history of philosophy-第47章

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here　a　false　position　indeed；　as　if　that　subject　were　implicit　or　in　itself；　whereas　subject　and
predicate　are；　fundamentally　even；　moments　in　separation；　in　the　judgment　“God　is　One；”　the
subject　itself　is　universal；　since　it　resolves　itself　into　unity。　On　the　other　side　it　is　implied　in　this　false
position　that　the　proof　is　brought　in　from　outside　merely；　as　in　mathematics　from　a　preceding
proposition；　and　that　the　proposition　is　not　therefore　conceived　through　itself；　thus　we　see　the
ordinary　method　of　proof　take　its　middle　term；　the　principle；　from　anywhere　it　can；　in　the　same
way　as　in　classification　it　takes　its　principle　of　classification。　The　proposition　is　then；　as　it　were；　a
secondary　affair；　but　we　must　ask　if　this　proposition　is　true。　The　result　as　proposition　ought　to　be
truth；　but　is　only　knowledge。　The　movement　of　knowledge；　as　proof；　falls　therefore；　in　the　third
place；　outside　of　the　proposition；　which　ought　to　be　the　truth。　The　essential　moments　of　the　system
are　really　already　completely　contained　in　the　pre…suppositions　of　the　definitions；　from　which　all
further　proofs　have　merely　to　be　deduced。　But　whence　have　we　these　categories　which　here
appear　as　definitions？　We　find　them　doubtless　in　ourselves；　in　scientific　culture。　The　existence　of
the　understanding；　the　will；　extension；　is　therefore　not　developed　from　infinite　substance；　but　it　is
directly　expressed　in　these　determinations；　and　that　quite　naturally；　for　of　a　truth　there　exists　the
One　into　which　everything　enters；　in　order　to　be　absorbed　therein；　but　out　of　which　nothing　comes。
For　as　Spinoza　has　set　up　the　great　proposition；　all　determination　implies　negation　（supra；　p。　267）；
and　as　of　everything；　even　of　thought　in　contrast　to　extension；　it　may　be　shown　that　it　is　determined
and　finite；　what　is　essential　in　it　rests　upon　negation。　Therefore　God　alone　is　the　positive；　the
affirmative；　and　consequently　the　one　substance；　all　other　things；　on　the　contrary；　are　only
modifications　of　this　substance；　and　are　nothing　in　and　for　themselves。　Simple　determination　or
negation　belongs　only　to　form；　but　is　quite　another　thing　from　absolute　determinateness　or
negativity；　which　is　absolute　form；　in　this　way　of　looking　at　it　negation　is　the　negation　of　negation；
and　therefore　true　affirmation。　This　negative　self…conscious　moment；　the　movement　of　knowledge；
which　pursues　its　way　in　the　thought　which　is　present　before　us；　is　however　certainly　lacking　to　the
content　of　Spinoza's　philosophy；　or　at　least　it　is　only　externally　associated　with　it；　since　it　falls
within　self…consciousness。　That　is　to　say；　thoughts　form　the　content；　but　they　are　not　self…conscious
thoughts　or　Notions：　the　content　signifies　thought；　as　pure　abstract　self…consciousness；　but　an
unreasoning　knowledge；　into　which　the　individual　does　not　enter：　the　content　has　not　the
signification　of　'I。'　Therefore　the　case　is　as　in　mathematics；　a　proof　is　certainly　given；　conviction
must　follow；　but　yet　the　matter　fails　to　be　understood。　There　is　a　rigid　necessity　in　the　proof；　to
which　the　moment　of　self…consciousness　is　lacking；　the　'I'　disappears；　gives　itself　altogether　up；
merely　withers　away。　Spinoza's　procedure　is　therefore　quite　correct；　yet　the　individual　proposition
is　false；　seeing　that　it　expresses　only　one　side　of　the　negation。　The　understanding　has
determinations　which　do　not　contradict　one　another；　contradiction　the　understanding　cannot　suffer。
The　negation　of　negation　is；　however；　contradiction；　for　in　that　it　negates　negation　as　simple
determination；　it　is　on　the　one　hand　affirmation；　but　on　the　other　hand　also　really　negation；　and　this
contradiction；　which　is　a　matter　pertaining　to　reason；　is　lacking　in　the　case　of　Spinoza。　There　is
lacking　the　infinite　form；　spirituality　and　liberty。　I　have　already　mentioned　before　this　（pp。　93；　94；
129…137）　that　Lullus　and　Bruno　attempted　to　draw　up　a　system　of　form；　which　should　embrace
and　comprehend　the　one　substance　which　organizes　itself　into　the　universe；　this　attempt　Spinoza
did　not　make。

Because　negation　was　thus　conceived　by　Spinoza　in　one…sided　fashion　merely；　there　is；　in　the　third
place；　in　his　system；　an　utter　blotting　out　of　the　principle　of　subjectivity；　individuality；　personality；
the　moment　of　self…consciousness　in　Being。　Thought　has　only　the　signification　of　the　universal；　not
of　self…consciousness。　It　is　this　lack　which　has；　on　the　one　side；　brought　the　conception　of　the
liberty　of　the　subject　into　such　vehement　antagonism　to　the　system　of　Spinoza；　because　it　set　aside
the　independence　of　the　human　consciousness；　the　so…called　liberty　which　is　merely　the　empty
abstraction　of　independence；　and　in　so　doing　set　aside　God；　as　distinguished　from　nature　and　the
human　consciousness　—　that　is　as　implicit　consciousness　of　freedom；　of　the　spiritual；　which　is　the
negative　of　the　corporeal；　and　man　has　also　the　consciousness　that　his　true　Being　lies　in　what　is
opposed　to　the　corporeal。　This　has　been　firmly　maintained　by　religion；　theology；　and　the　sound
common　sense　of　the　common　consciousness；　and　this　form　of　opposition　to　Spinoza　appears　first
of　all　in　the　assertion　that　freedom　is　real；　and　that　evil　exists。　But　because　for　Spinoza；　on　the
other　hand；　there　exists　only　absolute　universal　substance　as　the　non…particularized；　the　truly　real
—　all　that　is　particular　and　individual；　my　subjectivity　and　spirituality；　has；　on　the　other　hand；　as　a
limited　modification　whose　Notion　depends　on　another；　no　absolute　existence。　Thus　the　soul；　the
Spirit；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　individual　Being；　is　for　Spinoza　a　mere　negation；　like　everything　in　general
that　is　determined。　As　all　differences　and　determinations　of　things　and　of　consciousness　simply　go
back　into　the　One　substance；　one　may　say　that　in　the　system　of　Spinoza　all　things　are　merely　cast
down　into　this　abyss　of　annihilation。　But　from　this　abyss　nothing　comes　out；　and　the　particular　of
which　Spinoza　speaks　is　only　assumed　and　presupposed　from　the　ordinary　conception；　without
being　justified。　Were　it　to　be　justified；　Spinoza　would　have　to　deduce　it　from　his　Substance；　but
that　does　not　open　itself　out；　and　therefore　comes　to　no　vitality；　spirituality　or　activity。　His
philosophy　has　only　a　rigid　and　unyielding　substance；　and　not　yet　spirit；　in　it　we　are　not　at　home
with　ourselves。　But　the　reason　that　God　is　not　spirit　is　that　He　is　not　the　Three　in　One。　Substance
remains　rigid　and　petrified；　without　Boehme's　sources　or　springs；　for　the　individual　determinations
in　the　form　of　determinations　of　the　understanding　are　not　Boehme's　originating　spirits；　which
energize　and　expand　in　one　another　（supra；　pp。　202；　203）。　What　we　find　regarding　this　particular
then　is　that　it　is　only　a　modification　of　absolute　substance；　which；　however；　is　not　declared　to　be
such；　for　the　moment　of　negativity　is　what　is　lacking　to　this　rigid　motionlessness；　whose　single　form
of　activity　is　this；　to　divest　all　things　of　their　determination　and　particularity　and　cast　them　back　into
the　one　absolute　substance；　wherein　they　are　simply　swallowed　up；　and　all　life　in　itself　is　utterly
destroyed。　This　is　what　we　find　philosophically　inadequate　with　Spinoza；　distinctions　are　externally
present；　it　is　true；　but　they　remain　external；　since　even　the　negative　is　not　known　in　itself。　Thought
is　the　absolutely　abstract；　and　for　that　very　reason　the　absolutely　negative；　it　is　so　in　truth；　but　with
Spinoza　it　is　not　asserted　to　be　the　absolutely　negative。　But　if　in　opposition　to　Spinozism　we　hold
fast　to　the　assertion　that　Spirit；　as　distinguishing　itself　from　the　corporeal；　is　substantial；　actual；　true；
and　in　the　same　way　that　freedom　is　not　something　merely　privative；　then　this　actuality　in　formal
thought　is　doubtless　correct；　yet　it　rests　only　upon　feeling；　but　the　further　step　is　that　the　Idea
essentially　includes　within　itself　motion　and　vitality；　and　that　it　consequently　has　in　itself　the　principle
of　spiritual　freedom。　On　the　one　hand；　therefore；　the　defect　of　Spinozism　is　conceived　as
consisting　in　its　want　of　correspondence　with　actuality；　but　on　the　other　side　it　is　to　be
apprehended　in　a　higher　sense；　I　mean　in　the　sense　that　substance　with　Spinoza　is　only　the　Idea
taken　altogether　abstractly；　not　in　its　vitality。

If；　in　conclusion；　we　sum　up　this　criticism　that　we　have　offered；　we　would　say　that　on　the　one　hand
with　Spinoza　negation　or　privation　is　distinct　from　substance；　for　he　merely　assumes　individual
determinations；　and　does　not　deduce　them　from　substance。　On　the　other　hand　the　negation　is
present　only　as　Nothing；　for　in　the　absolute　there　is　no　mode；　the　negative　is　not　there；　but　only　its
dissolution；　its　return：　we　do　not　find　its　movement；　its　Becoming　and　Being。　The　negative　is
conceived　altogether　as　a　vanishing　moment　—　not　in　itself；　but　only　as　individual
self…consciousness；　it　is　not　like　the　Separator　we　met　with　in　Boehme's　system　（supra；　p。　206）。
Self…consciousness　is　born　from　this　ocean；　dripping　with　the　water　thereof；　i。e。；　never　coming　to
absolute　self…hood；　the　heart；　the　independence　is　transfixed　—　the　vital　fire　is　wanting。　This　lack
has　to　be　supplied；　the　moment　of　self…consciousness　has　to　be　added。　It　has　the　following　two
special　aspects；　which　we　now　perceive　emerging　and　gaining　acceptance；　in　the　first　place　the
objective　aspect；　that　absolute　essence　obtains　in　self…consciousness　the　mode　of　an　object　of
consciousness　for　which　the　“other”　exists；　or　the　existent　as　such；　and　that　what　Spinoza；
understood　by　the　“modes”　is　elevated　to　objective　reality　its　an　absolute　moment　of　the　absolute；
in　the　second　place　we　have　the　aspect　of　self…consciousness；　individuality；　independence。　As　was
formerly　the　case　with　respect　to　Bacon　and　Boehme；　the　former　aspect　is　here　taken　up　by　the
Englishman；　John　Locke；　the　latter　by　the　German　Leibnitz；　in　the　first　case　it　did　not　appear　as　a
moment；　nor　did　it　in　the　second　appear　as　absolute　Notion。　Now　while　Spinoza　only　takes　notice
of　these　ordinary　conceptions；　and。　the　highest　point　of　view　he　reaches　in　regard　to　them　is　that
they　sink　and　disappear　in　the　one　Substance；　Locke　on　the　contrary　examines　the　genesis　of
these　conceptions；　while　Leibnitz　opposes　to　Spinoza　the　infinite　multiplicity　of　individuals；
although　all　these　monads　have　one　monad　as　the　basis　of　their　Being。　Both　Locke　and　Leibnitz
therefore　came　forward　as　opponents　of　the　abovementioned　one…sidedness　of　Spinoza。






1。　Collectanea　de　vita　B。　de　Spinoza　（addita　Operibus　ed。　Paulus　Jenn？　1802…1803；　T。　II。）；　pp。
593…604；　612…628　（Spinoza　Epist。　LIII…LIV。　in　Oper。　ed。　Paul　T。　I。　pp。　638…640）　642…665；
Spinoz？　Oper。　ed。　Paul　T。　II。　Pr？f。　p。　XVI。　
2。　Collectanea　de　vita　B。　de　Spinoza；　pp。　629…641；　Spinoz？　Ethic。　（Oper。　T。　II。）　Pp。　1；　3　et　not。；
33。
3。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　V。　VIII。　X。　et　Schol。；　XIII。　pp。　37…39；　41；　42；　45。
4。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　I。　Prop。　XVII。；　Coroll。　I。；　II。；　et　Schol。；　Prop。　XVIII。；　Prop。　XX。；　et　Coroll。
I。　Prop。　XXI。；　XXVI。；　XXVII。；　XXIX。；　XXXII。；　XXXIII。　Schol。　II。　pp。　51…57；　59；　61；　63；　67；
68。
5。　Spinoz。　Ethices；　P。　II。　Prop。　I。；　II。；　VII。　et　Schol。　pp。　78；　79；　82；　83。
6。　Spinoz。　Ethic。　P。　I。　Prop。　XXX…XXXII。　pp。　62；　63；　P。　III。　Defin。　III。