history of philosophy-第42章

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Idea；　has　certainly　Being　included　in　its　Notion；　but　it　is　only　Being　as　abstract；　not　as　real　Being　or
as　extension　（supra；　p。　241）。　With　Descartes　corporeality　and　the　thinking　'I'　are　altogether
independent　Beings；　this　independence　of　the　two　extremes　is　done　away　with　in　Spinozism　by
their　becoming　moments　of　the　one　absolute　Being。　This　expression　signifies　that　Being　must　be
grasped　as　the　unity　of　opposites；　the　chief　consideration　is　not　to　let　slip　the　opposition　and　set　it
aside；　but　to　reconcile　and　resolve　it。　Since　then　it　is　thought　and　Being；　and　no　longer　the
abstractions　of　the　finite　and　infinite；　or　of　limit　and　the　unlimited；　that　form　the　opposition　（supra；
p。　161）；　Being　is　here　more　definitely　regarded　as　extension；　for　in　its　abstraction　it　would　be　really
only　that　return　into　itself；　that　simple　equality　with　itself；　which　constitutes　thought　（supra；　p。　229）。
The　pure　thought　of　Spinoza　is　therefore　not　the　simple　universal　of　Plato；　for　it　has　likewise　come
to　know　the　absolute　opposition　of　Notion　and　Being。

Taken　as　a　whole；　this　constitutes　the　Idea　of　Spinoza；　and　it　is　just　what　pure　being　was　to　the
Eleatics　（Vol。　1。　pp。　244；　252）。　This　Idea　of　Spinoza's　we　must　allow　to　be　in　the　main　true　and
well…grounded；　absolute　substance　is　the　truth；　but　it　is　not　the　whole　truth；　in　order　to　be　this　it
must　also　be　thought　of　as　in　itself　active　and　living；　and　by　that　very　means　it　must　determine　itself
as　mind。　But　substance　with　Spinoza　is　only　the　universal　and　consequently　the　abstract
determination　of　mind；　it　may　undoubtedly　be　said　that　this　thought　is　the　foundation　of　all　true
views　—　not；　however；　as　their　absolutely　fixed　and　permanent　basis；　but　as　the　abstract　unity
which　mind　is　in　itself。　It　is　therefore　worthy　of　note　that　thought　must　begin　by　placing　itself　at　the
standpoint　of　Spinozism；　to　be　a　follower　of　Spinoza　is　the　essential　commencement　of　all
Philosophy。　For　as　we　saw　above　（Vol。　I。　p。　144）；　when　man　begins　to　philosophize；　the　soul
must　commence　by　bathing　in　this　ether　of　the　One　Substance；　in　which　all　that　man　has　held　as
true　has　disappeared；　this　negation　of　all　that　is　particular；　to　which　every　philosopher　must　have
come；　is　the　liberation　of　the　mind　and　its　absolute　foundation。　The　difference　between　our
standpoint　and　that　of　the　Eleatic　philosophy　is　only　this；　that　through　the　agency　of　Christianity
concrete　individuality　is　in　the　modern　world　present　throughout　in　spirit。　But　in　spite　of　the　infinite
demands　on　the　part　of　the　concrete；　substance　with　Spinoza　is　not　yet　determined　as　in　itself
concrete。　As　the　concrete　is　thus　not　present　in　the　content　of　substance；　it　is　therefore　to　be　found
within　reflecting　thought　alone；　and　it　is　only　from　the　endless　oppositions　of　this　last　that　the
required　unity　emerges。　Of　substance　as　such　there　is　nothing　more　to　be　said；　all　that　we　can　do　is
to　speak　of　the　different　ways　in　which　Philosophy　has　dealt　with　it；　and　the　opposites　which　in　it
are　abrogated。　The　difference　depends　on　the　nature　of　the　opposites　which　are　held　to　be
abrogated　in　substance。　Spinoza　is　far　from　having　proved　this　unity　as　convincingly　as　was　done
by　the　ancients；　but　what　constitutes　the　grandeur　of　Spinoza's　manner　of　thought　is　that　he　is　able
to　renounce　all　that　is　determinate　and　particular；　and　restrict　himself　to　the　One；　giving　heed　to　this
alone。

1。　Spinoza　begins　（Eth。　P。　I　pp。　35；　36）　with　a　series　of　definitions；　from　which　we　take　the
following。

a。　Spinoza's　first　definition　is　of　the　Cause　of　itself。　He　says：　“By　that　which　is　causa　sui；　its　own
cause；　I　understand　that　whose　essence”　（or　Notion）　“involves　existence；　or　which　cannot　be
conceived　except　as　existent。”　The　unity　of　existence　and　universal　thought　is　asserted　from　the
very　first；　and　this　unity　will　ever　be　the　question　at　issue。　“The　cause　of　itself”　is　a　noteworthy
expression；　for　while　we　picture　to　ourselves　that　the　effect　stands　in　opposition　to　the　cause；　the
cause　of　itself　is　the　cause　which；　while　it　operates　and　separates　an　“other；”　at　the　same　time
produces　only　itself；　and　in　the　production　therefore　does　away　with　this　distinction。　The
establishing　of　itself　as　an　other　is　loss　or　degeneration；　and　at　the　same　time　the　negation　of　this
loss；　this　is　a　purely　speculative　Notion；　indeed　a　fundamental　Notion　in　all　speculation。　The　cause
in　which　the　cause　is　identical　with　the　effect；　is　the　infinite　cause　（infra；　p。　263）；　if　Spinoza　had
further　developed　what　lies　in　causa　sui；　substance　with　him　would　not　have　been　rigid　and
unworkable。

b。　The　second　definition　is　that　of　the　finite。　“That　thing　is　said　to　be　finite　in　its　kind　which　can　be
limited　by　another　of　the　same　nature。”　For　it　comes　then　to　an　end；　it　is　not　there；　what　is　there　is
something　else。　This　something　else　must；　however；　be　of　a　like　nature；　for　those　things　which　are
to　limit　each　other　must；　in　order　to　be　able　to　limit　each　other；　touch　each　other；　and　consequently
have　a　relation　to　each　other；　that　is　to　say　they　must　be　of　one　nature；　stand　on　a　like　basis；　and
have　a　common　sphere。　That　is　the　affirmative　side　of　the　limit。　“Thus　a　thought　is”　only　“limited
by　another　thought；　a　body　by　another　body；　but　thoughts　are　not　limited　by　bodies　nor〃
conversely　〃bodies　by　thoughts。”　We　saw　this　（p。　244）　with　Descartes：　thought　is　an　independent；
totality　and　so　is　extension；　they　have　nothing　to　do　with　one　another；　they　do　not　limit　each　other；
each　is　included　in　itself。

c。　The　third　definition　is　that　of　substance。　“By　substance　I　understand　that　which　exists　in　itself
and　is　conceived　by　itself；　i。e。　the　conception　of　which　does　not　require　the　aid　of　the　conception
of　any　other　thing　for　its　formation　（a　quo　formari　debeat）；”　otherwise　it　would　be　finite；
accidental。　What　cannot　have　a　conception　formed　of　it　without　the　aid　of　something　else；　is　not
independent；　but　is　dependent　upon　that　something　else。

d。　In　the　fourth　place　Spinoza　defines　attributes；　which；　as　the　moment　coming；　second　to
substance；　belong　to　it。　“By　attribute　I　understand　that　which　the　mind　perceives　as　constituting　the
essence　of　substance；”　and　to　Spinoza　this　alone　is　true。　This　is　an　important　determination；　the
attribute　is　undoubtedly　a　determinateness；　but　at　the　same　time　it　remains　a　totality。　Spinoza；　like
Descartes；　accepts　only　two　attributes；　thought　and　extension。　The　understanding　grasps　them　as
the　reality　of　substance；　but　the　reality　is　not　higher　than　the　substance；　for　it　is　only　reality　in　the
view　of　the　understanding；　which　falls　outside　substance。　Each　of　the　two　ways　of　regarding
substance　—　extension　and　thought　—　contains　no　doubt　the　whole　content　of　substance；　but　only
in　one　form；　which　the　understanding　brings　with　it；　and　for　this　very　reason　both　sides　are　in
themselves　identical　and　infinite。　This　is　the　true　completion；　but　where　substance　passes　over　into
attribute　is　not　stated。

e。　The　fifth　definition　has　to　do　with　what　comes　third　in　relation　to　substance；　the　mode。　“By
mode　I　understand　the　affections　of　substance；　or　that　which　is　in　something　else；　through　the　aid
of　which　also　it　is　conceived。”　Thus　substance　is　conceived　through　itself；　attribute　is　not
conceived　through　itself；　but　has　a　relation　to　the　conceiving　understanding；　in　so　far　as　this　last
conceives　reality；　mode；　finally；　is　what　is　not　conceived　as　reality；　but　through　and　in　something
else。

These　last　three　moments　Spinoza　ought　not　merely　to　have　established　in　this　way　as　conceptions；
he　ought　to　have　deduced　them；　they　are　especially　important；　and　correspond　with　what　we　more
definitely　distinguish　as　universal；　particular　and　individual。　They　must　not；　however；　be　taken　as
formal；　but　in　their　true　concrete　sense；　the　concrete　universal　is　substance；　the　concrete　particular
is　the　concrete　species；　the　Father　and　Son　in　the　Christian　dogma　are　similarly　particular；　but　each
of　them　contains　the　whole　nature　of　God；　only　under　a　different　form。　The　mode　is　the　individual；
the　finite　as　such；　which　enters　into　external　connection　with　what　is　“other。”　In　this　Spinoza　only
descends　to　a　lower　stage；　the　mode　is　only　the　foregoing　warped　and　stunted。　Spinoza's　defect　is
therefore　this；　that　he　takes　the　third　moment　as　mode　alone；　as　a　false　individuality。　True
individuality　and　subjectivity　is　not　a　mere　retreat　from　the　universal；　not　merely　something　clearly
determinate；　for；　as　clearly　determinate；　it　is　at　the　same　time　Being…for…itself；　determined　by　itself
alone。　The　individual；　the　subjective；　is　even　in　being　so　the　return　to　the　universal；　and　in　that　it　is
at　home　with　itself；　it　is　itself　the　universal。　The　return　consists　simply　and　solely　in　the　fact　of　the
particular　being　in　itself　the　universal；　to　this　return　Spinoza　did　not　attain。　Rigid　substantiality　is　the
last　point　he　reached；　not　infinite　form；　this　he　knew　not；　and　thus　determinateness　continually
vanishes　from　his　thought。

f。　In　the　sixth　place；　the　definition　of　the　infinite　is　also　of　importance；　for　in　the　infinite　Spinoza
defines　more　strictly　than　anywhere　else　the　Notion　of　the　Notion。　The　infinite　has　a　double
significance；　according　as　it　is　taken　as　the　infinitely　many　or　as　the　absolutely　infinite　（infra；　p。
263）。　“The　infinite　in　its　kind　is　not　such　in　respect　of　all　possible　attributes；　but　the　absolutely
infinite　is　that　to　whose　essence　all　belongs　that　expresses　an　essence　and　contains　no　negation。”
In　the　same　sense　Spinoza　distinguishes　in　the　nine…and…twentieth　Letter　（Oper。　T。　I。　pp。　526…532）
the　infinite　of　imagination　from　the　infinite　of　thought　（intellectus）；　the　actual　（actu）　infinite。　Most
men；　when　they　wish　to　strive　after　the　sublime；　get　no　farther　than　the　first　of　these；　this　is　the　false
infinite；　just　as　when　one　says　“and　so　on　into　infinity；”　meaning　perhaps　the　infinity　of　space　from
star　to　star；　or　else　the　infinity　of　time。　An　infinite　numerical　series　in　mathematics　is　exactly　the
same　thing。　If　a　certain　fraction　is　represented　as　a　decimal　fraction；　it　is　incomplete；　1/7　is；　on　the
contrary；　the　true　infinite；　and　therefore　not　an　incomplete　expression；　although　the　content　here　is
of　course　limited。　It　is　infinity　in　the　incorrect　sense　that　one　usually　has　in　view　when　infinity　is
spoken　of；　and　even　if　it　is　looked　on　as　sublime；　it　yet　is　nothing　present；　and　only　goes　ever　out
into　the　negative；　without　being　actual　（actu）。　But　for　Spinoza　the　infinite　is　not　the　fixing　of　a　limit
and　then　passing　beyond　the　limit　fixed　—　the　sensuous　infinity　—　but　absolute　infinity；　the　positive；
which　has　complete　and　present　in　itself　an　absolute　multiplicity　which　has　no　Beyond。　Philosophic
infinity；　that　which　is　infinite　actu；　Spinoza　therefore　calls　the　absolute　affirmation　of　itself。　This　is
quite　correct；　only　it　might　have　been　better　expressed　as：　“It　is　the　negation　of　negation。”
Spinoza　here　also　employs　geometrical　figures　as　illustrations　of　the　Notion　of　infinity。　In　his　Opera
postuma；　preceding　his　Ethics；　and　also　in　the　letter　quoted　above；　he　has　two　circles；　one　of
which　lies　within　the　other；　which　have