the origins of contemporary france-2-第47章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



paper；　but　to　see　that　the　machine　works　well　when　set　up　on　the

ground。　　In　vain　might　its　founders　allege　the　beauty　of　their　plan

and　the　logical　connection　of　their　theorems；　they　are　not　required

to　furnish　either　plan　or　theorems；　but　an　instrument。



Two　conditions　are　requisite　to　render　this　instrument　serviceable

and　effective。　　In　the　first　place；　the　public　powers　must　harmonize

with　each　other；　if　not；　one　will　neutralize　the　other；　in　the

second　place　they　must　be　obeyed；　or　they　are　null。



The　Constituent　Assembly　made　no　provision　for　securing　this　harmony

or　this　obedience。　　In　the　machine　which　it　constructed　the　motions

all　counteract　each　other；　the　impulse　is　not　transmitted；　the

gearing　is　not　complete　between　the　center　and　the　extremities；　the

large　central　and　upper　wheels　turn　to　no　purpose；　the　innumerable

small　wheels　near　the　ground　break　or　get　out　of　order：　the　machine；

by　virtue　of　its　own　mechanism；　remains　useless；　over…heated；　under

clouds　of　waste　steam；　creaking　and　thumping　in　such　a　matter　as　to

show　clearly　that　it　must　explode。





I。



Powers　of　the　Central　Government。　…　The　Assembly　on　the　partition　of

power。　…　Rupture　of　every　tie　between　the　Legislature　and　the　King。

…　The　Assembly　on　the　subordination　of　the　executive　power。　…　How

this　is　nullified。　…　Certainty　of　a　conflict。　…　The　deposition　of

the　King　is　inevitable。



Let　us　first　consider　the　two　central　powers；　the　Assembly　and　the

King。　…　Ordinarily　when　distinct　powers　of　different　origin　are

established　by　a　Constitution；　it　makes；　in　the　case　of　conflict

between　them；　a　provision　for　an　arbiter　in　the　institution　of　an

Upper　Chamber。　　Each　of　these　powers；　at　least；　has　a　hold　on　the

other。　　The　Assembly　must　have　one　on　the　King：　which　is　the　right

to　refuse　taxation。　　The　King　must　have　one　on　the　Assembly：　which

is　the　right　of　dissolving　it。　　Otherwise；　one　of　the　two　being

disarmed；　the　other　becomes　omnipotent；　and；　consequently；　insane。

The　peril　here　is　as　great　for　an　omnipotent　Assembly　as　it　is　for

an　absolute　King。　　If　the　former　is　desirous　of　remaining　in　its

right　mind；　it　needs　repression　and　control　as　much　as　the　latter。

If　it　is　proper　for　the　Assembly　to　restrain　the　King　by　refusing

him　subsidies；　it　is　proper　for　him　to　be　able　to　defend　himself　by

appealing　to　the　electors。　…　But；　besides　these　extreme　measures；

which　are　dangerous　and　rarely　resorted　to；　there　is　another　which

is　ordinarily　employed　and　is　safe；　that　is；　the　right　for　the　King

to　take　his　ministers　from　the　Chamber。　　Generally；　the　leaders　of

the　majority　form　the　ministry；　their　nomination　being　the　means　of

restoring　harmony　between　the　King　and　Assembly；　they　are　at　once

men　belonging　to　the　Assembly　and　men　belonging　to　the　King。

Through　this　expedient　not　only　is　the　confidence　of　the　Assembly

assured；　since　the　Government　remains　in　the　hands　of　its　leaders；

but　also　it　is　under　restraint　because　these　become　simultaneously

both　powerful　and　responsible。　　Placed　at　the　head　of　all　branches

of　the　service；　they　are；　before　proposing　it　or　accepting　it；　in　a

position　to　judge　whether　a　law　is　useful　and　practicable。　　Nothing

is　so　healthy　for　a　majority　as　a　ministry　composed　of　its　own

chiefs；　nothing　is　so　effective　in　repressing　rashness　or

intemperance。　　A　railway　conductor　is　not　willing　that　his

locomotive　should　be　deprived　of　coal；　nor　to　have　the　rails　he　is

about　to　run　on　broken　up。　…　This　arrangement；　with　all　its

drawbacks　and　inconveniences；　is　the　best　one　yet　arrived　at　by

human　experience　for　the　security　of　societies　against　despotism　and

anarchy。　　For　the　absolute　power　which　establishes　or　saves　them　may

also　oppress　or　exhaust　them；　there　is　a　gradual　substitution　of

differentiated　powers；　held　together　through　the　mediation　of　a

third　umpire；　caused　by　reciprocal　dependence　and　an　which　is　common

to　both。



Experience；　however；　is　unimportant　to　the　members　of　the

Constituent　Assembly；　under　the　banner　of　principles　they　sunder　one

after　another　all　the　ties　which　keep　the　two　powers　together

harmoniously。　…　There　must　not　be　an　Upper　Chamber；　because　this

would　be　an　asylum　or　a　nursery　for　aristocrats。　　Moreover；　〃the

nation　being　of　one　mind；〃　it　is　averse　to　〃the　creation　of

different　organs。〃　So；　applying　ready…made　formulas　and　metaphors；

they　continue　to　produce　ideological　definitions　and　distinctions。



The　King　must　not　have　a　hold　on　the　legislative　body：　the　executive

is　an　arm；　whose　business　it　is　to　obey；　it　is　absurd　for　the　arm　to

constrain　or　direct　the　head。　　Scarcely　is　the　monarch　allowed　a

delaying　veto。　　Sieyès　here　enters　with　his　protest　declaring　that

this　is　a　〃lettre　de　cachet＇1＇　launched　against　the　universal　will；〃

and　there　is　excluded　from　the　action　of　the　veto　the　articles　of

the　Constitution；　all　money…bills；　and　some　other　laws。　…　…Neither

the　monarch　nor　the　electors　of　the　Assembly　are　to　convoke　the

Assembly；　he　has　no　voice　in　or　oversight　of　the　details　of　its

formation；　the　electors　are　to　meet　together　and　vote　without　his

summons　or　supervision。　　Once　the　Assembly　is　elected　he　can　neither

adjourn　nor　dissolve　it。　　He　cannot　even　propose　a　law；＇2＇　per…

mission　is　only　granted　to　him　〃to　invite　it　to　take　a　subject　into

consideration。〃　He　is　limited　to　his　executive　duties；　and　still

more；　a　sort　of　wall　is　built　up　between　him　and　the　Assembly；　and

the　opening　in　it；　by　which　each　could　take　the　other's　hand；　is

carefully　closed　up。　　The　deputies　are　forbidden　to　become　ministers

throughout　the　term　of　their　service　and　for　two　years　afterwards。

This　is　because　fears　are　entertained　that　they　might　be　corrupted

through　contact　with　the　Court；　and；　again；　whoever　the　ministers

might　be；　there　is　no　disposition　to　accept　their　ascendancy。＇3＇　　If

one　of　them　is　admitted　into　the　Assembly　it　is　not　for　the　purpose

of　giving　advice；　but　to　furnish　information；　reply　to

interrogatories；　and　make　protestations　of　his　zeal　in　humble　terms

and　in　a　dubious　position。＇4＇　　By　virtue　of　being　a　royal　agent　he

is　under　suspicion　like　the　King　himself；　and　he　is　sequestered　in

his　bureau　as　the　King　is　sequestered　in　his　palace。…　Such　is　the

spirit　of　the　Constitution：　by　force　of　the　theory；　and　the　better

to　secure　a　separation　of　the　powers；＇5＇　a　common　understanding

between　them　is　for　ever　rendered　impossible；　and　to　make　up　for

this　impossibility　there　remains　nothing　but　to　make　one　the　master

and　the　other　the　clerk。



This　they　did　not　fail　to　do；　and　for　greater　security；　the　latter

is　made　an　honorary　clerk；　The　executive　power　is　conferred　on　him

nominally　and　in　appearance；　he　does　not　possess　it　in　fact；　care

having　been　taken　to　place　it　in　other　hands。　…　In　effect；　all

executive　agents　and　all　secondary　and　local　powers　are　elective。

The　King　has　no　voice；　directly　or　indirectly；　in　the　choice　of

judges；　public　prosecutors；　bishops；　curés；　collectors　and　assessors

of　the　taxes；　commissaries　of　police；　district　and　departmental

administrators；　mayors；　and　municipal　officers。　　At　most；　should　an

administrator　violate　a　law；　he　may　annul　his　acts　and　suspend　him；

but　the　Assembly；　the　superior　power；　has　the　right　to　cancel　this

suspension。　…　As　to　the　armed　force；　of　which　he　is　supposed　to　be

the　commander…in…chief；　this　escapes　from　him　entirely：　the　National

Guard　is　not　to　receive　orders　from　him；　the　gendarmerie　and　the

troops　are　bound　to　respond　to　the　requisitions　of　the　municipal

authorities；　whom　the　King　can　neither　select　nor　displace：　in

short；　local　action　of　any　kind　…　that　is　to　say；　all　effective

action　…　is　denied　to　him。　…　The　executive　instrument　is　purposely

destroyed。　　The　connection　which　existed　between　the　wheels　of　the

extremities　and　the　central　shaft　is　broken；　and　henceforth；

incapable　of　distributing　its　energy；　this　shaft；　in　the　hands　of

the　monarch；　stands　still　or　else　turns　to　no　purpose。　　The　King；

〃supreme　head　of　the　general　administration；　of　the　army；　and　of　the

navy；　guardian　of　public　peace　and　order；　hereditary　representative

of　the　nation；〃　is　without　the　means；　in　spite　of　his　lofty　titles；

of　directly　applying　his　pretended　powers；　of　causing　a　schedule　of

assessments　to　be　drawn　up　in　a　refractory　commune；　of　compelling

payment　by　a　delinquent　tax…payer；　of　enforcing　the　free　circulation

of　a　convoy　of　grain；　of　executing　the　judgment　of　a　court；　of

suppressing　an　outbreak；　or　of　securing　protection　to　persons　and

property。　　For　he　can　bring　no　constraint　to　bear　on　the　agents　who

are　declared　to　be　subordinate　to　him；　he　has　no　resources　but　those

of　warning　and　persuasion。　　He　sends　to　each　Departmental　Assembly

the　decrees　which　he　has　sanctioned；　requesting　it　to　transmit　them

and　cause　them　to　be　carried　out；　he　receives　its　correspondence　and

bestows　his　censure　or　approval　…　and　that　is　all。　　He　is　merely　a

powerless　medium　of　communication；　a　herald　or　public　advertiser；　a

sort　of　central　echo；　sonorous　and　empty；　to　which　news　is　brought；

and　from　which　laws　depart；　to　spread　abroad　like　a　common　rumor。

Such　as　he　is；　and　thus　diminished；　he　is　still　considered　to　be　too

strong。　　He　is　deprived　of　the　right　of　pardon；　〃which　severs　the

last　artery　of　monarchical　government。〃＇6＇　　All　sorts　of　precautions

are　taken　against　him。　　He　cannot　declare　war　without　a　decree　of

the　Assembly；　he　is　obliged　to　bring　war　to　an　end　on　the　decree　of

the　Assembly；　he　cannot　make　a　treaty　of　peace；　an　alliance；　or　a

commercial　treaty；　without　the　ratification　of　these　by　the

Assembly。　　It　is　expressly　declared　that　he　is　to　nominate　but　two…

thirds　of　the　rear…admirals；　one…half　of　the　lieutenant…generals；

field…marshals；　captains　of　Vessels　and　colonels　of　the　gendarmerie；

one…third　of　the　colonels　and　lieutenant…colonels　of　the　line；　and　a

sixth　of　the　naval　lieutenants。　　He　must　not　allow　troops　to　stay　or

pass　within　30；000　yards　of　the　Assembly。　　His　guard　must　not

consist　of　more　than　1；800　men；　duly　verified；　and　protected　against

his　seductions　by　the　civil　oath。　　The　heir…presumptive　must　not

leave　the　country　without　the　Assembly's　assent。　　It　is　the　Assembly

which　is　to　regulate　by　law　the　education　of　his　son　during

minority。　…　All　these　precautions　are　accompanied　with　threats。

There　are　against　him　five　possible　causes　of　dethronement；　against

his　responsible　Ministers；　eight　causes　for　condemnation　to　from

twelve　to　twenty　years　of　constraint；　and　eight　grounds　for

condemnations　to　death。＇7＇　　Everywhere　between　the　lines　of　the

Constitution；　we　read　the　constant　disposition　to　assume　an　attitude

of　defense；　the　secret　dread　of　treachery；　the　conviction　that

executive　power；　of　whatever　kind；　is　in　its　nature　inimical　to　the

public　welfare。　…　For　withholding　the　nomination　of　judges；　the

reason　alleged　is　that　〃the　Cou