philosophy of right-第11章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


many　objects　and　ways　of　satisfaction。　The　will；　by　giving　itself　in　this　two…fold
indefiniteness　the　form　of　individuality　（§　7）；　resolves；　and　only　as　resolving　is　it
actual。　

Remark：　Instead　of　to　〃　resolve；〃　i。e。　to　supersede　the　indefinite　condition　in　which　a　content　is
merely　possible；　our　language　has　the　expression　〃decide　〃　（〃　unfold　itself　〃）。　The　indeterminate
condition　of　the　will；　as　neutral　but　infinitely　fruitful　germ　of　all　existence；　contains　within　itself　its
definite　character　and　ends；　and　brings　them　forth　solely　out　of　itself。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　13。

By　resolution；　will　fixes　itself　as　the　will　of　a　definite　individual；　and　as　thereby
distinguishing　itself　from　another。　However　apart　from　this　finite　character　which
it　has　as　consciousness　（§　8）；　the　immediate　will　is　in　virtue　of　the　distinction
between　its　form　and　its　content　formal。　Hence　its　resolution　as　such　is　abstract；
and　its　content　is　not　yet　the　content　and　work　of　its　freedom。　

Remark：　To　the　intelligence；　as　thinking；　the　object　or　content　remains　universal　；　the　intelligence
retains　the　form　merely　of　a　universal　activity。　Now　the　universal　signifies　in　will　that　which　is　mine；
i。e。　it　is　individuality。　And　yet；　also；　the　direct　and　formal　will　is　abstract　；　its　individuality　is　not　yet
filled　with　its　free　universality。　Hence　at　the　beginning　the　peculiar　finitude　of　the　intelligence　is　in
will；　and　only　by　exalting　itself　again　to　thought　and　giving　itself　intrinsic　universality　does　the　will
transcend　the　distinction　of　form　and　content　and　make　itself　objective　infinite　will。　It　is　therefore　a
misunderstanding　of　the　nature　of　thought　and　will　to　suppose　that　in　the　will　man　is　infinite；　while　in
thought　and　even　in　reason　he　is　limited。　In　so　far　as　thought　and　will　are　still　distinct；　the　reverse　is
rather　the　case；　and　thinking　reason；　when　it　becomes　will；　assigns　itself　to　finitude。　

Addition。　A　will　which　resolves　nothing；　is　not　an　actual　will；　that　which　is　devoid　of　definite
character　never　reaches　a　volition。　The　reason　for　hesitation　may　lie　in　a　sensitiveness；　which　is
aware　that　in　determining　itself　it　is　engaged　with　what　is　finite；　is　assigning　itself　a　limit；　and
abandoning　its　infinity　；　it　may　thus　hold　to　its　decision　not　to　renounce　the　totality　which　it　intends。
Such　a　feeling　is　dead；　even　when　it　aims　to　be　something　beautiful。　〃Who　will　be　great；〃　says
Goethe；　〃must　be　able　to　limit　himself。〃　By　volition　alone　man　enters　actuality；　however　distasteful
it　may　be　to　him；　for　indolence　will　not　desert　its　own　self…brooding；　in　which　it　clings　to　a　universal
possibility。　But　possibility　is　not　yet　actuality。　Hence　the　will；　which　is　secure　simply　of　itself；　does
not　as　yet　lose　itself　in　any　definite　reality。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　14。

The　finite　will；　which　has　merely　from　the　standpoint　of　form　doubled　itself　back
upon　itself；　and　has　become　the　infinite　and　self…secluded　I　（§　5）；　stands　above
its　content　of　different　impulses　and　also　above　the　several　ways　by　which　they
are　realised　and　satisfied。　At　the　same　time；　as　it　is　only　formally　infinite；　it　is
confined　to　this　very　content　as　the　decisive　feature　of　its　nature　and　external
actuality；　although　it　is　undetermined　and　not　confined　to　one　content　rather　than
another　（§§　6；　11）。　As　to　the　return　of　the　I　into　itself　such　a　will　is　only　a
possible　will；　which　may　or　may　not　be　mine；　and　the　I　is　only　the　possibility　of
deputing　itself　to　this　or　that　object。　Hence　amongst　these　definite　phases；　which
in　this　light　are　for　the　I　external；　the　will　chooses。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　15。

Freedom　of　the　will　is；　in　this　view　of　it；　caprice；　in　which　are　contained　both　a
reflection；　which　is　free　and　abstracted　from　everything　and　a　dependence　upon　a
content　or　matter　either　internally　or　externally　provided。　Since　the　content　is　in
itself　or　implicitly　necessary　as　all　end；　and　in　opposition　to　this　reflection　is　a
definite　possibility；　caprice；　when　it　is　will；　is　in　its　nature　contingent。　

Remark：　The；　usual　idea　of　freedom　is　that　of　caprice。　It　is　a　midway　stage　of　reflection
between　the　will　as　merely　natural　impulse　and　the　will　as　free　absolutely。　When　it　is　said　that
freedom　as　a；　general　thing　consists　in　doing　what　one　likes；　such　an　idea　must　be　taken　to　imply
an　utter　lack　of　developed　thought；　containing　as　yet　not　even　the　suspicion　of　what　is　meant　by
the　absolutely　free　will；　right；　the　ethical　system；　etc。　Reflection；　being　the　formal　universality　and　I
unity　of　self…consciousness；　is　the　will's　abstract　certitude　of　its　freedom；　but　it　is　not　yet　the　truth
of　it；　because　it　has　not　as　yet　itself　for　content　and　end；　the　subjective　side　is　still　different　from　the
objective。　Thus　the　content　in　such　a　case　remains　purely　and　completely　finite。　Caprice；　instead　of
being　will　in　its　truth；　is　rather　will　in　its　contradiction。　

In　the　controversy　carried　on；　especially　at　the　time　of　the　metaphysic　of　Wolf；　as　to　whether　the
will　is　really　free　or　our　consciousness　of　its　freedom　is　a　delusion；　it　was　this　caprice；　which　was　in
the　minds　of　both　parties。　Against　the　certitude　of　abstract　self…direction；　determinism　rightly
opposed　a　content；　which　was　externally　presented；　and　not　being　contained　in　this　certitude　came
from　without。　It　did　not　matter　whether　this　〃without〃　were　impulse；　imagination；　or　in　general　a
consciousness　so　filled　that　the　content　was　not　the　peculiar　possession　of　the　self…activity　as　such。
Since　only　the　formal　element　of　free　self…direction　is　immanent　in　caprice；　while　the　other　element
is　something　given　to　it　from　without；　to　take　caprice　as　freedom　may　fairly　be　named　a　delusion。
Freedom　in　every　philosophy　of　reflection；　whether　it　be　the　Kantian　or　the　Friesian；　which　is　the
Kantian　superficialised；　is　nothing　more　than　this　formal　self…activity。　

Addition。　Since　I　have　the　possibility　of　determining　himself　in　this　or　that　way；　since　I　have　the
power　of　choice；　possess　caprice；　or　what　is　commonly　called　freedom。　This　choice　is　due　to　the
universality　of　the　will；　enabling　me　to　make　my　own　this　thing　or　another。　This　possession　is　a
particular　content；　which　is　therefore　not　adequate　to　me；　but　separated　from　me；　and　is　mine　only
in　possibility；　just　as　I　am　the　possibility　of　bringing　myself　into　coincidence　with　it。　Hence　choice　is
due　to　the　indeterminateness　of　the　I；　and　to　the　determinateness　of　a　content。　But　as　to　this
content　the　will　is　not　free；　although　it　has　in　itself　formally　the　side　of　infinitude。　No　such　content
corresponds　to　will　；　in　no　content　can　it　truly　find　itself。　In　caprice　it　is　involved　that　the　content　is
not　formed　by　the　nature　of　my　will；　but　by　contingency。　I　am　dependent　upon　this　content。　This　is
the　contradiction　contained　in　caprice。　Ordinary　man　believes　that　he　is　free；　when　lie　is　allowed　to
act　capriciously；　but　precisely　in　caprice　is　it　inherent　that　he　is　not　free。　When　I　will　the　rational；　I
do　not　act　as　a　particular　individual　but　according　to　the　conception　of　ethical　life　in　general。　In　an
ethical　act　I　establish　not　myself　but　the　thing。　A　man；　who　acts　perversely；　exhibits　particularity。
The　rational　is　the　highway　on　which　every　one　travels；　and　no　one　is　specially　marked。　When　a
great　artist　finishes　a　work　we　say：　〃It　must　be　so。〃　The　particularity　of　the；　artist　has　wholly
disappeared　and　the　work　shows　no　mannerism。　Phidias　has　no　mannerism；　the　statue　itself　lives
and　moves。　But　the　poorer　is　the　artist；　the　more　easily　we　discern　himself；　his　particularity　all
caprice。　If　we　adhere　to　the　consideration　that　in　caprice　a　man　can　will　what　he　pleases；　we　have
certainly　freedom　of　a　kind；　but　again；　if　we　hold　to　the　view　that　the　content　is　given；　then　man
must　be　determined　by　it；　and　in　this　light　is　no　longer　free。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　16。

What　is　resolved　upon　and　chosen　（§　14）　the　will　may　again　give　up　（§　5）。　Yet；
even　with　the　possibility　of　transcending　any　other　content　which　it　may
substitute；　and　of　proceeding　in　this　way　ad　infinitum；　the　will　does　not　advance
beyond　finitude；　because　every　content　in　turn　is　different　from　the　form　and　is
finite。　The　opposite　aspect；　namely　indeterminateness；　irresolution　or　abstraction；
is　also　one…sided。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　17。

Since　the　contradiction　involved　in　caprice　（§　15）　is　the　dialectic　of　the　impulses
and　inclinations；　it　is　manifested　in　their　mutual　antagonism。　The　satisfaction　of
one　demands　the　subjection　and　sacrifice　of　the　satisfaction　of　another。　Since　an
impulse　is　merely　the　simple　tendency　of　its　own　essential　nature；　and　has　no
measure　in　itself；　to　subject　or　sacrifice　the　satisfaction　of　any　impulse　is　a
contingent　decision　of　caprice。　In　such　a　case　caprice　may　act　upon　the
calculation　as　to　which　impulse　will　bring　the　greater　satisfaction；　or　may　have
some　other　similar　purpose。　

Addition。　Impulses　and　inclinations　are　in　the　first　instance　the　content　of　will；　and　only
reflection　transcends　them。　But　these　impulses　are　self…directing；　crowding　upon　and　jostling　one
another；　and　all　seeking　to　be　satisfied。　To　set　all　but　one　in　the　background；　and　put　myself　into
this　one；　is　to　limit　and　distort　myself；　since　I；　in　so　doing；　renounce　my　universality；　which　is　a
system　of　the　impulses。　Just　as　little　help　is　found　in　a　mere　subordination　of　them；　a　course　usually
followed　by　the　understanding。　There　is　available　no　criterion　by　which　to　make　such　an
arrangement；　and　hence　the　demand　for　a　subordination　is　usually　sustained　by　tedious　and
irrelevant　allusions　to　general　savings。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　18。

With　regard　to　the　moral　estimate　of　impulses；　dialectic　appears　in　this　form。　The
phases　of　the　direct　or　natural　will　are　immanent　and　positive；　and　thus　good。
Hence　man　is　by　nature　good。　But　natural　characteristics；　since　they　are　opposed
to　freedom　and　the　conception　of　the　spirit；　and　are；　hence；　negative；　must　be
eradicated。　Thus　man　is　by　nature　evil。　To　decide　for　either　view　is　a　matter　of
subjective　caprice。　

Addition。　The　Christian　doctrine　that　man　is　by　nature　evil　is　loftier　than　the　opposite　that　he　is
naturally　good；　and　is　to　be　interpreted　philosophically　in　this　way。　Man　as　spirit　is　a　free　being；
who　need　not　give　way　to　impulse。　Hence　in　his　direct　and　unformed　condition；　man　is　in　a
situation　in　which　he　ought　not　to　be；　and　he　must　free　himself。　This　is　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine
of　original　sin；　without　which　Christianity　would　not　be　the　religion　of　freedom。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　19。

In　the　demand　that　impulses　must　be　purified　is　found　the　general　idea　that　they
must　be　freed　from　the　form　of　direct　subjection　to　nature；　and　from　a　content
that　is　subjective　and　contingent；　and　must　be　restored　to　their　substantive
essence。　The　truth　contained　in　this　indefinite　demand　is　that　impulses　should　be
phases　of　will　in　a　rational　system。　To　apprehend　them　in　this　way　as　proceeding
from　the　conception　is　the　content　of　the　science　of　right。　

Remark：　The　content　of　this　science　may；　in　all