history of philosophy-第62章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


reason　of　the　principle　of　the　association　of　ideas。　Hence　there　is　no　knowledge　and　no
metaphysics　beyond　experience。”　（4）

The　simple　thought　we　have　here　is　exactly　what　Locke　says；　that　we　must　receive　the　conception
of　cause　and　effect；　and　thus　of　a　necessary　connection；　from　experience；　but　experience；　as
sensuous　perception；　contains　no　necessity；　has　no　causal　connection。　For　in　what　we　term　such；
that　which　we　properly　speaking　perceive　is　merely　the　fact　that　something　first　of　all　happens　and
that　then　something　else　follows。　Immediate　perception　relates　only　to　a　content　of　conditions　or
things　which　are　present　alongside　of　and　in　succession　to　one　another；　but　not　to　what　we　call
cause　and　effect；　in　time…succession　there　is　thus　no　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　and　consequently
no　necessity　either。　（5）　When　we　say　the　pressure　of　the　water　is　the　cause　of　the　destruction　of
this　house；　that　is　no　pure　experience。　We　have　merely　seen　the　water　pressing　or　moving　along　in
this　direction；　and　subsequently　the　house　falling　down；　and　so　with　other　examples。　Necessity　is
thus　not　justified　by　experience；　but　we　carry　it　into　experience；　it　is　accidentally　arrived　at　by　us
and　is　subjective　merely。　This　kind　of　universality　which　we　connect　with　necessity；　Hume　calls
custom。　Because　we　have　often　seen　results　to　follow　we　are　accustomed　to　regard　the
connection　as　a　necessary　one；　the　necessity　to　him　is　thus　a　quite　contingent　association　of　ideas；
which　is　custom。

It　is　the　same　thing　in　respect　of　the　universal。　What　we　perceive　are　individual　phenomena　and
sensations　in　which　we　see　that　this　is　now　one　thing　and　now　another。　It　may　likewise　be　that　we
perceive　the　same　determination　frequently　repeated　and　in　manifold　ways。　But　this　is　still　far
removed　from　universality；　universality　is　a　determination　which　is　not　given　to　us　through
experience。　It　may　be　said　that　this　is　quite　a　correct　remark　on　Hume's　part；　if　by　experience　we
understand　outward　experience。　Experience　is　sensible　that　something　exists；　but　nevertheless　the
universal　is　not　as　yet　present　in　it。　Indeed；　sensuous　existence　as　such　is　something　which　is　set
forth　as　indifferent；　not　differentiated　from　anything　else；　but　sensuous　existence　is　likewise
universal　in　itself；　or　the　indifference　of　its　determinateness　is　not　its　only　determinateness。　But
since　Hume　regards　necessity；　the　unity　of　opposites；　as　resting　quite　subjectively　on　custom；　we
cannot　get　any　deeper　in　thought。　Custom　is　indeed　so　far　a　necessity　in　consciousness；　and　to　this
extent　we　really　see　the　principle　of　this　idealism　in　it；　but　in　the　second　place　this　necessity　is
represented　as　something　quite　devoid　of　thought　or　Notion。

This　custom　obtains　both　in　our　perception　which　relates　to　sensuous　nature；　and　in　relation　to　law
and　morality。　The　ideas　of　justice　and　morality　rest　upon　an　instinct；　on　a　subjective；　but　very　often
deceptive　moral　feeling。　（6）　From　a　sceptical　point　of　view　the　opposite　may　likewise　be
demonstrated。　From　this　side　Hume　considers　justice；　morality；　religious　determinations；　and
disputes　their　absolute　validity。　That　is　to　say　when　it　is　assumed　that　our　knowledge　arises　from
experience；　and　that　we　must　consider　only　what　we　obtain　thereby　to　be　the　truth；　we　find　indeed
in　our　feeling；　the　sentiment　e。g。　that　the　murderer；　the　thief；　&c。；　must　be　punished；　and　because
this　is　likewise　felt　by　others　it　is　universally　allowed。　But　Hume；　like　the　sceptics　of　former　days；
appeals　to　the　various　opinions　of　various　nations：　amongst　different　nations　and　in　different　times
various　standards　of　right　have　been　held。　（7）　There　are　those　who　in　this　case　do　not　have　the
feeling　of　wrongdoing　in　respect　of　stealing；　e。g。　the　Laced？monians　or　the　so…called　innocent
inhabitants　of　the　South　Sea　Islands。　What　is　by　one　nation　called　immoral；　shameful　and
irreligious；　is　by　another　not　considered　so　at　all。　Thus　because　such　matters　rest　upon　experience；
one　subject　has　such　and　such　an　experience；　finds；　for　instance；　in　his　religious　feelings　this
determination　which　inclines　him　to　God；　while　another　subject　has　different　experiences
altogether。　We　are　in　the　habit　of　allowing　one　thing　to　be　just　and　moral；　others　have　another
mode　of　regarding　it。　Hence　if　the　truth　depends　upon　experience；　the　element　of　universality；　of
objectivity；　&c。；　comes　from　elsewhere；　or　is　not　justified　by　experience。　Hume　thus　declared　this
sort　of　universality；　as　he　declared　necessity；　to　be　rather　subjectively　than　objectively　existent；　for
custom　is　just　a　subjective　universality　of　this　kind。　This　is　an　important　and　acute　observation　in
relation　to　experience　looked　at　as　the　source　of　knowledge；　and　it　is　from　this　point　that　the
Kantian　reflection　now　begins。

Hume　（Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；　Vol。　111。　Sect。　8；　11）　then　extended　his
scepticism　to　the　conceptions　and　doctrines　of　freedom　and　necessity；　and　to　the　proofs　of　the
existence　of　God；　and　in　fact　scepticism　here　possesses　a　wide　field。　To　such　a　system　of
reasoning　from　thoughts　and　possibilities　another　method　of　reasoning　may　again　be　opposed；　and
this　reasoning　is　no　better　than　the　other。　What　is　said　to　be　metaphysically　established　regarding
immortality；　God；　nature；　&c。；　lacks　a　real　ground　for　resting　upon；　such　as　is　professed　to　be
given；　for　the　inferences　on　which　men　ground　their　proofs　are　subjectively　formed　conceptions。
But　where　a　universality　is　found；　it　does　not　rest　in　the　matter　in　itself；　but　is　simply　a　subjective
necessity　which　is　really　mere　custom。　Hence　the　result　which　Hume　arrives　at　is　necessarily
astonishment　regarding　the　condition　of　human　knowledge；　a　general　state　of　mistrust；　and　a
sceptical　indecision　—　which　indeed　does　not　amount　to　much。　The　condition　of　human　knowledge
regarding　which　Hume　so　much　wonders；　he　further　describes　as　containing　an　antagonism
between　reason　and　instinct；　this　instinct；　it　is　said；　which　embraces　many　sorts　of　powers；
inclinations；　&c。；　deceives　us　in　many　different　ways；　and　reason　demonstrates　this。　But　on　the
other　side　it　is　empty；　without　content　or　principles　of　its　own；　and　if　a　content　is　in　question　at　all；
it　must　keep　to　those　inclinations。　In　itself　reason　thus　has　no　criterion　whereby　the　antagonism
between　individual　desires；　and　between　itself　and　the　desires；　may　be　settled。　（8）　Thus　everything
appears　in　the　form　of　an　irrational　existence　devoid　of　thought；　the　implicitly　true　and　right　is　not　in
thought；　but　in　the　form　of　an　instinct；　a　desire。






1。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　193…200。　

2。　Tennemann's　Grundriss　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie　von　Wendt　（Leipzig；　1829）；　§　370；
pp。　439；　440；　Hume：　Essays　and　Treatises　on　several　subjects；　Vol。　III。　containing　an　Inquiry
Concerning　Human　Understanding　（London；　1770）；　Sect。　2。　pp。　21；　22；　Sect。　4；　P。　I。　p。　42；
Tennemann；　Vol。　XI。　pp。　433；　434。　

3。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Not。　A。　pp。　283；　284。　

4。　Tennemann　op。　cit。；　§　370；　p。　440；　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　4；　Pt。　I。　pp。　43…45；　Sect。　5；
pp。　66；　67；　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　204；　205；　Tennemann；
Vol。　XI。　pp。　435；　436。　

5。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　vii。　Pt。　1；　pp。　102；　103；　Pt。　2；　pp。　108；　109；　Sect。　viii。　pp。　118；
119。　

6。　Hume：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　IV。　containing　an　Inquiry　concerning　the　principles　of　morals；　Sect。　1；　p。　4；
Appendix　I。　p。　170。　

7。　Buhle：　op。　cit。；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　pp。　230；　231；　cf。　Hume；　ibidem；　Vol。　III。　Sect。　12；　P。　II。　p。
221；　Vol。　IV。；　An　Inquiry；　&c。；　Sect。　4；　pp。　62…65；　A　dialogue；　pp。　235；　236；　&c。；　&c。　

8。　Hume：　op。　cit。。　Vol。　III。　Sect。　12；　Pt。　I。　pp。　217；　218；　Not。　N。　pp。　296；　297；　Buhle：
Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosophie；　Vol。　V。　Sect。　1；　p。　210。　





Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　Scottish　Philosophy

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　THOMAS　REID。

Thomas　Reid；　born　in　1710；　died　as　a　professor　in　Glasgow　in　1796。（1）　He　maintained　the
principle　of　common…sense。　His　endeavour　was　to　discover　the　principles　of　knowledge；　and　the
following　are　his　conclusions：　〃（a）　There　are　certain　undemonstrated　and　undemonstrable
fundamental　truths　which　common…sense　begets　and　recognizes　as　immediately　conclusive　and
absolute。〃　This　hence　constitutes　an　immediate　knowledge；　in　it　an　inward　independent　source　is
set　forth　which　is　hereby　opposed　to　religion　as　revealed。　〃（b）　These　immediate　truths　require　no
support　from　any　elaborated　science；　nor　do　they　submit　to　its　criticism；〃　they　cannot　be　criticized
by　philosophy。　〃（c）　Philosophy　itself　has　no　root　other　than　that　of　an　immediate；　self…enlightening
truth；　whatever　contradicts　such　truth　is　in　itself　false；　contradictory；　and　absurd。〃　This　is　true　for
knowledge　and　〃（d）　Morality；　the　individual　is　moral　if　he　acts　in　accordance　with　the　perfect
principles　of　the　perfection　of　the　whole　and　with　his　own　duty　as　it　is　known　to　him。〃（2）　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　JAMES　BEATTIE。

James　Beattie；　born　1735；　was　a　professor　of　moral　philosophy　in　Edinburgh　and　Aberdeen；　and
died　in　1803。　He　likewise　made　common…sense　the　source　of　all　knowledge。　〃The　common…sense
of　the　plain　human　understanding　is　the　source　of　all　morality；　of　all　religion；　and　all　certainty。　The
confirmation　of　common…sense　must　be　added　to　the　testimony　of　our　senses。　The　truth　is　what　the
necessities　of　my　nature　call　upon　me　to　believe。　Belief　signifies　conviction　in　the　case　of　truths
which　are　certain；　in　that　of　those　which　are　probable；　approbation。　The　truth　which　is　certain　is
known　by　means　of　intuition；　the　probable　truth　by　means　of　proofs。〃（3）　Such　convictions　as　are
quite　certain　form　the　basis　of　actions。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　JAMES　OSWALD。

James　Oswald；　a　Scottish　clergyman；　made　use　of　an　expression　which　indicates　that　we　have　the
principles　just　mentioned　as　facts　existing　within　us。（4）　〃The　existence　of　the　Divine　Being　is
（according　to　him）　a　fact　absolutely　raised　above　all　reasoning　and　all　doubt；　and　immediately
certain　for　the　common…sense　of　morality。〃（5）　The　same　principle　was　likewise　established　in
Germany　at　this　time　…　an　inward　revelation；　a　knowledge　of　the　conscience；　and　specially　of　God
and　His　Being。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4。　DUGALD　STEWART。

To　this　school　also　belong　Dugald　Stewart；　Edward　Search；（9）　Ferguson；　and　Hutcheson；　most　of
whom　have　written　on　morals。　The　political　economist　Adam　Smith　from　this　point　of　view　is
likewise　a　philosopher；　and　the　best　known　of　them　all。　This　Scottish　philosophy　is　now　given　forth
in　Germany　as　something　new。　It　is　a　popular　philosophy；　which；　on　the　one　hand；　has　the　great
merit　of　seeking　in　man；　and　in　his　consciousness；　for　the　source　of　all　that　should　be　held　by　him
as　true；　the　immanence　of　what　should　be　by　him　esteemed。　The　content　is　at　the　same　time　a
concrete　content；　in　a　certain　degree；　it　is　the　antithesis　of　metaphysics　proper；　of　the　wandering
about　in　abstract　determinations　of　the　understanding。　Of　these　Scots；　Dugald　Stewart；　who