philosophy of right-第12章

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from　the　conception　is　the　content　of　the　science　of　right。　

Remark：　The　content　of　this　science　may；　in　all　its　several　elements；　right；　property；　morality；
family；　state；　be　represented　in　this　way；　that　man　has　by　nature　the　impulse　to　right；　the　impulse　to
property；　to　morality；　to　sexual　love；　and　to　social　life。　If　instead　of　this　form；　which　belongs　to
empirical　psychology；　a　philosophic　form　be　preferred；　it　may　be　obtained　cheap　from　what；　in
modern　times　was　reputed　and　still　is　reputed　to　be　philosophy。　He　will　then　say　that　man　finds　in
himself　as　a　fact　of　consciousness　that　he　wills　right；　property；　the　state；　etc。　Later　will　be　given　still
another　form　of　the　content　which　appears　here　in　the　shape　of　impulses；　that；　namely；　of　duties。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　20。

The　reflection　which　is　brought　to　bear　upon　impulses；　placing　them　before　itself；
estimating　them；　comparing　them　with　one　another；　and　contrasting　them　with
their　means　and　consequences；　and　also　with　a　whole　of　satisfaction；　namely
happiness；　brings　the　formal　universal　to　this　material；　and　in　an　external　way
purifies　it　of　its　crudity　and　barbarism。　This　propulsion　by　the　universality　of
thought　is　the　absolute　worth　of　civilisation　（§　187）。　

Addition。　In　happiness　thought　has　already　the　upper　hand　with　the　force　of　natural　impulse；
since　it　is　not　satisfied　with　what　is　momentary；　but　requires　happiness　as　a　whole。　This　happiness
is　dependent　upon　civilisation　to　the　extent　to　which　civilisation　confirms　the　universal。　But　in　the
ideal　of　happiness　there　are　two　elements。　There　is　

　　　1。a　universal　that　is　higher　than　all　particulars；　vet；　as　the　content　of　this　universal　is　in　turn　only
　　　　　universal　pleasure；　there　arises　once　more　the　individual；　particular　and　finite；　and　retreat
　　　　　must　be　made　to　impulse；　
　　　2。Since　the　content　of　happiness　lies　in　the　subjective　perception　of　each　individual；　this
　　　　　universal　end　is　again　particular；　nor　is　there　present　in　it　any　true　unity　of　content　and　form。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　21。

But　the　truth　of　this　formal　universality；　which　taken　by　itself　is　undetermined　and
finds　definite　character　in　externally　given　material；　is　the　self…directing
universality　which　is　will　or　freedom。　Since　the　will　has　as　its　object；　content　and
end；　universality　itself；　and　thus　assumes　the　form　of　the　infinite；　it　is　free　not
only　in　itself　or　implicitly；　but　for　itself　or　explicitly。　It　is　the　true　idea。　

Remark：　The　self…consciousness　of　the　will　in　the　form　of　appetite　or　impulse　is　sensible；　the
sensible　in　general　indicating　the　externality　of　self…consciousness；　or　that　condition　in　which
self…consciousness　is　outside　of　itself。　Now　this　sensible　side　is　one　of　the　two　elements　of　the
reflecting　will；　and　the　other　is　the　abstract　universality　of　thought。　But　the　absolute　will　has　as　its
object　the　will　itself　as　such　in　its　pure　universality。　In　this　universality　the　directness　of　the　natural
will　is　superseded；　and　so　also　is　the　private　individuality　which　is　produced　by　reflection　and
infects　the　natural　condition。　But　to　supersede　these　and　lift　them　into　the　universal；　constitutes　the
activity　of　thought。　Thus　the　self…consciousness；　which　purifies　its　object；　content　or　end；　and
exalts　it　to　universality；　is　thought　carrying　itself　through　into　will。　It　is　at　this　point　that　it　becomes
clear　that　the　will　is　true　and　free　only　as　thinking　intelligence。　The　slave　knows　not　his　essence；　his
infinitude；　his　freedom；　he　does　not　know　himself　in　his　essence；　and　not　to　know　himself　is　not　to
think　himself。　The　self…consciousness；　which　by　thought　apprehends　that　itself　is　essence；　and　thus
puts　away　from　itself　the　accidental　and　untrue；　constitutes　the　principle　of　right；　morality；　and　all
forms　of　ethical　life。　They　who；　in　speaking　philosophically　of　right；　morality；　and　ethical　life；　would
exclude　thought　and　turn　to　feeling；　the　heart；　the　breast；　and　inspiration；　express　the　deepest
contempt　for　thought　and　science。　And　science　itself；　overwhelmed　with　despair　and　utter
insipidity；　makes　barbarism　and　absence　of　thought　a　principle；　and　so　far　as　in　it　lay　robbed　men
of　all　truth；　dignity；　and　worth。　

Addition。　In　philosophy　truth　is　had　when　the　conception　corresponds　to　reality。　A　body　is　the
reality；　and　soul　is　the　conception。　Soul　and　body　should　be　adequate　to　each　other。　A　dead　man
is　still　an　existence；　but　no　longer　a　true　existence；　it　is　a　reality　void　of　conception。　For　that　reason
the　dead　body　decays。　So　with　the　true　will；　that　which　it　wills；　namely；　its　content；　is　identical　with
it；　and　so　freedom　wills　freedom。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　22。

The　will　which　exists　absolutely　is　truly　infinite；　because　its　object　being　the　will
itself；　is　for　it　not　another　or　a　limitation。　In　the　object　the　will　has　simply　reverted
into　itself。　Moreover；　it　is　not　mere　possibility；　capacity；　potentiality　（potential；　but
infinitely　actual　（infinitum　actu）；　because　the　reality　of　the　conception　or　its
visible　externality　is　internal　to　itself。　

Remark：　Hence　when　the　free　will　is　spoken　of　without　the　qualification　of　absolute　freedom；
only　the　capacity　of　freedom　is　meant；　or　the　natural　and　finite　will　（§　11）；　and；　notwithstanding　all
words　and　opinions　to　the　contrary；　not　the　free　will。　Since　the　understanding　comprehends　the
infinite　only　in　its　negative　aspect；　and　hence　as　a　beyond；　it　thinks　to　do　the　infinite　all　the　more
honour　the　farther　it　removes　it　into　the　vague　distance；　and　the　more　it　takes　it　as　a　foreign　thing。
In　free　will　the　true　infinite　is　present　and　real；　it　is　itself　the　actually　present　self…contained　idea。　

Addition。　The　infinite　has　rightly　been　represented　as　a　circle。　The　straight　line　goes　out　farther
and　farther；　and　symbolises　the　merely　negative　and　bad　infinite；　which；　unlike　the　true；　does　not
return　into　itself。　The　free　will　is　truly　infinite；　for　it　is　not　a　mere　possibility　or　disposition。　Its
external　reality　is　its　own　inner　nature；　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　23。

Only　in　this　freedom　is　the　will　wholly　by　itself；　because　it　refers　to　nothing　but
itself；　and　all　dependence　upon　any　other　thing　falls　away。　The　will　is　true；　or
rather　truth　itself；　because　its　character　consists　in　its　being　in　its　manifested
reality；　or　correlative　opposite；　what　it　is　in　its　conception。　In　other　words；　the
pure　conception　has　the　perception　or　intuition　of　itself　as　its　end　and　reality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　24。

The　will　is　universal；　because　in　it　all　limitation　and　particular　individuality　are
superseded。　These　one…sided　phases　are　found　only　in　the　difference　between　the
conception　and　its　object　or　content；　or；　from　another　standpoint；　in　the
difference　between　the　conscious　independent　existence　of　the　subject；　and　the
will's　implicit；　or　self…involved　existence；　or　between　its　excluding　and　concluding
individuality；　and　its　universality。　

Remark：　The　different　phases　of　universality　are　tabulated　In　the　logic　（Encyclopaedia。　of　the
Phil。　Sciences；　§§　118…126）。　Imaginative　thinking　always　takes　universality　in　an　abstract　and
external　way。　But　absolute　universality　is　not　to　be　thought　of　either　as　the　universality　of　reflection；
which　is　a　kind　of　consensus　or　generality；　or；　as　the　abstract　universality　and　self…identity；　which　is
fashioned　by　the　understanding　（§　6；　note）；　and　keeps　aloof　from　the　individual。　It　is　rather　the
concrete；　self…contained；　and　self…referring　universality；　which　is　the　substance；　intrinsic　genus；　or
immanent　idea　of　self…consciousness。　It　is　a　conception　of　free　will　as　the　universal；　transcending　its
object；　passing　through　and　beyond　its　own　specific　character；　and　then　becoming　identical　with
itself。　This　absolute　universal　is　what　is　in　general　called　the　rational；　and　is　to　be　apprehended　only
in　this　speculative　way。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　25。

The　subjective　side　of　the　will　is　the　side　of　its　self…consciousness　and
individuality　（§　7）；　as　distinguished　from　its　implicit　conception。　This　subjectivity
is　

＇a＇　pure　form　or　absolute　unity　of　self…consciousness　with　itself。　This　unity　is　the
equation　〃　I　=　I；〃　consciousness　being　characterised　by　a　thoroughly　inward　and
abstract　self…dependence。　It　is　pure　certitude　of　itself　in　contrast　with　the　truth；　

＇b＇　particularity　of　will；　as　caprice　with　its　accidental　content　of　pleasurable　ends；　

＇c＇　in　general　a　one…sided　form　（§　8）；　in　so　far　as　that　which　is　willed　is　at　first　an
unfulfilled　end；　or　a　content　which　simply　belongs　to　self…consciousness。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　26。

＇a＇　In　so　far　as　free　will　is　determined　by　itself；　and　is　in　accord　with　its
conception　and　true；　it　is　wholly　objective　will。　＇b＇　But　objective
self…consciousness；　which　has　not　the　form　of　the　infinite；　is　a　will　sunk　in　its
object　or　condition；　whatever　the　content　of　that　may　be。　It　is　the　will　of　the
child；　or　the　will　present　in　slavery　or　superstition。　＇c＇　Objectivity　is　finally　a
one…sided　form　in　opposition　to　the　subjective　phase　of　will　；　it　is　direct　reality；　or
external　existence。　In　this　sense　the　will　becomes　objective　only　by　the　execution
of　its　ends。　

Remark：　These　logical　phases　of　subjectivity　and　objectivity；　since　they　are　often　made　use　of　in
the　sequel；　are　here　exposed；　with　the　express　purpose　of　noting　that　it　happens　with　them　as　with
other　distinctions　and　opposed　aspects　of　reflection；　they　by　virtue　of　their　finite　and　dialectic
character　pass　over　into　their　opposites。　For　imagination　and　understanding　the　meanings　of
antithetic　phases　are　not　convertible；　because　their　identity　is　still　internal。　But　in　will；　on　the
contrary；　these　phases；　which　ought　to　be　at　once　abstract　and　yet　also　sides　of　that　which　can　be
known　only　as　concrete；　lead　of　themselves　to　identity；　and　to　an　exchange　of　meaning。　To　the
understanding　this　is　unintelligible。　Thus；　e。g。；　the　will；　as　a　freedom　which　exists　in　itself；　is
subjectivity　itself；　thus　subjectivity　is　the　conception　of　the　will；　and　therefore　its　objectivity。　But
subjectivity　is　finite　in　opposition　to　objectivity；　yet　in　this　opposition　the　will　is　＇lot　isolated；　but　in
intricate　union　with　the　object　；　and　thus　its　finitude　consists　quite　as　much　in　its　not　being
subjective；　etc。　What　in　the　sequel　is　to　be　meant　by　the　subjective　or　the　objective　side　of　the　will；
has　each　time　to　be　made　clear　from　the　context；　which　will　supply　their　positions　in　relation　to　the
totality。　

Addition。　It　is　ordinarily　supposed　that　subjective　and　objective　are　blank　opposites　；　but　this　is
not　the　case。　Rather　do　they　pass　into　one　another；　for　they　are　not　abstract　aspects　like　positive
and　negative；　but　have　already　a　concrete　significance。　To　consider　in　the　first　instance　the
expression　〃subjective；〃　this　may　mean　an　end　which　is　merely　the　end　of　a　certain　subject。　In　this
sense　a　poor　work　of　art；　that　is　not　adequate　to　the　thing　is　merely　subjective。　But；　further；　this
expression　may　point　to　the　content　of　the　will；　and　is　then　of　about　the　same　meaning　as
capricious；　t