history of philosophy-第60章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


of　Wolff　was　thus　pre…eminent；　Baumgarten；　Crusius；　and　Moses　Mendelssohn　worked　each　of
them　independently　on　the　same　lines　as　Wolff；　the　philosophy　of　the　last…mentioned　was　popular
and　graceful　in　form。　The　Wolffian　philosophy　was　thus　carried　on；　although　it　had　cast　off　its
pedantic　methods：　no　further　progress　was　however　made。　The　question　dealt　with　was　how
perfection　could　be　attained　…　what　it　is　possible　to　think　and　what　not；　metaphysic　was　reduced　to
its　slightest　consistency　and　to　its　completest　vacuity；　so　that　in　its　texture　not　a　single　thread
remained　secure。　Mendelssohn　considered　himself；　and　was　considered；　the　greatest　of
philosophers；　and　was　lauded　as　such　by　his　friends。　In　his　〃Morgenstunden〃　we　really　find　a　dry
Wolffian　philosophy；　however　much　these　gentlemen　endeavoured　to　give　their　dull　abstractions　a
bright　Platonic　form。

The　forms　of　Philosophy　which　we　have　considered　bear　the　character　which　pertains　specially　to
metaphysics；　of　proceeding　from　general　determinations　of　the　understanding；　but　of　combining
therewith　experience　and　observation；　or　the　empiric　method　in　general。　One　side　of　this
metaphysic　is　that　the　opposites　of　thought　are　brought　into　consciousness；　and　that　attention　is
directed　upon　the　solution　of　this　contradiction。　Thought　and　Being　or　extension；　God　and　the
world；　good　and　evil；　the　power　and　prescience　of　God　on　the　one　side；　and　the　evil　in　the　world
and　human　freedom　on　the　other：　these　contradictions；　the　opposites　of　soul　and　spirit；　things
conceived　and　things　material；　and　their　mutual　relation；　have　occupied　all　men's　attention。　The
solution　of　these　opposites　and　contradictions　has　still　to　be　given；　and　God　is　set　forth　as　the　One
in　whom　all　these　contradictions　are　solved。　This　is　what　is　common　to　all　these　philosophies　as　far
as　their　main　elements　are　concerned。　Yet　we　must　likewise　remark　that　these　contradictions　are
not　solved　in　themselves；　i。e。　that　the　nullity　of　the　supposition　is　not　demonstrated　in　itself；　and
thereby　a　true　concrete　solution　has　not　come　to　pass。　Even　if　God　is　recognised　as　solving　all
contradictions；　God　as　the　solution　of　these　contradictions　is　a　matter　of　words　rather　than
something　conceived　and　comprehended。　If　God　is　comprehended　in　His　qualities；　and
prescience；　omnipresence；　omniscience；　power；　wisdom；　goodness；　justice；　&c。；　are　considered
as　qualities　of　God　Himself；　they　simply　lead　to　contradictions；　and　these　contradictions；　Leibnitz
（supra；　p。　348）　sought　to　remove　by　saying　that　the　qualities　temper　one　another；　i。e。　that　they　are
combined　in　such　a　way　that　one　annuls　the　other。　This；　however；　is　no　real　comprehension　of
such　contradiction。

This　metaphysic　contrasts　greatly　with　the　old　philosophy　of　a　Plato　or　an　Aristotle。　To　the　old
philosophy　we　can　always　turn　again　and　admit　its　truth；　it　is　satisfying　in　the　stage　of　development
it　has　reached　…　a　concrete　centre…point　which　meets　all　the　problems　set　by　thought　as　these　are
comprehended。　In　this　modern　metaphysic；　however；　the　opposites　are　merely　developed　into
absolute　contradictions。　God　is　indeed　given　as　their　absolute　solution；　but　only　as　an　abstract
solution；　as　a　Beyond；　on　this　side　all　contradictions　are；　as　regards　their　content；　unsolved　and
unexplained。　God　is　not　comprehended　as　the　One　in　whom　these　contradictions　are　eternally
resolved；　He　is　not　comprehended　as　Spirit；　as　the　Trinity。　It　is　in　Him　alone　as　Spirit；　and　as　Spirit
which　is　Three　in　One；　that　this　opposition　of　Himself　and　His　Other；　the　Son；　is　contained；　and
with　it　the　resolution　of　the　same；　this　concrete　Idea　of　God　as　reason；　has　not　as　yet　found　an
entrance　into　Philosophy。

In　order　that　we　may　now　cast　a　retrospective　glance　over　the　philosophic　efforts　of　other　nations；
we　shall　apply　ourselves　to　the　further　progress　of　Philosophy。　Once　more　we　see　Scepticism
making　its　way　into　this　and　philosophy　of　the　understanding。　But　this　time　it　is；　properly　speaking；
in　the　form　of　Idealism；　or　the　determinations　are　subjective　determinations　of　self…consciousness。
In　the　place　of　thought　we　consequently　find　the　Notion　now　making　its　appearance。　Just　as　with
the　Stoics　determinateness　is　held　to　be　an　object　of　thought；　we　have　in　modern　times　this　same
manifestation　of　thought　as　the　unmoved　form　of　simplicity。　Only　here　the　image　or　inner
consciousness　of　totality　is　present；　the　absolute　spirit　which　the　world　has　before　it　as　its　truth　and
to　whose　Notion　it　makes　its　way　…　this　is　another　inward　principle；　another　implicitude　of　mind
which；　it　endeavours　to　bring　forth　from　itself　and　for　itself；　so　that　reason　is　a　comprehension　of
the　same；　or　has　the　certitude　of　being　all　reality。　With　the　ancients　reason；　as　the　implicit　and
explicit　Being　of　consciousness；　had　only　an　ethereal　and　formal　existence　as　language；　but　here　it
has　certainty　as　existent　substance。　Hence　with　Descartes　there　is　the　unity　of　the　Notion　and
Being；　and　with　Spinoza　the　universal　reality。　The　first　commencement　of　the　Notion　of　the
movement　of　fixed　thoughts　in　themselves　is　found　in　this；　that　the　movement　which；　as　method；
simply　falls　outside　its　object；　comes　within　it；　or　that　self…consciousness　comes　within　thought。
Thought　is　implicitude　without　explicitude；　an　objective　mode　bearing　no　resemblance　to　a
sensuous　thing；　and　yet　it　is　quite　different　from　the　actuality　of　self…consciousness。　This　Notion
which　we　now　find　entering　into　thought；　has　the　three　kinds　of　form　which　we　still　have　to
consider；　in　the　first　place　it　has　that　of　individual　self…consciousness　or　the　formal　conception
generally；　secondly；　that　of　universal　self…consciousness；　which　applies　itself　to　all　objects　whether
they　be　objects　of　thought；　determinate　conceptions；　or　have　the　form　of　actuality　…　that　is　to　say　it
applies　itself　to　what　is　established　in　thought；　to　the　intellectual　world　with　the　riches　of　its
determinations　and　looked　on　as　a　Beyond；　or　to　the　intellectual　world　in　as　far　as　it　is　its
realisation；　the　world　here　and　around　us。　It　is　in　those　two　ways；　and　in　those　ways　alone；　that　the
actual　Notion　is　present　in　the　succeeding　chapter；　for　not　as　yet　is　it　in　the　third　place　to　be　found
as　taken　back　into　thought；　or　as　the　self…thinking　or　thought　of　Notion。　While　that　universal
self…consciousness　is；　on　the　whole；　a　thought　which　grasps　and　comprehends；　this　third　kind　of
thought　is　the　Notion　itself　recognised　as　constituting　reality　in　its　essence；　that　is　to　say　as
Idealism。　These　three　aspects　again　divide　themselves　as　before　into　the　three　nations　which　alone
count　in　the　civilised　world。　The　empirical　and　perfectly　finite　form　of　Notion　pertains　to　the
English；　to　the　French　belongs　its　form　as　making　an　attempt　at　everything；　as　establishing　itself　in
its　reality；　abolishing　all　determination；　and　therefore　being　universal；　unlimited；　pure
self…consciousness；　and；　lastly；　to　the　German　pertains　the　entering　into　itself　of　this　implicitude；　the
thought　of　the　absolute　Notion。　






1。　Buhle：　Geschichte　der　neuern　Philosoph。；　Vol。　IV。　Sec。　II。；　pp。　571…582；　Tiedemann；　Geist　der
speculativen　Philos。；　Vol。　VI。　pp。　511…518；　Rixner：　Handbuch　der　Geschichte　der　Philosophie；
Vol。　III。　§　79；　pp。　195；　196。
2。　Wolf's　Vernünftige　Gedanken　von　Gott；　der　Welt　und　der　Seele　des　Menschen　（Halle；　1741）；
Pt。　I。　chap。　ii。　§　114；　120；　pp。　59；　60；　62；　63；　chap。　vi。　§　575…581；　686；　pp。　352…359；　425；
chap。　v。　§　742；　p。　463；　§　926；　p。　573；　chap。　vi。　§　928；　p。　574；　seq。
3。　Wolff's　Anfangsgründe　aller　mathematischen　Wissenschaften；　Pt。　I。：　Anfangsgründe　der
Baukunst；　Pt。　II。　Prop。　8；　p。　414；　Problem　22；　pp。　452；　453；　Pt。　II。：　Anfangsgründe　der
Fortification；　Pt。　I。　p。　570。




Section　Two：　Period　of　the　Thinking　Understanding
　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　II。　—　Transition　Period；　A　Idealism　&　Scepticism
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　BERKELEY。

This　idealism；　in　which　all　external　reality　disappears；　has　before　it　the　standpoint　of　Locke；　and　it
proceeds　directly　from　him。　For　we　saw　that　to　Locke　the　source　of　truth　is　experience；　or　Being
as　perceived。　Now　since　this　sensuous　Being；　as　Being；　has　in　it　the　quality　of　being　for
consciousness；　we　saw　that　it　necessarily　came　to　pass　that　in　Locke's　case　some　qualities；　at
least；　were　so　determined　that　they　were　not　in　themselves；　but　only　for　another；　and　that　colour；
figure；　&c。；　had　their　ground　only　in　the　subject；　in　his　particular　organization。　This
Being…for…another；　however；　was　not　by　him　accepted　as　the　Notion；　but　as　falling　within
self…consciousness　—　i。e。；　self…consciousness　not　looked　on　as　universal；　—　not　within　mind；　but
within　what　is　opposed　to　the　implicit。

George　Berkeley　was　born　in　1684　at　Kilcrin；　near　Thomastown；　in　the　county　of　Kilkenny；
Ireland：　in　1754　he　died　as　an　English　Bishop。（1）　He　wrote　the　“Theory　of　Vision；”　1709；　“A
Treatise　concerning　the　principles　of　human　knowledge；”　1710；　“Three　Dialogues　between　Hylas
and　Philonous；”　1713。　In　1784　his　collected　works　were　published　in　London　in　two　quarto
volumes。

Berkeley　advocated　an　idealism　which　came　very　near　to　that　of　Malebranche。　As　against　the
metaphysic　of　the　understanding；　we　have　the　point　of　view　that　all　existence　and　its　determinations
arise　from　feeling；　and　are　constituted　by　self…consciousness。　Berkeley's　first　and　fundamental
thought　is　consequently　this：　“The　Being　of　whatever　is　called　by　us　a　thing　consists　alone　in　its
being　perceived；”　i。e。；　our　determinations　are　the　objects　of　our　knowledge。　“All　objects　of
human　knowledge　are　ideas”　（so　called　by　Berkeley　as　by　Locke）；　“which　arise　either　from　the
impressions　of　the　outward　senses；　or　from　perceptions　of　the　inward　states　and　activities　of　the
mind；　or　finally；　they　are　such　as　are　constituted　by　means　of　memory　and　imagination　through　their
separation　and　rearrangement。　A　union　of　different　sensuous　feelings　appears　to　us　to　be　a
particular　thing；　e。g。；　the　feeling　of　colour；　taste；　smell；　figure；　&c。；　for　by　colours；　smells；　sounds；
something　of　which　we　have　a　sensation　is　always　understood。”（2）　This　is　the　matter　and　the
object　of　knowledge；　the　knower　is　the　percipient　“I；”　which　reveals　itself　in　relation　to　those
feelings　in　various　activities；　such　as　imagination；　remembrance；　and　will。

Berkeley　thus　indeed　acknowledges　the　distinction　between　Being…for…self　and　Other…Being；
which　in　his　case；　however；　itself　falls　within　the　“I。”　Of　the　matter　on　which　activity　is　directed；　it
is　no　doubt　in　regard　to　one　portion　allowed　that　it　does　not　exist　outside　of　mind　—　that　is　to　say；
so　far　as　our　thoughts；　inward　feelings　and　states；　or　the　operations　of　our　imaginary　powers　are
concerned。　But　in　like　manner　the　manifold　sensuous　conceptions　and　feelings　can　only　exist　in　a
mind。　Locke　certainly　distinguished　extension　and　movement；　for　example；　as　fundamental
qualities；　i。e。；　as　qualities　which　pertain　to　the　objects　in　themselves。　But　Berkeley　very　pertinently
points　out　inconsistency　here　from　the　point　of　view　that　great　and　small；　quick　and　slow；　hold
good　as　something　relative；　thus　were　extension　and　movement　to　be　inherent　or　implicit；　t