an enquiry concerning human understanding-第26章

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but　also　of　our　very　faculties；　of　whose　veracity；　say　they；
we　must　assure　ourselves；　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　deduced
from　some　original　principle；　which　cannot　possibly　be
fallacious　or　deceitful。　But　neither　is　there　any　such
original　principle；　which　has　a　prerogative　above　others；
that　are　self…evident　and　convincing：　Or　if　there　were；
could　we　advance　a　step　beyond　it；　but　by　the　use　of　those
very　faculties；　of　which　we　are　supposed　to　be　already
diffident。　The　C/ARTESIAN　doubt；　therefore；　were　it　ever
possible　to　be　attained　by　any　human　creature　（as　it　plainly
is　not）　would　be　entirely　incurable；　and　no　reasoning　could
ever　bring　us　to　a　state　of　assurance　and　conviction　upon
any　subject。

　　　　　It　must；　however；　be　confessed；　that　this　species　of
scepticism；　when　more　moderate；　may　be　understood　in　a　very
reasonable　sense；　and　is　a　necessary　preparative　to　the
study　of　philosophy；　by　preserving　a　proper　impartiality　in
our　judgements；　and　weaning　our　mind　from　all　those
prejudices；　which　we　may　have　imbibed　from　education　or　rash
opinion。　To　begin　with　clear　and　self…evident　principles；　to
advance　by　timorous　and　sure　steps；　to　review　frequently　our
conclusions；　and　examine　accurately　all　their　consequences；
though　by　these　means　we　shall　make　both　a　slow　and　a　short
progress　in　our　systems；　are　the　only　methods；　by　which　we
can　ever　hope　to　reach　truth；　and　attain　a　proper　stability
and　certainty　in　our　determinations。

　　　　　There　is　another　species　of　scepticism；　　to
science　and　enquiry；　when　men　are　supposed　to　have
discovered；　either　the　absolute　fallaciousness　of　their
mental　faculties；　or　their　unfitness　to　reach　any　fixed
determination　in　all　those　curious　subjects　of　speculation；
about　which　they　are　commonly　employed。　Even　our　very　senses
are　brought　into　dispute；　by　a　certain　species　of
philosophers；　and　the　maxims　of　common　life　are　subjected　to
the　same　doubt　as　the　most　profound　principles　or
conclusions　of　metaphysics　and　theology。　As　these
paradoxical　tenets　（if　they　may　be　called　tenets）　are　to　be
met　with　in　some　philosophers；　and　the　refutation　of　them　in
several；　they　naturally　excite　our　curiosity；　and　make　us
enquire　into　the　arguments；　on　which　they　may　be　founded。

　　　　　I　need　not　insist　upon　the　more　trite　topics；　employed
by　the　sceptics　in　all　ages；　against　the　evidence　of
；　such　as　those　which　are　derived　from　the
imperfection　and　fallaciousness　of　our　organs；　on　numberless
occasions；　the　crooked　appearance　of　an　oar　in　water；　the
various　aspects　of　objects；　according　to　their　different
distances；　the　double　images　which　arise　from　the　pressing
one　eye；　with　many　other　appearances　of　a　like　nature。　These
sceptical　topics；　indeed；　are　only　sufficient　to　prove；　that
the　senses　alone　are　not　implicitly　to　be　depended　on；　but
that　we　must　correct　their　evidence　by　reason；　and　by
considerations；　derived　from　the　nature　of　the　medium；　the
distance　of　the　object；　and　the　disposition　of　the　organ；　in
order　to　render　them；　within　their　sphere；　the　proper
criteria　of　truth　and　falsehood。　There　are　other　more
profound　arguments　against　the　senses；　which　admit　not　of　so
easy　a　solution。

　　　　　It　seems　evident；　that　men　are　carried；　by　a　natural
instinct　or　prepossession；　to　repose　faith　in　their　senses；
and　that；　without　any　reasoning；　or　even　almost　before　the
use　of　reason；　we　always　suppose　an　external　universe；　which
depends　not　on　our　perception；　but　would　exist；　though　we
and　every　sensible　creature　were　absent　or　annihilated。　Even
the　animal　creation　are　governed　by　a　like　opinion；　and
preserve　this　belief　of　external　objects；　in　all　their
thoughts；　designs；　and　actions。

　　　　　It　seems　also　evident；　that；　when　men　follow　this　blind
and　powerful　instinct　of　nature；　they　always　suppose　the
very　images；　presented　by　the　senses；　to　be　the　external
objects；　and　never　entertain　any　suspicion；　that　the　one　are
nothing　but　representations　of　the　other。　This　very　table；
which　we　see　white；　and　which　we　feel　hard；　is　believed　to
exist；　independent　of　our　perception；　and　to　be　something
external　to　our　mind；　which　perceives　it。　Our　presence
bestows　not　being　on　it：　Our　absence　does　not　annihilate　it。
It　preserves　its　existence　uniform　and　entire；　independent
of　the　situation　of　intelligent　beings；　who　perceive　or
contemplate　it。

　　　　　But　this　universal　and　primary　opinion　of　all　men　is
soon　destroyed　by　the　slightest　philosophy；　which　teaches
us；　that　nothing　can　ever　be　present　to　the　mind　but　an
image　or　perception；　and　that　the　senses　are　only　the
inlets；　through　which　these　images　are　conveyed；　without
being　able　to　produce　any　immediate　intercourse　between　the
mind　and　the　object。　The　table；　which　we　see；　seems　to
diminish；　as　we　remove　farther　from　it：　But　the　real　table；
which　exists　independent　of　us；　suffers　no　alteration：　It
was；　therefore；　nothing　but　its　image；　which　was　present　to
the　mind。　These　are　the　obvious　dictates　of　reason；　and　no
man；　who　reflects；　ever　doubted；　that　the　existences；　which
we　consider；　when　we　say；　　and　；　are
nothing　but　perceptions　in　the　mind；　and　fleeting　copies　or
representations　of　other　existences；　which　remain　uniform
and　independent。

　　　　　So　far；　then；　are　we　necessitated　by　reasoning　to
contradict　or　depart　from　the　primary　instincts　of　nature；
and　to　embrace　a　new　system　with　regard　to　the　evidence　of
our　senses。　But　here　philosophy　finds　herself　extremely
embarrassed；　when　she　would　justify　this　new　system；　and
obviate　the　cavils　and　objections　of　the　sceptics。　She　can
no　longer　plead　the　infallible　and　irresistible　instinct　of
nature：　For　that　led　us　to　a　quite　different　system；　which
is　acknowledged　fallible　and　even　erroneous。　And　to　justify
this　pretended　philosophical　system；　by　a　chain　of　clear　and
convincing　argument；　or　even　any　appearance　of　argument；
exceeds　the　power　of　all　human　capacity。

　　　　　By　what　argument　can　it　be　proved；　that　the　perceptions
of　the　mind　must　be　caused　by　external　objects；　entirely
different　from　them；　though　resembling　them　（if　that　be
possible）　and　could　not　arise　either　from　the　energy　of　the
mind　itself；　or　from　the　suggestion　of　some　invisible　and
unknown　spirit；　or　from　some　other　cause　still　more　unknown
to　us？　It　is　acknowledged；　that；　in　fact；　many　of　these
perceptions　arise　not　from　any　thing　external；　as　in　dreams；
madness；　and　other　diseases。　And　nothing　can　be　more
inexplicable　than　the　manner；　in　which　body　should　so
operate　upon　mind　as　ever　to　convey　an　image　of　itself　to　a
substance；　supposed　of　so　different；　and　even　contrary　a
nature。

　　　　　It　is　a　question　of　fact；　whether　the　perceptions　of
the　senses　be　produced　by　external　objects；　resembling　them：
how　shall　this　question　be　determined？　By　experience　surely；
as　all　other　questions　of　a　like　nature。　But　here　experience
is；　and　must　be　entirely　silent。　The　mind　has　never　any
thing　present　to　it　but　the　perceptions；　and　cannot　possibly
reach　any　experience　of　their　connexion　with　objects。　The
supposition　of　such　a　connexion　is；　therefore；　without　any
foundation　in　reasoning。

　　　　　To　have　recourse　to　the　veracity　of　the　supreme　Being；
in　order　to　prove　the　veracity　of　our　senses；　is　surely
making　a　very　unexpected　circuit。　If　his　veracity　were　at
all　concerned　in　this　matter；　our　senses　would　be　entirely
infallible；　because　it　is　not　possible　that　he　can　ever
deceive。　Not　to　mention；　that；　if　the　external　world　be　once
called　in　question；　we　shall　be　at　a　loss　to　find　arguments；
by　which　we　may　prove　the　existence　of　that　Being　or　any　of
his　attributes。

　　　　　This　is　a　topic；　therefore；　in　which　the　profounder　and
more　philosophical　sceptics　will　always　triumph；　when　they
endeavour　to　introduce　an　universal　doubt　into　all　subjects
of　human　knowledge　and　enquiry。　Do　you　follow　the　instincts
and　propensities　of　nature；　may　they　say；　in　assenting　to
the　veracity　of　sense？　But　these　lead　you　to　believe　that
the　very　perception　or　sensible　image　is　the　external
object。　Do　you　disclaim　this　principle；　in　order　to　embrace
a　more　rational　opinion；　that　the　perceptions　are　only
representations　of　something　external？　You　here　depart　from
your　natural　propensities　and　more　obvious　sentiments；　and
yet　are　not　able　to　satisfy　your　reason；　which　can　never
find　any　convincing　argument　from　experience　to　prove；　that
the　perceptions　are　connected　with　any　external　objects。

　　　　　There　is　another　sceptical　topic　of　a　like　nature；
derived　from　the　most　profound　philosophy；　which　might　merit
our　attention；　were　it　requisite　to　dive　so　deep；　in　order
to　discover　arguments　and　reasonings；　which　can　so　little
serve　to　any　serious　purpose。　It　is　universally　allowed　by
modern　enquirers；　that　all　the　sensible　qualities　of
objects；　such　as　hard；　soft；　hot；　cold；　white；　black；　&c。
are　merely　secondary；　and　exist　not　in　the　objects
themselves；　but　are　perceptions　of　the　mind；　without　any
external　archetype　or　model；　which　they　represent。　If　this
be　allowed；　with　regard　to　secondary　qualities；　it　must　also
follow；　with　regard　to　the　supposed　primary　qualities　of
extension　and　solidity；　nor　can　the　latter　be　any　more
entitled　to　that　denomination　than　the　former。　The　idea　of
extension　is　entirely　acquired　from　the　senses　of　sight　and
feeling；　and　if　all　the　qualities；　perceived　by　the　senses；
be　in　the　mind；　not　in　the　object；　the　same　conclusion　must
reach　the　idea　of　extension；　which　is　wholly　dependent　on
the　sensible　ideas　or　the　ideas　of　secondary　qualities。
Nothing　can　save　us　from　this　conclusion；　but　the　asserting；
that　the　ideas　of　those　primary　qualities　are　attained　by
；　an　opinion；　which；　if　we　examine　it
accurately；　we　shall　find　to　be　unintelligible；　and　even
absurd。　An　extension；　that　is　neither　tangible　nor　visible；
cannot　possibly　be　conceived：　And　a　tangible　or　visible
extension；　which　is　neither　hard　nor　soft；　black　nor　white；
is　equally　beyond　the　reach　of　human　conception。　Let　any　man
try　to　conceive　a　triangle　in　general；　which　is　neither
　nor　；　nor　has　any　particular　length　or
proportion　of　sides；　and　he　will　soon　perceive　the　absurdity
of　all　the　scholastic　notions　with　regard　to　abstraction　and
general　ideas。＇37＇

　　　　　Thus　the　first　philosophical　objection　to　the　evidence
of　sense　or　to　the　opinion　of　external　existence　consists　in
this；　that　such　an　opinion；　if　rested　on　natural　instinct；
is　contrary　to　reason；　and　if　referred　to　reason；　is
contrary　to　natural　instinct；　and　at　the　same　time　carries
no　rational　evidence　with　it；　to　convince　an　impartial
enquirer。　The　second　objection　goes　farther；　and　represents
this　opinion　as　contrary　to　reason：　At　least；　if　it　be　a
principle　of　reason；　that　all　sensible　qualities　are　in　the
mind；　not　in　the　object。　Bereave　matter　of　all　its
intelligible　qualities；　both　primary　and　secondary；　you　in　a
manner　annihilate　it；　and　leave　only　a　certain　unknown；
inexplicable　；　as　the　cause　of　our　perceptions；　a
notion　so　imperfect；　that　no　sceptic　will　think　it　worth
while　to　contend　against　it。

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