an enquiry concerning human understanding-第27章

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while　to　contend　against　it。

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　I/T　may　seem　a　very　extravagant　attempt　of　the
sceptics　to　destroy　　by　argument　and　ratiocination；
yet　is　this　the　grand　scope　of　all　their　enquiries　and
disputes。　They　endeavour　to　find　objections；　both　to　our
　reasonings；　and　to　those　which　regard　matter　of
fact　and　existence。

　　　　　The　chief　objection　against　all　abstract　reasonings　is
derived　from　the　ideas　of　space　and　time；　ideas；　which；　in
common　life　and　to　a　careless　view；　are　very　clear　and
intelligible；　but　when　they　pass　through　the　scrutiny　of　the
profound　sciences　（and　they　are　the　chief　object　of　these
sciences）　afford　principles；　which　seem　full　of　absurdity
and　contradiction。　No　priestly　；　invented　on　purpose
to　tame　and　subdue　the　rebellious　reason　of　mankind；　ever
shocked　common　sense　more　than　the　doctrine　of　the
infinitive　divisibility　of　extension；　with　its　consequences；
as　they　are　pompously　displayed　by　all　geometricians　and
metaphysicians；　with　a　kind　of　triumph　and　exultation。　A
real　quantity；　infinitely　less　than　any　finite　quantity；
containing　quantities　infinitely　less　than　itself；　and　so　on
；　this　is　an　edifice　so　bold　and　prodigious；
that　it　is　too　weighty　for　any　pretended　demonstration　to
support；　because　it　shocks　the　clearest　and　most　natural
principles　of　human　reason。＇38＇　But　what　renders　the　matter
more　extraordinary；　is；　that　these　seemingly　absurd　opinions
are　supported　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　the　clearest　and　most
natural；　nor　is　it　possible　for　us　to　allow　the　premises
without　admitting　the　consequences。　Nothing　can　be　more
convincing　and　satisfactory　than　all　the　conclusions
concerning　the　properties　of　circles　and　triangles；　and　yet；
when　these　are　once　received；　how　can　we　deny；　that　the
angle　of　contact　between　a　circle　and　its　tangent　is
infinitely　less　than　any　rectilineal　angle；　that　as　you　may
increase　the　diameter　of　the　circle　；　this
angle　of　contact　becomes　still　less；　even　；
and　that　the　angle　of　contact　between　other　curves　and　their
tangents　may　be　infinitely　less　than　those　between　any
circle　and　its　tangent；　and　so　on；　？　The
demonstration　of　these　principles　seems　as　unexceptionable
as　that　which　proves　the　three　angles　of　a　triangle　to　be
equal　to　two　right　ones；　though　the　latter　opinion　be
natural　and　easy；　and　the　former　big　with　contradiction　and
absurdity。　Reason　here　seems　to　be　thrown　into　a　kind　of
amazement　and　suspence；　which；　without　the　suggestions　of
any　sceptic；　gives　her　a　diffidence　of　herself；　and　of　the
ground　on　which　she　treads。　She　sees　a　full　light；　which
illuminates　certain　places；　but　that　light　borders　upon　the
most　profound　darkness。　And　between　these　she　is　so　dazzled
and　confounded；　that　she　scarcely　can　pronounce　with
certainty　and　assurance　concerning　any　one　object。

　　　　　The　absurdity　of　these　bold　determinations　of　the
abstract　sciences　seems　to　become；　if　possible；　still　more
palpable　with　regard　to　time　than　extension。　An　infinite
number　of　real　parts　of　time；　passing　in　succession；　and
exhausted　one　after　another；　appears　so　evident　a
contradiction；　that　no　man；　one　should　think；　whose
judgement　is　not　corrupted；　instead　of　being　improved；　by
the　sciences；　would　ever　be　able　to　admit　of　it。

　　　　　Yet　still　reason　must　remain　restless；　and　unquiet；
even　with　regard　to　that　scepticism；　to　which　she　is　driven
by　these　seeming　absurdities　and　contradictions。　How　any
clear；　distinct　idea　can　contain　circumstances；
contradictory　to　itself；　or　to　any　other　clear；　distinct
idea；　is　absolutely　incomprehensible；　and　is；　perhaps；　as
absurd　as　any　proposition；　which　can　be　formed。　So　that
nothing　can　be　more　sceptical；　or　more　full　of　doubt　and
hesitation；　than　this　scepticism　itself；　which　arises　from
some　of　the　paradoxical　conclusions　of　geometry　or　the
science　of　quantity。＇39＇

　　　　　The　sceptical　objections　to　　evidence；　or　to　the
reasonings　concerning　matter　of　fact；　are　either　
or　。　The　popular　objections　are　derived　from
the　natural　weakness　of　human　understanding；　the
contradictory　opinions；　which　have　been　entertained　in
different　ages　and　nations；　the　variations　of　our　judgement
in　sickness　and　health；　youth　and　old　age；　prosperity　and
adversity；　the　perpetual　contradiction　of　each　particular
man's　opinions　and　sentiments；　with　many　other　topics　of
that　kind。　It　is　needless　to　insist　farther　on　this　head。
These　objections　are　but　weak。　For　as；　in　common　life；　we
reason　every　moment　concerning　fact　and　existence；　and
cannot　possibly　subsist；　without　continually　employing　this
species　of　argument；　any　popular　objections；　derived　from
thence；　must　be　insufficient　to　destroy　that　evidence。　The
great　subverter　of　　or　the　excessive　principles
of　scepticism　is　action；　and　employment；　and　the　occupations
of　common　life。　These　principles　may　flourish　and　triumph　in
the　schools；　where　it　is；　indeed；　difficult；　if　not
impossible；　to　refute　them。　But　as　soon　as　they　leave　the
shade；　and　by　the　presence　of　the　real　objects；　which
actuate　our　passions　and　sentiments；　are　put　in　opposition
to　the　more　powerful　principles　of　our　nature；　they　vanish
like　smoke；　and　leave　the　most　determined　sceptic　in　the
same　condition　as　other　mortals。

　　　　　The　sceptic；　therefore；　had　better　keep　within　his
proper　sphere；　and　display　those　　objections；
which　arise　from　more　profound　researches。　Here　he　seems　to
have　ample　matter　of　triumph；　while　he　justly　insists；　that
all　our　evidence　for　any　matter　of　fact；　which　lies　beyond
the　testimony　of　sense　or　memory；　is　derived　entirely　from
the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　that　we　have　no　other　idea
of　this　relation　than　that　of　two　objects；　which　have　been
frequently　　together；　that　we　have　no　argument　to
convince　us；　that　objects；　which　have；　in　our　experience；
been　frequently　conjoined；　will　likewise；　in　other
instances；　be　conjoined　in　the　same　manner；　and　that　nothing
leads　us　to　this　inference　but　custom　or　a　certain　instinct
of　our　nature；　which　it　is　indeed　difficult　to　resist；　but
which；　like　other　instincts；　may　be　fallacious　and
deceitful。　While　the　sceptic　insists　upon　these　topics；　he
shows　his　force；　or　rather；　indeed；　his　own　and　our
weakness；　and　seems；　for　the　time　at　least；　to　destroy　all
assurance　and　conviction。　These　arguments　might　be　displayed
at　greater　length；　if　any　durable　good　or　benefit　to　society
could　ever　be　expected　to　result　from　them。

　　　　　For　here　is　the　chief　and　most　confounding　objection　to
　scepticism；　that　no　durable　good　can　ever　result
from　it；　while　it　remains　in　its　full　force　and　vigour。　We
need　only　ask　such　a　sceptic；　？　He　is
immediately　at　a　loss；　and　knows　not　what　to　answer。　A
C/OPERNICAN　or　P/TOLEMAIC；　who　supports　each　his　different
system　of　astronomy；　may　hope　to　produce　a　conviction；　which
will　remain　constant　and　durable；　with　his　audience。　A
S/TOIC　or　E/PICUREAN　displays　principles；　which　may　not　be
durable；　but　which　have　an　effect　on　conduct　and　behaviour。
But　a　P/YRRHONIAN　cannot　expect；　that　his　philosophy　will
have　any　constant　influence　on　the　mind：　Or　if　it　had；　that
its　influence　would　be　beneficial　to　society。　On　the
contrary；　he　must　acknowledge；　if　he　will　acknowledge　any
thing；　that　all　human　life　must　perish；　were　his　principles
universally　and　steadily　to　prevail。　All　discourse；　all
action　would　immediately　cease；　and　men　remain　in　a　total
lethargy；　till　the　necessities　of　nature；　unsatisfied；　put
an　end　to　their　miserable　existence。　It　is　true；　so　fatal　an
event　is　very　little　to　be　dreaded。　Nature　is　always　too
strong　for　principle。　And　though　a　P/YRRHONIAN　may　throw
himself　or　others　into　a　momentary　amazement　and　confusion
by　his　profound　reasonings；　the　first　and　most　trivial　event
in　life　will　put　to　flight　all　his　doubts　and　scruples；　and
leave　him　the　same；　in　every　point　of　action　and
speculation；　with　the　philosophers　of　every　other　sect；　or
with　those　who　never　concerned　themselves　in　any
philosophical　researches。　When　he　awakes　from　his　dream；　he
will　be　the　first　to　join　in　the　laugh　against　himself；　and
to　confess；　that　all　his　objections　are　mere　amusement；　and
can　have　no　other　tendency　than　to　show　the　whimsical
condition　of　mankind；　who　must　act　and　reason　and　believe；
though　they　are　not　able；　by　their　most　diligent　enquiry；　to
satisfy　themselves　concerning　the　foundation　of　these
operations；　or　to　remove　the　objections；　which　may　be　raised
against　them。

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　III。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HERE　is；　indeed；　a　more　　scepticism　or
　philosophy；　which　may　be　both　durable　and
useful；　and　which　may；　in　part；　be　the　result　of　this
P/YRRHONISM；　or　　scepticism；　when　its
undistinguished　doubts　are；　in　some　measure；　corrected　by
common　sense　and　reflection。　The　greater　part　of　mankind　are
naturally　apt　to　be　affirmative　and　dogmatical　in　their
opinions；　and　while　they　see　objects　only　on　one　side；　and
have　no　idea　of　any　counterpoising　argument；　they　throw
themselves　precipitately　into　the　principles；　to　which　they
are　inclined；　nor　have　they　any　indulgence　for　those　who
entertain　opposite　sentiments。　To　hesitate　or　balance
perplexes　their　understanding；　checks　their　passion；　and
suspends　their　action。　They　are；　therefore；　impatient　till
they　escape　from　a　state；　which　to　them　is　so　uneasy：　And
they　think；　that　they　could　never　remove　themselves　far
enough　from　it；　by　the　violence　of　their　affirmations　and
obstinacy　of　their　belief。　But　could　such　dogmatical
reasoners　become　sensible　of　the　strange　infirmities　of
human　understanding；　even　in　its　most　perfect　state；　and
when　most　accurate　and　cautious　in　its　determinations；　such
a　reflection　would　naturally　inspire　them　with　more　modesty
and　reserve；　and　diminish　their　fond　opinion　of　themselves；
and　their　prejudice　against　antagonists。　The　illiterate　may
reflect　on　the　disposition　of　the　learned；　who；　amidst　all
the　advantages　of　study　and　reflection；　are　commonly　still
diffident　in　their　determinations：　And　if　any　of　the　learned
be　inclined；　from　their　natural　temper；　to　haughtiness　and
obstinacy；　a　small　tincture　of　P/YRRHONISM　might　abate
their　pride；　by　showing　them；　that　the　few　advantages；　which
they　may　have　attained　over　their　fellows；　are　but
inconsiderable；　if　compared　with　the　universal　perplexity
and　confusion；　which　is　inherent　in　human　nature。　In
general；　there　is　a　degree　of　doubt；　and　caution；　and
modesty；　which；　in　all　kinds　of　scrutiny　and　decision；　ought
for　ever　to　accompany　a　just　reasoner。

　　　　　Another　species　of　　scepticism　which　may　be
of　advantage　to　mankind；　and　which　may　be　the　natural　result
of　the　P/YRRHONIAN　doubts　and　scruples；　is　the　limitation
of　our　enquiries　to　such　su