history of philosophy-第26章

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　　　　　ii。　In　the　second　place；　the　spiritual　was　observed　as　in　its　realization　it　constitutes　the
　　　　　spiritual　world　of　states；　in　order　thus　to　investigate　from　experience　the　rights　of　individuals
　　　　　as　regards　one　another；　and　as　regards　rulers；　and　the　rights　of　states　against　states。　Before
　　　　　this　popes　anointed　kings；　just　as　was　done　in　Old　Testament　times　to　those　appointed　by
　　　　　God；　it　was　in　the　Old　Testament　that　the　tithe　was　commanded；　the　forbidden　degrees　of
　　　　　relationship　in　marriage　were　also　adopted　from　the　Mosaic　laws。　What　was　right　and
　　　　　permissible　for　kings　was　demonstrated　from　Saul's　and　David's　histories；　the　rights　of
　　　　　priesthood　from　Samuel　…　in　short；　the　Old　Testament　was　the　source　of　all　the　principles　of
　　　　　public　law；　and　it　is　in　this　way　even　now　that　all　papal　bulls　have　their　deliverances
　　　　　confirmed。　It　may　easily　be　conceived　how　much　nonsense　was　in　this　manner　concocted。
　　　　　Now；　however；　right　was　sought　for　in　man　himself；　and　in　history；　and　what　had　been
　　　　　accounted　right　both　in　peace　and　in　war　was　explained。　In　this　way　books　were　composed
　　　　　which　even　now　are　constantly　quoted　in　the　Parliament　of　England。　Men　further　observed
　　　　　the　desires　which　could　be　satisfied　in　the　state　and　the　manner　in　which　satisfaction　could
　　　　　be　given　to　them；　in　order　thus　from　man　himself；　from　man　of　the　past　as　well　as　of　the
　　　　　present；　to　learn　what　is　right。

b。　The　second　method；　that　of　Idealism；　proceeds　from　what　is　inward；　according　to　it　everything
is　in　thought；　mind　itself　is　all　content。　Here　the　Idea　itself　is　made　the　object；　that　signifies　the
thinking　it　and　from　it　proceeding　to　the　determinate。　What　Realism　draws　from　experience　is　now
derived　from　thought　à　priori；　or　the　determinate　is　also　comprehended　but　not　led　back　to　the
universal　merely；　but　to　the　Idea。

The　two　methods　overlap　one　another；　however；　because　experience　on　its　side　desires　to　derive
universal　laws　from　observations；　while；　on　the　other　side；　thought　proceeding　from　abstract
universality　must　still　give　itself　a　determinate　content；　thus　a　priori　and　a　posteriori　methods　are
mingled。　In　France　abstract　universality　was　the　more　predominant；　from　England　experience　took
its　rise；　and　even　now　it　is　there　held　in　the　greatest　respect；　Germany　proceeded　from　the
concrete　Idea；　from　the　inwardness　of　mind　and　spirit。

2。　The　questions　of　present　philosophy；　the　opposites；　the　content　which　occupies　the　attention　of
these　modern　times；　are　as　follows：　—　

a。　The　first　form　of　the　opposition　which　we　have　already　touched　upon　in　the　Middle　Ages　is　the
Idea　of　God　and　His　Being；　and　the　task　imposed　is　to　deduce　the　existence　of　God；　as　pure
spirit；　from　thought。　Both　sides　must　be　comprehended　through　thought　as　absolute　unity；　the
extremest　opposition　is　apprehended　as　gathered　into　one　unity。　Other　subjects　which　engage　our
attention　are　connected　with　the　same　general　aim；　namely；　the　bringing　about　of　the　inward
reconciliation　in　the　opposition　which　exists　between　knowledge　and　its　object。

b。　The　second　form　of　opposition　is　that　of　Good　and　Evil　…　the　opposition　of　the　assertion　of
independent　will　to　the　positive　and　universal；　the　origin　of　evil　must　be　known。　Evil　is　plainly　the
〃other；〃　the　negation　of　God　as　Holiness；　because　He　is；　because　He　is　wise；　good；　and　at　the
same　time　almighty；　evil　is　contradictory　to　Him；　an　endeavour　is　made　to　reconcile　this
contradiction。

c。　The　third　form　of　opposition　is　that　of　the　freedom　of　man　and　necessity。

　　　　　i。　The　individual　is　clearly　not　determined　in　any　other　way　than　from　himself；　he　is　the
　　　　　absolute　beginning　of　determination；　in　the　'I；'　in　the　self；　a　power　of　decision　is　clearly　to　be
　　　　　found。　This　freedom　is　in　opposition　to　the　theory　that　God　alone　is　really　absolutely
　　　　　determining。　Further；　when　that　which　happens　is　in　futurity；　the　determining　of　it　through
　　　　　God　is　regarded　as　Providence　and　the　foreknowledge　of　God。　In　this；　however；　a　new
　　　　　contradiction　is　involved；　inasmuch　as　because　God's　knowledge　is　not　merely　subjective；
　　　　　that　which　God　knows　likewise　is。

　　　　　ii。　Further　still；　human　freedom　is　in　opposition　to　necessity　as　the　determinateness　of
　　　　　nature；　man　is　dependent　on　nature；　and　the　external　as　well　as　the　inward　nature　of　man　is
　　　　　his　necessity　as　against　his　freedom。

　　　　　iii。　Considered　objectively；　this　opposition　is　that　between　final　causes　and　efficient　causes；
　　　　　i。e。；　between　the　acts　of　freedom　and　the　acts　of　necessity。

　　　　　iv。　This　opposition　between　the　freedom　of　man　and　natural　necessity　has　finally　likewise
　　　　　the　further　form　of　community　of　soul　and　body；　of　commercium　animi　cum　corpore；　as　it
　　　　　has　been　called；　wherein　the　soul　appears　as　the　simple；　ideal；　and　free；　and　the　body　as　the
　　　　　manifold；　material　and　necessary。

These　matters　occupy　the　attention　of　science；　and　they　are　of　a　completely　different　nature　from
the　interests　of　ancient　philosophy。　The　difference　is　this；　that　here　there　is　a　consciousness　of　an
opposition；　which　is　certainly　likewise　contained　in　the　subjects　with　which　the　learning　of　the
ancients　was　occupied；　but　which　had　not　come　to　consciousness。　This　consciousness　of　the
opposition；　this　'Fall；'　is　the　main　point　of　interest　in　the　conception　of　the　Christian　religion。　The
bringing　about　in　thought　of　the　reconciliation　which　is　accepted　in　belief；　now　constitutes　the
whole　interest　of　knowledge。　Implicitly　it　has　come　to　pass；　for　knowledge　considers　itself
qualified　to　bring　about　in　itself　this　recognition　of　the　reconciliation。　The　philosophic　systems　are
therefore　no　more　than　modes　of　this　absolute　unity；　and　only　the　concrete　unity　of　those　opposites
is　the　truth。

3。　As　regards　the　stages　which　were　reached　in　the　progress　of　this　knowledge　we　have　to
mention　three　of　the　principal。

a。　First　of　all　we　find　the　union　of　those　opposites　stated；　and　to　prove　it　genuine　attempts　are
made；　though　not　yet　determined　in　purity。

b。　The　second　stage　is　the　metaphysical　union；　and　here；　with　Descartes；　the　philosophy　of
modern　times　as　abstract　thought　properly　speaking　begins。

　　　　　i。　Thinking　understanding　seeks　to　bring　to　pass　the　union；　inasmuch　as　it　investigates　with
　　　　　its　pure　thought…determinations；　this　is　in　the　first　place　the　standpoint　of　metaphysics　as
　　　　　such。

　　　　　ii。　In　the　second　place；　we　have　to　consider　negation；　the　destruction　of　this　metaphysics　…
　　　　　the　attempt　to　consider　knowledge　on　its　own　account；　and　the　determinations　which
　　　　　proceed　from　it。

c。　The　third　stage　is　that　this　union　itself　which　is　to　be　brought　about；　and　which　is　the　only
subject　of　interest；　comes　to　consciousness　and　becomes　an　object。　As　principle　the　union　has　the
form　of　the　relationship　of　knowledge　to　the　content；　and　thus　this　question　has　been　put：　'How　is；
and　how　can　thought　be　identical　with　the　objective？'　With　this　the　inward　element　which　lies　at　the
basis　of　this　metaphysic　is　raised　into　explicitude　and　made　an　object；　and　this　includes　all　modern
philosophy　in　its　range。

4。　In　respect　to　the　external　history　and　the　lives　of　the　philosophers；　it　will　strike　us　that　from　this
time　on；　these　appear　to　be　very　different　from　those　of　the　philosophers　of　ancient　times；　whom
we　regarded　as　self…sufficing　individualities。　It　is　required　that　a　philosopher　should　live　as　he
teaches；　that　he　should　despise　the　world　and　not　enter　into　connection　with　it；　this　the　ancients
have　accomplished；　and　they　are　such　plastic　individualities　just　because　the　inward　spiritual　aim　of
philosophy　has　likewise　frequently　determined　their　external　relations　and　conditions。　The　object　of
their　knowledge　was　to　take　a　thoughtful　view　of　the　universe；　they　kept　the　external　connection
with　the　world　all　the　further　removed　from　themselves　because　they　did　not　greatly　approve　of
much　therein　present；　or；　at　least；　it　ever　proceeds　on　its　way；　according　to　its　own　particular　laws；
on　which　the　individual　is　dependent。　The　individual　likewise　participates　in　the　present　interests　of
external　life；　in　order　to　satisfy　his　personal　ends；　and　through　them　to　attain　to　honour；　wealth；
respect；　and　distinction；　the　ancient　philosophers；　however；　because　they　remained　in　the　Idea；　did
not　concern　themselves　with　things　that　were　not　the　objects　of　their　thought。　Hence　with　the
Greeks　and　Romans　the　philosophers　lived　in　an　independent　fashion　peculiar　to　themselves；　and
in　an　external　mode　of　life　which　appeared　suitable　to　and　worthy　of　the　science　they　professed；
they　conducted　themselves　independently　as　private　persons；　unfettered　by　outside　trammels；　and
they　may　be　compared　to　the　monks　who　renounced　all　temporal　goods。

In　the　Middle　Ages　it　was　chiefly　the　clergy；　doctors　of　theology；　who　occupied　themselves　with
philosophy。　In　the　transition　period　the　philosophers　showed　themselves　to　be　in　an　inward
warfare　with　themselves　and　in　an　external　warfare　with　their　surroundings；　and　their　lives　were
spent　in　a　wild；　unsettled　fashion。

In　modern　times　things　are　very　different；　now　we　no　longer　see　philosophic　individuals　who
constitute　a　class　by　themselves。　With　the　present　day　all　difference　has　disappeared；　philosophers
are　not　monks；　for　we　find　them　generally　in　connection　with　the　world；　participating　with　others　in
some　common　work　or　calling。　They　live；　not　independently；　but　in　the　relation　of　citizens；　or　they
occupy　public　offices　and　take　part　in　the　life　of　the　state。　Certainly　they　may　be　private　persons；
but　if　so；　their　position　as　such　does　not　in　any　way　isolate　them　from　their　other　relationship。　They
are　involved　in　present　conditions；　in　the　world　and　its　work　and　progress。　Thus　their　philosophy　is
only　by　the　way；　a　sort　of　luxury　and　superfluity。　This　difference　is　really　to　be　found　in　the　manner
in　which　outward　conditions　have　taken　shape　after　the　building　up　of　the　inward　world　of　religion。
In　modern　times；　namely；　on　account　of　the　reconciliation　of　the　worldly　principle　with　itself；　the
external　world　is　at　rest；　is　brought　into　order　…　worldly　relationships；　conditions；　modes　of　life；
have　become　constituted　and　organized　in　a　manner　which　is　conformable　to　nature　and　rational。
We　see　a　universal；　comprehensible　connection；　and　with　that　individuality　likewise　attains　another
character　and　nature；　for　it　is　no　longer　the　plastic　individuality　of　the　ancients。　This　connection　is
of　such　power　that　every　individuality　is　under　its　dominion；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　can　construct
for　itself　an　inward　world。　The　external　has　thus　been　reconciled　with　itself　in　such　a　way　that　both
inward　and　outward　may　be　self…sufficing　and　remain　independent　of　one　another；　and　the
individual　is　in　the　condition　of　being　able　to　leave　his　external　side　to　external　order；　while　in　the
case　of　those　plastic　forms　the　external　could　only　be　determined　entirely　from　within。　Now；　on　the
contrary；　with　the　higher　degree　of　strength　attained　by　the　inward　side　of　the　individual；　he　may
hand　the　external　over　to　chance；　just　as　he　leaves　clothing　to　the