an enquiry concerning human understanding-第9章

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farther。　And　it　is　certain　we　here　advance　a　very
intelligible　proposition　at　least；　if　not　a　true　one；　when
we　assert　that；　after　the　constant　conjunction　of　two
objects　…　…　heat　and　flame；　for　instance；　weight　and
solidity　　we　are　determined　by　custom　alone　to　expect　the
one　from　the　appearance　of　the　other。　This　hypothesis　seems
even　the　only　one　which　explains　the　difficulty；　why　we
draw；　from　a　thousand　instances；　an　inference　which　we　are
not　able　to　draw　from　one　instance；　that　is；　in　no　respect；
different　from　them。　Reason　is　incapable　of　any　such
variation。　The　conclusions　which　it　draws　from　considering
one　circle　are　the　same　which　it　would　form　upon　surveying
all　the　circles　in　the　universe。　But　no　man；　having　seen
only　one　body　move　after　being　impelled　by　another；　could
infer　that　every　other　body　will　move　after　a　like　impulse。
All　inferences　from　experience；　therefore；　are　effects　of
custom；　not　of　reasoning。＇12＇

　　　　　Custom；　then；　is　the　great　guide　of　human　life。　It　is
that　principle　alone　which　renders　our　experience　useful　to
us；　and　makes　us　expect；　for　the　future；　a　similar　train　of
events　with　those　which　have　appeared　in　the　past。　Without
the　influence　of　custom；　we　should　be　entirely　ignorant　of
every　matter　of　fact　beyond　what　is　immediately　present　to
the　memory　and　senses。　We　should　never　know　how　to　adjust
means　to　ends；　or　to　employ　our　natural　powers　in　the
production　of　any　effect。　There　would　be　an　end　at　once　of
all　action；　as　well　as　of　the　chief　part　of　speculation。

　　　　　But　here　it　may　be　proper　to　remark；　that　though　our
conclusions　from　experience　carry　us　beyond　our　memory　and
senses；　and　assure　us　of　matters　of　fact　which　happened　in
the　most　distant　places　and　most　remote　ages；　yet　some　fact
must　always　be　present　to　the　senses　or　memory；　from　which
we　may　first　proceed　in　drawing　these　conclusions。　A　man；
who　should　find　in　a　desert　country　the　remains　of　pompous
buildings；　would　conclude　that　the　country　had；　in　ancient
times；　been　cultivated　by　civilized　inhabitants；　but　did
nothing　of　this　nature　occur　to　him；　he　could　never　form
such　an　inference。　We　learn　the　events　of　former　ages　from
history；　but　then　we　must　peruse　the　volumes　in　which　this
instruction　is　contained；　and　thence　carry　up　our　inferences
from　one　testimony　to　another；　till　we　arrive　at　the
eyewitnesses　and　spectators　of　these　distant　events。　In　a
word；　if　we　proceed　not　upon　some　fact；　present　to　the
memory　or　senses；　our　reasonings　would　be　merely
hypothetical；　and　however　the　particular　links　might　be
connected　with　each　other；　the　whole　chain　of　inferences
would　have　nothing　to　support　it；　nor　could　we　ever；　by　its
means；　arrive　at　the　knowledge　of　any　real　existence。　If　I
ask　why　you　believe　any　particular　matter　of　fact；　which　you
relate；　you　must　tell　me　some　reason；　and　this　reason　will
be　some　other　fact；　connected　with　it。　But　as　you　cannot
proceed　after　this　manner；　；　you　must　at　last
terminate　in　some　fact；　which　is　present　to　your　memory　or
senses；　or　must　allow　that　your　belief　is　entirely　without
foundation。

　　　　　What；　then；　is　the　conclusion　of　the　whole　matter？　A
simple　one；　though；　it　must　be　confessed；　pretty　remote　from
the　common　theories　of　philosophy。　All　belief　of　matter　of
fact　or　real　existence　is　derived　merely　from　some　object；
present　to　the　memory　or　senses；　and　a　customary　conjunction
between　that　and　some　other　object。　Or　in　other　words；
having　found；　in　many　instances；　that　any　two　kinds　of
objects　　flame　and　heat；　snow　and　cold　　have　always　been
conjoined　together；　if　flame　or　snow　be　presented　anew　to
the　senses；　the　mind　is　carried　by　custom　to　expect　heat　or
cold；　and　to　　that　such　a　quality　does　exist；　and
will　discover　itself　upon　a　nearer　approach。　This　belief　is
the　necessary　result　of　placing　the　mind　in　such
circumstances。　It　is　an　operation　of　the　soul；　when　we　are
so　situated；　as　unavoidable　as　to　feel　the　passion　of　love；
when　we　receive　benefits；　or　hatred；　when　we　meet　with
injuries。　All　these　operations　are　a　species　of　natural
instincts；　which　no　reasoning　or　process　of　the　thought　and
understanding　is　able　either　to　produce　or　to　prevent。

　　　　　At　this　point；　it　would　be　very　allowable　for　us　to
stop　our　philosophical　researches。　In　most　questions　we　can
never　make　a　single　step　farther；　and　in　all　questions　we
must　terminate　here　at　last；　after　our　most　restless　and
curious　enquiries。　But　still　our　curiosity　will　be
pardonable；　perhaps　commendable；　if　it　carry　us　on　to　still
farther　researches；　and　make　us　examine　more　accurately　the
nature　of　this　；　and　of　the　；
whence　it　is　derived。　By　this　means　we　may　meet　with　some
explications　and　analogies　that　will　give　satisfaction；　at
least　to　such　as　love　the　abstract　sciences；　and　can　be
entertained　with　speculations；　which；　however　accurate；　may
still　retain　a　degree　of　doubt　and　uncertainty。　As　to
readers　of　a　different　taste；　the　remaining　part　of　this
section　is　not　calculated　for　them；　and　the　following
enquiries　may　well　be　understood；　though　it　be　neglected。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　N/OTHING　is　more　free　than　the　imagination　of　man；　and
though　it　cannot　exceed　that　original　stock　of　ideas
furnished　by　the　internal　and　external　senses；　it　has
unlimited　power　of　mixing；　compounding；　separating；　and
dividing　these　ideas；　in　all　the　varieties　of　fiction　and
vision。　It　can　feign　a　train　of　events；　with　all　the
appearance　of　reality；　ascribe　to　them　a　particular　time　and
place；　conceive　them　as　existent；　and　paint　them　out　to
itself　with　every　circumstance；　that　belongs　to　any
historical　fact；　which　it　believes　with　the　greatest
certainty。　Wherein；　therefore；　consists　the　difference
between　such　a　　and　？　It　lies　not　merely　in
any　peculiar　idea；　which　is　annexed　to　such　a　conception　as
commands　our　assent；　and　which　is　wanting　to　every　known
fiction。　For　as　the　mind　has　authority　over　all　its　ideas；
it　could　voluntarily　annex　this　particular　idea　to　any
fiction；　and　consequently　be　able　to　believe　whatever　it
pleases；　contrary　to　what　we　find　by　daily　experience。　We
can；　in　our　conception；　join　the　head　of　a　man　to　the　body
of　a　horse；　but　it　is　not　in　our　power　to　believe　that　such
an　animal　has　ever　really　existed。

　　　　　It　follows；　therefore；　that　the　difference　between
　and　　lies　in　some　sentiment　or　feeling；
which　is　annexed　to　the　latter；　not　to　the　former；　and　which
depends　not　on　the　will；　nor　can　be　commanded　at　pleasure。
It　must　be　excited　by　nature；　like　all　other　sentiments；　and
must　arise　from　the　particular　situation；　in　which　the　mind
is　placed　at　any　particular　juncture。　Whenever　any　object　is
presented　to　the　memory　or　senses；　it　immediately；　by　the
force　of　custom；　carries　the　imagination　to　conceive　that
object；　which　is　usually　conjoined　to　it；　and　this
conception　is　attended　with　a　feeling　or　sentiment；
different　from　the　loose　reveries　of　the　fancy。　In　this
consists　the　whole　nature　of　belief。　For　as　there　is　no
matter　of　fact　which　we　believe　so　firmly　that　we　cannot
conceive　the　contrary；　there　would　be　no　difference　between
the　conception　assented　to　and　that　which　is　rejected；　were
it　not　for　some　sentiment　which　distinguishes　the　one　from
the　other。　If　I　see　a　billiard…ball　moving　toward　another；
on　a　smooth　table；　I　can　easily　conceive　it　to　stop　upon
contact。　This　conception　implies　no　contradiction；　but　still
it　feels　very　differently　from　that　conception　by　which　I
represent　to　myself　the　impulse　and　the　communication　of
motion　from　one　ball　to　another。

　　　　　Were　we　to　attempt　a　　of　this　sentiment；　we
should；　perhaps；　find　it　a　very　difficult；　if　not　an
impossible　task；　in　the　same　manner　as　if　we　should
endeavour　to　define　the　feeling　of　cold　or　passion　of　anger；
to　a　creature　who　never　had　any　experience　of　these
sentiments。　B/ELIEF　is　the　true　and　proper　name　of　this
feeling；　and　no　one　is　ever　at　a　loss　to　know　the　meaning　of
that　term；　because　every　man　is　every　moment　conscious　of
the　sentiment　represented　by　it。　It　may　not；　however；　be
improper　to　attempt　a　　of　this　sentiment；　in
hopes　we　may；　by　that　means；　arrive　at　some　analogies；　which
may　afford　a　more　perfect　explication　of　it。　I　say；　then；
that　belief　is　nothing　but　a　more　vivid；　lively；　forcible；
firm；　steady　conception　of　an　object；　than　what　the
imagination　alone　is　ever　able　to　attain。　This　variety　of
terms；　which　may　seem　so　unphilosophical；　is　intended　only
to　express　that　act　of　the　mind；　which　renders　realities；　or
what　is　taken　for　such；　more　present　to　us　than　fictions；
causes　them　to　weigh　more　in　the　thought；　and　gives　them　a
superior　influence　on　the　passions　and　imagination。　Provided
we　agree　about　the　thing；　it　is　needless　to　dispute　about
the　terms。　The　imagination　has　the　command　over　all　its
ideas；　and　can　join　and　mix　and　vary　them；　in　all　the　ways
possible。　It　may　conceive　fictitious　objects　with　all　the
circumstances　of　place　and　time。　It　may　set　them；　in　a
manner；　before　our　eyes；　in　their　true　colours；　just　as　they
might　have　existed。　But　as　it　is　impossible　that　this
faculty　of　imagination　can　ever；　of　itself；　reach　belief；　it
is　evident　that　belief　consists　not　in　the　peculiar　nature
or　order　of　ideas；　but　in　the　　of　their　conception；
and　in　their　　to　the　mind。　I　confess；　that　it　is
impossible　perfectly　to　explain　this　feeling　or　manner　of
conception。　We　may　make　use　of　words　which　express　something
near　it。　But　its　true　and　proper　name；　as　we　observed
before；　is　；　which　is　a　term　that　every　one
sufficiently　understands　in　common　life。　And　in　philosophy；
we　can　go　no　farther　than　assert；　that　　is　something
felt　by　the　mind；　which　distinguishes　the　ideas　of　the
judgement　from　the　fictions　of　the　imagination。　It　gives
them　more　weight　and　influence；　makes　them　appear　of　greater
importance；　enforces　them　in　the　mind；　and　renders　them　the
governing　principle　of　our　actions。　I　hear　at　present；　for
instance；　a　person's　voice；　with　whom　I　am　acquainted；　and
the　sound　comes　as　from　the　next　room。　This　impression　of　my
senses　immediately　conveys　my　thought　to　the　person；
together　with　all　the　surrounding　objects。　I　paint　them　out
to　myself　as　existing　at　present；　with　the　same　qualities
and　relations；　of　which　I　formerly　knew　them　possessed。
These　ideas　take　faster　hold　of　my　mind　than　ideas　of　an
enchanted　castle。　They　are　very　different　to　the　feeling；
and　have　a　much　greater　influence　of　every　kind；　either　to
give　pleasure　or　pain；　joy　or　sorrow。

　　　　　Let　us；　then；　take　in　the　whole　compass　of　this
doctrine；　and　allow；　that　the　sentiment　of　belief　is　nothing
but　a　conception　more　intense　and　steady　than　what　attends
the　mere　fictions　of　the　imagination；　and　that　this　
of　conception　arises　from　a　customary　conjunction　of　the
object　with　something　present　to　the　memory　or　senses：　I
believe　that　it　will　not　be　difficult；　upon　these
suppositions；　to　find　other