame　of　the　commonwealth　will　bear；　is　an　occasion　of　sedition；　which　ends　for　the　greater　part　in　monarchy　and　that　for　this　cause　the　ostracism　has　been　received　in　divers　places；　as　in　Argos　and　Athens。　But　that　it　were　better　to　prevent　the　growth　in　the　beginning；　than；　when　it　has　got　head；　to　seek　the　remedy　of　such　an　evil。〃　　　　　Machiavel　has　missed　it　very　narrowly　and　more　dangerously　for　not　fully　perceiving　that　if　a　commonwealth　be　galled　by　the　gentry　it　is　by　their　overbalance；　he　speaks　of　the　gentry　as　hostile　to　popular　governments；　and　of　popular　governments　as　hostile　to　the　gentry；　and　makes　us　believe　that　the　people　in　such　are　so　enraged　against　them；　that　where　they　meet　a　gentleman　they　kill　him：　which　can　never　be　proved　by　any　one　example；　unless　in　civil　war；　seeing　that　even　in　Switzerland　the　gentry　are　not　only　safe；　but　in　honor。　But　the　balance；　as　I　have　laid　it　down；　though　unseen　by　Machiavel；　is　that　which　interprets　him；　and　that　which　he　confirms　by　his　judgment　in　many　others　as　well　as　in　this　place；　where　he　concludes；　〃That　he　who　will　go　about　to　make　a　commonwealth　where　there　be　many　gentlemen；　unless　he　first　destroys　them；　undertakes　an　impossibility。　And　that　he　who　goes　about　to　introduce　monarchy　where　the　condition　of　the　people　is　equal；　shall　never　bring　it　to　pass；　unless　he　cull　out　such　of　them　as　are　the　most　turbulent　and　ambitious；　and　make　them　gentlemen　or　noblemen；　not　in　name　but　in　effect；　that　is；　by　enriching　them　with　lands；　castles；　and　treasures；　that　may　gain　them　power　among　the　rest；　and　bring　in　the　rest　to　dependence　upon　themselves；　to　the　end　that；　they　maintaining　their　ambition　by　the　prince；　the　prince　may　maintain　his　power　by　them。〃　　　　　Wherefore；　as　in　this　place　I　agree　with　Machiavel；　that　a　nobility　or　gentry；　overbalancing　a　popular　government；　is　the　utter　bane　and　destruction　of　it；　so　I　shall　show　in　another；　that　a　nobility　or　gentry；　in　a　popular　government；　not　overbalancing　it；　is　the　very　life　and　soul　of　it。　　　　　By　what　has　been　said；　it　should　seem　that　we　may　lay　aside　further　disputes　of　the　public　sword；　or　of　the　right　of　the　militia；　which；　be　the　government　what　it　will；　or　let　it　change　how　it　can；　is　inseparable　from　the　overbalance　in　dominion：　nor；　if　otherwise　stated　by　the　law　or　custom　（as　in　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome；　where　the　people　having　the　sword；　the　nobility　came　to　have　the　overbalance）；　avails　it　to　any　other　end　than　destruction。　For　as　a　building　swaying　from　the　foundation　must　fall；　so　it　fares　with　the　law　swaying　from　reason；　and　the　militia　from　the　balance　of　dominion。　And　thus　much　for　the　balance　of　national　or　domestic　empire；　which　is　in　dominion。　　　　　The　balance　of　foreign　or　provincial　empire　is　of　a　contrary　nature。　A　man　may　as　well　say　that　it　is　unlawful　for　him　who　has　made　a　fair　and　honest　purchase　to　have　tenants；　as　for　a　government　that　has　made　a　just　progress　and　enlargement　of　itself　to　have　provinces。　But　how　a　province　may　be　justly　acquired　appertains　to　another　place。　In　this　I　am　to　show　no　more　than　how　or　upon　what　kind　of　balance　it　is　to　be　held；　in　order　whereto　I　shall　first　show　upon　what　kind　of　balance　it　is　not　to　be　held。　It　has　been　said；　that　national　or　independent　empire；　of　what　kind　soever；　is　to　be　exercised　by　them　that　have　the　proper　balance　of　dominion　in　the　nation；　wherefore　provincial　or　dependent　empire　is　not　to　be　exercised　by　them　that　have　the　balance　of　dominion　in　the　province；　because　that　would　bring　the　government　from　provincial　and　dependent；　to　national　and　independent。　Absolute　monarchy；　as　that　of　the　Turks；　neither　plants　its　people　at　home　nor　abroad；　otherwise　than　as　tenants　for　life　or　at　will；　wherefore　its　national　and　provincial　government　is　all　one。　But　in　governments　that　admit　the　citizen　or　subject　to　dominion　in　lands；　the　richest　are　they　that　share　most　of　the　power　at　home；　whereas　the　richest　among　the　provincials；　though　native　subjects；　or　citizens　that　have　been　transplanted；　are　least　admitted　to　the　government　abroad；　for　men；　like　flowers　or　roots　being　transplanted；　take　after　the　soil　wherein　they　grow。　Wherefore　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome；　by　planting　colonies　of　its　citizens　within　the　bounds　of　Italy；　took　the　best　way　of　propagating　itself；　and　naturalizing　the　country；　whereas　if　it　had　planted　such　colonies　without　the　bounds　of　Italy　it　would　have　alienated　the　citizens；　and　given　a　root　to　liberty　abroad；　that　might　have　sprung　up　foreign　or　savage；　and　hostile　to　her：　wherefore　it　never　made　any　such　dispersion　of　itself　and　its　strength；　till　it　was　under　the　yoke　of　the　Emperors；　who；　disburdening　themselves　of　the　people；　as　having　less　apprehension　of　what　they　could　do　abroad　than　at　home；　took　a　contrary　course。　　　　　The　Mamelukes　（which；　till　any　man　show　me　the　contrary；　I　shall　presume　to　have　been　a　commonwealth　consisting　of　an　army；　whereof　the　common　soldier　was　the　people；　the　commissioned　officer　the　Senate；　and　the　general　the　prince）　were　foreigners；　and　by　nation　Circassians；　that　governed　Egypt；　wherefore　these　never　durst　plant　themselves　upon　dominion；　which　growing　naturally　up　into　the　national　interest；　must　have　dissolved　the　foreign　yoke　in　that　province。　　　　　The　like　in　some　sort　may　be　said　of　Venice；　the　government　whereof　is　usually　mistaken；　for　Venice；　though　it　does　not　take　in　the　people；　never　excluded　them。　This　commonwealth；　the　orders　whereof　are　the　most　democratical　or　popular　of　all　others；　in　regard　of　the　exquisite　rotation　of　the　Senate；　at　the　first　institution　took　in　the　whole　people；　they　that　now　live　under　the　government　without　participation　of　it；　are　such　as　have　since　either　voluntarily　chosen　so　to　do；　or　were　subdued　by　arms。　Wherefore　the　subject　of　Venice　is　governed　by　provinces；　and　the　balance　of　dominion　not　standing；　as　has　been　said；　with　provincial　government；　as　the　Mamelukes　durst　not　cast　their　government　upon　this　balance　in　their　provinces；　lest　the　national　interest　should　have　rooted　out　the　foreign；　so　neither　dare　the　Venetians　take　in　their　subjects　upon　this　balance；　lest　the　foreign　interest　should　root　out　the　national　（which　is　that　of　the　3；000　now　governing）；　and　by　diffusing　the　commonwealth　throughout　her　territories；　lose　the　advantage　of　her　situation；　by　which　in　great　part　it　subsists。　And　such　also　is　the　government　of　the　Spaniard　in　the　Indies；　to　which　he　deputes　natives　of　his　own　country；　not　admitting　the　creoles　to　the　government　of　those　provinces；　though　descended　from　Spaniards。　　　　　But　if　a　prince　or　a　commonwealth　may　hold　a　territory　that　is　foreign　in　this；　it　may　be　asked　why　he　may　not　hold　one　that　is　native　in　the　like　manner？　To　which　I　answer；　because　he　can　hold　a　foreign　by　a　native　territory；　but　not　a　native　by　a　foreign；　and　as　hitherto　I　have　shown　what　is　not　the　provincial　balance；　so　by　this　answer　it　may　appear　what　it　is；　namely；　the　overbalance　of　a　native　territory　to　a　foreign；　for　as　one　country　balances　itself　by　the　distribution　of　property　according　to　the　proportion　of　the　same；　so　one　country　overbalances　another　by　advantage　of　divers　kinds。　For　example；　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome　overbalanced　her　provinces　by　the　vigor　of　a　more　excellent　government　opposed　to　a　crazier。　Or　by　a　more　exquisite　militia　opposed　to　one　inferior　in　courage　or　discipline。　The　like　was　that　of　the　Mamelukes；　being　a　hardy　people；　to　the　Egyptians；　that　were　a　soft　one。　And　the　balance　of　situation　is　in　this　kind　of　wonderful　effect；　seeing　the　King　of　Denmark；　being　none　of　the　most　potent　princes；　is　able　at　the　Sound　to　take　toll　of　the　greatest；　and　as　this　King；　by　the　advantage　of　the　land；　can　make　the　sea　tributary；　so　Venice；　by　the　advantage　of　the　sea；　in　whose　a