an enquiry concerning human understanding-第18章

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infinitely　wise　and　powerful。　Ignorance　or　impotence　may　be
pleaded　for　so　limited　a　creature　as　man；　but　those
imperfections　have　no　place　in　our　Creator。　He　foresaw；　he
ordained；　he　intended　all　those　actions　of　men；　which　we　so
rashly　pronounce　criminal。　And　we　must　therefore　conclude；
either　that　they　are　not　criminal；　or　that　the　Deity；　not
man；　is　accountable　for　them。　But　as　either　of　these
positions　is　absurd　and　impious；　it　follows；　that　the
doctrine　from　which　they　are　deduced　cannot　possibly　be
true；　as　being　liable　to　all　the　same　objections。　An　absurd
consequence；　if　necessary；　proves　the　original　doctrine　to
be　absurd；　in　the　same　manner　as　criminal　actions　render
criminal　the　original　cause；　if　the　connexion　between　them
be　necessary　and　inevitable。

　　　　　This　objection　consists　of　two　parts；　which　we　shall
examine　separately；　；　that；　if　human　actions　can　be
traced　up；　by　a　necessary　chain；　to　the　Deity；　they　can
never　be　criminal；　on　account　of　the　infinite　perfection　of
that　Being　from　whom　they　are　derived；　and　who　can　intend
nothing　but　what　is　altogether　good　and　laudable。　Or；
；　if　they　be　criminal；　we　must　retract　the
attribute　of　perfection；　which　we　ascribe　to　the　Deity；　and
must　acknowledge　him　to　be　the　ultimate　author　of　guilt　and
moral　turpitude　in　all　his　creatures。

　　　　　The　answer　to　the　first　objection　seems　obvious　and
convincing。　There　are　many　philosophers　who；　after　an　exact
scrutiny　of　all　the　phenomena　of　nature；　conclude；　that　the
W/HOLE；　considered　as　one　system；　is；　in　every　period　of
its　existence；　ordered　with　perfect　benevolence；　and　that
the　utmost　possible　happiness　will；　in　the　end；　result　to
all　created　beings；　without　any　mixture　of　positive　or
absolute　ill　or　misery。　Every　physical　ill；　say　they；　makes
an　essential　part　of　this　benevolent　system；　and　could　not
possibly　be　removed；　even　by　the　Deity　himself；　considered
as　a　wise　agent；　without　giving　entrance　to　greater　ill；　or
excluding　greater　good；　which　will　result　from　it。　From　this
theory；　some　philosophers；　and　the　ancient　　among
the　rest；　derived　a　topic　of　consolation　under　all
afflictions；　while　they　taught　their　pupils　that　those　ills
under　which　they　laboured　were；　in　reality；　goods　to　the
universe；　and　that　to　an　enlarged　view；　which　could
comprehend　the　whole　system　of　nature；　every　event　became　an
object　of　joy　and　exultation。　But　though　this　topic　be
specious　and　sublime；　it　was　soon　found　in　practice　weak　and
ineffectual。　You　would　surely　more　irritate　than　appease　a
man　lying　under　the　racking　pains　of　the　gout　by　preaching
up　to　him　the　rectitude　of　those　general　laws；　which
produced　the　malignant　humours　in　his　body；　and　led　them
through　the　proper　canals；　to　the　sinews　and　nerves；　where
they　now　excite　such　acute　torments。　These　enlarged　views
may；　for　a　moment；　please　the　imagination　of　a　speculative
man；　who　is　placed　in　ease　and　security；　but　neither　can
they　dwell　with　constancy　on　his　mind；　even　though
undisturbed　by　the　emotions　of　pain　or　passion；　much　less
can　they　maintain　their　ground　when　attacked　by　such
powerful　antagonists。　The　affections　take　a　narrower　and
more　natural　survey　of　their　object；　and　by　an　economy；　more
suitable　to　the　infirmity　of　human　minds；　regard　alone　the
beings　around　us；　and　are　actuated　by　such　events　as　appear
good　or　ill　to　the　private　system。

　　　　　The　case　is　the　same　with　　as　with　
ill。　It　cannot　reasonably　be　supposed；　that　those　remote
considerations；　which　are　found　of　so　little　efficacy　with
regard　to　one；　will　have　a　more　powerful　influence　with
regard　to　the　other。　The　mind　of　man　is　so　formed　by　nature
that；　upon　the　appearance　of　certain　characters；
dispositions；　and　actions；　it　immediately　feels　the
sentiment　of　approbation　or　blame；　nor　are　there　any
emotions　more　essential　to　its　frame　and　constitution。　The
characters　which　engage　our　approbation　are　chiefly　such　as
contribute　to　the　peace　and　security　of　human　society；　as
the　characters　which　excite　blame　are　chiefly　such　as　tend
to　public　detriment　and　disturbance：　Whence　it　may
reasonably　be　presumed；　that　the　moral　sentiments　arise；
either　mediately　or　immediately；　from　a　reflection　of　these
opposite　interests。　What　though　philosophical　meditations
establish　a　different　opinion　or　conjecture；　that　everything
is　right　with　regard　to　the　W/HOLE；　and　that　the　qualities；
which　disturb　society；　are；　in　the　main；　as　beneficial；　and
are　as　suitable　to　the　primary　intention　of　nature　as　those
which　more　directly　promote　its　happiness　and　welfare？　Are
such　remote　and　uncertain　speculations　able　to
counterbalance　the　sentiments　which　arise　from　the　natural
and　immediate　view　of　the　objects？　A　man　who　is　robbed　of　a
considerable　sum；　does　he　find　his　vexation　for　the　loss
anywise　diminished　by　these　sublime　reflections？　Why　then
should　his　moral　resentment　against　the　crime　be　supposed
incompatible　with　them？　Or　why　should　not　the　acknowledgment
of　a　real　distinction　between　vice　and　virtue　be
reconcileable　to　all　speculative　systems　of　philosophy；　as
well　as　that　of　a　real　distinction　between　personal　beauty
and　deformity？　Both　these　distinctions　are　founded　in　the
natural　sentiments　of　the　human　mind：　And　these　sentiments
are　not　to　be　controuled　or　altered　by　any　philosophical
theory　or　speculation　whatsoever。

　　　　　The　　objection　admits　not　of　so　easy　and
satisfactory　an　answer；　nor　is　it　possible　to　explain
distinctly；　how　the　Deity　can　be　the　mediate　cause　of　all
the　actions　of　men；　without　being　the　author　of　sin　and
moral　turpitude。　These　are　mysteries；　which　mere　natural　and
unassisted　reason　is　very　unfit　to　handle；　and　whatever
system　she　embraces；　she　must　find　herself　involved　in
inextricable　difficulties；　and　even　contradictions；　at　every
step　which　she　takes　with　regard　to　such　subjects。　To
reconcile　the　indifference　and　contingency　of　human　actions
with　prescience；　or　to　defend　absolute　decrees；　and　yet　free
the　Deity　from　being　the　author　of　sin；　has　been　found
hitherto　to　exceed　all　the　power　of　philosophy。　Happy；　if
she　be　thence　sensible　of　her　temerity；　when　she　pries　into
these　sublime　mysteries；　and　leaving　a　scene　so　full　of
obscurities　and　perplexities；　return；　with　suitable　modesty；
to　her　true　and　proper　province；　the　examination　of　common
life；　where　she　will　find　difficulties　enough　to　employ　her
enquiries；　without　launching　into　so　boundless　an　ocean　of
doubt；　uncertainty；　and　contradiction！

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　IX。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Reason　of　Animals。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　A/LL　our　reasonings　concerning　matter　of　fact　are
founded　on　a　species　of　A/NALOGY；　which　leads　us　to　expect
from　any　cause　the　same　events；　which　we　have　observed　to
result　from　similar　causes。　Where　the　causes　are　entirely
similar；　the　analogy　is　perfect；　and　the　inference；　drawn
from　it；　is　regarded　as　certain　and　conclusive：　Nor　does　any
man　ever　entertain　a　doubt；　where　he　sees　a　piece　of　iron；
that　it　will　have　weight　and　cohesion　of　parts；　as　in　all
other　instances；　which　have　ever　fallen　under　his
observation。　But　where　the　objects　have　not　so　exact　a
similarity；　the　analogy　is　less　perfect；　and　the　inference
is　less　conclusive；　though　still　it　has　some　force；　in
proportion　to　the　degree　of　similarity　and　resemblance。　The
anatomical　observations；　formed　upon　one　animal；　are；　by
this　species　of　reasoning；　extended　to　all　animals；　and　it
is　certain；　that　when　the　circulation　of　the　blood；　for
instance；　is　clearly　proved　to　have　place　in　one　creature；
as　a　frog；　or　fish；　it　forms　a　strong　presumption；　that　the
same　principle　has　place　in　all。　These　analogical
observations　may　be　carried　farther；　even　to　this　science；
of　which　we　are　now　treating；　and　any　theory；　by　which　we
explain　the　operations　of　the　understanding；　or　the　origin
and　connexion　of　the　passions　in　man；　will　acquire
additional　authority；　if　we　find；　that　the　same　theory　is
requisite　to　explain　the　same　phenomena　in　all　other
animals。　We　shall　make　trial　of　this；　with　regard　to　the
hypothesis；　by　which　we　have；　in　the　foregoing　discourse；
endeavoured　to　account　for　all　experimental　reasonings；　and
it　is　hoped；　that　this　new　point　of　view　will　serve　to
confirm　all　our　former　observations。

　　　　　；　It　seems　evident；　that　animals　as　well　as　men
learn　many　things　from　experience；　and　infer；　that　the　same
events　will　always　follow　from　the　same　causes。　By　this
principle　they　become　acquainted　with　the　more　obvious
properties　of　external　objects；　and　gradually；　from　their
birth；　treasure　up　a　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　fire；　water；
earth；　stones；　heights；　depths；　&。；　and　of　the　effects
which　result　from　their　operation。　The　ignorance　and
inexperience　of　the　young　are　here　plainly　distinguishable
from　the　cunning　and　sagacity　of　the　old；　who　have　learned；
by　long　observation；　to　avoid　what　hurt　them；　and　to　pursue
what　gave　ease　or　pleasure。　A　horse；　that　has　been
accustomed　to　the　field；　becomes　acquainted　with　the　proper
height　which　he　can　leap；　and　will　never　attempt　what
exceeds　his　force　and　ability。　An　old　greyhound　will　trust
the　more　fatiguing　part　of　the　chace　to　the　younger；　and
will　place　himself　so　as　to　meet　the　hare　in　her　doubles；
nor　are　the　conjectures；　which　he　forms　on　this　occasion；
founded　in　any　thing　but　his　observation　and　experience。

　　　　　This　is　still　more　evident　from　the　effects　of
discipline　and　education　on　animals；　who；　by　the　proper
application　of　rewards　and　punishments；　may　be　taught　any
course　of　action；　and　most　contrary　to　their　natural
instincts　and　propensities。　Is　it　not　experience；　which
renders　a　dog　apprehensive　of　pain；　when　you　menace　him；　or
lift　up　the　whip　to　beat　him？　Is　it　not　even　experience；
which　makes　him　answer　to　his　name；　and　infer；　from　such　an
arbitrary　sound；　that　you　mean　him　rather　than　any　of　his
fellows；　and　intend　to　call　him；　when　you　pronounce　it　in　a
certain　manner；　and　with　a　certain　tone　and　accent？

　　　　　In　all　these　cases；　we　may　observe；　that　the　animal
infers　some　fact　beyond　what　immediately　strikes　his　senses；
and　that　this　inference　is　altogether　founded　on　past
experience；　while　the　creature　expects　from　the　present
object　the　same　consequences；　which　it　has　always　found　in
its　observation　to　result　from　similar　objects。

　　　　　；　It　is　impossible；　that　this　inference　of
the　animal　can　be　founded　on　any　process　of　argument　or
reasoning；　by　which　he　concludes；　that　like　events　must
follow　like　objects；　and　that　the　course　of　nature　will
always　be　regular　in　its　operations。　For　if　there　be　in
reality　any　arguments　of　this　nature；　they　surely　lie　too
abstruse　for　the　observation　of　such　imperfect
understandings；　since　it　may　well　employ　the　utmost　care　and
attention　of　a　philosophic　genius　to　discover　and　observe
them。　Animals；　therefore　are　not　guided　in　these　inferences
by　reasoning：　Neither　are　children；　neither　are　the
generality　of　mankind；　in　their　ordinary　actions　and
conclusions：　Neither　are　philosophers　themselves；　who