the ethics(part iv)-及2嫗
梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ○ 賜 ★ 辛酔堀貧和鍬匈��梓囚徒貧議 Enter 囚辛指欺云慕朕村匈��梓囚徒貧圭�鮗� ● 辛指欺云匈競何��
!!!!隆堋響頼��紗秘慕禰厮宴和肝写偬堋響��
inadequate ideas involve ��II��xxxv。���察�nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false ��II��xxxiii。���察 �contrariwise�察�in so far as they
are referred to God�察�they are true
��II��xxxii。��。 Wherefore�察�if the positive quality possessed by a false
idea were removed by the presence of what is true�察�in virtue of its
being true�察�a true idea would then be removed by itself�察�which
��IV��iii。�� is absurd。 Therefore�察�no positive quality possessed by a
false idea�察�&c。 Q。E。D。
Note。´ This proposition is more clearly understood from II��xvi。Coroll。ii。
For imagination is an idea�察�which indicates rather the present disposition
of the human body than the nature of the external body�察�not indeed
distinctly�察�but confusedly�察�whence it comes to pass�察�that the mind is
said to err。 For instance�察�when we look at the sun�察�we conceive that it
is distant from us about two hundred feet�察�in this judgment we err�察�so
long as we are in ignorance of its true distance�察�when its true distance
is known�察�the error is removed�察�but not the imagination�察�or�察�in other
words�察�the idea of the sun�察�which only explains tho nature of that
luminary�察�in so far as the body is affected thereby�此�wherefore�察�though
we know the real distance�察�we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun
to be near us。 For�察�as we said in III��xxxv。note�察�we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us�察�because we are ignorant of its true distance�察�but because
the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is
affected thereby。 Thus�察�when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of
water are reflected into our eyes�察�we imagine the sun as if it were in the
water�察�though we are aware of its real position�察�and similarly other
imaginations�察�wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the
natural disposition of the body�察�or that its power of activity is
increased or diminished�察�are not contrary to the truth�察�and do not vanish
at its presence。 It happens indeed that�察�when we mistakenly fear an evil�察�
the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings�察�but the contrary also
happens�察�namely�察�that we fear an evil which will certainly come�察�and our
fear vanishes when we hear false tidings�察�thus imaginations do not vanish
at the presence of the truth�察�in virtue of its being true�察�but because
other imaginations�察�stronger than the first�察�supervene and exclude the
present existence of that which we imagined�察�as I have shown in II�此�xvii。
Prop。 II。 We are only passive�察�in so far as
we are apart of Nature�察�which cannot be
conceived by itself without other parts。
Proof。´ We are said to be passive�察�when something arises in us�察�whereof
we are only a partial cause ��III��Def。ii。���察�that is ��III��Def。i。���察�something
which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature。 We are passive
therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature�察�which cannot be conceived
by itself without other parts。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 III。 The force whereby a man persists
in existing is limited�察�and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes。
Proof。´This is evident from the axiom of this part。 For�察�when man is
given�察�there is something else ´ say A ´ more powerful�察�when A is given�察�
there is something else ´ say B ´ more powerful than A�察�and so on to
infinity�察�thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other
thing�察�and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 IV。 It is impossible�察�that man should
not be a part of Nature�察�or that he should
be capable of undergoing no changes�察�save
such as can be understood through his nature
only as their adequate cause。
Proof。´ The power�察�whereby each particular thing�察�and consequently man�察�
preserves his being�察�is the power of God or of Nature ��I��xxiv。Coroll。���察�
not in so far as it is infinite�察�but in so far as it can be explained by
the actual human essence ��III��vii。��。 Thus the power of man�察�in so far
as it is explained through his own actual essence�察�is a part of the
infinite power of God or Nature�察�in other words�察�of the essence thereof
��I��xxxiv。��。 This was our first point。 Again�察�if it were possible�察�that man
should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through
the nature of man�察�it would follow that he would not be able to die�察�but
would always necessarily exist�察�this would be the necessary consequence
of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite�察�namely�察�either of
man's power only�察�inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself
all changes which could spring from external causes�察�or of the infinite
power of Nature�察�whereby all individual things would be so ordered�察�that
man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended
towards his own preservation。 But the first alternative is absurd ��by the
last Prop。�察�the proof of which is universal�察�and can be applied to all
individual things��。 Therefore�察�if it be possible�察�that man should not be
capable of undergoing any changes�察�save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature�察�and consequently that he must always ��as we have
shown�� necessarily exist�察�such a result must follow from the infinite
power of God�察�and consequently ��I��xvi。�� from the necessity of the divine
nature�察�in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given
man�察�the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of
extension and thought must be deducible。 It would therefore follow ��I��xxi。��
that man is infinite�察�which ��by the first part of this proof�� is absurd。
It is�察�therefore�察�impossible�察�that man should not undergo any changes save
those whereof he is the adequate cause。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ Hence it follows�察�that man is necessarily always a prey to
his passions�察�that he follows and obeys the general order of nature�察�and
that he accommodates himself thereto�察�as much as the nature of things
demands。
Prop。 V。 The power and increase of every
passion�察�and its persistence in existing
are not defined by the power�察�whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing�察�
but by the power of an external cause
compared with our own。
Proof。´ The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our
essence alone ��III��Def。i。&。ii。���察�that is ��III��vii。���察�the power of
a passion cannot be defined by the power�察�whereby we ourselves
endeavour to persist in existing�察�but ��as is shown in II��xvi。�� must
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 VI。 The force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or
power�察�so that the emotion becomes obstinately
fixed to him。
Proof。´ The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in
existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with
our own ��by the foregoing Prop。���察�therefore ��IV��iii。�� it can overcome a
man's power�察�&e。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 VII。 An emotion can only be controlled
or destroyed by another emotion contrary
thereto�察�and with more power for controlling
emotion。
Proof。´ Emotion�察�in so far as it is referred to the mind�察�is an idea�察�
whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence
than before ��cf。 the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of
Part III。�� When�察�therefore�察�the mind is assailed by any emotion�察�the
body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power
of activity is increased or diminished。 Now this modification of the body
��IV��v。�� receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being�察�
which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause ��II��vi。���察�
in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to
��III��v。�� and stronger than itself ��IV。Ax。���察�wherefore ��II��xii。�� the mind
is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to�察�and stronger than
the former modification�察�in other words�察。�by the general definition
of the emotions�� the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion�察�which will exclude or destroy the
existence of the former emotion�察�thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor
controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。´ An emotion�察�in so far as it is referred to the mind�察�can
only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of
the body contrary to�察�and stronger than�察�that which we are undergoing。
For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an
emotion contrary to�察�and stronger than�察�itself�察�in other words�察。�by the
general Definition of the Emotions�� only by an idea of a modification
of the body contrary to�察�and stronger than�察�the modification which we
undergo。
Prop。 VIII。 The knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure
or pain�察�in so far as we are conscious
thereof。
Proof。´ We call a thing good or evil�察�when it is of service or the
reverse in preserving our being ��IV��Def。i。&。ii。���察�that is ��III��vii。���察�
when it increases or diminishes�察�helps or hinders�察�our power of activity。
Thus�察�in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or
pain�察�we call it good or evil�察�wherefore the knowledge of good and evil
is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain�察�which necessarily
follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion ��II��xxii。��。 But this idea
is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body
��II��xxi。���察�that is�察�there is no real distinction between this idea and
the emotion or idea of the modification of the body�察�save in conception
only。 Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the
emotion�察�in so far as we are conscious thereof。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 IX。 An emotion�察�whereof we conceive
the cause to be with us at the present time�察�
is stronger than if we did not conceive the
cause to be with us。
Proof。´ Imagination or conception is the idea�察�by which the mind regards
a thing as present ��II��xvii。note���察�but which indicates the disposition of
the mind rather than the nature of the external thing ��II��xvi。Coroll。ii��。
An emotion is therefore a conception�察�in so far as it indicates the
disposition of the body。 But a conception ��by II��xvii。�� is stronger�察�
so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object�察�wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more
intense�察�when we conceive the