the prince(王子)-第10章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
which he held the principality； not only was he secure in the city of Fermo；
but he had become formidable to all his neighbours。 And his destruction
would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed
himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia； who took him with the Orsini
and Vitelli at Sinigalia； as was stated above。 Thus one year after he had
committed this parricide； he was strangled； together with Vitellozzo；
whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness。
Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles； and his like；
after infinite treacheries and cruelties； should live for long secure in his
country； and defend himself from external enemies； and never be
conspired against by his own citizens； seeing that many others； by means
of cruelty； have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state；
still less in the doubtful times of war。 I believe that this follows from
42
… Page 43…
The Prince
severities＇*＇ being badly or properly used。 Those may be called properly
used； if of evil it is possible to speak well； that are applied at one blow and
are necessary to one's security； and that are not persisted in afterwards
unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects。 The badly
employed are those which； notwithstanding they may be few in the
commencement； multiply with time rather than decrease。 Those who
practise the first system are able； by aid of God or man； to mitigate in
some degree their rule； as Agathocles did。 It is impossible for those who
follow the other to maintain themselves。
＇*＇ Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of 〃crudelta〃 than the
more obvious 〃cruelties。〃
Hence it is to be remarked that； in seizing a state； the usurper ought to
examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to
inflict； and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them
daily； and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them； and
win them to himself by benefits。 He who does otherwise； either from
timidity or evil advice； is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand；
neither can he rely on his subjects； nor can they attach themselves to him；
owing to their continued and repeated wrongs。 For injuries ought to be
done all at one time； so that； being tasted less； they offend less； benefits
ought to be given little by little； so that the flavour of them may last
longer。
And above all things； a prince ought to live amongst his people in such
a way that no unexpected circumstances； whether of good or evil； shall
make him change； because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times；
you are too late for harsh measures； and mild ones will not help you； for
they will be considered as forced from you； and no one will be under any
obligation to you for them。
43
… Page 44…
The Prince
CHAPTER IX
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY
But coming to the other pointwhere a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country； not by wickedness or any intolerable violence； but
by the favour of his fellow citizensthis may be called a civil principality：
nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to it； but rather a
happy shrewdness。 I say then that such a principality is obtained either by
the favour of the people or by the favour of the nobles。 Because in all
cities these two distinct parties are found； and from this it arises that the
people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles； and the nobles
wish to rule and oppress the people； and from these two opposite desires
there arises in cities one of three results； either a principality； self…
government； or anarchy。
A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles；
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity； for the nobles；
seeing they cannot withstand the people； begin to cry up the reputation of
one of themselves； and they make him a prince； so that under his shadow
they can give vent to their ambitions。 The people； finding they cannot
resist the nobles； also cry up the reputation of one of themselves； and
make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority。 He who obtains
sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more
difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people； because the
former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his
equals； and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his
liking。 But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself
alone； and has none around him； or few； who are not prepared to obey him。
Besides this； one cannot by fair dealing； and without injury to others；
satisfy the nobles； but you can satisfy the people； for their object is more
righteous than that of the nobles； the latter wishing to oppress； while the
former only desire not to be oppressed。 It is to be added also that a prince
can never secure himself against a hostile people； because of their being
too many； whilst from the nobles he can secure himself； as they are few in
number。 The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be
44
… Page 45…
The Prince
abandoned by them； but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear
abandonment； but also that they will rise against him； for they； being in
these affairs more far… seeing and astute； always come forward in time to
save themselves； and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to
prevail。 Further； the prince is compelled to live always with the same
people； but he can do well without the same nobles； being able to make
and unmake them daily； and to give or take away authority when it pleases
him。
Therefore； to make this point clearer； I say that the nobles ought to be
looked at mainly in two ways： that is to say； they either shape their course
in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune； or they do not。 Those
who so bind themselves； and are not rapacious； ought to be honoured and
loved； those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in two ways；
they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural want of
courage； in which case you ought to make use of them； especially of those
who are of good counsel； and thus； whilst in prosperity you honour them；
in adversity you do not have to fear them。 But when for their own
ambitious ends they shun binding themselves； it is a token that they are
giving more thought to themselves than to you； and a prince ought to
guard against such； and to fear them as if they were open enemies； because
in adversity they always help to ruin him。
Therefore； one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly； and this he can easily do seeing they only ask
not to be oppressed by him。 But one who； in opposition to the people；
becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles； ought； above everything； to
seek to win the people over to himself； and this he may easily do if he
takes them under his protection。 Because men； when they receive good
from him of whom they were expecting evil； are bound more closely to
their benefactor； thus the people quickly become more devoted to him
than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours； and the
prince can win their affections in many ways； but as these vary according
to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules； so I omit them； but； I
repeat； it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly； otherwise he
has no security in adversity。
45
… Page 46…
The Prince
Nabis；＇*＇ Prince of the Spartans； sustained the attack of all Greece；
and of a victorious Roman army； and against them he defended his country
and his government； and for the overcoming of this peril it was only
necessary for him to make himself secure against a few； but this would not
have been sufficient had the people been hostile。 And do not let any one
impugn this statement with the trite proverb that 〃He who builds on the
people； builds on the mud；〃 for this is true when a private citizen makes a
foundation there； and persuades himself that the people will free him when
he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates； wherein he would
find himself very often deceived； as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and
to Messer Giorgio Scali＇＋＇ in Florence。 But granted a prince who has
established himself as above； who can command； and is a man of courage；
undismayed in adversity； who does not fail in other qualifications； and
who； by his resolution and energy； keeps the whole people encouraged
such a one will never find himself deceived in them； and it will be shown
that he has laid his foundations well。
＇*＇ Nabis； tyrant of Sparta； conquered by the Romans under
Flamininus in 195 B。C。； killed 192 B。C。
＇＋＇ Messer Giorgio Scali。 This event is to be found in Machiavelli's
〃Florentine History；〃 Book III。
These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government； for such princes either rule
personally or through magistrates。 In the latter case their government is
weaker and more insecure； because it rests entirely on the goodwi
