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of the external object�察�wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more 



intense�察�when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time�察�



than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ When I said above in III��xviii。 that we are affected by the image 



of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived 



were present�察�I expressly stated�察�that this is only true in so far as we 



look solely to the image of the thing in question itself �察�for the thing's 



nature is unchanged�察�whether we have conceived it or not�察�I did not deny 



that the image becomes weaker�察�when we regard as present to us other 



things which exclude the present existence of the future object�此�I did 



not expressly call attention to the fact�察�because I purposed to treat 



of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work。







Corollary。´ The image of something past or future�察�that is�察�of a thing 



which we regard as in relation to time past or time future�察�to the 



exclusion of time present�察�is�察�when other conditions are equal�察�weaker 



than the image of something present�察�consequently an emotion felt towards 



what is past or future is less intense�察�other conditions being equal�察�



than an emotion felt towards something present。















Prop。 X。 Towards something future�察�which we 



conceive as close at hand�察�we are affected 



more intensely�察�than if we conceive that 



its time for existence is separated from 



the present by a longer interval�察�so too 



by the remembrance of what we conceive to 



have not long passed away we are affected 



more intensely�察�than if we conceive that 



it has long passed away。 







Proof。´ In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand�察�or not long 



passed away�察�we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object 



less�察�than if its period of future existence were more distant from the 



present�察�or if it had long passed away ��this is obvious�� therefore ��by the 



foregoing Prop。�� we are�察�so far�察�more intensely affected towards it。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ From the remarks made in IV��Def。vi。 of this part it follows 



that�察�if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than 



we can define in conception�察�though their dates of occurrence be widely 



separated one from the other�察�they all affect us equally faintly。















Prop。 XI。 An emotion towards that which 



we conceive as necessary is�察�when other 



conditions are equal�察�more intense than 



an emotion towards that which impossible�察�



or contingent�察�or non´necessary。







Proof。´ In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary�察�we�察�to that 



extent�察�affirm its existence�察�on the other hand we deny a thing's 



existence�察�in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary ��xxxiii。note。i。���察�



wherefore ��IV。ix。�� an emotion towards that which is necessary is�察�other 



conditions being equal�察�more intense than an emotion that which is 



non´necessary。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XII。 An emotion towards a thing�察�



which we know not to exist at the present 



time�察�and which we conceive as possible�察�



is more intense�察�other conditions being 



equal�察�than an emotion towards a thing 



contingent。







Proof。´ In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent�察�we are affected 



by the conception of some further thing�察�which would assert the existence 



of the former ��IV��Def。iii。���察�but�察�on the other hand�察�we ��by hypothesis�� 



conceive certain things�察�which exclude its present existence。 But�察�in 



so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future�察�we there by 



conceive things which assert its existence ��IV��iv。���察�that is ��III��xviii。���察�



things which promote hope or fear�此�wherefore an emotion towards something 



possible is more vehement。 Q。E。D。







Corollary。´ An emotion towards a thing�察�which we know not to exist in the 



present�察�and which we conceive as contingent�察�is far fainter�察�than if we 



conceive the thing to be present with us。







Proof。´ Emotion towards a thing�察�which we conceive to exist�察�is more 



intense than it would be�察�if we conceived the thing as future V��ix。Coroll。���察�



and is much more vehement�察�than if the future time be conceived as far 



distant from the present ��IV��x。��。 Therefore an emotion towards a thing�察�



whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present�察�



is far fainter�察�than if we conceive the thing as present�察�it is�察�



nevertheless�察�more intense�察�than if we conceived the thing as contingent�察�



wherefore an emotion towards a thing�察�which we regard as contingent�察�



will be far fainter�察�than if we conceived the thing to be present with us。 



Q。E。D。















Prop。 XIII。 Emotion towards a thing contingent�察�



which we know not to exist in the present�察�is�察�



other conditions being equal�察�fainter than an 



emotion towards a thing past。







Proof。´ In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent�察�we are not 



affected by the image of any other thing�察�which asserts the existence 



of the said thing ��IV��Def。iii。���察�but�察�on the other hand ��by hypothesis���察�



we conceive certain things excluding its present existence。 But�察�in so 



far as we conceive it in relation to time past�察�we are assumed to 



conceive something�察�which recalls the thing to memory�察�or excites the 



image thereof ��II��xviii。&Note���察�which is so far the same as regarding 



it as present ��II��xvii。Coroll。��。 Therefore ��IV��ix。�� an emotion towards a 



thing contingent�察�which we know does not exist in the present�察�is fainter�察�



other conditions being equal�察�than an emotion towards a thing past。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XIV。 A true knowledge of good and evil 



cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true�察�



but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion。







Proof。´ An emotion is an idea�察�whereby the mind affirms of its body a 



greater or less force of existing than before ��by the general Definition 



of the Emotions���察�therefore it has no positive quality�察�which can be 



destroyed by the presence of what is true�察�consequently the knowledge 



of good and evil cannot�察�by virtue oi being true�察�restrain any emotion。  



But�察�in so far as such knowledge is an emotion ��IV��viii。�� if it have 



more strength for restraining emotion�察�it will to that extent be able 



to restrain the given emotion。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XV。 Desire arising from the 



knowledge of good and bad can be 



quenched or checked by many of the 



other desires arising from the 



emotions whereby we are assailed。







Proof。´ From the true knowledge of good and evil�察�in so far as it is an 



emotion�察�necessarily arises desire ��Def。 of the Emotions�察�i。���察�the strength 



of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises 



��III��xxxvii。��。 But�察�inasmuch as this desire arises ��by hypothesis�� from the 



fact of our truly understanding anything�察�it follows that it is also 



present with us�察�in so far as we are active ��III��i。���察�and must therefore 



be understood through our essence only ��III��Def。ii。���察�consequently 



��III��vii。�� its force and increase can be defined solely by human power。 



Again�察�the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are 



stronger�察�in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement�察�wherefore 



their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external 



causes�察�which�察�when compared with our own power�察�indefinitely surpass it 



��IV��iii。���察�hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more 



vehement�察�than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and 



evil�察�and may�察�consequently�察�control or quench it。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XVI。 Desire arising from the knowledge 



of good and evil�察�in so far as such knowledge 



regards what is future�察�may be more easily 



controlled or quenched�察�than the desire for 



what is agreeable at the present moment。







Proof。´ Emotion towards a thing�察�which we conceive as future�察�is fainter 



than emotion towards a thing that is present ��IV��ix。Coroll。��。 But desire�察�



which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil�察�though it be 



concerned with things which are good at the moment�察�can be quenched 



or controlled by any headstrong desire ��by the last Prop。�察�the proof 



whereof is of universal application��。 Wherefore desire arising from 



such knowledge�察�when concerned with the future�察�can be more easily 



controlled or quenched�察�&c。 Q。E。D。















Prop。 XVII。 Desire arising from the true 



knowledge of good and evil�察�in so far as 



such knowledge is concerned with what is 



contingent�察�can be controlled far more 



easily still�察�than desire for things 



that are present。







Proof。´ This Prop。 is proved in the same way as the last Prop。 from 



IV��xii。Coroll。







Note。´ I think I have now shown the reason�察�why men are moved by opinion 



more readily than by true reason�察�why it is that the true knowledge of good 



and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul�察�and often yields to every kind of 



passion。 This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet�此�



��Ov。 Met。 vii。20�察 �Video meliora proboque�察�Deteriora sequor。;��







    The better path I gaze at and approve�察�







   The worse ´ I follow。;



Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind�察�when he says�察�



;He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow。; I have not written the 



above with the object of drawing the conclusion�察�that ignorance is more 



excellent than knowledge�察�or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in 



controlling his emotions�察�but because it is necessary to know the power 



and the infirmity of our nature�察�before we can determine what reason can 



do in restraining the emotions�察�and what is beyond her power。 I have said�察�



that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity。 The 



power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately。















Prop。 XVIII。 Desire arising from pleasure is�察�



other conditions being equal�察�stronger than 



desire arising from pain。







Proof。´ Desire is the essence of a man ��Def。 of the Emotions�察�i。���察�



that is�察�the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own 



being。 Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is�察�by the fact of 



pleasure being felt�察�increased or helped�察�on the contrary�察�desire 



arising from pain is�察�by the fact of pain being felt�察�diminished or 



hindered�察�hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be 



defined by human power together with the power of an external cause�察�



whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only。 



Thus the former is the stronger of the two。 Q。E。D。







Note。´ In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human i

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