an enquiry concerning human understanding-第19章

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conclusions：　Neither　are　philosophers　themselves；　who；　in
all　the　active　parts　of　life；　are；　in　the　main；　the　same
with　the　vulgar；　and　are　governed　by　the　same　maxims。　Nature
must　have　provided　some　other　principle；　of　more　ready；　and
more　general　use　and　application；　nor　can　an　operation　of
such　immense　consequence　in　life；　as　that　of　inferring
effects　from　causes；　be　trusted　to　the　uncertain　process　of
reasoning　and　argumentation。　Were　this　doubtful　with　regard
to　men；　it　seems　to　admit　of　no　question　with　regard　to　the
brute　creation；　and　the　conclusion　being　once　firmly
established　in　the　one；　we　have　a　strong　presumption；　from
all　the　rules　of　analogy；　that　it　ought　to　be　universally
admitted；　without　any　exception　or　reserve。　It　is　custom
alone；　which　engages　animals；　from　every　object；　that
strikes　their　senses；　to　infer　its　usual　attendant；　and
carries　their　imagination；　from　the　appearance　of　the　one；
to　conceive　the　other；　in　that　particular　manner；　which　we
denominate　。　No　other　explication　can　be　given　of
this　operation；　in　all　the　higher；　as　well　as　lower　classes
of　sensitive　beings；　which　fall　under　our　notice　and
observation。＇24＇

　　　　　But　though　animals　learn　many　parts　of　their　knowledge
from　observation；　there　are　also　many　parts　of　it；　which
they　derive　from　the　original　hand　of　nature；　which　much
exceed　the　share　of　capacity　they　possess　on　ordinary
occasions；　and　in　which　they　improve；　little　or　nothing；　by
the　longest　practice　and　experience。　These　we　denominate
I/NSTINCTS；　and　are　so　apt　to　admire　as　something　very
extraordinary；　and　inexplicable　by　all　the　disquisitions　of
human　understanding。　But　our　wonder　will；　perhaps；　cease　or
diminish；　when　we　consider；　that　the　experimental　reasoning
itself；　which　we　possess　in　common　with　beasts；　and　on　which
the　whole　conduct　of　life　depends；　is　nothing　but　a　species
of　instinct　or　mechanical　power；　that　acts　in　us　unknown　to
ourselves；　and　in　its　chief　operations；　is　not　directed　by
any　such　relations　or　comparisons　of　ideas；　as　are　the
proper　objects　of　our　intellectual　faculties。　Though　the
instinct　be　different；　yet　still　it　is　an　instinct；　which
teaches　a　man　to　avoid　the　fire；　as　much　as　that；　which
teaches　a　bird；　with　such　exactness；　the　art　of　incubation；
and　the　whole　economy　and　order　of　its　nursery。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　X。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Miracles。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。

　　　　　T/HERE　is；　in　Dr。　T/ILLOTSON'S　writings；　an　argument
against　the　；　which　is　as　concise；　and
elegant；　and　strong　as　any　argument　can　possibly　be　supposed
against　a　doctrine；　so　little　worthy　of　a　serious
refutation。　It　is　acknowledged　on　all　hands；　says　that
learned　prelate；　that　the　authority；　either　of　the　scripture
or　of　tradition；　is　founded　merely　in　the　testimony　of　the
Apostles；　who　were　eye…witnesses　to　those　miracles　of　our
Saviour；　by　which　he　proved　his　divine　mission。　Our
evidence；　then；　for；　the　truth　of　the　　religion
is　less　than　the　evidence　for　the　truth　of　our　senses；
because；　even　in　the　first　authors　of　our　religion；　it　was
no　greater；　and　it　is　evident　it　must　diminish　in　passing
from　them　to　their　disciples；　nor　can　any　one　rest　such
confidence　in　their　testimony；　as　in　the　immediate　object　of
his　senses。　But　a　weaker　evidence　can　never　destroy　a
stronger；　and　therefore；　were　the　doctrine　of　the　real
presence　ever　so　clearly　revealed　in　scripture；　it　were
directly　contrary　to　the　rules　of　just　reasoning　to　give　our
assent　to　it。　It　contradicts　sense；　though　both　the
scripture　and　tradition；　on　which　it　is　supposed　to　be
built；　carry　not　such　evidence　with　them　as　sense；　when　they
are　considered　merely　as　external　evidences；　and　are　not
brought　home　to　every　one's　breast；　by　the　immediate
operation　of　the　Holy　Spirit。

　　　　　Nothing　is　so　convenient　as　a　decisive　argument　of　this
kind；　which　must　at　least　　the　most　arrogant
bigotry　and　superstition；　and　free　us　from　their　impertinent
solicitations。　I　flatter　myself；　that　I　have　discovered　an
argument　of　a　like　nature；　which；　if　just；　will；　with　the
wise　and　learned；　be　an　everlasting　check　to　all　kinds　of
superstitious　delusion；　and　consequently；　will　be　useful　as
long　as　the　world　endures。　For　so　long；　I　presume；　will　the
accounts　of　miracles　and　prodigies　be　found　in　all　history；
sacred　and　profane。

　　　　　Though　experience　be　our　only　guide　in　reasoning
concerning　matters　of　fact；　it　must　be　acknowledged；　that
this　guide　is　not　altogether　infallible；　but　in　some　cases
is　apt　to　lead　us　into　errors。　One；　who　in　our　climate；
should　expect　better　weather　in　any　week　of　J/UNE　than　in
one　of　D/ECEMBER；　would　reason　justly；　and　conformably　to
experience；　but　it　is　certain；　that　he　may　happen；　in　the
event；　to　find　himself　mistaken。　However；　we　may　observe；
that；　in　such　a　case；　he　would　have　no　cause　to　complain　of
experience；　because　it　commonly　informs　us　beforehand　of　the
uncertainty；　by　that　contrariety　of　events；　which　we　may
learn　from　a　diligent　observation。　All　effects　follow　not
with　like　certainty　from　their　supposed　causes。　Some　events
are　found；　in　all　countries　and　all　ages；　to　have　been
constantly　conjoined　together：　Others　are　found　to　have　been
more　variable；　and　sometimes　to　disappoint　our　expectations；
so　that；　in　our　reasonings　concerning　matter　of　fact；　there
are　all　imaginable　degrees　of　assurance；　from　the　highest
certainty　to　the　lowest　species　of　moral　evidence。

　　　　　A　wise　man；　therefore；　proportions　his　belief　to　the
evidence。　In　such　conclusions　as　are　founded　on　an
infallible　experience；　he　expects　the　event　with　the　last
degree　of　assurance；　and　regards　his　past　experience　as　a
full　　of　the　future　existence　of　that　event。　In　other
cases；　he　proceeds　with　more　caution：　He　weighs　the　opposite
experiments：　He　considers　which　side　is　supported　by　the
greater　number　of　experiments：　To　that　side　he　inclines；
with　doubt　and　hesitation；　and　when　at　last　he　fixes　his
judgement；　the　evidence　exceeds　not　what　we　properly　call
。　All　probability；　then；　supposes　an　opposition
of　experiments　and　observations；　where　the　one　side　is　found
to　overbalance　the　other；　and　to　produce　a　degree　of
evidence；　proportioned　to　the　superiority。　A　hundred
instances　or　experiments　on　one　side；　and　fifty　on　another；
afford　a　doubtful　expectation　of　any　event；　though　a　hundred
uniform　experiments；　with　only　one　that　is　contradictory；
reasonably　beget　a　pretty　strong　degree　of　assurance。　In　all
cases；　we　must　balance　the　opposite　experiments；　where　they
are　opposite；　and　deduct　the　smaller　number　from　the
greater；　in　order　to　know　the　exact　force　of　the　superior
evidence。

　　　　　To　apply　these　principles　to　a　particular　instance；　we
may　observe；　that　there　is　no　species　of　reasoning　more
common；　more　useful；　and　even　necessary　to　human　life；　than
that　which　is　derived　from　the　testimony　of　men；　and　the
reports　of　eye…　witnesses　and　spectators。　This　species　of
reasoning；　perhaps；　one　may　deny　to　be　founded　on　the
relation　of　cause　and　effect。　I　shall　not　dispute　about　a
word。　It　will　be　sufficient　to　observe　that　our　assurance　in
any　argument　of　this　kind　is　derived　from　no　other　principle
than　our　observation　of　the　veracity　of　human　testimony；　and
of　the　usual　conformity　of　facts　to　the　reports　of
witnesses。　It　being　a　general　maxim；　that　no　objects　have
any　discoverable　connexion　together；　and　that　all　the
inferences；　which　we　can　draw　from　one　to　another；　are
founded　merely　on　our　experience　of　their　constant　and
regular　conjunction；　it　is　evident；　that　we　ought　not　to
make　an　exception　to　this　maxim　in　favour　of　human
testimony；　whose　connexion　with　any　event　seems；　in　itself；
as　little　necessary　as　any　other。　Were　not　the　memory
tenacious　to　a　certain　degree；　had　not　men　commonly　an
inclination　to　truth　and　a　principle　of　probity；　were　they
not　sensible　to　shame；　when　detected　in　a　falsehood：　Were
not　these；　I　say；　discovered　by　　to　be
qualities；　inherent　in　human　nature；　we　should　never　repose
the　least　confidence　in　human　testimony。　A　man　delirious；　or
noted　for　falsehood　and　villainy；　has　no　manner　of　authority
with　us。

　　　　　And　as　the　evidence；　derived　from　witnesses　and　human
testimony；　is　founded　on　past　experience；　so　it　varies　with
the　experience；　and　is　regarded　either　as　a　　or　a
；　according　as　the　conjunction　between　any
particular　kind　of　report　and　any　kind　of　object　has　been
found　to　be　constant　or　variable。　There　are　a　number　of
circumstances　to　be　taken　into　consideration　in　all
judgements　of　this　kind；　and　the　ultimate　standard；　by　which
we　determine　all　disputes；　that　may　arise　concerning　them；
is　always　derived　from　experience　and　observation。　Where
this　experience　is　not　entirely　uniform　on　any　side；　it　is
attended　with　an　unavoidable　contrariety　in　our　judgements；
and　with　the　same　opposition　and　mutual　destruction　of
argument　as　in　every　other　kind　of　evidence。　We　frequently
hesitate　concerning　the　reports　of　others。　We　balance　the
opposite　circumstances；　which　cause　any　doubt　or
uncertainty；　and　when　we　discover　a　superiority　on　any　side；
we　incline　to　it；　but　still　with　a　diminution　of　assurance；
in　proportion　to　the　force　of　its　antagonist。

　　　　　This　contrariety　of　evidence；　in　the　present　case；　may
be　derived　from　several　different　causes；　from　the
opposition　of　contrary　testimony；　from　the　character　or
number　of　the　witnesses；　from　the　manner　of　their　delivering
their　testimony；　or　from　the　union　of　all　these
circumstances。　We　entertain　a　suspicion　concerning　any
matter　of　fact；　when　the　witnesses　contradict　each　other；
when　they　are　but　few；　or　of　a　doubtful　character；　when　they
have　an　interest　in　what　they　affirm；　when　they　deliver
their　testimony　with　hesitation；　or　on　the　contrary；　with
too　violent　asseverations。　There　are　many　other　particulars
of　the　same　kind；　which　may　diminish　or　destroy　the　force　of
any　argument；　derived　from　human　testimony。

　　　　　Suppose；　for　instance；　that　the　fact；　which　the
testimony　endeavours　to　establish；　partakes　of　the
extraordinary　and　the　marvellous；　in　that　case；　the
evidence；　resulting　from　the　testimony；　admits　of　a
diminution；　greater　or　less；　in　proportion　as　the　fact　is
more　or　less　unusual。　The　reason　why　we　place　any　credit　in
witnesses　and　historians；　is　not　derived　from　any
；　which　we　perceive　；　between　testimony
and　reality；　but　because　we　are　accustomed　to　find　a
conformity　between　them。　But　when　the　fact　attested　is　such
a　one　as　has　seldom　fallen　under　our　observation；　here　is　a
contest　of　two　opposite　experiences；　of　which　the　one
destroys　the　other；　as　far　as　its　force　goes；　and　the
superior　can　only　operate　on　the　mind　by　the　force；　which
remains。　The　very　same　principle　of　experience；　which　gives
us　a　certain　degree　of　assurance　in　the　testimony　of
witnesses；　gives　us　also；　in　this　case；　another　degree　of
assurance　against　the　fact；　which　they　endeavour　to
establish；　from　which　contradiction　th