charmides-第6章

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4。　　The　myths　of　Plato。







5。　　The　relation　of　the　Republic；　Statesman　and　Laws。







6。　　The　legend　of　Atlantis。







7。　　Psychology。







8。　　Comparison　of　the　Laws　of　Plato　with　Spartan　and　Athenian　Laws　and



Institutions。











CHARMIDES。







INTRODUCTION。







The　subject　of　the　Charmides　is　Temperance　or　（Greek）；　a　peculiarly　Greek



notion；　which　may　also　be　rendered　Moderation　（Compare　Cic。　Tusc。　'（Greek）；



quam　soleo　equidem　tum　temperantiam；　tum　moderationem　appellare；　nonnunquam



etiam　modestiam。'）；　Modesty；　Discretion；　Wisdom；　without　completely



exhausting　by　all　these　terms　the　various　associations　of　the　word。　　It　may



be　described　as　'mens　sana　in　corpore　sano；'　the　harmony　or　due　proportion



of　the　higher　and　lower　elements　of　human　nature　which　'makes　a　man　his　own



master；'　according　to　the　definition　of　the　Republic。　　In　the　accompanying



translation　the　word　has　been　rendered　in　different　places　either



Temperance　or　Wisdom；　as　the　connection　seemed　to　require：　　for　in　the



philosophy　of　Plato　（Greek）　still　retains　an　intellectual　element　（as



Socrates　is　also　said　to　have　identified　（Greek）　with　（Greek）：　　Xen。　Mem。）　



and　is　not　yet　relegated　to　the　sphere　of　moral　virtue；　as　in　the



Nicomachean　Ethics　of　Aristotle。







The　beautiful　youth；　Charmides；　who　is　also　the　most　temperate　of　human



beings；　is　asked　by　Socrates；　'What　is　Temperance？'　　He　answers



characteristically；　（1）　'Quietness。'　　'But　Temperance　is　a　fine　and　noble



thing；　and　quietness　in　many　or　most　cases　is　not　so　fine　a　thing　as



quickness。'　　He　tries　again　and　says　（2）　that　temperance　is　modesty。　　But



this　again　is　set　aside　by　a　sophistical　application　of　Homer：　　for



temperance　is　good　as　well　as　noble；　and　Homer　has　declared　that　'modesty



is　not　good　for　a　needy　man。'　　（3）　Once　more　Charmides　makes　the　attempt。　



This　time　he　gives　a　definition　which　he　has　heard；　and　of　which　Socrates



conjectures　that　Critias　must　be　the　author：　　'Temperance　is　doing　one's



own　business。'　　But　the　artisan　who　makes　another　man's　shoes　may　be



temperate；　and　yet　he　is　not　doing　his　own　business；　and　temperance　defined



thus　would　be　opposed　to　the　division　of　labour　which　exists　in　every



temperate　or　well…ordered　state。　　How　is　this　riddle　to　be　explained？







Critias；　who　takes　the　place　of　Charmides；　distinguishes　in　his　answer



between　'making'　and　'doing；'　and　with　the　help　of　a　misapplied　quotation



from　Hesiod　assigns　to　the　words　'doing'　and　'work'　an　exclusively　good



sense：　　Temperance　is　doing　one's　own　business；（4）　is　doing　good。







Still　an　element　of　knowledge　is　wanting　which　Critias　is　readily　induced



to　admit　at　the　suggestion　of　Socrates；　and；　in　the　spirit　of　Socrates　and



of　Greek　life　generally；　proposes　as　a　fifth　definition；　（5）　Temperance　is



self…knowledge。　　But　all　sciences　have　a　subject：　　number　is　the　subject　of



arithmetic；　health　of　medicinewhat　is　the　subject　of　temperance　or



wisdom？　　The　answer　is　that　（6）　Temperance　is　the　knowledge　of　what　a　man



knows　and　of　what　he　does　not　know。　　But　this　is　contrary　to　analogy；　there



is　no　vision　of　vision；　but　only　of　visible　things；　no　love　of　loves；　but



only　of　beautiful　things；　how　then　can　there　be　a　knowledge　of　knowledge？　



That　which　is　older；　heavier；　lighter；　is　older；　heavier；　and　lighter　than



something　else；　not　than　itself；　and　this　seems　to　be　true　of　all　relative



notionsthe　object　of　relation　is　outside　of　them；　at　any　rate　they　can



only　have　relation　to　themselves　in　the　form　of　that　object。　　Whether　there



are　any　such　cases　of　reflex　relation　or　not；　and　whether　that　sort　of



knowledge　which　we　term　Temperance　is　of　this　reflex　nature；　has　yet　to　be



determined　by　the　great　metaphysician。　　But　even　if　knowledge　can　know



itself；　how　does　the　knowledge　of　what　we　know　imply　the　knowledge　of　what



we　do　not　know？　　Besides；　knowledge　is　an　abstraction　only；　and　will　not



inform　us　of　any　particular　subject；　such　as　medicine；　building；　and　the



like。　　It　may　tell　us　that　we　or　other　men　know　something；　but　can　never



tell　us　what　we　know。







Admitting　that　there　is　a　knowledge　of　what　we　know　and　of　what　we　do　not



know；　which　would　supply　a　rule　and　measure　of　all　things；　still　there



would　be　no　good　in　this；　and　the　knowledge　which　temperance　gives　must　be



of　a　kind　which　will　do　us　good；　for　temperance　is　a　good。　　But　this



universal　knowledge　does　not　tend　to　our　happiness　and　good：　　the　only　kind



of　knowledge　which　brings　happiness　is　the　knowledge　of　good　and　evil。　　To



this　Critias　replies　that　the　science　or　knowledge　of　good　and　evil；　and



all　the　other　sciences；　are　regulated　by　the　higher　science　or　knowledge　of



knowledge。　　Socrates　replies　by　again　dividing　the　abstract　from　the



concrete；　and　asks　how　this　knowledge　conduces　to　happiness　in　the　same



definite　way　in　which　medicine　conduces　to　health。







And　now；　after　making　all　these　concessions；　which　are　really　inadmissible；



we　are　still　as　far　as　ever　from　ascertaining　the　nature　of　temperance；



which　Charmides　has　already　discovered；　and　had　therefore　better　rest　in



the　knowledge　that　the　more　temperate　he　is　the　happier　he　will　be；　and　not



trouble　himself　with　the　speculations　of　Socrates。







In　this　Dialogue　may　be　noted　（1）　The　Greek　ideal　of　beauty　and　goodness；



the　vision　of　the　fair　soul　in　the　fair　body；　realised　in　the　beautiful



Charmides；　（2）　The　true　conception　of　medicine　as　a　science　of　the　whole　as



well　as　the　parts；　and　of　the　mind　as　well　as　the　body；　which　is　playfully



intimated　in　the　story　of　the　Thracian；　（3）　The　tendency　of　the　age　to



verbal　distinctions；　which　here；　as　in　the　Protagoras　and　Cratylus；　are



ascribed　to　the　ingenuity　of　Prodicus；　and　to　interpretations　or　rather



parodies　of　Homer　or　Hesiod；　which　are　eminently　characteristic　of　Plato



and　his　contemporaries；　（4）　The　germ　of　an　ethical　principle　contained　in



the　notion　that　temperance　is　'doing　one's　own　business；'　which　in　the



Republic　（such　is　the　shifting　character　of　the　Platonic　philosophy）　is



given　as　the　definition；　not　of　temperance；　but　of　justice；　（5）　The



impatience　which　is　exhibited　by　Socrates　of　any　definition　of　temperance



in　which　an　element　of　science　or　knowledge　is　not　included；　（6）　The



beginning　of　metaphysics　and　logic　implied　in　the　two　questions：　　whether



there　can　be　a　science　of　science；　and　whether　the　knowledge　of　what　you



know　is　the　same　as　the　knowledge　of　what　you　do　not　know；　and　also　in　the



distinction　between　'what　you　know'　and　'that　you　know；'　（Greek；）　here　too



is　the　first　conception　of　an　absolute　self…determined　science　（the　claims



of　which；　however；　are　disputed　by　Socrates；　who　asks　cui　bono？）　as　well　as



the　first　suggestion　of　the　difficulty　of　the　abstract　and　concrete；　and



one　of　the　earliest　anticipations　of　the　relation　of　subject　and　object；



and　of　the　subjective　element　in　knowledgea　'rich　banquet'　of



metaphysical　questions　in　which　we　'taste　of　many　things。'　　（7）　And　still



the　mind　of　Plato；　having　snatched　for　a　moment　at　these　shadows　of　the



future；　quickly　rejects　them：　　thus　early　has　he　reached　the　conclusion



that　there　can　be　no　science　which　is　a　'science　of　nothing'　（Parmen。）。　



（8）　The　conception　of　a　science　of　good　and　evil　also　first　occurs　here；　an



anticipation　of　the　Philebus　and　Republic　as　well　as　of　moral　philosophy　in



later　ages。







The　dramatic　interest　of　the　Dialogue　chiefly　centres　in　the　youth



Charmides；　with　whom　Socrates　talks　in　the　kindly　spirit　of　an　elder。　　His



childlike　simplicity　and　ingenuousness　are　contrasted　with　the　dialectical



and　rhetorical　arts　of　Critias；　who　is　the　grown…up　man　of　the　world；



having　a　tincture　of　philosophy。　　No　hint　is　given；　either　here　or　in　the



Timaeus；　of　the　infamy　which　attaches　to　the　name　of　the　latter　in　Athenian



history。　　He　is　simply　a　cultivated　person　who；　like　his　kinsman　Plato；　is



ennobled　by　the　connection　of　his　family　with　Solon　（Tim。）；　and　had　been



the　follower；　if　not　the　disciple；　both　of　Socrates　and　of　the　Sophists。　



In　the　argument　he　is　not　unfair；　if　allowance　is　made　for　a　slight



rhetorical　tendency；　and　for　a　natural　desire　to　save　his　reputation　with



the　company；　he　is　sometimes　nearer　the　truth　than　Socrates。　　Nothing　in



his　language　or　behaviour　is　unbecoming　the　guardian　of　the　beautiful



Charmides。　　His　love　of　reputation　is　characteristically　Greek；　and



contrasts　with　the　humility　of　Socrates。　　Nor　in　Charmides　himself　do　we



find　any　resemblance　to　the　Charmides　of　history；　except；　perhaps；　the



modest　and　retiring　nature　which；　according　to　Xenophon；　at　one　time　of　his



life　prevented　him　from　speaking　in　the　Assembly　（Mem。）；　and　we　are



surprised　to　hear　that；　like　Critias；　he　afterwards　became　one　of　the



thirty　tyrants。　　In　the　Dialogue　he　is　a　pattern　of　virtue；　and　is



therefore　in　no　need　of　the　charm　which　Socrates　is　unable　to　apply。　　With



youthful　naivete；　keeping　his　secret　and　entering　into　the　spirit　of



Socrates；　he　enjoys　the　detection　of　his　elder　and　guardian　Critias；　who　is



easily　seen　to　be　the　author　of　the　definition　which　he　has　so　great　an



interest　in　maintaining。　　The　preceding　definition；　'Temperance　is　doing



one's　own　business；'　is　assumed　to　have　been　borrowed　by　Charmides　from



another；　and　when　the　enquiry　becomes　more　abstract　he　is　superseded　by



Critias　（Theaet。；　Euthyd。）。　　Socrates　preserves　his　accustomed　irony　to　the



end；　he　is　in　the　neighbourhood　of　several　great　truths；　which　he　views　in



various　lights；　but　always　either　by　bringing　them　to　the　test　of　common



sense；　or　by　demanding　too　great　exactness　in　the　use　of　words；　turns　aside



from　them　and　comes　at　last　to　no　conclusion。







The　definitions　of　temperance　proceed　in　regular　order　from　the　popular　to



the　philosophical。　　The　first　two　are　simple　enough　and　partially　true；



like　the　first　thoughts　of　an　intelligent　youth；　the　third；　which　is　a　real



contribution　to　ethical　philosophy；　is　perverted　by　the　ingenuity　of



Socrates；　and　hardly　rescued　by　an　equal　perversion　on　the　part　of　Critias。



The　remaining　definitions　have　a　higher　aim；　which　is　to　introduce　the



element　of　knowledge；　and　at　last　to　unite　good　and　truth　in　a　single



science。　　But　the　time　has　not　yet　arrived　for　the　realization　of　this



vision　of　metaphysical　philosophy；　and　such　a　science　when　brought　nearer