the six enneads-第3章

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ilosophy　of　it；　examine　with　what　Existences　it　has　touch　and　by　kinship　to　what　Existences　it　is　what　it　is。〃　　　　　Thus　the　Life　is　one　thing；　the　Act　is　another　and　the　Expiator　yet　another。　The　retreat　and　sundering；　then；　must　be　not　from　this　body　only；　but　from　every　alien　accruement。　Such　accruement　takes　place　at　birth；　or　rather　birth　is　the　coming…into…being　of　that　other　＇lower＇　phase　of　the　Soul。　For　the　meaning　of　birth　has　been　indicated　elsewhere；　it　is　brought　about　by　a　descent　of　the　Soul；　something　being　given　off　by　the　Soul　other　than　that　actually　coming　down　in　the　declension。　　　　　Then　the　Soul　has　let　this　image　fall？　And　this　declension　is　it　not　certainly　sin？　　　　　If　the　declension　is　no　more　than　the　illuminating　of　an　object　beneath；　it　constitutes　no　sin：　the　shadow　is　to　be　attributed　not　to　the　luminary　but　to　the　object　illuminated；　if　the　object　were　not　there；　the　light　could　cause　no　shadow。　　　　　And　the　Soul　is　said　to　go　down；　to　decline；　only　in　that　the　object　it　illuminates　lives　by　its　life。　And　it　lets　the　image　fall　only　if　there　be　nothing　near　to　take　it　up；　and　it　lets　it　fall；　not　as　a　thing　cut　off；　but　as　a　thing　that　ceases　to　be：　the　image　has　no　further　being　when　the　whole　Soul　is　looking　toward　the　Supreme。　　　　　The　poet；　too；　in　the　story　of　Hercules；　seems　to　give　this　image　separate　existence；　he　puts　the　shade　of　Hercules　in　the　lower　world　and　Hercules　himself　among　the　gods：　treating　the　hero　as　existing　in　the　two　realms　at　once；　he　gives　us　a　twofold　Hercules。　　　　　It　is　not　difficult　to　explain　this　distinction。　Hercules　was　a　hero　of　practical　virtue。　By　his　noble　serviceableness　he　was　worthy　to　be　a　God。　On　the　other　hand；　his　merit　was　action　and　not　the　Contemplation　which　would　place　him　unreservedly　in　the　higher　realm。　Therefore　while　he　has　place　above；　something　of　him　remains　below。　　　　　13。　And　the　principle　that　reasons　out　these　matters？　Is　it　We　or　the　Soul？　　　　　We；　but　by　the　Soul。　　　　　But　how　〃by　the　Soul〃？　Does　this　mean　that　the　Soul　reasons　by　possession　＇by　contact　with　the　matters　of　enquiry＇？　　　　　No；　by　the　fact　of　being　Soul。　Its　Act　subsists　without　movement；　or　any　movement　that　can　be　ascribed　to　it　must　be　utterly　distinct　from　all　corporal　movement　and　be　simply　the　Soul's　own　life。　　　　　And　Intellection　in　us　is　twofold：　since　the　Soul　is　intellective；　and　Intellection　is　the　highest　phase　of　life；　we　have　Intellection　both　by　the　characteristic　Act　of　our　Soul　and　by　the　Act　of　the　Intellectual…Principle　upon　us…　for　this　Intellectual…Principle　is　part　of　us　no　less　than　the　Soul；　and　towards　it　we　are　ever　rising。　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECOND　TRACTATE。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　VIRTUE。

　　　　1。　Since　Evil　is　here；　〃haunting　this　world　by　necessary　law；〃　and　it　is　the　Soul's　design　to　escape　from　Evil；　we　must　escape　hence。　　　　　But　what　is　this　escape？　　　　　〃In　attaining　Likeness　to　God；〃　we　read。　And　this　is　explained　as　〃becoming　just　and　holy；　living　by　wisdom；〃　the　entire　nature　grounded　in　Virtue。　　　　　But　does　not　Likeness　by　way　of　Virtue　imply　Likeness　to　some　being　that　has　Virtue？　To　what　Divine　Being；　then；　would　our　Likeness　be？　To　the　Being…　must　we　not　think？…　in　Which；　above　all；　such　excellence　seems　to　inhere；　that　is　to　the　Soul　of　the　Kosmos　and　to　the　Principle　ruling　within　it；　the　Principle　endowed　with　a　wisdom　most　wonderful。　What　could　be　more　fitting　than　that　we；　living　in　this　world；　should　become　Like　to　its　ruler？　　　　　But；　at　the　beginning；　we　are　met　by　the　doubt　whether　even　in　this　Divine…Being　all　the　virtues　find　place…　Moral…Balance　＇Sophrosyne＇；　for　example；　or　Fortitude　where　there　can　be　no　danger　since　nothing　is　alien；　where　there　can　be　nothing　alluring　whose　lack　could　induce　the　desire　of　possession。　　　　　If；　indeed；　that　aspiration　towards　the　Intelligible　which　is　in　our　nature　exists　also　in　this　Ruling…Power；　then　need　not　look　elsewhere　for　the　source　of　order　and　of　the　virtues　in　ourselves。　　　　　But　does　this　Power　possess　the　Virtues？　　　　　We　cannot　expect　to　find　There　what　are　called　the　Civic　Virtues；　the　Prudence　which　belongs　to　the　reasoning　faculty；　the　Fortitude　which　conducts　the　emotional　and　passionate　nature；　the　Sophrosyne　which　consists　in　a　certain　pact；　in　a　concord　between　the　passionate　faculty　and　the　reason；　or　Rectitude　which　is　the　due　application　of　all　the　other　virtues　as　each　in　turn　should　command　or　obey。　　　　　Is　Likeness；　then；　attained；　perhaps；　not　by　these　virtues　of　the　social　order　but　by　those　greater　qualities　known　by　the　same　general　name？　And　if　so　do　the　Civic　Virtues　give　us　no　help　at　all？　　　　　It　is　against　reason；　utterly　to　deny　Likeness　by　these　while　admitting　it　by　the　greater：　tradition　at　least　recognizes　certain　men　of　the　civic　excellence　as　divine；　and　we　must　believe　that　these　too　had　in　some　sort　attained　Likeness：　on　both　levels　there　is　virtue　for　us；　though　not　the　same　virtue。　　　　　Now；　if　it　be　admitted　that　Likeness　is　possible；　though　by　a　varying　use　of　different　virtues　and　though　the　civic　virtues　do　not　suffice；　there　is　no　reason　why　we　should　not；　by　virtues　peculiar　to　our　state；　attain　Likeness　to　a　model　in　which　virtue　has　no　place。　　　　　But　is　that　conceivable？　　　　　When　warmth　comes　in　to　make　anything　warm；　must　there　needs　be　something　to　warm　the　source　of　the　warmth？　　　　　If　a　fire　is　to　warm　something　else；　must　there　be　a　fire　to　warm　that　fire？　　　　　Against　the　first　illustration　it　may　be　retorted　that　the　source　of　the　warmth　does　already　contain　warmth；　not　by　an　infusion　but　as　an　essential　phase　of　its　nature；　so　that；　if　the　analogy　is　to　hold；　the　argument　would　make　Virtue　something　communicated　to　the　Soul　but　an　essential　constituent　of　the　Principle　from　which　the　Soul　attaining　Likeness　absorbs　it。　　　　　Against　the　illustration　drawn　from　the　fire；　it　may　be　urged　that　the　analogy　would　make　that　Principle　identical　with　virtue；　whereas　we　hold　it　to　be　something　higher。　　　　　The　objection　would　be　valid　if　what　the　soul　takes　in　were　one　and　the　same　with　the　source；　but　in　fact　virtue　is　one　thing；　the　source　of　virtue　quite　another。　The　material　house　is　not　identical　with　the　house　conceived　in　the　intellect；　and　yet　stands　in　its　likeness：　the　material　house　has　distribution　and　order　while　the　pure　idea　is　not　constituted　by　any　such　elements；　distribution；　order；　symmetry　are　not　parts　of　an　idea。　　　　　So　with　us：　it　is　from　the　Supreme　that　we　derive　order　and　distribution　and　harmony；　which　are　virtues　in　this　sphere：　the　Existences　There；　having　no　need　of　harmony；　order　or　distribution；　have　nothing　to　do　with　virtue；　and；　none　the　less；　it　is　by　our　possession　of　virtue　that　we　become　like　to　Them。　　　　　Thus　much　to　show　that　the　principle　that　we　attain　Likeness　by　virtue　in　no　way　involves　the　existence　of　virtue　in　the　Supreme。　But　we　have　not　merely　to　make　a　formal　demonstration：　we　must　persuade　as　well　as　demonstrate。　　　　　2。　First；　then；　let　us　examine　those　good　qualities　by　which　we　hold　Likeness　comes；　and　seek　to　establish　what　is　this　thing　which；　as　we　possess　it；　in　transcription；　is　virtue　but　as　the　Supreme　possesses　it；　is　in　the　nature　of　an　exemplar　or　archetype　and　is　not　virtue。　　　　　We　must　first　distinguish　two　modes　of　Likeness。　　　　　There　is　the　likeness　demanding　an　identical　nature　in　the　objects　which；　further；　must　draw　their　likeness　from　a　common　principle：　and　there　is　the　case　in　which　B　resembles　A；　but　A　is　a　Primal；　not　concerned　about　B　and　not　said　to　resemble　B。　In　this　second　case；　likeness　is　understood　in　a　distinct　sense：　we　no　longer　look　for　identity　of　nature；　but；　on　the　contrary；　for　divergence　since　the　likeness　has　come　about　by　the　mode　of　difference。　　　　　What；　then；　precisely　is　Virtue；　collectively　and　in　the　particular？　The　clearer　method　will　be　to　begin　with　the　particular；　for　so　the　common　element　by　which　all　the　forms　hold　the　general　name　will　readily　appear。　　　　　The　Civic　Virtues；　on　which　we　have　touched　above；　are　a　principle　or　order　and　beauty　in　us　as　long　as　we　remain　passing　our　life　here：　they　ennoble　us　by　setting　bound　and　measure　to　our　desires　and　to　our　entire　sensibility；　and　dispelling　false　judgement…　and　this　by　sheer　efficacy　of　the　better；　by　the　very　setting　of　the　bounds；　by　the　fact　that　the　measured　is　lifted　outside　of　the　sphere　of　the　unmeasured　and　lawless。　　　　　And；　further；　these　Civic　Virtues…　measured　and　ordered　themselves　and　acting　as　a　principle　of　measure　to　the　Soul　which　is　as　Matter　to　their　forming…　are　like　to　the　measure　reigning　in　the　over…world；　and　they　carry　a　trace　of　that　Highest　Good　in　the　Supreme；　for；　while　utter　measurelessness　is　brute　Matter　and　wholly　outside　of　Likeness；　any　participation　in　Ideal…Form　produces　some　corresponding　degree　of　Likeness　to　the　formless　Being　There。　And　participation　goes　by　nearness：　the　Soul　nearer　than　the　body；　therefore　closer　akin；　participates　more　fully　and　shows　a　godlike　presence；　almost　cheating　us　into　the　delusion　that　in　the　Soul　we　see　God　entire。　　　　　This　is　the　way　in　which　men　of　the　Civic　Virtues　attain　Likeness。　　　　　3。　We　come　now　to　that　other　mode　of　Likeness　which；　we　read；　is　the　fruit　of　the　loftier　virtues：　discussing　this　we　shall　penetrate　more　deeply　into　the　essence　of　the　Civic　Virtue　and　be　able　to　define　the　nature　of　the　higher　kind　whose　existence　we　shall　establish　beyond　doubt。　　　　　To　Plato；　unmistakably；　there　are　two　distinct　orders　of　virtue；　and　the　civic　does　not　suffice　for　Likeness：　〃Likeness　to　God；〃　he　says；　〃is　a　flight　from　this　world's　ways　and　things〃：　in　dealing　with　the　qualities　of　good　citizenship　he　does　not　use　the　simple　term　Virtue　but　adds　the　distinguishing　word　civic：　and　elsewhere　he　declares　all　the　virtues　without　exception　to　be　purifications。　　　　　But　in　what　sense　can　we　call　the　virtues　purifications；　and　how　does　purification　issue　in　Likeness？　　　　　As　the　Soul　is　evil　by　being　interfused　with　the　body；　and　by　coming　to　share　the　body's　states　and　to　think　the　body's　thoughts；　so　it　would　be　good；　it　would　be　possessed　of　virtue；　if　it　threw　off　the　body's　moods　and　devoted　itself　to　its　own　Act…　the　state　of　Intellection　and　Wisdom…　never　allowed　the　passions　of　the　body　to　affect　it…　the　virtue　of　Sophrosyne…　knew　no　fear　at　the　parting　from　the　body…　the　virtue　of　Fortitude…　and　if　reason　and　the　Intellectual…Principle　ruled…　in　which　state　is　Righteousness。　Such　a　disposition　in　the　Soul；　become　thus　intellective　and　immune　to　passion；　it　would　not　be　wrong　to　call　Likeness　to　God；　for　the　Divine；　too；　is　pure　and　the　Divine…Act　is　such　that　Likeness　to　it　is　Wisdom。　　　　　But　would　not　this　make　virtue　a　state　of　the　Divine　also？　　　　　No：　the　Divine　has　no　states；　the　state　is　in　the　Soul。　The　Act　of　Intellection　in　the　Soul　is　not　the　same　as　in　the　Divine：　of　things　in　the　Supreme；　Soul　grasps　some　after　a　mode　of　its　own；　some　not　at　all。　　　　　Then　yet　again；　the　one　word　Intellection　covers　two　distinct　Acts？　　　　　Rather　there　is　primal　Intellection　and　there　is　Intellection　deriving　from　the　Primal　and　of　other　scope。　　　　　As　speech　is　the　echo　of　the　thought　in　the　Soul；　so　thought　in　the　Soul　is　an　echo　from　elsewhere：　that　is　to　say；　as　the　uttered　thought　is　an　image　of　the　soul…thought；　so　the