the prince(王子)-第4章
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principalities。 In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above； and
discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved。
I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states；
and those long accustomed to the family of their prince； than new ones； for
it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors； and to
deal prudently with circumstances as they arise； for a prince of average
powers to maintain himself in his state； unless he be deprived of it by
some extraordinary and excessive force； and if he should be so deprived of
it； whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper； he will regain it。
We have in Italy； for example； the Duke of Ferrara； who could not
have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84； nor those of Pope Julius
in '10； unless he had been long established in his dominions。 For the
hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend； hence it
happens that he will be more loved； and unless extraordinary vices cause
him to be hated； it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be
naturally well disposed towards him； and in the antiquity and duration of
his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost； for one
change always leaves the toothing for another。
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CHAPTER III
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES
But the difficulties occur in a new principality。 And firstly； if it be not
entirely new； but is； as it were； a member of a state which； taken
collectively； may be called composite； the changes arise chiefly from an
inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities； for men change
their rulers willingly； hoping to better themselves； and this hope induces
them to take up arms against him who rules： wherein they are deceived；
because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to
worse。 This follows also on another natural and common necessity； which
always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him
with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon
his new acquisition。
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality； and you are not able to keep those friends who
put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way
they expected； and you cannot take strong measures against them； feeling
bound to them。 For； although one may be very strong in armed forces； yet
in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives。
For these reasons Louis the Twelfth； King of France； quickly occupied
Milan； and as quickly lost it； and to turn him out the first time it only
needed Lodovico's own forces； because those who had opened the gates to
him； finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit； would
not endure the ill…treatment of the new prince。 It is very true that； after
acquiring rebellious provinces a second time； they are not so lightly lost
afterwards； because the prince； with little reluctance； takes the opportunity
of the rebellion to punish the delinquents； to clear out the suspects； and to
strengthen himself in the weakest places。 Thus to cause France to lose
Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico＇*＇ to raise
insurrections on the borders； but to cause him to lose it a second time it
was necessary to bring the whole world against him； and that his armies
should be defeated and driven out of Italy； which followed from the causes
above mentioned。
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＇*＇ Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro； a son of Francesco Sforza；
who married Beatrice d'Este。 He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500； and
died in 1510。
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the
second time。 The general reasons for the first have been discussed； it
remains to name those for the second； and to see what resources he had；
and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself
more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France。
Now I say that those dominions which； when acquired； are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them； are either of the same country and
language； or they are not。 When they are； it is easier to hold them；
especially when they have not been accustomed to self… government； and
to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the
prince who was ruling them； because the two peoples； preserving in other
things the old conditions； and not being unlike in customs； will live quietly
together； as one has seen in Brittany； Burgundy； Gascony； and Normandy；
which have been bound to France for so long a time： and； although there
may be some difference in language； nevertheless the customs are alike；
and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves。 He who
has annexed them； if he wishes to hold them； has only to bear in mind two
considerations： the one； that the family of their former lord is extinguished；
the other； that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered； so that in a very
short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality。
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language；
customs； or laws； there are difficulties； and good fortune and great energy
are needed to hold them； and one of the greatest and most real helps would
be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there。 This would
make his position more secure and durable； as it has made that of the Turk
in Greece； who； notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for
holding that state； if he had not settled there； would not have been able to
keep it。 Because； if one is on the spot； disorders are seen as they spring up；
and one can quickly remedy them； but if one is not at hand； they are heard
of only when they are great； and then one can no longer remedy them。
Besides this； the country is not pillaged by your officials； the subjects are
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satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince； thus； wishing to be good； they
have more cause to love him； and wishing to be otherwise； to fear him。 He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution；
as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the
greatest difficulty。
The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places；
which may be as keys to that state； for it is necessary either to do this or
else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry。 A prince does
not spend much on colonies； for with little or no expense he can send them
out and keep them there； and he offends a minority only of the citizens
from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants；
and those whom he offends； remaining poor and scattered； are never able
to injure him； whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet； and at
the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it
has to those who have been despoiled。 In conclusion； I say that these
colonies are not costly； they are more faithful； they injure less； and the
injured； as has been said； being poor and scattered； cannot hurt。 Upon this；
one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed；
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries； of more serious
ones they cannot； therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to
be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge。
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends
much more； having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
state； so that the acquisition turns into a loss； and many more are
exasperated； because the whole state is injured； through the shifting of the
garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship； and all
become hostile； and they are enemies who； whilst beaten on their own
ground； are yet able to do hurt。 For every reason； therefore； such guards
are as useless as a colony is useful。
Again； the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours； and to weaken the more powerful amongst them； taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall； by any accident； get a
footing there； for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced
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by those who are discontented； either through excess of ambition or
through fear； as one has seen already。 The Romans were brought into
Greece by the Aetolians； and in every other country where they obtained a
footing they were brought in by the inhabitants。 And the usual course of
affairs is that； as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country； all the
subject states are drawn to him； moved by the hatred which they feel
against the ruling power。 So that in respect to those subject states he has
not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself； for the whole of them
quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there。 He has only to take
care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority；
and then with his own forces； and with their goodwill； he can easily keep
down the more powerful of them； so as to remain entirely master in the
country。 And he who does not properly manage this business will soon
lose what he has acquired； and whilst he does hold it he will have endless
difficulti
