history of philosophy-第55章
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at Wolff； who had taken them to be quite in earnest； his opinion was that if Leibnitz were not
perfectly serious in this sense with his Théodicée； yet he had unconsciously written his best
therein。 Leibnitz's Théodicée is not what we can altogether appreciate； it is a justification of God
in regard to the evil in the world。 His really philosophic thoughts are most connectedly expressed
in a treatise on the principles of Grace （Principes de la Nature et de la Grace）；（3） and especially
in the pamphlet addressed to Prince Eugéne of Savoy。（4） 。Buhle （Geschichte der neuern
Philosophie； vol。 iv。 section 1； p。 131） says： “His philosophy is not so much the product of free；
independent； original speculation； as the result of well…tested earlier” and later “systems； an
eclecticism whose defects he tried to remedy in his own way。 It is a desultory treatment of
Philosophy in letters。”
Leibnitz followed the same general plan in his philosophy as the physicists adopt when they
advance a hypothesis to explain existing data。 He has it that general conceptions of the Idea are to
be found； from which the particular may be derived； here； on account of existing data； the general
conception； for example the determination of force or matter furnished by reflection； must have its
determinations disposed in such a way that it fits in with the data。 Thus the philosophy of Leibnitz
seems to be not so much a philosophic system as an hypothesis regarding the existence of the
world； namely how it is to be determined in accordance with the metaphysical determinations and
the data and assumptions of the ordinary conception； which are accepted as valid（5） — thoughts
which are moreover propounded without the sequence pertaining to the Notion and mainly in
narrative style； and which taken by themselves show no necessity in their connection。 Leibnitz's
philosophy therefore appears like a string of arbitrary assertions； which follow one on another like
a metaphysical romance； it is only when we see what he wished thereby to avoid that we learn to
appreciate its value。 He really makes use of external reasons mainly in order to establish relations：
“Because the validity of such relations cannot be allowed； nothing remains but to establish the
matter in this way。” If we are not acquainted with these reasons； this procedure strikes us as
arbitrary。
a。 Leibnitz's philosophy is an idealism of the intellectuality of the universe； and although from one
point of view he stands opposed to Locke； as from another point of view he is in opposition to the
Substance of Spinoza； he yet binds them both together again。 For； to go into the matter more
particularly； on the one hand he expresses in the many monads the absolute nature of things
distinguished and of individuality； on the other hand； in contrast to this and apart from it； he
expresses the ideality of Spinoza and the non…absolute nature of all difference； as the idealism of
the popular conception。 Leibnitz's philosophy is a metaphysics； and in sharp contrast to the simple
universal Substance of Spinoza； where all that is determined is merely transitory； it makes
fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances； which after the example of the
ancients he named monads — an expression already used by the Pythagoreans。 These monads he
then proceeds to determine as follows。
Firstly： “Substance is a thing that is capable of activity； it is compound or simple； the compound
cannot exist without the simple。 The monads are simple substances。” The proof that they
constitute the truth in all things is very simple； it is a superficial reflection。 For instance； one of
Leibnitz's maxims is： “Because there are compound things； the principles of the same must be
simple； for the compound consists of the simple。”（6） This proof is poor enough； it is an example of
the favourite way of starting from something definite； say the compound； and then drawing
conclusions therefrom as to the simple。 It is quite right in a way； but really it is tautology。 Of
course； if the compound exists； so does the simple； for the compound means something in itself
manifold whose connection or unity is external。 From the very trivial category of the compound it
is easy to deduce the simple。 It is a conclusion drawn from a certain premiss； but the question is
whether the premiss is true。 These monads are not； however； something abstract and simple in
itself； like the empty Epicurean atoms； which； as they were in themselves lacking in determination；
drew all their determination from their aggregation alone。 The monads are； on the contrary；
substantial forms； a good expression； borrowed from the Scholastics （supra； p。 71）； or the
metaphysical points of the Alexandrian School （Vol。 II。 p。 439）； they are the entelechies of
Aristotle taken as pure activity； which are forms in themselves （Vol。 II。 pp。 138； 182； 183）。
“These monads are not material or extended； nor do they originate or decay in the natural fashion；
for they can begin only by a creative act of God； and they can end only by annihilation。”（7）
Thereby they are distinguished from the atoms； which are regarded simply as principles。 The
expression creation we are familiar with from religion； but it is a meaningless word derived from
the ordinary conception； in order to be a thought and to have philosophic significance； it must be
much more closely defined。
Secondly： “On account of their simplicity the monads are not susceptible of alteration by another
monad in their inner essence； there is no causal connection between them。” Each of them is
something indifferent and independent as regards the rest； otherwise it would not be an entelechy。
Each of them is so much for itself that all its determinations and modifications go on in itself alone；
and no determination from without takes place。 Leibnitz says： “There are three ways in which
substances are connected： （1） Causality； influence； （2） The relation of assistance； （3） The relation
of harmony。 The relation of influence is a relation pertaining to a commonplace or popular
philosophy。 But as it is impossible to understand how material particles or immaterial qualities can
pass from one substance into another； such a conception as this must be abandoned。” If we
accept the reality of the many； there can be no transition at all； each is an ultimate and absolutely
independent entity。 “The system of assistance；” according to Descartes； “is something quite
superfluous； a Deus ex machina； because continual miracles in the things of nature are assumed。”
If we； like Descartes； assume independent substances； no causal nexus is conceivable； for this
presupposes an influence； a bearing of the one upon the other； and in this way the other is not a
substance。 “Therefore there remains only harmony； a unity which is in itself or implicit。 The monad
is therefore simply shut up in itself； and cannot be determined by another； this other cannot be set
into it。 It can neither get outside itself； nor can others get inside it。”（8） That is also Spinoza's way of
regarding matters： each attribute entirely represents the essence of God for itself； extension and
thought have no influence on each other。
In the third place； “however； these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or
determinations in themselves； inner actions； through which they are distinguished from others。
There cannot be two things alike； for otherwise they would not be two； they would not be different
but one and the same。”（9） Here then Leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words。
What is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished。 This may be taken in a trivial sense； as that
there are not two individuals which are alike。 To such sensuous things the maxim has no
application； it is prima facie indifferent whether there are things which are alike or not； there may
also be always a difference of space。 This is the superficial sense； which does not concern us。 The
more intimate sense is； however； that each thing is in itself something determined； distinguishing
itself from others implicitly or in itself。 Whether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison
which we make； which falls within our ken。 But what we have further to consider is the determined
difference in themselves。 The difference must be a difference in themselves； not for our
comparison； for the subject must have the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or
determination； i。e。； the determination must be immanent in the individual。 Not only do we
distinguish the animal by its claws； but it distinguishes itself essentially thereby； it defends itself； it
preserves itself。 If two things are different only in being two； then each of them is one； but the fact
of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them； the determined difference in itself
is the principal point。
Fourthly： “The determinateness and the variation thereby established is； however； an inward
implicit principle； it is a multiplicity of modification； of relations to surrounding existences； but a
multiplicity which remains locked up in simplicity。 Determinateness and variation such as this；
which remains and goes on in the existence itself； is a perception；” and therefore Leibnitz says all
monads perceive or represent （for we may translate perceptio by representation ＇Vorstellung＇）。 In
other words； they are in themselves universal； for universality is just simplicity in multiplicity； and
therefore a simplicity which is at the same time change and motion of multiplicity。 This is a very
important determination； in substance itself there is negativity； determinateness； without its
simplicity and its implicitude being given up。 Further； in it there is this idealism； that the simple is
something in itself distinguished； and in spite of its variation； that it yet remains one； and continues
in its simplicity。 An instance of this is found in “I；” my spirit。 I have many conceptions； a wealth
of thought is in me； and yet I remain one； notwithstanding this variety of state。 This identity may be
found in the fact that what is different is at the same time abrogated； and is determined as one； the
monads are therefore distinguished by modifications in themselves； but not by external
determinations。 These determinations contained in the monads exist in them in ideal fashion； this
ideality in the monad is in itself a whole； so that these differences are only representations and
ideas。 This absolute difference what is termed the Notion； what falls asunder in the mere
representation is held together。 This is what possesses interest in Leibnitz's philosophy。 Such
ideality in the same way pertains to the material； which is also a multiplicity of monads； therefore
the system of Leibnitz is an intellectual system； in accordance with which all that is material has
powers of representation and perception。 As thus representing； the monad； says Leibnitz；
possesses activity； for activity is to be different； and yet to be one； and this is the only true
difference。 The monad not only represents； it also changes； but in doing so； it yet remains in itself
absolutely what it is。 This variation is based on activity。 �
