an enquiry concerning human understanding-第10章

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object　with　something　present　to　the　memory　or　senses：　I
believe　that　it　will　not　be　difficult；　upon　these
suppositions；　to　find　other　operations　of　the　mind　analogous
to　it；　and　to　trace　up　these　phenomena　to　principles　still
more　general。

　　　　　We　have　already　observed　that　nature　has　established
connexions　among　particular　ideas；　and　that　no　sooner　one
idea　occurs　to　our　thoughts　than　it　introduces　its
correlative；　and　carries　our　attention　towards　it；　by　a
gentle　and　insensible　movement。　These　principles　of
connexion　or　association　we　have　reduced　to　three；　namely；
；　　and　；　which　are　the
only　bonds　that　unite　our　thoughts　together；　and　beget　that
regular　train　of　reflection　or　discourse；　which；　in　a
greater　or　less　degree；　takes　place　among　all　mankind。　Now
here　arises　a　question；　on　which　the　solution　of　the　present
difficulty　will　depend。　Does　it　happen；　in　all　these
relations；　that；　when　one　of　the　objects　is　presented　to　the
senses　or　memory；　the　mind　is　not　only　carried　to　the
conception　of　the　correlative；　but　reaches　a　steadier　and
stronger　conception　of　it　than　what　otherwise　it　would　have
been　able　to　attain？　This　seems　to　be　the　case　with　that
belief　which　arises　from　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect。
And　if　the　case　be　the　same　with　the　other　relations　or
principles　of　associations；　this　may　be　established　as　a
general　law；　which　takes　place　in　all　the　operations　of　the
mind。

　　　　　We　may；　therefore；　observe；　as　the　first　experiment　to
our　present　purpose；　that；　upon　the　appearance　of　the
picture　of　an　absent　friend；　our　idea　of　him　is　evidently
enlivened　by　the　；　and　that　every　passion；
which　that　idea　occasions；　whether　of　joy　or　sorrow；
acquires　new　force　and　vigour。　In　producing　this　effect；
there　concur　both　a　relation　and　a　present　impression。　Where
the　picture　bears　him　no　resemblance；　at　least　was　not
intended　for　him；　it　never　so　much　as　conveys　our　thought　to
him：　And　where　it　is　absent；　as　well　as　the　person；　though
the　mind　may　pass　from　the　thought　of　the　one　to　that　of　the
other；　it　feels　its　idea　to　be　rather　weakened　than
enlivened　by　that　transition。　We　take　a　pleasure　in　viewing
the　picture　of　a　friend；　when　it　is　set　before　us；　but　when
it　is　removed；　rather　choose　to　consider　him　directly　than
by　reflection　in　an　image；　which　is　equally　distant　and
obscure。

　　　　　The　ceremonies　of　the　R/OMAN　C/ATHOLIC　religion　may
be　considered　as　instances　of　the　same　nature。　The　devotees
of　that　superstition　usually　plead　in　excuse　for　the
mummeries；　with　which　they　are　upbraided；　that　they　feel　the
good　effect　of　those　external　motions；　and　postures；　and
actions；　in　enlivening　their　devotion　and　quickening　their
fervour；　which　otherwise　would　decay；　if　directed　entirely
to　distant　and　immaterial　objects。　We　shadow　out　the　objects
of　our　faith；　say　they；　in　sensible　types　and　images；　and
render　them　more　present　to　us　by　the　immediate　presence　of
these　types；　than　it　is　possible　for　us　to　do　merely　by　an
intellectual　view　and　contemplation。　Sensible　objects　have
always　a　greater　influence　on　the　fancy　than　any　other；　and
this　influence　they　readily　convey　to　those　ideas　to　which
they　are　related；　and　which　they　resemble。　I　shall　only
infer　from　these　practices；　and　this　reasoning；　that　the
effect　of　resemblance　in　enlivening　the　ideas　is　very
common；　and　as　in　every　case　a　resemblance　and　a　present
impression　must　concur；　we　are　abundantly　supplied　with
experiments　to　prove　the　reality　of　the　foregoing　principle。

　　　　　We　may　add　force　to　these　experiments　by　others　of　a
different　kind；　in　considering　the　effects　of　
as　well　as　of　。　It　is　certain　that　distance
diminishes　the　force　of　every　idea；　and　that；　upon　our
approach　to　any　object；　though　it　does　not　discover　itself
to　our　senses；　it　operates　upon　the　mind　with　an　influence；
which　imitates　an　immediate　impression。　The　thinking　on　any
object　readily　transports　the　mind　to　what　is　contiguous；
but　it　is　only　the　actual　presence　of　an　object；　that
transports　it　with　a　superior　vivacity。　When　I　am　a　few
miles　from　home；　whatever　relates　to　it　touches　me　more
nearly　than　when　I　am　two　hundred　leagues　distant；　though
even　at　that　distance　the　reflecting　on　any　thing　in　the
neighbourhood　of　my　friends　or　family　naturally　produces　an
idea　of　them。　But　as　in　this　latter　case；　both　the　objects
of　the　mind　are　ideas；　notwithstanding　there　is　an　easy
transition　between　them；　that　transition　alone　is　not　able
to　give　a　superior　vivacity　to　any　of　the　ideas；　for　want　of
some　immediate　impression。＇13＇

　　　　　No　one　can　doubt　but　causation　has　the　same　influence
as　the　other　two　relations　of　resemblance　and　contiguity。
Superstitious　people　are　fond　of　the　reliques　of　saints　and
holy　men；　for　the　same　reason；　that　they　seek　after　types　or
images；　in　order　to　enliven　their　devotion；　and　give　them　a
more　intimate　and　strong　conception　of　those　exemplary
lives；　which　they　desire　to　imitate。　Now　it　is　evident；　that
one　of　the　best　reliques；　which　a　devotee　could　procure；
would　be　the　handywork　of　a　saint；　and　if　his　cloaths　and
furniture　are　ever　to　be　considered　in　this　light；　it　is
because　they　were　once　at　his　disposal；　and　were　moved　and
affected　by　him；　in　which　respect　they　are　to　be　considered
as　imperfect　effects；　and　as　connected　with　him　by　a　shorter
chain　of　consequences　than　any　of　those；　by　which　we　learn
the　reality　of　his　existence。

　　　　　Suppose；　that　the　son　of　a　friend；　who　had　been　long
dead　or　absent；　were　presented　to　us；　it　is　evident；　that
this　object　would　instantly　revive　its　correlative　idea；　and
recall　to　our　thoughts　all　past　intimacies　and
familiarities；　in　more　lively　colours　than　they　would
otherwise　have　appeared　to　us。　This　is　another　phaenomenon；
which　seems　to　prove　the　principle　above　mentioned。

　　　　　We　may　observe；　that；　in　these　phaenomena；　the　belief
of　the　correlative　object　is　always　presupposed；　without
which　the　relation　could　have　no　effect。　The　influence　of
the　picture　supposes；　that　we　　our　friend　to　have
once　existed。　Contiguity　to　home　can　never　excite　our　ideas
of　home；　unless　we　　that　it　really　exists。　Now　I
assert；　that　this　belief；　where　it　reaches　beyond　the　memory
or　senses；　is　of　a　similar　nature；　and　arises　from　similar
causes；　with　the　transition　of　thought　and　vivacity　of
conception　here　explained。　When　I　throw　a　piece　of　dry　wood
into　a　fire；　my　mind　is　immediately　carried　to　conceive；
that　it　augments；　not　extinguishes　the　flame。　This
transition　of　thought　from　the　cause　to　the　effect　proceeds
not　from　reason。　It　derives　its　origin　altogether　from
custom　and　experience。　And　as　it　first　begins　from　an
object；　present　to　the　senses；　it　renders　the　idea　or
conception　of　flame　more　strong　and　lively　than　any　loose；
floating　reverie　of　the　imagination。　That　idea　arises
immediately。　The　thought　moves　instantly　towards　it；　and
conveys　to　it　all　that　force　of　conception；　which　is　derived
from　the　impression　present　to　the　senses。　When　a　sword　is
levelled　at　my　breast；　does　not　the　idea　of　wound　and　pain
strike　me　more　strongly；　than　when　a　glass　of　wine　is
presented　to　me；　even　though　by　accident　this　idea　should
occur　after　the　appearance　of　the　latter　object？　But　what　is
there　in　this　whole　matter　to　cause　such　a　strong
conception；　except　only　a　present　object　and　a　customary
transition　of　the　idea　of　another　object；　which　we　have　been
accustomed　to　conjoin　with　the　former？　This　is　the　whole
operation　of　the　mind；　in　all　our　conclusions　concerning
matter　of　fact　and　existence；　and　it　is　a　satisfaction　to
find　some　analogies；　by　which　it　may　be　explained。　The
transition　from　a　present　object　does　in　all　cases　give
strength　and　solidity　to　the　related　idea。

　　　　　Here；　then；　is　a　kind　of　pre…established　harmony
between　the　course　of　nature　and　the　succession　of　our
ideas；　and　though　the　powers　and　forces；　by　which　the　former
is　governed；　be　wholly　unknown　to　us；　yet　our　thoughts　and
conceptions　have　still；　we　find；　gone　on　in　the　same　train
with　the　other　works　of　nature。　Custom　is　that　principle；　by
which　this　correspondence　has　been　effected；　so　necessary　to
the　subsistence　of　our　species；　and　the　regulation　of　our
conduct；　in　every　circumstance　and　occurrence　of　human　life。
Had　not　the　presence　of　an　object；　instantly　excited　the
idea　of　those　objects；　commonly　conjoined　with　it；　all　our
knowledge　must　have　been　limited　to　the　narrow　sphere　of　our
memory　and　senses；　and　we　should　never　have　been　able　to
adjust　means　to　ends；　or　employ　our　natural　powers；　either
to　the　producing　of　good；　or　avoiding　of　evil。　Those；　who
delight　in　the　discovery　and　contemplation　of　；　have　here　ample　subject　to　employ　their　wonder　and
admiration。

　　　　　I　shall　add；　for　a　further　confirmation　of　the
foregoing　theory；　that；　as　this　operation　of　the　mind；　by
which　we　infer　like　effects　from　like　causes；　and　；　is　so　essential　to　the　subsistence　of　all　human
creatures；　it　is　not　probable；　that　it　could　be　trusted　to
the　fallacious　deductions　of　our　reason；　which　is　slow　in
its　operations；　appears　not；　in　any　degree；　during　the　first
years　of　infancy；　and　at　best　is；　in　every　age　and　period　of
human　life；　extremely　liable　to　error　and　mistake。　It　is
more　conformable　to　the　ordinary　wisdom　of　nature　to　secure
so　necessary　an　act　of　the　mind；　by　some　instinct　or
mechanical　tendency；　which　may　be　infallible　in　its
operations；　may　discover　itself　at　the　first　appearance　of
life　and　thought；　and　may　be　independent　of　all　the　laboured
deductions　of　the　understanding。　As　nature　has　taught　us　the
use　of　our　limbs；　without　giving　us　the　knowledge　of　the
muscles　and　nerves；　by　which　they　are　actuated；　so　has　she
implanted　in　us　an　instinct；　which　carries　forward　the
thought　in　a　correspondent　course　to　that　which　she　has
established　among　external　objects；　though　we　are　ignorant
of　those　powers　and　forces；　on　which　this　regular　course　and
succession　of　objects　totally　depends。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　VI。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Probability。＇14＇

　　　　　T/HOUGH　there　be　no　such　thing　as　Chance　in　the　world；
our　ignorance　of　the　real　cause　of　any　event　has　the　same
influence　on　the　understanding；　and　begets　a　like　species　of
belief　or　opinion。

　　　　　There　is　certainly　a　probability；　which　arises　from　a
superiority　of　chances　on　any　side；　and　according　as　this
superiority　increases；　and　surpasses　the　opposite　chances；
the　probability　receives　a　proportionable　increase；　and
begets　still　a　higher　degree　of　belief　or　assent　to　that
side；　in　which　we　discover　the　superiority。　If　a　dye　were
marked　with　one　figure　or　number　of　spots　on　four　sides；　and
with　another　figure　or　number　of　spots　on　the　two　remaining
sides；　it　would　be　more　probable；　that　the　former　would　turn
up　than　the　latter；　though；　if　it　had　a　thousand　sides
marked　in　the　same　manner；　and　only　one　side　different；　the
probability　would　be　much　higher；　and　our　belief　or
expectation　of　the　event　more　steady　and　secure。　This