history of philosophy-第39章

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not　out　of　thought；　—　but　the　thought　of　the　‘out　of　thought。’

2。　Descartes　accepts　Being　in　the　entirely　positive　sense；　and　has　not　the　conception　of　its　being
the　negative　of　self…consciousness：　but　simple　Being；　set　forth　as　the　negative　of
self…consciousness；　is　extension。　Descartes　thus　separates　extension　from　God；　remains　constant
to　this　separation；　unites　the　universe；　matter；　with　God　in　such　a　way　as　to　make　Him　its　creator
and　first　cause：　and　he　has　the　true　perception　that　conservation　is　a　continuous　creation；　in　so　far
as　creation　as　activity　is　asserted　to　be　separated。　Descartes　does　not；　however；　trace　extension　in
a　true　method　back　to　thought；　matter；　extended　substances；　stand　over　against　the　thinking
substances　which　are　simple；　in　as　far　as　the　universe　is　created　by　God；　it　could　not　be　as　perfect
as　its　cause。　As　a　matter　of　fact　the　effect　is　less　perfect　than　the　cause；　since　it　is　that　which　is
posited；　if　we　are　to　remain　at　the　conception　of　cause　pertaining　to　the　understanding。　Hence
according　to　Descartes　extension　is　the　less　perfect。　But　as　imperfect　the　extended　substances
cannot　exist　and　subsist　through　themselves　or　their　Notion；　they　thus　require　every　moment　the
assistance　of　God　for　their　maintenance；　and　without　this　they　would　in　a　moment　sink　back　into
nothing。　Preservation　is；　however；　unceasing　re…production。　（25）

Descartes　now　proceeds　to　further　particulars；　and　expresses　himself　as　follows：　“We　consider
what　comes　under　consciousness　either　as　things　or　their　qualities；　or　as　eternal　truths　which　have
no　existence　outside　our　thought〃　—　which　do　not　belong　to　this　or　that　time；　to　this　or　that　place。
He　calls　these　last　something　inborn　within　us；　something　not　made　by　us　or　merely　felt；　（26）　but
the　eternal　Notion　of　mind　itself　and　the　eternal　determinations　of　its　freedom；　of　itself　as　itself。
From　this　point　the　conception　that　ideas　are　inborn　（innat？　ide？）　hence　proceeds；　this　is　the
question　over　which　Locke　and　Leibnitz　dispute。　The　expression　“eternal　truths”　is　current　even
in　these　modern　times；　and　it　signifies　the　universal　determinations　and　relations　which　exist　entirely
on　their　own　account。　The　word　‘Inborn’　is　however　a　clumsy　and　stupid　expression；　because
the　conception　of　physical　birth　thereby　indicated；　does　not　apply　to　mind。　To　Descartes　inborn
ideas　are　not　universal；　as　they　are　to　Plato　and　his　successors；　but　that　which　has　evidence；
immediate　certainty；　an　immediate　multiplicity　founded　in　thought　itself　—　manifold　conceptions　in
the　form　of　a　Being；　resembling　what　Cicero　calls　natural　feelings　implanted　in　the　heart。　We　would
rather　say　that　such　is　implied　in　the　nature　and　essence　of　our　mind　and　spirit。　Mind　is　active　and
conducts　itself　in　its　activity　in　a　determinate　manner；　but　this　activity　has　no　other　ground　than　its
freedom。　Yet　if　this　is　the　case　more　is　required　than　merely　to　say　so；　it　must　be　deduced　as　a
necessary　product　of　our　mind。　We　have　such　ideas；　for　instance；　in　the　logical　laws：　“From
nothing　comes　nothing；”　“A　thing　cannot　both　be　and　not　be；”　（27）　as　also　in　moral　principles。
These　are　facts　of　consciousness　which　Descartes　however　soon　passes　from　again；　they　are　only
present　in　thought　as　subjective；　and　he　has　thus　not　yet　inquired　respecting　their　content。

As　regards　things；　on　which　Descartes　now　directs　his　attention；　the　other　side　to　these　eternal
verities；　the　universal　determinations　of　things　are　substance；　permanence；　order；　&c。　（28）　He　then
gives　definitions　of　these　thoughts；　just　as　Aristotle　draws　up　a　list　of　the　categories。　But　although
Descartes　laid　it　down　formerly　as　essential　that　no　hypotheses　must　be　made；　yet　now　he　takes
the　conceptions；　and　passes　on　to　them　as　something　found　within　our　consciousness。　He　defines
substance　thus：　“By　substance　I　understand　none　other　than　a　thing　（rem）　which　requires　no　other
something　for　existence；　and　there　is　only　one　thing；　namely　God；　which　can　be　regarded　as　such　a
substance　requiring　no　other　thing。”　This　is　what　Spinoza　says；　we　may　say　that　it　is　likewise　the
true　definition；　the　unity　of　Notion　and　reality：　“All　other”　（things）　“can　only　exist　by　means　of　a
concurrence　（concursus）　of　God；”　what　we　still　call　substance　outside　of　God　thus　does　not　exist
for　itself；　does　not　have　its　existence　in　the　Notion　itself。　That　is　then　called　the　system　of
assistance　（systema　assistenti？）　which　is；　however；　transcendental。　God　is　the　absolute　uniter　of
Notion　and　actuality；　other　things；　finite　things　which　have　a　limit　and；　stand　in　dependence；　require
something　else。　“Hence　if　we　likewise　call　other　things　substances；　this　expression　is　not　applicable
both　to　them　and　to　God　univoce；　as　is　said　in　the　schools；　that　is　to　say　no　definite　significance
can　be　given　to　this　word　which　would　equally　apply　both　to　God　and　to　the　creatures。”　（29）

“But　I　do　not　recognize　more　than　two　sorts　of　things；　the　one　is　that　of　thinking　things；　and　the
other　that　of　things　which　relate　to　what　is　extended。”　Thought；　the　Notion；　the　spiritual；　the
self…conscious；　is　what　is　at　home　with　itself；　and　its　opposite　is　contained　in　what　is　extended；
spatial；　separated；　not　at　home　with　itself　nor　free。　This　is　the　real　distinction　（distinctio　realis）　of
substances：　“The　one　substance　can　be　clearly　and　definitely　comprehended　without　the　other。　But
the　corporeal　and　the　thinking　and　creating　substance　can　be　comprehended　under　this　common
notion；　for　the　reason　that　they　are　things　which　require　God’s　support　alone　in　order　to　exist。”
They　are　universal；　other　finite　things　require　other　things　as　conditions　essential　to　their　existence。
But　extended　substance；　the　kingdom　of　nature；　and　spiritual　substance；　do　not　require　one
another。　They　may　be　called　substances；　because　each　of　them　constitutes　an　entire　range　or
sphere；　an　independent　totality。　But　because；　Spinoza　concluded；　each　side；　the　kingdom　of
thought　as　well　as　nature；　is　one　complete　system　within　itself；　they　are　likewise　in　themselves；　that
is　absolutely；　identical　as　God；　the　absolute　substance；　for　thinking　spirit　this　implicit　is　thus　God；
or　their　differences　are　ideal。

Descartes　proceeds　from　the　Notion　of　God　to　what　is　created；　to　thought　and　extension；　and
from　this　to　the　particular。　“Now　substances　have　several　attributes　without　which　they　cannot　be
thought〃　—　that　signifies　their　determinateness　—　〃but　each　has　something　peculiar　to　itself　which
constitutes　its　nature　and　essence〃　—　a　simple　universal　determinateness　—　〃and　to　which　the
others　all　relate。　Thus　thought；　constitutes　the　absolute　attribute　of　mind；”　thought　is　its　quality；
“extension　is〃　the　essential　determination　of　corporeality；　and　this　alone　is　“the　true　nature　of
body。　What　remains　are　merely　secondary　qualities；　modes；　like　figure　and　movement　in　what　is
extended；　imagination；　feeling　and　will　in　thinking；　they　may　be　taken　away　or　thought　away。　God
is　the　uncreated；　thinking　substance。”　（30）

Descartes　here　passes　to　what　is　individual；　and　because　he　follows　up　extension　he　arrives　at
matter；　rest；　movement。　One　of　Descartes’　main　points　is　that　matter；　extension；　corporeality；　are
quite　the　same　thing　for　thought；　according　to　him　the　nature　of　body　is　fulfilled　in　its　extension；　and
this　should　be　accepted　as　the　only　essential　fact　respecting　the　corporeal　world。　We　say　that
body　offers　resistance；　has　smell；　taste；　colour；　transparency；　hardness；　&c。；　since　without　these
we　can　have　no　body。　All　these　further　determinations　respecting　what　is　extended；　such　as　size；
rest；　movement；　and　inertia；　are；　however；　merely　sensuous；　and　this　Descartes　showed；　as　it　had
long　before　this　been　shown　by　the　Sceptics。　Undoubtedly　that　is　the　abstract　Notion　or　pure
essence；　but　to　body　or　to　pure　existence；　there　likewise　of　necessity　pertains　negativity　or
diversity。　By　means　of　the　following　illustration　Descartes　showed　that　with　the　exception　of
extension；　all　corporeal　determinations　may　be　annihilated；　and　that　none　can　be　absolutely
predicated。　We　draw　conclusions　respecting　the　solidity　and　hardness　of　matter　from　the
resistance　which　a　body　offers　to　our　disturbance；　and　by　means　of　which　it　seeks　to　hold　its
place。　Now　if　we　admit　that　matter　as　we　touch　it　always　gives　way　to　as　like　space；　we　should
have　no　reason　for　ascribing　to　it　solidity。　Smell；　colour；　taste；　are　in　the　same　way　sensuous
qualities　merely；　but　what　we　clearly　perceive　is　alone　true。　If　a　body　is　ground　into　small　parts；　it
gives　way；　and　yet　it　does　not　lose　its　nature；　resistance　is　thus　not　essential。（31）　This
not…being…for…itself　is　however　a　quantitatively　slighter　resistance　only；　the　resistance　always
remains。　But　Descartes　desires　only　to　think；　now　he　does　not　think　resistance；　colour；　&c。；　but
apprehends　them　by　the　senses　only。　Hence　he　says　that　all　this　must　be　led　back　to　extension　as
being　special　modifications　of　the　same。　It　is　undoubtedly　to　the　credit　of　Descartes　that　he　only
accepts　as　true　what　is　thought；　but　the　abrogation　of　these　sensuous　qualities　simply　represents
the　negative　movement　of　thought：　the　essence　of　body　is　conditioned　through　this　thought；　that　is；
it　is　not　true　essence。

Descartes　now　makes　his　way　from　the　Notion　of　extension　to　the　laws　of　motion；　as　the　universal
knowledge　of　the　corporeal　in　its　implicitude；　he　shows　that　there　is　no　vacuum；　for　that　would　be
an　extension　without　bodily　substance；　i。e。　a　body　without　body；　that　there　are　no　atoms　（no
indivisible　independent　existence）；　for　the　same　reason；　viz。；　because　the　essence　of　body　is
extension。　He　further　shows　that　a　body　is　set　in　motion　by　something　outside　of　it；　but　of　itself　it
continues　in　a　condition　of　rest；　and　likewise　it　must；　when　in　a　condition　of　movement；　be　brought
to　rest　by　another　outside　of　it　—　this　is　the　property　of　inertia。（32）　These　are　unmeaning
propositions；　for　an　abstraction　is　involved　for　instance　in　asserting　simple　rest　and　movement　in
their　opposition。

Extension　and　motion　are　the　fundamental　conceptions　in　mechanical　physics；　they　represent　the
truth　of　the　corporeal　world。　It　is　thus　that　ideality　comes　before　the　mind　of　Descartes；　and　he　is
far　elevated　above　the　reality　of　the　sensuous　qualities；　although　he　does　not　reach　so　far　as　to　the
separation　of　this　ideality。　He　thus　remains　at　the　point　of　view　of　mechanism　pure　and　simple。
Give　me　matter　（extension）　and　motion　and　I　will　build　worlds　for　you；　is　what　Descartes　virtually
says。（33）　Space　and　time　were　hence　to　him　the　only　determinations　of　the　material　universe。　In
this；　then；　lies　the　mechanical　fashion　of　viewing　nature；　or　the　natural　philosophy　of　Descartes　is
seen　to　be　purely　mechanical。（34）　Hence　changes　in　matter　are　due　merely　to　motion；　so　that
Descartes　traces　every　relationship　to　the　rest　and　movement　of　particles；　and　all　material　diversity
such　as　colour；　and　taste　—　in　short；　all　bodily　qualities　and　animal　phenomena　—　to　mechanism。　In
living　beings　processes　such　as　that　of　digestion　are　mechanical　effects　which　have　as　principles；
rest　and　movement。　We　here　see　the　ground　and